

**INSTITUTES, SCHOLARS, AND TRANSNATIONAL DYNAMICS:
A DISCIPLINARY HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
IN GERMANY AND FRANCE**

by

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DEDICATION

To my mother, Dorotea Kuru (Paver) and my father Avni Kuru, for all their love.

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This dissertation is a realization of my long-time wish to study the developmental trajectory of the International Relations (IR) discipline in non-American contexts. When I was admitted to USC's doctoral program, I was lucky to have a short conversation with Prof. Hayward Alker, and looked forward to working with him on my research topic: difference and plurality as inherent features of IR. His sudden death in the summer of 2007 was a source of great sadness. It was in these difficult times that Prof. Ann Tickner showed her kindness and agreed to become my advisor. Her constant support to me meant that I could continue to focus on my initial interests in my research. When working with a professor who has such a distinct position in our discipline, one could expect to face difficulties with regard to time, commitment, and accessibility. However, Prof. Tickner never made me feel that she was a leading name in the ISA, a committed feminist scholar who was engaged in various research and book projects. Whenever I needed her advise or help, she was there. I want to share my limitless gratitude. Prof. Robert English was my second committee member. His intellectual breadth helped me to make this dissertation better. At the same time, he was kind to speak with me Croatian when I wanted to talk in my mother tongue. Prof. Paul Lerner was my third committee member. One of the best courses I took at USC was his seminar on 20th century European history that showed me history's broader frames which go beyond the politico-diplomatical. I am indebted to all my committee members for having made my dissertation a better study.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation aims to analyze the developmental trajectories of the International Relations (IR) discipline by going beyond the usual narratives that focus only on the American (and to a lesser extent the British) IR community. While explaining the role of scholars and institutes in establishing IR as an academic discipline in (West) Germany and France, the impact of transnational dynamics plays an important role. The most important actors that lie at the origins of transnationality are American foundations, the American government and military officials, German and French scholars with US educational backgrounds, refugee-scholars who returned to Europe or stayed in the US (both in the 19th and 20th centuries), German and French political decision-makers, their academic communities and national university structures, and international scholarly organizations. I show how the combined impact of these forces paved the way for the establishment of a hybrid IR in these two continental European countries.

In order to clarify the conditions that marked IR's different trajectories, I highlight the International Studies Conference (ISC), an interwar international association that brought together scholars who were interested in the study of the international. By covering both the interwar years and providing an analysis of the post-1945 pathways of the discipline in Europe, the dissertation expands the temporal and the geographic scope of IR's disciplinary historiography. I analyze the role of Arnold Bergstraesser and the *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik* (DHfP) in the German case, and of Pierre Renouvin and

Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, as well as Sciences Po Paris, in the French case because these scholarly and institutional actors made the most important contributions to IR's development in these countries. The dissertation shows how IR is a discipline whose past cannot be explained merely in terms of its American development. Understanding IR's different trajectories in Europe helps to gain a better understanding of its present plurality that is being shaped by a less Western-centric world.

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Does the discipline of International Relations (IR)¹ have a single history? Stated differently, can one provide a history of this discipline by focusing only on its American, or perhaps on its Anglo-American trajectory?² The present study starts from a position that questions this broadly accepted understanding as a way of dealing with IR's disciplinary history.³ By presenting an alternative approach which shifts the focus to a continental European perspective, I aim to pave the way for overcoming the dominant self-perception prevailing among members of its scholarly community that sees IR's historical narrative more or less as consisting of one American (or Anglo-American) disciplinary trajectory.⁴ My research shows that there are multiple histories of IR's development and that the establishment of European IR studies was a result of transnational dynamics that brought together scholarly and governmental agents as well as academic institutions from both sides of the Atlantic.

Throughout the following chapters, I will present a disciplinary history of IR in terms of its development in continental Europe. In this context, I will first shift the focus to a

1 When talking about International Relations as a discipline, in the sense of an academic enterprise, I will use the shorter version of "IR." Even the fact that German or French scholars tend to use much less frequently the shorter version of "IB" (from *Internationale Beziehungen*) or "RI" (from *Relations Internationales*) in their languages can be interpreted as a sign of discipline's much more settled status in the American and British scholarly communities.

2 For most definitive studies dealing with IR's disciplinary history see Schmidt, 1998, Dunne, 1998, Guilhot, 2010. Their common point is a focus on the American or British IR, without coverage of other disciplinary trajectories in the 20th century.

3 For an early example of rejecting a single American IR-based narrative of IR's disciplinary history see Gareau, 1981.

4 While I note the problematic way in which the adjective "American" is used, for purposes of clarity, I will still refer to US-American IR as American IR, or as US IR.

much ignored aspect of IR in the interwar (post-1918) and early post-Second World War period, the International Studies Conference (ISC) that brought together scholars from around the globe, but where a dominance of European institutions and scholars was visible. The ISC was the first institute to create a forum for scholars interested in world politics. After the analysis of this important international organ through its structure and scientific conferences, I will turn to two continental European countries: Germany and France. In this regard, I will look into the developmental trajectory of IR in these two cases, starting, in a more detailed way, with the interwar period. Special attention will be paid to the post-World War II era in which one notes the convergence of multiple factors in giving the discipline a decisive form in its German and French versions.⁵

When analyzing the forces shaping the formation of the study of world politics, I will deal with a multiplicity of actors, while basing the general framework on two important dimensions. These are *institutions* and *individuals*, with the former referring to major scholarly establishments that played a significant role in the creation and advancement of IR studies in Germany and France: *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik* (DHfP, German School of Politics) in Berlin with its interwar existence and post-Second World War re-founding, and Sciences Po in its *Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques* version (ELSP, Free School of Political Sciences) as well as its post-1945 transformation into *Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris* (IEP Paris)⁶ and *Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques* (National Foundation of Political Sciences). These institutions deserve a special attention in order

⁵ All the translations from German and French into English are mine.

⁶ Both the pre-1945 ELSP and the post-1945 IEP Paris are known and referred to as Sciences Po. Therefore, when I use the name Sciences Po it can refer to either or both of these periods.

to understand the framework upon which newly emerging disciplines of IR, and more broadly political science, were built. The cadres and decisions of these schools paved the way for generations of students more knowledgeable about international politics. For many, the history of US IR is the only history available, thus creating a distorted picture of IR's reality.

The second dimension, *individuals*, covers the formative role of certain *scholarly agents*. This refers to certain prominent scholars' capacity to act as agents who managed to affect the broader frames of their disciplinary community, both in institutional terms by contributing to IR's establishment, and also in the direct sense of academic-scholarly positions they develop in IR studies. Hence, scholarly-agential aspects have to be understood in this context of individual professors' roles as actors shaping, and being shaped by the larger transnational dynamics. My analysis covers the role and contributions of Arnold Bergstraesser in the case of Germany and turns to Pierre Renouvin, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, and in a more questioning way to Raymond Aron in the French case. The contributions of these professors to the discipline had a dual feature. First, they were positioned at significant intersections of the academic world, connecting their areas of study to outside actors. Such positions enabled them to bring in actors interested in supporting the further development of the discipline or to defend the still weakly advanced area of world political studies against competitors.

The actors to be dealt with include not only state educational organs, but also American foundations helping the advancement of social sciences, and American officials

directly interacting with their local counterparts (in the specific case of post-1945 West Germany). Furthermore, representatives from within the university system, coming from other academic disciplines such as law, history, or sociology, have to be made a part of analysis as these presented heavy opposition to IR's independent development. The second contribution of early IR specialists came through their conceptual and sometimes theoretical work which provided initial inputs for the newly emerging discipline.

With this disciplinary history, I want to highlight the plurality that exists within the discipline. This will not be done by an extensive analysis of the theoretical dimensions that emerged from within the German or French IR scholarship but more by underlining the contingencies that shaped the developmental trajectory of IR's establishment as a separate area of study in this continental European context. While referring to the influence of American and sometimes British dynamics that played an important role in shaping the features of German and French IR, I will also demonstrate that there has not been a standardization of the discipline in the sense of all other national IR communities carrying the stamp of American IR scholarship. To the contrary, the emerging discipline was marked both by the weight of national politico-historical legacies and the influence of transnational dynamics.

The development of IR in Germany and France reflects, on the one hand, the specific legacies of these two countries' domestic and world political paths. Politico-historical as well as socio-cultural events specific to their national contexts have marked the way IR emerged in these two countries. At the same time, the trajectory is one that shows the

effects of various foreign and domestic actors whose actions resulted in the emergence of IR as an area of academic study and research that did not meet the original expectations carried by these players. This means that the rather unexpected combination of domestic traditions and foreign influences generated a new kind of IR whose features point to a non-American disciplinary structure. Through the two detailed case studies of German and French IR scholarship, I will demonstrate what one could call the contingent developmental trajectories of disciplinary development, shaped by the dynamics of transnational forces that generated a hybrid disciplinary structure. Such a picture enables us to speak of a veritable plurality of and in IR, as the discipline's much emphasized American character becomes just one of its broad features, but not its main one.

American IR's positivism and theory-focused approaches are not found to the same extent in the German and French cases, and IR scholars only rarely become policy advisers in these cases.

Analyzing in a detailed manner the pathways of German and French IR, as well interwar IR's disciplinary organization, namely the ISC, makes it possible to understand that the mid- and late 20th century emphasis on IR as an “American social science”⁷ is one that has only served to narrow our scholarly understanding of world political studies. Instead of providing a framework of analysis that explains the current shape of IR's global structure, the singular focus on its American trajectory has created a false image

⁷ For the most famous (but as will become clear in this study not earliest) exploration on IR's specifically American features see Hoffmann, 1977.

that is far from reflecting the different pathways of the discipline around the world, hindering us from perceiving the discipline in all its diversity and plurality.

The main goal of this study is to pluralize the disciplinary history of International Relations by carrying it beyond a mere textual analysis of US theoretical developments, and analyzing key continental European institutional and scholarly pathways. In so doing it provides the first Europe-focused study that examines the developmental trajectory of IR in such a broad temporal framework, with its focus being in the middle third of the 20th century (1930s-1970s). It does this by considering simultaneously two important continental European countries and their IR communities. In the remainder of this introduction, I turn to the general framework that lies behind this reasoning in order to provide the broader context that makes it not only useful but also necessary to undertake this research. The later sections build on these explanations and deal with the methodological aspects as well as the reasons for choosing Germany and France as my cases. Lastly, the structure of the study is presented, and the nature and key findings of its chapters explained.

I.1. A Turn to Revisionism: A Broader Disciplinary History for IR

That there has been a significant increase in the number of studies dealing with IR's history, providing new interpretations of the way it developed, seems to be shared by many scholars.⁸ This new wave of disciplinary history has been quite broad in its interests, ranging from analyses looking at the late 19th century US studies of world

8 Bell, 2001; Holden, 2002.

politics to the questionable nature of the supposed debate between the idealists and realists of the interwar years, from the moral aspects of Morgenthau's understanding of world politics to the impact of political developments on the very processes of scholarly theorizing.⁹ I start from these new revisionist approaches, but advance them by focusing on the rather neglected aspect of IR's European trajectories.

The starting point is marked by the fact that the non-US developmental pathways of the discipline have not been much emphasized. It is only a recent feature of the discipline's turn towards more self-reflexivity that IR's European, and in fact even more intensively its non-Western dimensions, have become points of interest for scholarly analyses. A recent volume edited by Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver testifies to this more inclusive look at IR as a discipline.¹⁰ By using the concept of geocultural epistemologies Tickner and Wæver have managed to present a solid alternative to a usual US-centric understanding of IR. Other works that more closely deal with the Asian approaches to IR¹¹ further testify to the growing uneasiness felt about the rather narrow limits of an American IR that has become for many the *only* IR that in fact exists. In this study, I want to challenge that assumption while still remaining in the context of the Western approaches to IR. By focusing on the way the discipline developed in Germany and France, it will be possible both to underline the plurality that exists in IR as well as the contingent forces that gave birth to varying developmental trajectories, which prevented a

9 Osiander, 1998; Bain, 2000; Thies, 2002a; Schmidt, 2002; Quirk and Vigneswaran, 2005; Ashwort, 2006; Scheuerman, 2008; Kuklick, 2006; Parmar, 2002.

10 Tickner and Wæver, 2009.

11 Acharya and Buzan, 2010.

monotype emergence of modern IR. Emphasizing the transnational dynamics that shaped the emergence and development of IR in continental Europe, I offer a broader framework for appreciating IR's rich disciplinary history.

The focus on IR in the context of continental Europe also serves as a useful counterweight to the dominant Anglo-American aspects of the discipline. As Miles Kahler has written in his analysis of IR's history, the decline of the old Western powers' global significance “reinforced postwar [post-1945] austerity in assigning low priority to the new field” of IR, a weakness only furthered by the relatively undeveloped nature of social sciences in European universities. Even when it comes to the later decades of the 20th century, Kahler sees a general progress in the discipline's European position that still lacks sufficient theoretical advance. According to him, the “removal of responsibility” from the “old continent” to the two peripheral superpowers could explain Europeans' lesser demand for theory.¹² These points are highly relevant, as they provide this study with a useful basis. It will not be limited to the exploration of theoretical developments in order to consider the generation of an IR discipline with its institutes and scholars. It is important to stress that the forms and approaches of these units were shaped not only by national socio-cultural divergences but also by influences of transnational dynamics.

It is also important to note the trans-Atlantic character IR took on, especially in the second half of the 20th century. As Kahler correctly states, “[w]hat had been in Europe a collection of guides to statecraft melded to the 'science' of geopolitics had become a

¹² Kahler, 1993: 400-403.

respectable academic discipline” in the US.¹³ The role of German-Jewish emigrants, and other scholars who had to flee from the Nazi occupation, is of utmost importance in US IR's developmental history. As Ned Lebow makes clear in his analysis of realist IR's advances in American scholarship, it was these refugee scholars who provided a very rich amalgam of worldviews that created a certain synthesis of continental European philosophies with the contemporary character of the US world political position.¹⁴ Such an engagement also meant that these emigrants had to change their earlier disciplinary interests, with dozens of them becoming IR scholars in their US emigration years, co-developing a discipline in which they were prominent new comers.¹⁵ These conditions make it important to turn one's attention more carefully to IR's developmental pathways in interwar and post-Second World War continental Europe, also providing explanations on American IR's own developmental trajectory.

Furthermore, a focus on the two continental European communities, those in Germany and France, can help us to broaden the discipline's cognitive tools in general. Hence the emerging picture can, by opening space for different epistemic communities, pave the way for an analysis of world politics that is enriched by other means of doing IR beyond the confines of an Anglo-American dominance that has stood since the discipline's foundational years. However, by still remaining tied to a Western-centered approach, this study automatically narrows its focus to Europe. Such an approach is

13 Kahler, 1993: 405.

14 Lebow, 2011.

15 See on this transformation of German-Jewish emigrants, leading their paths from international law toward IR, Söllner, 1988, especially p. 165.

useful not only in order to analyze interactions within the Western IR scholarly community, but also because of the rather limited nature of non-Western IR until the late 20th century. Similarly, this choice includes another difficulty with regard to the possible overlaps between German and French IR on the one hand, and the disciplinary godfather, the US IR community. Thus, I will not only underline differences and divergences but also emphasize the intermittent convergences that are a result of the latter community's dominance. As an important part of these processes, the role US philanthropic foundations played in continental Europe will be elaborated in order to understand how a “standardization” of IR was undertaken not only in the colonial world but also among the Western countries.

One of the aims of this disciplinary history is to challenge the widespread impact of myths in IR. By shifting the perspective to two continental European cases, it becomes possible to witness the rather different pathways of the discipline that lead us to question the standard explanations emanating from the US context.¹⁶ As Marten Valbjørn has stated, such approaches have created “an idealized version of the past where attention is diverted from the actual academic practices and individuals who have contributed to the development and current identity of the field.”¹⁷ It is for this reason that a shift to

¹⁶ These explanations focus on the supposed “great debates” between idealists and realists, traditionalists and behavioralists, neorealists and neoliberals. The main scholars whose works are cited as the main axes of these debates are all American (including a few British). This means not only that IR's disciplinary history is reduced to a few waves of “confrontations.” Such an approach also neglects the non-American developmental trajectories the existence of which cannot be rejected by any serious analysis. It is for this reason that I turn to continental European context, as it is an early example of IR's different past, one in which such debates were not at all the decisive points (even if taking the debates' relevance for American IR as something serious).

¹⁷ Valbjørn, 2008: 72.

continental European cases, and to a special focus on the scholarly-institutional frames, can present an alternative means of understanding IR's development in non-US contexts. Furthermore, such an approach can challenge the assumptions regarding the “culture-neutral theories of world politics.” In this sense, it becomes possible to suggest that a meta-study of the discipline can simultaneously serve “as a re-mapping of the cognitive status of a changing discipline.”¹⁸

One possible explanation for the IR community's overlooking, if not ignoring, the discipline's earlier history can be located in the post-World War II scholars' tendency to see in their own contributions a major factor for IR's development. Many members of post-1945 IR were new to the discipline, witnessing its rise in the aftermath of the Second World War, especially in the US which was the new superpower of the era. It was with regard to these conditions that John Herz was able to assert many years later that there was no pre-World War II IR (in Germany). However, while he was actively following Hans Kelsen's studies on international law in those interwar years , a direct engagement with the work of ISC and its conferences does not seem to have existed, and similarly no connection with German professors dealing with world political issues is visible.¹⁹ The present study aims to overcome these perceptions by illuminating important institutional and scholarly activities that demonstrate the existence of world politics as a subject of study, even if of a more limited capacity, in the interwar years. Thus, it is helpful to understand that the usual protests against the discipline's presentism have to be thought of

18 Valbjørn, 2008: 59, 56.

19 See Herz, 1986: *passim*.

within the framework of scholars who came to IR from other disciplines. Many contributors to the early post-1945 scholarship lacked direct connections to its interwar development due to their newness and their consequent ignorance of earlier trends.

I.2. Beyond Categorical Separations: Transnational Perspectives

When looking at certain factors that have (had) an impact on the emergence and development of the discipline of International Relations, and which are usually perceived as internally coherent and distinct factors, one approach would be to divide these as science-internal vs. science-external as well as domestic vs. international.²⁰ This means that one would divide different factors according to their features. On the one hand, there would be factors that are supposedly purely connected to the scientific sphere. On the other hand, factors with non-scientific features that are tied to political or societal spheres would build a separate category. Similar divisions would be established between factors whose essential features are said to lie in the domestic level and factors whose origins are assumed to be in the international dimension.

However, the cases I discuss in this study point to a different situation, one in which these analytical frames lose their initial separateness. How could one, otherwise, try to explain the role played by US philanthropies or by German-Jewish scholars who returned to a post-war West Germany, or clarify the position of Sciences Po scholars looking to American practices while making use of US foundational support and still keeping their French scholarly traditions to a large extent unchanged? These developments, which one

²⁰ For such an approach see Breitenbauch, 2008.

cannot analyze via an exclusively national perspective, point to the contingent pathways of the IR discipline, one that was shaped by these transnational dynamics rather than direct implementation of US models or the legacies of national academic structures and traditions alone. In this section, therefore, it is important to explain the perspective I employ in the present study: *transnationality*.

The picture that emerges from the phenomena described above testifies to the existence of transnational dynamics. The perspective of transnationality provides a framework that goes beyond a nation-bounded analytical dimension even when analyzing the nation-level development of a discipline. However, this same perspective should also be understood as contributing to an approach that questions the specificities of a mainstream idea of science. In many instances, science is juxtaposed to politics and thus assumed to present a hermetically sealed dimension. Such propositions are also visible in more critical studies that use matrices, which demonstrate the nature of many scholars' inherent assumptions about a clear separation between science and non-scientific elements like politics or society.²¹ My analysis, on the other hand, derives from an alternative viewpoint that takes the interwovenness of science with politics as an important part of the former's actual development. This means that many of the factors in the origins of a discipline and its consequent development are themselves instances of political intervention or societal influence.

When advancing the dimension of transnational forces, a more detailed explanation becomes necessary. According to a framework suggested by Johan Heilbron and his

²¹ For a recent example of that see Breitenbauch, 2008.

colleagues Nicolas Guilhot and Laurent Jeanpierre, transnational dynamics can function in three ways. The first one pertains to the international scholarly institutions, while a second impact can result from the mobility of scholars on a global level. Their last point is also highly relevant, as it looks at non-academic institutions in the context of their role in transnational exchange.²² Thus, the three points refer, respectively, to the establishment of international associations that brought scholars and interested people together and worked for the organization of regular conferences that went beyond a national character, whereas the other two areas refer to the influence of scholarly mobility, and international exchange, for broadening one's worldview and academic outlook.

These points provide a useful toolkit when turning to the developmental trajectories of European IR. In chapter III, I focus directly on the role of ISC, the international organization for IR scholars of the early 20th century, and US foundations in general, so that a framework can be presented upon which to build the developmental history of IR studies in Germany and France. In line with my emphasis on transnational dynamics, it becomes possible to explain all three dimensions also highlighted by Heilbron and his colleagues, when I turn in the case studies to a detailed analysis of the impact of transnational forces. This includes also the way German and French scholars as well as their American counterparts made use of their mutual (study and research) visits in order to shape the newly emerging discipline of IR (and on a more general level political science), which resulted in a contingent outcome not in line with American or continental European trajectories, but providing a new hybrid disciplinary structure.

²² Heilbron et al., 2008.

Under these conditions, it is important to perceive transnationality as more than a one-way street. The above examples serve as instances of this multi-path nature of scientific-political interconnections that produces an alternative understanding of science. In this light, science emerges as something that is no longer to be analyzed as a separated domain of research. Clear distinctions between science and non-science, the domestic and the international lose their assumed clarity as well as the explanatory functions they were expected to carry as analytical categories. What should be the exact category for the returning scholars, many of whom have become more at home in American political science, or for foundations that are distinct entities with international activities, notwithstanding certain ties to US government policies? As will be seen in the discussion of US philanthropies, they have positioned themselves into distinct spaces so that they could be seen as both part of the establishment and as alternatives to dominant isolationist US foreign policy ideas of the interwar period. While they pointed to the possibility of more internationalist approaches at home, many of their policies for developing social sciences were actual reflections of an American way of doing science. Therefore, propagating further research and study in political science, even if of an implicit nature, was simultaneously a quest to broaden the impact of American values and ideas of science. However, due to their nature as non-governmental organizations focusing on scientific undertakings, a strict categorization with its science vs. non-science and domestic vs. international groupings fails to provide us with concrete possibilities of locating the foundations in such hermetic matrices.

For this reason, it is necessary to go beyond these problematic distinctions that reify certain perspectives, thereby decreasing our possibilities for gaining broader analytical insights. In the case of a US foundation and the policies it carries, one sees the actual merger of scientific expectations and political and social goals that are at the roots of their activities. A transnational perspective that goes both beyond and beneath the national as well as the international can overcome boundaries between the scientific and the political, and provide therefore a more helpful means for dealing with the general picture. A more comprehensive analysis is the result, which includes aspects that would be left out of analysis in a study that approaches the issue from a perspective that is based on these categorical divisions between the national and the international as well as the scientific and the political. At the same time, this approach enables us to reject claims of path-dependency. The weight of transnational scientific cooperation, with its long history discussed earlier, as well as the importance of socio-political developments point to the role of contingent factors that cannot be easily foreseen and the impact of which only becomes visible in their aftermath.²³

In this regard, no categorical statements should be made about certain factors' predominance in shaping a discipline. In the (West) German case, it is possible to assert that the newly established political science, and specifically IR, took shape under

²³ For an example from the history discipline see Peter Novick's book *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) in which he analyzes the problematic ways in which German historiography debates were carried to the American profession, with mistranslations leading to important conceptual misunderstandings in American understandings of German historians. On this aspect of problematic knowledge transfers and modifications across different cultural settings see also Bourdieu, 2002.

conditions not of their choosing. Focusing on the role of US military government's educational policies would be a consequence of such an assumption. However, this would under-emphasize the role played by German politicians and scientists (including both the returning and visiting emigrants, as well as the ones who spent the war years in Germany in a largely isolated way) and the quite long history of German pre-World War II and pre-1933 studies in politics and international affairs. It is only by taking a broader approach that we could bring these various dynamics together whereby it becomes possible to understand the formative impact of transnational factors and to question assumptions of sealed-off scientific undertakings.

A significant aspect of IR's features that stands in the way of a global IR – but one that paves the way for the long-term existence of a plurality of IRs – is the fact that as a social science it not only is open to global influences but also determined by national scholarly frames. As Gerard Holden stated at one point, it is important “to incorporate the fact that IR's various intellectual communities are themselves manifestations of the cultures and contexts in which they exist and develop over time.”²⁴ However, by pointing to the transnational dynamics that disabled a one-way full implementation of earlier national university structures and scholarly practices, I aim to demonstrate that the consequent development of IR (and more generally, political science) in the 20th century German and French contexts was an example of hybridization. National and foreign forces, and their joint impact in a transnational form, modified the developmental trajectories of the IR discipline in its long journey in 20th century continental Europe.

24 Holden, 2001: 29.

While the actual result was not always a totally independent IR discipline, there emerged still a notable community of scholars whose distinct positions were a reflection of these broader dynamics.

I.3. Disciplinary Structures, Disciplinary Traditions

As I will use transnational dynamics as one of the major connecting points for forces shaping the development of the International Relations discipline in Germany and France, it is important to understand the way disciplines emerged on a level that was not tied merely to the national dimension. My usage of International Relations is based on an understanding of it as a separate discipline, which in many instances, however, ends up as one subdiscipline of political science as a consequence of institutional and scholarly constraints and practices. In this regard, I focus in this section on how these disciplinary processes of change were marked by national and international actors. It is as a consequence of these that IR has reached its modern version as a more political scientific approach of studying the international domain.

According to Johan Heilbron, an important scholar in the history of social sciences, the aspect of national traditions has been much ignored when one deals with social sciences as a subject of study. While some of this ignorance can be explained by many scholars' wish to detach social sciences from “nationalist politicization” (like Schumpeter's attack in early 1930s against the idea of national schools), for Heilbron these sciences were in fact influenced from early on by their national context. It is clear

that earlier forms of the social and political sciences were developed as “sciences of government” since the era of Renaissance, providing concomitantly the newly emerging nation-states with useful support. In the French case, for instance, the very concept of “*science sociale*” was proposed by names like Sieyès and Condorcet, themselves active within the political realm, pointing to the close connections between science and the state.²⁵

In this context, it was not surprising that newly developing disciplines would be associated with their national location. It was Emile Durkheim himself who saw in sociology a “French science” that would be in the service of the Third Republic. The significant role played by organizations that brought together people interested in the new social sciences became visible when the French established in 1832 the *Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques* (ASMP) that included members in good connection with the establishment, supporting the cause of liberalism. Thus was born a “semi-official social science.” In the case of their Western neighbor, the British created the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science in 1857. This was similarly following a reformist liberal line. Later associations founded in the US (American Social Science Association in 1867) and in the unified Germany (*Verein für Socialpolitik* in 1873) imitated the British model, not the academy structure found in France.²⁶

As Robert Adcock and Mark Bevir have claimed in another context, political science's history is “one of the contingent transnational exchanges in which ideas are

25 Heilbron, 2008: 3-5.

26 Heilbron, 2008: 6-7.

appropriated, modified, and transformed.”²⁷ While their focus is more upon ideas, the preceding discussion shows that institutional developments can have similar transnational dynamics that influence their future shape. In the specific case of political science, it is possible to underline US leadership, with its flagship association, the American Political Science Association (APSA) founded in 1903, and its journal the *American Political Science Review* (APSR) launched in 1906. In this frame, the two authors are able to assert that “the existence of an autonomous discipline of political science was a North American anomaly” for a long time. In their analysis, the later institutionalization of the discipline in Europe was “a process of Americanization.” However, they are quick to add that “the intellectual trajectories were different,” pointing to the varying outcomes of actual institutions in Europe.²⁸ This is an important statement because it makes clear that continental developments were not indeed mere imitations of prevailing American structures. This aspect will be underlined in the specific cases of German and French IR with regard to the contingent dynamics that arose during the processes of IR's establishment as a separate discipline within their respective social science communities.

A discipline is foremost “the primary frame of reference in scholarship and science.” As a consequence, it is understandable that the disciplines have the function of “form[ing] the institutional regime which has come to dominate modern systems of

27 Adcock and Bevir, 2010: 71. At one point, one could interpret this as an instance of Anglo-American entrepreneurial skills facing French state intervention. However, when it comes to the development of social sciences, the ELSP case, which I analyze in detail in chapter V, showed that private initiatives played an important role in France, too.

28 Adcock and Bevir, 2010: 72-73.

higher learning.”²⁹ This means that disciplines are the actual centers of academic institutionalization, with each new discipline's gradual empowerment that leads to its separate department within the university structure. However, this disciplinary independence is not a result of linear processes. As I demonstrate in the case studies of the German and French IR disciplines, Heilbron's assumption about “the formation and functioning of disciplines as being embedded in historically changing structures of academic power relations” carries much weight. If, following him, one defines a discipline as “a domain of knowledge with a certain degree of specialization and definite forms of control over the production and diffusion of knowledge,” and if modern disciplines are about “organiz[ing] teaching, research, and professional organization within the same kind of institutional unit,” then it becomes useful to take a shorter path back to IR's origins.³⁰ It was only with the early 20th century that institutionalized courses were offered and its textbooks came into being. Hence, IR becomes indeed a science of late modernity, being born in the 20th century.

A separate existence for the discipline can only be defended when separate university departments (or at least departments of “politics/political science and IR”) do exist. While the UK with its chairs and then departments of IR has been prominent in the post-First World War period, the US was successful in establishing a great number of courses throughout the country that dealt with IR. Extending the case to non-US IR would mean, on the other hand, a narrower temporal frame that goes back in the continental European

29 Heilbron, 2004a: 23.

30 Heilbron, 2004a: 24, 26.

cases only to the mid-20th century, with a much less developed status in the interwar years. Therefore, understanding a discipline as a structure of processes dealing with scientific knowledge provides a useful means for choosing the early and mid-20th century as a main point of emphasis for this study's temporal starting point. Interwar and early post-World War II periods in both the German and French cases will be dealt with in line with this position.

According to Heilbron, the process of a discipline's coming into being can be approached by recognizing its three distinct stages. This long process starts with “the formation of a new intellectual practice accompanied by some sort of disciplinary ambition,” thus paving the way to the second step in which “the formation of a university discipline” takes center stage. This means that the discipline gets its own chairs, journals and association. Lastly, the final element pertains to the “establishment of a fully fledged discipline in which autonomous degrees are the key element.”³¹ Taking these three stages into account, it becomes possible to turn to IR with a different perception. Choosing such a basis for approaching processes of disciplinary establishment enables one to note some significant points in the specific case of IR.

In this regard, it should be clear that the three examples of chairs, journals, and associations mentioned by Heilbron as specific markers of disciplinary independence were late-comers when one looks to the developmental trajectory not only of IR but also

31 Heilbron, 2004a: 30-31. It is important to understand these three criteria as open to temporal shifts among themselves. For instance, the case studies of German IR make clear that journals come in the last stage, whereas in the France, autonomous degrees preceded the IR-specific academic journals that only flourished in the last two decades.

of political science, which to a large extent was its “supra-disciplinary” ground. Lastly, when it comes to the issue of autonomous degrees, one would need to take a much later starting period in the case of continental European IR. The German and French independent undergraduate and graduate degrees in IR and even the more general area of political science emerged much later compared to their Anglo-American counterparts. While I will specify the details of this process in the case studies, it is important at this juncture to state that a PhD in IR was a recent addition to the Franco-German university structures. As a consequence, it is possible to assert that an actual discipline of IR is rather a new element within the French and German social sciences.

When it comes to the starting points of a discipline, at least in the case of political science, scholars are now able to assert this discipline “is no longer a reflection of the intellectual interests of isolated individuals.” Such suggestions are developed by reference to certain criteria a professional discipline has to contain, and that have been fulfilled by political science: the existence of trained academics, a disciplinary degree, professional associations, related working areas (like university departments).³² The stated features are not so different from Heilbron's explanations. Their joint existence seems to coincide with Heilbron's third stage. The case studies will provide an answer to the disciplinary status of IR in the German and French contexts, dealing in a detailed manner with the features that pave the way for giving a positive reply to the question whether IR is a discipline.

³² Rose, 1990: 581.

An important point that needs to be clarified at this juncture pertains to the differentiation between IR and political science as well as the various labels used in place of IR, including world politics, international affairs, and international politics. While chapters III, IV, and V provide detailed analyses that explain the developments affecting IR's journey towards a disciplinary structure, it is important to stress that no teleological understanding should prejudice the explanations provided in this study. Therefore, my emphasis is always on the different pathways that marked the development of the IR discipline in Germany and France, explaining in this context also the structural weaknesses it faced. However, if one follows the criteria proposed by Heilbron in order to evaluate IR's disciplinary status in these two European cases, then it becomes visible (as will be illustrated in the case studies) that the late 20th and early 21st century conditions of German and French IR reflected this area of study as a viable discipline.

That the relevant criteria were fulfilled does not mean, on the other hand, that the discipline enjoys the same interest as it does in the US. At the same time, the relatively new and weak state of political science in continental Europe also posed a challenge to IR as no American-like conditions of a sub-disciplinary development were possible, with no dominating but also protective political science guaranteeing the prospects of IR as an academic research area. IR's interdisciplinary origins as well as the living legacy of that period which is embodied in British scholarship's openness to non-political science approaches shows that there is no unique way of interpreting IR's disciplinary history. Based on these factors, it is necessary to not present a very narrow definition of IR.

Doing otherwise would be to ignore its historical richness and developmental plurality. As a result, I use world politics or international politics for IR's earlier (non institutionally established) periods, while explaining the 20th century pathways of it at times in harmony with the developments marking political science. This choice makes it possible to engage with the interwoven nature of these two areas of study without leaving out of analysis their separate features. When it comes to the post-1945 period, I use IR in the sense of an emerging discipline (in its continental European setting), taking note of its more developed standing in the Anglo-American universities.

I.4. Methodological Choices and Case Selection

In the framework of a disciplinary history, my primary concern has been to reflect as broadly as possible on the developmental trajectories of German and French IR studies. As I have dealt with the question of why Germany and France were selected as the cases, it is useful to underline their scope. As the present focus necessitates setting temporal and spatial limits for providing a coherent study, I decided to deal with the cases of Germany (which means interwar Weimar Republic and the post-Second World War West Germany – or in its official name Federal Republic of Germany) and France (which means interwar France in its Third Republic, as well as the post-Second World War France, in this case the Fourth and Fifth Republics) in the context of their democratic periods.

Time-wise, this general framework includes also shorter explanations about 19th century developments and the period of the Second World War in order to not disconnect

the discipline's distinct pathways from the relevant overall analytical framework. As dictatorial regimes meant (quasi-)complete destruction of the free (social) scientific enterprise, I have left out the cases of Nazi Germany as well as Vichy France, as well as the separate case of East Germany (German Democratic Republic). They are only mentioned to the extent of their relevance for clarifying certain aspects of the cases discussed, especially in the context of the scholarly actors and institutional settings whose developmental trajectories were marked by these periods.

As I discussed above, the two institutions deserving special emphasis were DHfP in Berlin and ELSP in Paris, two schools located in their respective countries' capitals (or in the case of West German a former and future capital city). They are chosen as the scholarly establishments to be analyzed in a detailed manner, taking into consideration their origins and structure as well as their role in bringing together scholars working in the area of IR (as well as the broader political science).

In the case of individuals that provide another axis in studying the developmental trajectory of IR in the two continental European countries, I employ certain positions developed by Efraim Podoksik. According to him, a certain person can be chosen so that he/she is seen as an intellectually advanced example of his/her age. Therefore, it is his/her position that provides a useful connection point for the intellectual history that deals with that era. According to Podoksik, choosing an erudite person as a stellar nodal point around whom to shape one's research brings multiple benefits. One of these concerns an easier way of reaching an “organised and organising whole”; another advantage pertains

to the mind itself being “an historical event.”³³ His argument is thus based on a hero-derived explanation of the past that can be of much use if adapted in a coherent manner. My own approach will follow a similar path in the (West) German and French cases.

In the case of West German IR, with regard to the influence he had in the process of its gradual establishment, taking also into account his interwar ties to DHfP, his work in the area of studying foreign countries and later international politics, and also importantly his close connections with US foundations and American officials, Arnold Bergstraesser emerges as a scholar in whose personal history it becomes possible to trace the developmental trajectory of West German IR.

In the case of French IR, three names come to the fore, with Raymond Aron being the most natural candidate due to his internationally recognized status as a scholar with contributions to IR. However, I focus more on two other scholars who were able to more influentially affect the developmental trajectory of the French IR community, notwithstanding their background as historians of international relations (in the sense of history of world politics, a modern version of diplomatic history; not to be confused with the history of IR): Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. While it is difficult to put Renouvin into the camp of IR specialists, as he perceived himself as a historian, it is in his capacity as the president of FNSP that he contributed to the post-1945 development of political science and IR in France. A concept he developed, the idea of *forces profondes*, presented a new way of engaging with world political developments, at least in its historical context. His collaboration with his assistant and colleague Duroselle also

³³ Podoksik, 2010: 313-314.

has to be taken into account. This latter scholar would also play an active part in IR's development, as his study and research experiences in the US and connections to American foundations make him an important name in discussing the transnational dynamics shaping post-1945 French IR in its gradual institutionalization phase. His presidency at FNSP's important IR-related center, CERI, explains another reason to consider him as a focal figure when looking at the IR community in France.

This study providing a disciplinary history of International Relations in continental Europe, I differentiated my research from similar undertakings that apply sociology of science and cultural studies of science perspective.³⁴ In line with the emphasis on institutional and scholarly (agential) dimensions, the present study is not a complete intellectual history. The general framework I offer is one that takes into consideration the developmental trajectories of IR in two continental European countries, while pointing to the important role of transnational dynamics and emerging contingencies. This means assumptions for path-dependency will be shown to fail in explaining the directions IR scholarship in Germany and France has taken.

In order to fulfill the expectations of a study with a disciplinary historical understanding, my decision was to allow for a multiplicity of factors instead of focusing on a single dimension. Therefore, the inclusion of institutions such as schools for political

³⁴ See respectively Wæver, 1998 and Büger, 2007. While for Wæver's sociology of IR, journals and scholars' academic contributions provide main tools of a global comparative analysis (and his later work in the area remains tied to sociology of science perspectives in studying the present of the discipline), my approach looks to IR's past in the continental European context. Unlike Büger's use of sociology of science, and, more specifically, of cultural studies of science, I track the historical conditions that changed IR, and consider the transnational dynamics and their role in this process.

science and IR studies, academic organizations, scientific journals as well as American foundations and government officials does not constitute a decisive move in favor of sociology of science. Similarly, the detailed investigations into the emergence of scholarly practices, themselves results of transnational processes of interaction, should not be taken as a choice for cultural studies of science. In many instances, the conceptual and theoretical tendencies that reflect the academic mood as well as the ideological fashion will be presented while tying them to scholars' changing attitudes in the domain of IR. These, too, do not make this study an intellectual history, as their function is more one of setting a contextual framework for the broader disciplinary history.

As should be clear by now, I see disciplinary history as a broader approach that paves the way for engaging with an academic study area's developmental pathways. This signifies that it carries multiple factors within its analytical gaze. In this regard, *the present study employs disciplinary history as a means of pointing both to institutional and scholarly (agential) dimensions while not overlooking the ideational context in the shape of theoretical and conceptual developments*. Furthermore, a multiplicity of actors that includes the above mentioned organizational dimensions and academic features play a major role in the advancement of the positions I develop. Behind all these, the idea of transnationality and the contingent outcomes of the discipline's pathways build the general structure upon which the argumentation and exemplification follow.

With regard to methodology, I use secondary literature from various research agendas in order to bring this multiplicity of actors together in the disciplinary history

that emerges. Of importance in this regard is an approach that does not limit itself to a certain viewpoint's perceptual capacity. In this context, works on the trans-Atlantic features of broader social scientific developments, American foundations and emigrant-scholars are used in order to expand the specific studies providing analyses of German and French IR.³⁵ I turn to different fields of study so that their often separate results can be brought together to provide a fuller picture about the emergence and advancement of a discipline in a specific spatio-temporal context. I also turn to original documents, mainly in the form of conference records and scholarly reports.³⁶ These sources provide together not only direct insights on and from earlier periods of IR, but also on the transnational dynamics generated by activities of US foundations, the post-1945 American involvement in West Germany, the university structures and academic infighting in both Germany and France, theoretical debates in IR, the American dominance in the discipline, institutional developments in the case of German and French academic institutions as well as general policies that influenced scholarly-governmental-(and American) connections. A joint analysis of these studies provides a much needed clarification about the developmental trajectories of IR studies in Germany and France.

With regard to the main level of texts (articles, reports, books, etc.), I focus directly on documents that provide viewpoints by contemporaries in order to reach the ideational world of their respective authors. For this reason, when I analyze major debates taking place in West German and French political science and IR studies, two academic journals,

35 With works such as Rausch, 2007 and 2010, Fleck, 2011, Tournès, 2010 and 2011 on the one hand, and Burges, 2004, Breitenbauch, 2008 on the other.

36 Such as Bergstraesser, 1965's rich sources, or Duroselle's and Renouvin's IR and non-IR texts.

West German *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* (PVS) and French *Revue Française de Science Politique* (RFSP) are the most frequently used sources. This is both due to their number one status as their country's political scientific publications as well as their capacity to reflect most effectively the nature of various positions being developed within their respective scholarly communities. I especially engage with articles from the 1960 to late 1970s in the West German case, and 1950 to early 1970s in the French case. Secondly, in both country cases I pay special attention to reports published in the post-World War II period (as well as more limitedly the interwar period) so that the self-perception of the relevant actors can be more clearly stated.

At the same time, I use the American IR community as a case of comparison. This serves not only to deal extensively with claims of US superiority in the discipline but also to question this widely accepted idea. By juxtaposing German and French developments in IR to developments in the US, this study aims to extend the scope of IR's disciplinary history, while qualifying the degree of supposed American primacy in this area of study. The emphasis on published scholarly reports and debates held at various conferences are a useful tool for inquiring further about the actual significance of many “*idées reçues*,” IR's received wisdom about its past. The use of Scandinavian, and to a lesser extent, of British scholarship in IR serves a similar function in using the broader context for discussing the forces shaping German and French disciplinary trajectories.

For making clear the circumstances under which institutions emerged, and scholars developed their ideas (with both of them engaged in promoting, respectively, their

positions or ideas), it becomes important to take certain indicators into consideration. It is such a starting point that makes it useful to turn one's attention also to changes in the size and scope of disciplinary communities. Hence, making use of a large body of disconnected scholarly sources, I emphasize the dynamic nature of IR scholarship by pointing to advances in quantitative as well as qualitative dimensions. Transformations affecting scholarly institutions, bigger numbers of students and professors, modifications in the university setting all become part of this way of approaching the subject in a more comprehensive fashion.

I.5. Outline of the Chapters

In chapter II, my first engagement concerns the debates and analyses arising from recent scholarship focusing on IR's disciplinary history and its features as a relatively new social scientific undertaking. I use the relevant studies to advance this study's distinct position, offering thereby the general frame of the German and French country cases. The second section turns its attention in a detailed fashion to the relevance of space in IR scholarship. I discuss recent works by Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver, and John Hobson, using their studies to clarify the reasons for my focus on the European dimensions of IR's disciplinary trajectories. The concepts of geo-epistemology and geo-ontology are shown to be of much relevance in this context. At the same time, these analyses help to explain the functions of disciplinary history as a critical enterprise that could weaken the usual claims about US IR's historical uniqueness. There follows a

separate section on the political dimensions of IR scholarship, which shows how IR can mean more than IR, simultaneously questioning assumptions that equalize IR to its theoretical dimensions. Thus it becomes possible to turn to the significance of difference and capacities for dissent within IR scholarship. I employ two studies from outside IR scholarship that discuss the function of these two aspects in enriching a society's chances for advancement. A similar possibility could emerge as a consequence if IR communities take into consideration the developmental trajectories analyzed by its disciplinary histories. I conclude the chapter by reviewing studies of relevance to my specific research area, recognizing the important insights they have provided. However, the insignificant number of such studies as well as their separate analysis of the dynamics influencing the pathways of IR in its European context of emergence testifies to the contributions the present study can offer.

In chapter III, I focus on the disciplinary origins of IR, and after a brief look at its late 19th century origins, I turn to the interwar period as an era of its more decisive emergence. The International Studies Conference (ISC) as an international organization of IR specialists, founded in 1928, and terminated in the early 1950s, provides a useful stage for pointing to the discipline's non-American (as well as non-British) participants, emphasizing the role of continental Europeans in these years. I conclude this introductory chapter into IR's disciplinary history by analyzing the features of American foundations whose support for the development of IR (and more broadly political science) in

continental Europe was a major dynamic of transnationality that shaped the future paths of this newly emergent discipline.

Chapter IV provides the first of the two country cases, looking at the case of Germany in its Weimar and West German periods. After an initial explanation of the 19th century context of German political studies, I turn to German interest in world political studies and to the role of DHfP in this framework. In the third section, the emphasis is on the broader features of post-1945 West German IR. The function of American foundations is dealt with throughout the chapter, while a separate subsection explains their engagement in interwar years. The “founding father” of West German IR studies, Arnold Bergstraesser is the subject of section 4, which covers both his institutional involvement as well as his ideational contributions to West German IR under the impact of American interactions. In the following section, the focus is on German political scientists' 1963 meeting in which for the first time the general dimension of world politics became a topic of discussion. Next, I present a West German debate on IR's origins, underlining in this specific case the usefulness of looking at different IR communities' disciplinary histories, as these provide the means for broadening one's understanding of IR's general features, too. The sixth section serves a similar function, analyzing alternative scholarly projects in West Germany that aimed to generate a different kind of IR studies, open to more critical approaches. Before concluding the chapter by providing a broader picture of IR's West German features in a more comparative way, I offer a detailed presentation of West Germany's post-1945

developments in IR (and political science) with regard to the structural changes and institutional advances made, and the transformations generated by the overall impact of transnational dynamics.

In chapter V, the opening section covers the 19th and early 20th century developments marking the conditions of the emergence of IR and political science in France, with an emphasis on the founding of ELSP. Sections 2 and 4 deal in a detailed manner with the American foundations in the context of their influence on the developmental trajectories of French social sciences, and more specifically in this case, of political science and IR. Between these two analyses stands the continuing story of Sciences Po, in its post-1945 rebirth in the shape of IEP Paris and FNSP. The fifth section explains the role of IR's “founding fathers” in France, explaining the contributions of Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle and more critically that of Raymond Aron. After that, I engage with the general features of post-1945 French IR (and also political science in general due to their often interwoven nature). This section includes a presentation of important scholarly associations and journals, offering thus a means of evaluating the disciplinary status of French IR (as well as political science) in the post-Second World war period. French scholarly differences are underlined with regard to their academic advancement exam *agrégation*, which also shows the broader features of issue areas and research interests in the French community of IR and political science. I conclude this section by explaining the reasons for French scholars' (and public's) focus on geopolitics and the way IR and geopolitics merge. Following this, I shift the perspective to French perceptions of

American IR, enabling also a discussion of French IR scholarship's status. The concluding section deals with aspects of theory in the context of IR studies in France, analyzing the background of a general French disinterest in coming forward with *the* theory of IR.

The sixth and final chapter serves not only to revisit the main arguments of this dissertation, but also to look at the developmental trajectories of German and French IR in the post-1990 era. The first two sections explain the late 20th and early 21st century pathways of these two IR communities after their institutional and scholarly development had been shaped by the earlier decades of the 20th century, mainly in the period between the 1930s and 1970s. In the penultimate section, I turn to a more inclusive analysis of German and French IR studies, taking into consideration the discipline's biggest community, American IR. Finally, I conclude by explaining the results of this study. Here, the emphasis is on transnational dynamics affecting the development of IR in the two continental European cases. At the same time, I show how the European-centered nature of my analysis can serve for preparing the discipline for its post-Western future, as a broader and more inclusive study of IR's developmental trajectories helps to understand the inherent plurality and difference that it carries.

Before starting a more detailed analysis and debate of IR's disciplinary history, it is useful to return to the main points I presented in this introduction. I highlighted the need for an alternative approach to IR's origins and suggested that German and French IR's developmental trajectories could offer an ideal means to broaden one's understanding of

differing paths 20th century IR has taken. By using the two axes of scholars (academic agents) and schools (academic institutions) as my main bases of analysis, I aim to challenge the mainstream narratives that take American IR as *the* model of the discipline. Without neglecting the significant role US scholarship has carried, I turn to transnational dynamics that shaped the discipline's emergence and establishment in Germany and France throughout the 20th century. I use the concept of hybridity in order to explain that path-dependent explanations would fail to consider the broad range of actors that came together in the processes leading to IR's development in continental Europe. The role of American foundations and government officials, emigrant scholars, US-educated academicians, international academic organizations, national scholarly cultures, scientific associations, and university structures as well as policy decisions can only be taken into account when strict categorizations of science vs. politics, domestic vs. international are overcome. The joint impact (following various levels and degrees of interaction) of these actors takes shape under conditions of transnationality and leads to hybridity, as American IR is not recreated in Germany and France while still being different from traditional nationally determined social sciences in the two countries.

CHAPTER II: EUROPEANIZING IR'S DISCIPLINARY HISTORY

This chapter lays the framework for understanding the approach that will be employed in analyzing German and French IR's 20th century developmental trajectories in the context of the transnational dynamics shaping IR's emergence. By discussing the most important scholarly debates of IR's disciplinary features and its existence as an academic enterprise, I advance my position that prioritizes the larger historical dimension of the discipline in its non-American pathways. After the first section that provides the most useful tools for the general structure of this study, there follows a focused analysis of space's relevance for IR. This includes engaging with two concepts, geo-epistemology and geo-ontology, which I analyze in the context of two recent works on the discipline's origins in the West and the features of its development in non-Western settings. I defend a turn to IR's history in the European context as a means for a broader self-understanding of its scholarly community, going beyond a mere equalization of American narratives of disciplinary history to IR's overall development. The third and fourth sections explain the more than scientific dimensions of the discipline, pointing both to its political co-constitution and the advantages a more pluralistic IR can provide in terms of difference and dissent. I conclude by dealing with the more specific studies of European IR, pointing to their positive contributions as well as the lacks in the literature that the present study aims to overcome.

II.1. A Framework for Disciplinary History

In this section, I discuss important contributions by IR scholars dealing with the nature of the discipline itself. These include not only disciplinary histories, but also studies of its sociology. While emphasizing the main features of this broad range of works, I also underline my starting points, thus reiterating the general features of this study and setting them into a general framework upon which a European disciplinary history can be built. At the same time, the various studies discussed in this section serve to demonstrate the overall relevance of disciplinary history for understanding the actual structure of IR's nature in terms of its past and present functions, thus providing a picture that goes beyond a narrow focus on IR scholarship in the US.

Brian Schmidt, a scholar whose contributions to IR's history have played an important role in paving the way for studies in this area, provided a distinction between analytical and historical traditions. He sees in the former a more instrumentalized version that mainly serves to help the promotion of present frameworks, whereas the latter is turned more towards the past for the past's sake. In his 1998 book that opened the door for further historical studies of IR's disciplinary background, he focused on the development of the concept of anarchy throughout the works of the late 19th and early 20th century US scholars, claiming to find the origins of IR's birth in that era.

By opposing not only studies that follow the classical traditions and which interpret the development of IR in terms of contributions made by great thinkers, but also rejecting works that see in the realm of international politics the actual forces that generated the

discipline as such, Schmidt came forward with an alternative method, one connected to the idea of a critical internal discursive approach.³⁷ In this context, he interpreted the concept of anarchy as a shaper of the discipline by the way it was used as a political discourse. Such an implementation of anarchy served, in his opinion, as an uninterrupted discursive thread.³⁸ However, even if one accepts Schmidt's use of anarchy in that role, it becomes questionable to what extent a one-concept approach can succeed in providing a transversal account. This means that a decreased relevance of anarchy as a concept at an earlier or later historical period would necessarily post a challenge to Schmidt's analysis, or at least limit his temporal dimension.

One of Schmidt's important claims for disciplinary history in general concerns the usages to which historical studies are put. According to him, it is projects of legitimation or critique that arise as the main reasons for looking at the discipline's history. For some, including many realist IR scholars, the discipline's history is quite self-evident.³⁹ The general perception about the realist victory in IR's first supposed great debate has for a long time been the single narrative about the interwar era, challenged only recently by a significant number of revisionist studies.⁴⁰ Schmidt's main attack on contextual (that is

37 For an approach based on the idea of classical traditions see Kenneth Thompson who developed in his *Fathers of International Thought: The Legacy of Political Theory* what he called a "companion piece" to his other important book *Masters of International Thought: Major Twentieth-Century Theorists and the World Crisis*. In his approach, IR could not be thought of without Plato and Kant because these scholars, among others, gave the ideational tools necessary for IR's 20th century scholars such as Morgenthau and Wight. On the other hand, Ian Clark offers a work in which classical theories of IR are analyzed in a more critical fashion, serving not as tools of status quo but as a means for revising current understandings prevailing in the discipline. See his introduction chapter in Clark and Neumann, 1996.

38 Schmidt, 1998: 15-16.

39 Schmidt, 1998: 21ff.

40 See fn. 9 in chapter I as well as Schmidt, 2012 for sources discussing the issue of great debates in IR.

more or less externalist approaches) derives from their perceived presentism as well as the role they play in reinforcing the well-known ideas regarding the discipline's various debates, waves, or phases.⁴¹ Rightly, he asserts that “the external context is never sufficient by itself to account for what is taking place in an academic field.” Then he goes on to suggest that “[i]t would be difficult, if not impossible, to explain changes in key concepts such as the state, sovereignty, anarchy, and power by reference to contextual factors.”⁴² This conclusion, however, has to be reevaluated in the face of forces that have, for instance, completely reshaped the German approaches to world politics in the aftermath of 1945. While I will point to this aspect in the relevant chapter on post-World War II German IR, it needs to be said at this point that conceptual changes have a certain dependence on world political developments. When Schmidt mentions that it is the university context that needs our attention as IR's birth place, he is correct only to a certain degree, because his preference is once again to ignore the impact of outside dynamics. However, as will be shown in my case studies, the university structure itself was a result of the state's policy choices, its most clear illustration being the Nazification of German universities after 1933. In the French case, I will show how the Sciences Po leadership engaged in detailed negotiations with the French government to protect its status or narrow down the extent of state's intervention in its restructuring after the Second World War.

41 Schmidt, 1998: 28-29.

42 Schmidt, 1998: 35, 38.

As Renée Jeffery has rightly pointed out, Schmidt's approaches were shaped by John Gunnell, the author of a history of political science in the US. In that framework, certain disciplinary trajectories can also be interpreted as being part of a long tradition of doing things in a certain way. What is a useful means for counteracting such “traditionalizing” is to remember that traditions are mostly things of invention and derive from today's perspective.⁴³ The distinction between an externalist and internalist account is important for disciplinary history. For instance, the work of Schmidt has largely been associated with an internalist approach, an analysis that limits itself more to the ideational developments *within* the field, excluding socio-political events *outside* the discipline. Externalist approaches are known to be more contextualist as they widen their outlook in order to prioritize the influence of facts and processes that take their roots outside of IR. However, some scholars see even in the work of Schmidt a certain level of contextualism. According to Gerard Holden, even the anti-contextualists are not always successful at “exclud[ing] references to context.”⁴⁴ As I explain below, these distinctions lose their initial sealed-offness once the dimension of transnational dynamics is taken into account.

A recent exploration of IR's disciplinary history came from Duncan Bell who criticized the mainstream influence of IR's progressivist narrative, which provides a history of linear advancement toward the present conditions (prevalent in US IR). It is only thanks to the “revisionist historical scholarship” that “the inadequacy of the progressivist narrative” has been made visible. For Bell, the relevance of disciplinary

43 Jeffery, 2005: 74, 81; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983.

44 Holden, 2002: 259.

history should go beyond being a useful endogenous feature. This signifies that it is not there only for its own historical sake. It should rather serve an exogenous function because this enables one to simultaneously perceive “the interweaving of knowledge, power, and institutions.”⁴⁵ Furthermore, he proposes to remain agnostic in the face of an internalist-externalist dichotomy. What is underlined in his alternative pertains to the “transversal nature” of social science developments. In Bell's proposed framework, concepts and institutions as well as the (scholarly) agents of their interconnection deserve a place in the emerging disciplinary histories.

With regard to internalist vs. externalist explanations of IR's history, it is useful to take into consideration four factors summarized by Miles Kahler. He provides for each type of approach two relevant dimensions. In the case of internalist explanations, the issue of professional standing is of significance. There is also the hardening of its disciplinary boundaries, while IR as a scientific project was simultaneously framed in an interdisciplinary nature. With regard to the externalist analyses, the two important factors on which Kahler focuses are the influence of (world political) events and the demand-driven as well as policy-related nature of the discipline. For Kahler, it is the external context that carries more relevance, due to its focus on the “social and political context of the intellectual production,” differing thus from internalism with its prioritization of the “internal logic of scholarship.”⁴⁶ In regard to these dimensions, I follow the more critical approach of Bell in the sense of merging these effects when analyzing the developmental

45 Bell, 2009: 6, 9.

46 Kahler, 1997: 22-23, 21.

trajectories of IR in Germany and France. The reasoning here derives from rejecting a strict categorization of these factors, not a mere agnosticism, as this study pursues a transnational perspective in which such divisions lose their initial features.

Another important clarification of disciplinary historiography comes from David Long and Brian Schmidt's volume on IR scholarship's two concentrated dimensions of imperialism and internationalism, in which they focus on these two positions as hub points of disciplinary engagement, enriching the disciplinary history to a significant extent. What matters at this juncture is the way they defend the relevance of such approaches that focus on IR's past. According to Long and Schmidt, disciplinary history "has been regarded as something akin to an intellectual hobby; as something to do after the more serious and important research is completed." Such views have also prevented doing research that deals with "the actual institutional history of the field." Defending the need for such historical studies, they point that a general agreement among scholars of disciplinary history exists according to which "there is an intimate link between the present-day identity of the field and the manner by which a field chronicles and understands its older identities."⁴⁷ In line with other references to this aspect of discipline's self-understanding and the role of its history therein, it is important to note that additional work on the historical dimension can provide more advanced levels of reflexivity in the discipline. By means of both spatially and temporally more inclusive analyses, a broader disciplinary history can pave the way for challenging the usual narratives of IR as just an American social science. The statements of Long and Schmidt

⁴⁷ Long and Schmidt, 2005: 4, 6, 20.

connect to the reasons that lie at the origins of the present study, one that aims to Europeanize IR's disciplinary history in order to demonstrate its transnational dimensions and its inherent plurality that gets ignored in American-centric studies of the discipline's historical trajectory.

A similar contribution is found in an article of Darshan Vigneswaran and Joel Quirk. They suggest that “classificatory schemes from the 1950s and 1960s have served as privileged starting points for historiographical inquiry.”⁴⁸ Thus, a certain point in the discipline's history, one closer to its post-1945 regeneration under the US aegis, seems to have captured in time IR's then prevailing perceptions and turned them into historical perceptions that are supposedly of a timeless nature. For Vigneswaran and Quirk, the list of problems inherent to this constrained way of undertaking disciplinary history includes retroactive attributions, assumptions of enduring essences, ahistorical understandings as well as presentism. Obviously, many of these items relate more to studies that focus on the theoretical development of the discipline. However, even research into IR's trajectory with regard to its institutional structure and scholarly community can face similar difficulties. If one is not familiar with the way its scholarly institutes developed in various contexts, or if one ignores the stages through which diverging ways of doing world political studies emerged, then it becomes impossible to reach a clear understanding of the disciplinary plurality that is a result of these contingent dynamics of heterogeneous pathways marked by transnational dynamics.

48 Vigneswaran and Quirk, 2010: 127.

On a different, but not unrelated level, Vigneswaran and Quirk underline the problematic aspects of “efforts to cumulatively, retroactively forge genealogical links with earlier intellectual figures.”⁴⁹ This warning should in turn be extended to the area of institutional as well as individual scholarly dimensions, questioning those analyses that tend to approach the conditions of past periods while keeping the perspectives of today. It is in this context that the case studies will engage intensively with contemporary documents in the form of reports and conference debates so that the viewpoints of individuals and institutions can be analyzed in their own context.

One approach to disciplinary history that takes its roots from Peter Galison's work in the history of science has been recently exemplified in Lucian M. Ashworth's study of liberal socialism in interwar Great Britain.⁵⁰ The importance of his article is that he follows the earlier advice of Duncan Bell⁵¹ to take into consideration the work coming from history of science. Consequently Ashworth implemented Galison's microhistories-based method by using his “subcultures” approach in order to overcome the narrower explanations derived from a paradigms-focused analysis. Subcultures are shown to consist of four major features: a common language, a common narrative, a community of scholars, as well as links to the outside world. Such studies can extend “beyond just the published texts,” including documents on “conferences, funding agencies and the interaction between scholars and professionals both inside and outside of IR,” the recent study by Nicolas Guilhot on the 1954 IR conference organized by the Rockefeller

49 Vigneswaran and Quirk, 2010: 110

50 Ashworth, 2011.

51 See Bell, 2009.

Foundation (RF) being an example.⁵² It is also useful to see in subcultures a general tool in pointing the IR community towards the actual sources of its plurality. If following Ashworth, one could differentiate between Thomas Kuhn's paradigms and Galison's microhistories with their subcultures, then it becomes possible to see in the latter the impact of “non-rational prior social context,” whereas the paradigms would be “defined by common outcomes from theorising the international.” It is based on these differences that Ashworth suggests the possibility of IR’s realist Hans Morgenthau and neo-realist Kenneth Waltz sharing the same subculture, but not the same views on human nature.⁵³

Taking a step further from these positions, I propose to think of subcultures in terms of a broadened national culture, notwithstanding the difficulties of such a conceptual stretching. The major contribution of such a shift is to enable one to have a better grasp of the dominant national-cultural settings that influence a discipline's developmental pathways without necessarily suggesting that within that domain there are no theoretical divergences and disciplinary infighting. In that regard, Ashworth's assertion that microhistories provide a helpful means of analyzing the origins and development of scholarly communities points to a helpful direction. This means that I use the transnational perspective while still employing the idea of microcultures in the specific context of German and French IR communities when presenting their separate developmental trajectories in the form of a disciplinary history. Therefore, the two continental European IR communities are to be seen as microcultures with many distinct

52 Ashworth, 2011: 40.

53 Ashworth, 2011: 44.

but also certain common features, which will be shown to be the contingent outcomes of transnational dynamics.

A significant article that helped to make the discipline and its features a subject of scholarly analysis is the much cited 1998 article of Ole Wæver, published in the prestigious American IR journal *International Organization* (IO). This study looked at the sociology of IR, being to a large extent concomitant with the then growing interest in disciplinary history (shown not least by the publication of Schmidt's disciplinary history of American IR in the same year). Its place of publication provided Wæver's study with much attention, making it a starting point for future research for similar research agendas. His approach, developed by making use of works dealing with the sociology of science for the case of IR, reached the conclusion that American IR's socio-cultural background would lead to more divergence in the discipline, as its “not easily exportable” ontological and methodological baggage would pave the way for actual de-Americanization of IR in other parts of the world. Making use of Robert Merton's famous CUDOS model (featuring communalism, universalism, disinterestedness, originality, skepticism as parts of a scientific understanding and undertaking) and Peter Wagner's work on social sciences in general, Wæver presented his own model as a sociological analysis of the discipline *per se*.

As he acknowledges, this is a model that provides “a nonreductionist combination of social and cognitive explanations.”⁵⁴ It consists of three layers, the first one including the aspects of society and polity. Four separate dimensions are found within this layer:

⁵⁴ Wæver, 1998: 694.

cultural-linguistic factors, political ideology, political institutions, and foreign policy. While referring to Johan Galtung's analysis of various intellectual styles associated with certain national academic approaches in the cultural-linguistic area (which I discuss in the German case study), Wæver also sees ideologies and traditions of political thought, as well as state-society relations and the actual foreign policy as relevant aspects. His second layer concerns the area of social sciences, in the sense of both looking at the way they developed in different contexts and the shape they took with regard to the structure of their disciplinary and subdisciplinary formatting. A final layer pertains to the intellectual activities in IR. The two features of this layer deal with IR's discipline-specific developments, first by focusing on its social and intellectual structure, and second by analyzing the theoretical traditions therein.⁵⁵

After having laid out this explanatory model, Wæver deals with four different national scholarly communities: Germany, France, the UK, and the US. These are highly relevant for purposes of the present study, making a short summary of his explanations useful. In the (West) German case, he notes the post-World War II dismissal of geopolitical and even realist approaches. This point will be dealt with when analyzing the development of German IR in a more historical approach. However, while Wæver provides a short overall narrative of German IR, it is the trajectories of contingency upon which the present study will be built. He rightly claims the lack of a direct American-imitated field, but it is the direct and indirect impact of American actors that has to be taken into account due their influence on the developmental pathways of German IR (and

⁵⁵ Wæver, 1998: 694-695.

political science more broadly). With regard to the French case, his explanation is of a bigger frame. After pointing to the more extensive power of economics and sociology compared to political science in the university structure there, he positions political science “between administration and the humanities.”⁵⁶ This part of Wæver's analysis concludes by pointing to a much repeated claim on the willing detachment of the French IR community.⁵⁷ This assumption will be important in the chapter analyzing the discipline of IR in France. I approach this issue differently, and highlight the structural challenges that were only partially overcome by the impact of transnational forces. The result was a contingent developmental pathway for French IR that failed to reach its American counterpart, but still managed to establish itself, even if to a limited extent, in the much competitive French academic scene.

At this juncture, it is useful once again to clarify the aspects that are of relevance for this study. As its major approach is one based on the nature of contingent dynamics that have affected the processes of disciplinary formation and development in two continental European IR communities, it is certain features of Wæver's model that I rely on in choosing which aspects to look at. In order to keep the two basic foci, the institutional and the scholarly, it is the social sciences layer and the IR-internal intellectual layer put forward by him that provide useful guide lines for this study. However, the first layer that includes society and the polity is also important to the degree that it plays a primary role in shaping the other two layers. On the other hand, a major aspect that I aim to add as an

⁵⁶ Wæver, 1998: 705, 707.

⁵⁷ For a similar view see Giesen, 2006, which itself is a much cited study in this regard.

additional layer concerns the role of transnational interactions. It is rather difficult to find an appropriate space for these types of factors within Wæver's model with its three layers, as these influences originating from the outside go beyond the discipline-specific features of political science or IR as well as extend beyond our usual ideas concerning foreign policy processes. Transnational interactions should be understood as the processes that connect various forces, the origins of which go beyond the national IR community as well as contain actors of both governmental and non-governmental levels. This signifies that US foundations' work in Europe for the development of social sciences or American military occupation authorities' actions in (West) Germany as well as the possibilities present for their wide-reaching influence have to be taken into consideration. This layer can be interpreted as the one that surrounds the other three dimensions framed by Wæver. It is within this broader framework that the developmental trajectories of German and French IR disciplines will be analyzed.

II.2. Space and IR: Geo-epistemologies, Geo-ontologies

In this section, I use the role of space as an element of geographical diversity that serves a helpful function in explaining the reasons for intra-Western diversity. Geography and history will function as the two main elements in pointing to the impossibility of a single IR discipline, with a plurality of IR scholarship communities arising as the actual alternative. In this context, two recent studies providing alternative perspectives to the Western dominance in IR are discussed. I employ their conceptual tools and explanations

in order to defend a Europeanized disciplinary history for the discipline. Such a still-Western approach necessitates a detailed clarification, which this section provides. It is only after such a discussion that the general feasibility of the present study and its contributions for a future post-Western IR become visible.

In the context of IR, it is important to distinguish between two concepts in order to further our understanding of the discipline's knowledge generating practices. Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver's recent study that looks at different ways of doing IR across the world is structured around the idea of *geocultural epistemologies*. In this approach, the focus is on the relevance of a given country or region's contributions to IR and the way scholars around the world are shaped by their national/regional context, the conditions of which range from the university structure to the dominant understanding of IR in their locality. This means that various non-US and mainly non-Western ideas of world politics become relevant. The authors start their studies from a general acceptance of the plurality of IR while not denying the current dominance of US IR. Still, the main influence comes from two sources, sociology of knowledge and post-colonial theory.⁵⁸ This position does not necessarily prioritize national contexts, but underlines the cultural divergences influential in the development of a plural IR discipline.

Such a starting point does not directly overlap with a second type of analysis that can be found in John M. Hobson's major contribution to the debate on IR's Western nature. In *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics*, subtitled *Western International Theory, 1760-2010*, he directly confronts the issue of Western dominance in IR. This can be seen

58 Tickner and Wæver, 2009.

as a continuation of his earlier work that has challenged the idea of a Western-led world by pointing to the Oriental roots of many techno-scientific advances nowadays associated with the West.⁵⁹

Hobson's more recent book asserts that international theory in general (and its later disciplinary version, namely IR) has been “a Eurocentric construct” that keeps serving “a series of Eurocentric conceptions of world politics.”⁶⁰ Continuing with the analytical framework used in earlier work,⁶¹ he sees all of this Western international theory categorizable within pro- or anti-imperialist, as well as institutionalist or scientific racist versions, thus generating a 2x2 table of four versions. Leaving aside the huge intellectual challenges posed by such a generalizing work that tries to deal with multiple aspects of Western international theory,⁶² a significant point arises from his statement that “various Eurocentric metanarratives, all of which ... defend or celebrate the West as the highest normative referent in world politics” are at the basis of international theory.⁶³ The problem with this analysis lies in the question of a given agent's power and capabilities. If from a historical point one can accept the rise and influence of Western powers that was even accepted by Hobson's earlier work for the period of the 19th century onwards, then one can continue this path of thinking by asking whether it is not indeed natural that global power with material advantages is followed by certain levels of ideational domination. Stated differently, why should one be critical of metanarratives and even

59 See Hobson, 2004.

60 Hobson, 2012: 1.

61 See Hall and Hobson, 2010.

62 Hobson himself acknowledges the inherent difficulties, see for instance, Hobson, 2012: 14.

63 Hobson, 2012: 15.

theories that have a certain material connection, in fact a basis of power that derives from the Western world and its imperial-colonial policies that tragically changed the world?⁶⁴

As a concept that can serve in critically engaging with Hobson's approach, one can turn to the idea of *geo-ontologies*. Here, a major difference arises from the geo-epistemologies of the Tickner and Wæver volume. It is no longer a question whether local differences give birth to varying paths of knowledge. Hence, the question is no longer about the knowledge that is being shaped, but it concerns one's actual and preferred knowledge of certain historical and geographic developments. By these, I mean a given person's worldview and whether he/she sees the modern world system of the last 500 years as a period in which a Western-led world was born. If the question is answered affirmatively, then the selected geo-ontology is a Western one. What differs in this conceptualization from Hobson's approach is that one can accept, in line with the idea of IRs' plurality, a plurality of geo-ontologies. However, within the discipline of IR, it becomes necessary for any scholarly undertaking to point to its own geo-ontological preferences and to develop the study in line with that basic choice. Hobson's critique of Western international theory is not so difficult to overcome once IR scholars add the idea of Western hegemony within the modern world system or the very rejection of this supposition to their ontological preferences. Therefore, when an IR scholar sees the role played by the Western powers as a world-transforming effect via colonization and imperialism in general, then it is only a natural consequence for this scholar to accept the

64 For a critical approach in the case of the "discovery" of Americas see Todorov, 1991.

interwovenness between the development of Western global ideas and the West's global power.

Based on these assumptions, I can now employ these two ideas within the focus of this work. The idea of a separate continental European IR serves not only to leave non-Western IR communities out, but it is also detached from the US as well as British IR. Thus, it can be formulated as Western IR without the Anglo-American scholarly community. This is an important exclusion, and its background reasoning can be understood in light of the preceding discussion. While post-colonial IR asserts the relevance of non-Western IR(s), I follow an approach that starts by considering both geo-ontological and geo-epistemological concerns. The first assumption is that the Western powers have played an undeniably significant role in the construction of the modern world in the period following the geographical “discoveries.” Therefore, without necessarily denying the importance of non-Western contributions to International Relations, I assert that from a geo-ontological point, it becomes not only less problematic but even obligatory to see Western study of the international as the most relevant aspect of International Relations.

The assumption that lies behind this emphasis on Western ways of studying world politics, and in turn institutionalizing the IR discipline, is again located in the interaction between material and ideational power. At first sight, such a position can be interpreted as providing a reinverted version of Robert Cox' critique of modern IR, about his suggestions that one's position determines one's thinking and action, as well as that each

theory has a purpose, serving the interests of various groups.⁶⁵ In fact, I accept the main features of his criticism while asserting that it is important to see the connection between international power and IR studies as well as theories of the international. If there was a British dominance in the 19th century, then it is not surprising to see that it was primarily British thinkers who spent time on developing tools to better understand future possibilities and dangers for the UK. Similarly, thinkers from another group of countries, namely the ones who were facing the British challenge or were themselves challenging the British dominance were actors whom one could expect to have developed ideas on world politics and to have established scholarly institutions focusing on these aspects. In this regard, it should come as no surprise that it was the British who were the first to create independent IR chairs at their universities in the post-First World War era, with their continental European colleagues following with much enthusiasm but in less institutionally empowered ways.

What comes to mind in this context is also the ideational space of the ones who were not only challenged but furthermore occupied, oppressed and exploited. The position of the colonized was an integral part of Western international theory as suggested by Hobson. The problematic nature of its imperialist and racist dimensions plays an important role in his analysis of the Eurocentric conception of world politics. However, what he ignores is the rather limited scope of non-Western thought on, and more specifically, of non-Western studies of world politics in the earlier periods of the modern world system. The reasons for this weakness are easy to see. The forceful integration of

⁶⁵ Cox, 1981.

the non-Western world into the emerging international system led to a reactive “other” that could not come forward with its own challenging tools on the international ideational front. On the other hand, the global reach of certain great powers provided these Western nations with the capacity for engendering new ideas about the world and its politics as well as for creating institutions in which these international phenomena would be studied. These initiatives followed from their broad and global interactions with the “others.” Even a declining power such as the UK had scholars who worked, in the period of the empire's final years, on a whole range of IR concepts and positions later to be put together under the name of the English School. This approach was to meet its share of attacks from post-colonial IR scholars in the end of the 20th century, as the colonial connections and conceptualizations inherent to this IR school became more visible.⁶⁶ Similar concerns would be directed at the features of American IR with regard to its rise in the Cold War period, and the ideological-epistemological premises immanent to its content.

Based on these premises, it follows that by choosing a certain geo-ontology, a scholar of IR is able to build his/her ontological basis on an actual historical-geographical knowledge. The only feature not to be ignored is the need to follow a coherent line of historiographical understanding that does not lead to conflicting interpretations within a given study.⁶⁷ By tying the origins of IR studies to a historical context and the concomitant preferences made on the basis of varying and conflicting interpretations of

⁶⁶ See Jones, 2006.

⁶⁷ For the problematic way historical studies are used by IR specialist who ignore the various interpretations/schools within the historical scholarship, see Thies, 2002b.

it, one can create a valid starting point for further world political analysis and theorizing as well as focus directly on the transnational dynamics that shaped the emergence of IR itself as a disciplinary structure under conditions of contingency. While the new discipline was being affected by institutional and scholarly dimensions, which were themselves co-constituted by national legacies and the larger forces of transnationality, the way was paved for hybrid communities of IR scholarship that did not resemble their traditional and older national academic competitors or their American IR counterparts.

Following these steps, it becomes easier to reach back to the geo-epistemological dimension. Herein, while acknowledging the Anglo-American dominance in the modern world system and their simultaneous hegemony in the realm of ideas, I focus on the role played by the continental powers, namely Germany and France. Keeping note of their non-Anglo-American, and sometimes even anti-Anglo-American positions, I base my analysis on the geo-ontological acceptance of Western material and ideational primacy in the modern world system that was effectively challenged only in the 20th century, namely by the 1905 Russian-Japanese War. After the two world wars (that can be seen to a significant extent as intra-Western civil wars), the later decolonization as well as the start and end of the Cold War that paved the way for the complex world of the 21st century, it is now possible to think and talk of a pluralistic IR due to the effective existence of powers beyond the West. In this regard, the approach of Tickner and Wæver seems to be more valid for this era of later modernity rather than the pre-World War II period that was marked by intra-Western ideological and material rivalries. As the present study looks at

the birth and development of the discipline of International Relations, it becomes indispensable to build the analysis by critically accepting Western Eurocentric international theory and the institutionalized dimension of world political study as a natural instantiation of the Western great powers' global dominance in the end of the 19th and through the first two thirds of the 20th century.

Other scholars can ask whether “a field of study which is deeply Western-centric in its language and worldview explain[s] a world which is now less and less Western-centric.” While this is a legitimate critique to be developed given the conditions of the 21st century, I argue nonetheless that such an assertion would have been less relevant in the early 20th century – an assumption that is in fact also inherent to the author's question. This is a position openly deriving its legitimacy from the rise of non-Western powers, as Pierre Lizée sees the necessity for the discipline's change as a consequence of the world political impact these newly rising powers have.⁶⁸ One should not forget, though, that the Western powers are themselves familiar with the non-Western actors from their earlier imperial-colonial engagements, an element that can even be interpreted as being at the basis of the discipline's birth.⁶⁹ The author's call for new approaches, on the other hand, paves the way for a real change and challenge compared to Western IR. Lizée's defense of a *via media* that results from the acceptance of universal IR and the threat of another particularism in the form of non-Western IR leads him to ask for a beyond-the-non-Western IR that could succeed in an eventual new universalism for the discipline.⁷⁰

68 Lizée, 2011: 3-4.

69 On the imperialist ideas impact on the formation of IR see Vitalis, 2005.

70 Lizée, 2011: 10ff.

These arguments are valid for the late modernity of the 21st century, but returning to my analysis of Hobson's approach, I want to reiterate the need to look for varying paths not among the non-Western centers but within the West itself, at least when the temporal focus pertains to greater parts of the 20th century. That provides the starting point of this study. My approach will also be able to counter the general criticism directed at disciplinary histories of political science and IR. It is asserted that these narratives aim only to further empower the prevailing position of Western ideas of IR.⁷¹ While such assertions cannot be ignored, as mainstream IR scholarship has been indeed well-known for its taken-for-granted assumptions of Western-centrism, it is important to distinguish here between the unsubstantiated suggestion of a continuous focus on the West and its IR on one hand, and the spatio-temporal ruptures and continuities in the world political and socio-economic areas that enable scholars to start their analysis from a certain point of departure. This signifies that one *cannot* but *not* write a Western-centric history of IR as a social scientific discipline, the exception being the period that started with the decolonization in the post-World War II era. It is interesting, to note, in this regard, that even a major study that focuses on non-Western thought and IR turns its gazes more towards the 20th century, in general not dealing with non-Western ideas on the international of the pre-modern times.⁷²

Therefore, a disciplinary history looking at IR's earlier developmental trajectories will be mostly one of the West. It is of importance to note the difference here between an

71 For a recent such analysis see Savigny, 2010: 101.

72 See Shilliam, 2011, especially the introduction by Robbie Shilliam.

ideological critique and a perspective of scientific development. For instance, when Steve Smith gave his ISA (the [North American] scholarly organization International Studies Association) presidential speech in 2003 he made the following observation: “Just as the discipline in the 1930s reflected British self-interest, so since the end of the Second World War it has reflected US interests. In the name of explanation it has recreated the hegemony of US power and US interests.”⁷³ In Smith's understanding, there exists no social science that can be interpreted as being value-free, there is no view from nowhere; and IR is criticized for having ignored most important ethical questions because of its pre-given assumptions, due to its positivism and empiricist methodology. The discipline “has effectively served as a handmaiden to Western power and interests.”⁷⁴ These statements by an important critical IR scholar are essential to my argument, because it is by going beyond the very critique provided by Smith that I propose to extend our understanding of the discipline's role and position. It is in this regard that looking at German and French IR actually paves the way for a more informed critique of IR as a discipline. Focusing on the divergences that exist even within the Western structure of this discipline, as well as on the ways in which transnational dynamics formed the current shape of its continental European scholarly communities helps one to perceive the developmental trajectories of IR in a broader perspective. Therefore, critics of the discipline's Western-centric nature would more easily widen their influence when actually turning their gazes to the processes of intra-Western diversification, taking into

73 Smith, 2004: 507.

74 Smith, 2004: 513-514.

consideration how divergent scholarly practices in IR took shape in the continental European context, which was in turn decisively influenced by these transnational forces combining the impact of national, American and other international actors.

John Agnew, one of the most influential scholars whose work lies at the intersection of geography and politics, provided an important contribution for understanding the spatial dimension of IR. In a short article that also presented a review of the relevant scholarship, Agnew developed his analysis around the idea of “geographies of knowledge of world politics.” His main call was to go beyond “a universalist epistemology” (which was anyway not interested in the spatial dimensions) and “a totalistic cultural relativism” (which paved the way for “mutually understandable *Weltanschauung*”).⁷⁵

Like Smith, Agnew sees in IR (in its theory) “the projection onto the world at large of United States-oriented academic ideas” about national and international factors like the state or the economy. However, Agnew is cautious to distinguish the theoretical level, which “reflects the application of criteria about how best to model a presumably hostile world drawn from selected aspects of U.S. experience and a U.S. reading of world history” from the way “actual U.S. policies are constituted.” He does not necessarily see a connection between the scholarly and the political, at least not in the arena of practical implications. This means that the impact of scholarship is seen as rather distinct from the realm of political decisions.⁷⁶ Agnew's approach with regard to the concept of “geographies of knowledge” derives from his quest to deal with the “ontological bases of

⁷⁵ Agnew, 2007: 146.

⁷⁶ Agnew, 2007: 138.

knowing” while not getting tied to “a singular history of knowledge associated with a specific world region” and without “presum[ing] conceptions of knowledge” which “assume their own self-evident universality.” Based on this, Agnew criticizes positivism for being “agnostic about the social-geographic sources of its knowledge.”

An important aspect that he discusses concerns the issue of “hegemonic thinking.” In this instance, various processes lead to spatial diffusion, when specific ways of doing and seeing things become for others models to follow. In this regard, it is important to understand how this happens. It can take place through imitation, or by intellectual conversion. To analyze this phenomenon, Agnew presents a more general concept, developed by Antonio Gramsci, i.e. hegemony.⁷⁷ He underlines the successful American policies in “enrolling” others into its own models, but also the fact that the US “adapts as it enrolls by adjusting to local norms and practices.” In this case of “hegemonic thinking,” the example of American enrollment has to be specifically noted. However, while he sees in enrollment a process leading “others into American practices of consumption and a market mentality,”⁷⁸ I propose to broaden it so that the influence of US foundations and governmental authorities in the specific case of developing a discipline of political science and IR in continental Europe can be perceived in a similar fashion.

⁷⁷ In his influential texts, mainly written during his imprisonment by Mussolini's fascist regime, and published as *The Prison Notebooks* this influential Marxist politician and thinker developed the idea of hegemony as a means of controlling the society also through the impact of ideas. Intellectuals would serve as useful means for convincing wider masses instead of using violent coercion. It would be such hegemonic power that would ensure consent.

⁷⁸ Agnew, 2007: 145.

Such a usage of “enrollment” would not necessarily provide a complete success, and it will also show certain lacks in the other level pointed to by Agnew. Namely, American IR has been interpreted in general as being rather unwilling to be influenced by outside ideas. While one can assume this to be the case for the present period, I will also focus (within the limits of its relevance to German and French developments) on the ways in which continental European effects shaped American scholarship when a reverse “adjusting to local norms and practices” (to use Agnew's words) took place. Thus, the American developments in the discipline were themselves the consequence of previous influences from the continent, be it the late 19th or the mid-20th century – a point that will become clear in the case studies where the emerging picture demonstrates that one cannot speak of a one-way American influence. While the structure of the present study does not allow for a detailed analysis of this other aspect of the US-European interaction, it is important to note that the actual limits to American involvement in the development of IR's European trajectories, discussed in the two individual country cases, will make clear the extent of US hegemonic thinking with regard to its narrower capacity for implementing an American-modeled IR there. The contingent outcome would be one that was neither American nor German or French, but a hybrid and gradually institutionalized IR discipline in the continental European context.

II.3. IR's Political Dimensions

An important dimension that needs to be taken into account when dealing with the discipline's developmental history concerns the nature of its ontological and epistemological but also methodological preferences in the context of a potential connection to prevailing ideological choices among its scholars or within its institutional structure. An early analysis of this problematique can be found in the 1984 study of Hayward Alker and Thomas Biersteker in which they look at the advanced courses on IR theory in order to see whether the existing disciplinary plurality is in fact reflected in the readings offered by the relevant syllabi in the leading US graduate programs.

The two American scholars provide in their analysis an interesting matrix that results from the combination of three different levels of political orientation with three positions of scientific epistemology. The first group includes conservative, radical Marxist, and liberal internationalist orientations, whereas the latter comprises traditional historical, modern dialectical and analytical/empirical preferences for epistemology. For Alker and Biersteker, it is through the joint impact of these two triads that “major ongoing research approaches in international relations can be more fully understood.” While their major call is for a (self-)reflexive discipline of IR, it is the pathways they point to in the context of epistemological-ideological combinations that is of much relevance in approaching IR as a social science whose development cannot be separated from real world political events and processes. As a consequence, it is only natural that they renounce “timeless universal concepts” and advocate the need to take the socio-political context into account.

While they underline certain close connections between traditional approaches and conservatism, or dialectical positions and Marxism, the authors are also careful to point to differing amalgamations, for instance the non-Marxist dialectic approaches that are influenced by a liberal internationalist orientation – as an example of which they refer to their own situation.⁷⁹

The point about the interrelationship between epistemological choices and ideological positions was further developed in an article by Jennifer M. Welsh that looked at the role of conservative ideology in the area of IR. While being careful in not equating realist approaches with conservatism, she nonetheless suggested that a quest for order, supported by a preference for tradition and a skeptical outlook, has been the marker both of conservatism and IR's realism.⁸⁰ A similar critique was raised by Piki Ish-Shalom when he located in the discipline an interwovenness between realism, elitism, and conservatism. This triptych existed, in his opinion, in both the classical realism of Morgenthau and in Waltzian neo-realism. Again, skepticism regarding human nature was an eminent feature of their common position. According to Ish-Shalom, “[t]heorizing arises from ideological convictions that affect the process of determining which data are relevant, which are less so, and which have no relevance at all.”⁸¹ In that framework however, continuing on the basis of the ideological-epistemological duality presented by Alker and Biersteker provides a better way of overcoming the necessarily one-way outlook which would originate from an exclusive focus on politics or epistemology alone.

79 Alker and Biersteker, 1984: 137-139.

80 Welsh, 2003.

81 Ish-Shalom, 2006: 441.

It is in this context that the present study's focus on transnational dynamics through an analytical framework beyond scientific-political differentiations and “science-internal” vs. “science external” accounts offers an alternative that aims to advance this scholarship by employing it in the German and French cases. This approach rejects the separation of these factors.

Based on these assumptions, another essential dimension is not to constrain oneself exclusively to the theoretical realm. The discipline has to be perceived in broader aspects than merely its production of theories. For this reason, extending the ideological-epistemological effects of their joint dynamics to the general structure of IR scholarship provides a convenient tool for dealing with its disciplinary history in a more perceptive fashion. Such an approach also goes beyond the exclusivity claims of discipline-internal narratives that see in “outside” events and processes forces that do not have much of an impact on IR. Contrary to these positions, thus, implementing an accepted duality of dynamics, in the form of both ideological and epistemological origins, gives the possibility of dealing with the discipline's history without turning to just one aspect.⁸² It will be in this regard that the case studies of German and French IR are developed with an analytical framework that shows the co-constitutive interaction of the political and scientific fields without a hermetically sealed separation between them. Such an approach

⁸² An interesting work on the history of IR theory is found in Knutsen, 1997. By providing an extensive history of IR's theoretical trajectory that starts with an analysis of Western political theorizing, Knutsen ties IR to earlier periods marked by Renaissance thought. In the 20th century, he connects realist IR to conservatism, rationalism to liberalism, and revolutionism to radicalism, thus presenting a framework that resembles proposals of Ish-Shalom and Welsh. Another study (Kleinschmidt, 2000) offers a more thematic analysis, talking about the mechanist, biologist, functionalist, and realist periods that marked IR's theoretical trajectory. My approach differs from these works in its focus on institutions and scholars-agents, in line with my approach that does not prioritize the role of theories in IR's development.

also serves to overcome the “inside” and “outside” distinctions that dominate the disciplinary history frames.

The most significant suggestion of Alker and Biersteker for further advances in the discipline relates to the necessity of an “international savoir faire that incorporates a broader and deeper kind of political and epistemological self-consciousness” through which the way for “real knowledge cumulation” in IR can be opened.⁸³ This demand for disciplinary plurality as well as for more interest in approaches different from one's own provides a call for turning IR into a more effective social science in the sense of leaving behind its parochialisms. While their article deals with the problems of the discipline in its American IR context, later works testified to the continuation of this problem in other parts of the world. Either there has been too much imitation of the US (as discussed in the last section of this chapter, the Italian case can come to mind), or there is a tendency to undertake one's own studies without considering what is happening in the discipline's global position, for which the French IR community is given, in my opinion incorrectly (and which I explain in the relevant chapter) as an example thereof (also see this chapter's last section below). This is not necessarily a problem limited to the West. An article by a Chinese scholar, for example, suggests that a Chinese School of IR would “set the sustainable and harmonious relations” between nations, states, and non-state actors. By calling current IR theories vulgar, Yiwei Wang asserts that the new Chinese School would occupy the center in the pedigree of IR theories, surrounded by and challenging neo-

Gramscian Marxism, realisms, liberalisms, and English School, world society

⁸³ Alker and Biersteker, 1984: 138.

approaches, postmodernism, and feminism. This provides a rather exaggerated claim that shows the dangers of overimposing one's own worldview on the whole disciplinary structure, something IR is already familiar with through its American-centeredness.⁸⁴

Steve Smith's various analyses regarding US hegemony in the discipline extend the focus to IR's geography in the context of its disciplinary development. The danger of a US-centered IR could also weaken the American scholarship, as “the U.S study of international relations, by adopting an essentially rational-choice account of the relationship between interests and identity, runs the risk of failing to understand other cultures and identities and thereby become more and more a U.S. discipline far removed from the agendas and concerns of other parts of the world.”⁸⁵ Smith sees US domination mainly as a result of its great size in terms of scholars and the American primacy in theory production, in addition to the consequent leadership in the discipline's journals,⁸⁶ aspects that one sees repeated by European IR scholars when explaining the scholarly state of their American counterparts.

When thinking about what should count as part of IR, his approach supplies a broader perspective by asking for more inclusion. Smith's critique derives from US IR's assumptions of disciplinary core status that in turn pave the way for “engag[ing] in the politics of forgetting its own role in the practices of international relations.” This leads to “objectifying and reifying some aspects of the social world,” accusing “some approaches and methodologies as not being 'serious social science.’” On a more general level, Smith

84 For European cases see Friedrichs, 2004; for China see Wang, 2007.

85 Smith, 2002: 68.

86 Smith, 2002: 81ff.

recognizes the problem as one being of IR's self-perception, as it is interpreted to have “focused on politics as a realm of social activity separate from economics.”⁸⁷ Following this premise, it could be more appropriate to understand the problem of this suggested distinction between the “outside” reality and the discipline itself as something that goes beyond the current fashion of rational choice or even the way US scholarship deals with the challenges of being an IR community that lives in a country with superpower status. The sources of the imposed duality have to be sought within the broader frame of the discipline. One way of locating them would be to look back at the origins of the study of world politics, as discussed above. In that context, IR as a way of studying the international was in the eyes of many a social scientific solution to the challenges of modern international society in the later stages of its emergence. Therefore, a quest for solving the problem of war, or of international order, resulted in the later institutionalized version of world politics which later generations would know under the name of International Relations/IR. The historical analyses in chapter III as well as the case studies of 20th century German and French IR in chapters IV and V point to the influence of such thinking in non-US contexts also, showing the relevance of disciplinary history for carrying critical studies beyond the usual American framework.

When one approaches the social sciences as an area influenced by their national context, this is not only due to the way their development was connected to the empowerment of nation-states and the emerging quest for societal knowledge, but also because of the consequent connections that resulted from world political events. In the

⁸⁷ Smith, 2002: 83.

later context of the Cold War, Bruce Kuklick asserted that many scholars would just provide an *ex post facto* justification for the political choices made by the government or the military.⁸⁸ Others used a more cautious approach. According to David Engerman, for instance, analyses should give scholars more agency, and not see them as mere analysts paid for their expected services. The reason for this alternative understanding is explained by the fact that a significant amount of studies in that era reached conclusions diverging from (or even opposing) the original expectations of units that had initially requested these studies.⁸⁹ However, this study presents a frame of analysis in which such national contexts are shown not to be disconnected from the more influential forces interacting in the form of transnational dynamics. For this reasons, it is more difficult to approach German or French IR as mere reflections of their national political authorities. The case studies offer an alternative picture that arises from the hybrid IR communities in these two countries, ones shaped by the intervention of American foundations (and officials), the domestic scholarly and political actors as well as the historical legacy of their university structures and disciplinary traditions.

An important point that needs clarification when undertaking a disciplinary history of IR is to state the degree to which the more recent understanding of the discipline will shape one's approach. At this juncture, the role and weight of theory plays a distinct role. In line with other social sciences, IR has witnessed a major theorization effort taking place mainly in the post-World War II period. The well-researched volume edited by

88 See Kuklick, 2006.

89 Engerman, 2010.

Guilhot, for instance, took it more or less for granted that the general idea of IR has to be concomitant with (the) IR theory/theories. It is based upon such a promise that he and his colleagues look at the way Rockefeller Foundation co-supported the birth of a “scientifically manageable” theory of IR. Whereas the initial results of that Rockefeller-sponsored project were seen as lacking major success, with no single view dominating the meeting,⁹⁰ its consequences become obvious when one extends the perspective to the later decades that witnessed the rise of theoretical approaches. It is even possible to interpret the classical approach defended by the members of the English School in the mid-1960s as a last barrier against the general quest for theoretical-scientific forms of IR.⁹¹ However, it is also important to add that the Rockefeller-supported meeting was a means of creating an IR that would provide an answer to calls for more scientific approaches in the discipline. In this context, Kenneth Thompson, a leading foundation official would contact the British professor Herbert Butterfield so that a similar project on IR studies would take place in the UK, establishing in this process the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics.⁹² Therefore, the foundation's main aim was not creating a strictly scientific IR but one that could face the more behavioralist tendencies in the US.

As a prominent member of this school, Hedley Bull would write in 1972 that “the term 'theory of international relations' became fashionable only in the mid-1950s, and

90 See the appendix of the volume with all the varying reports presented by the meeting's participants like Morgenthau, as well as individual chapters discussing the meeting's importance in Guilhot, 2010.

91 See the articles-based debate between Hedley Bull and Morton Kaplan reprinted in Knorr and Rosenau, 1969.

92 See Dunne, 1998.

then only in the US: even now the term often provokes puzzlement and incomprehension elsewhere in the world.”⁹³ His explanation underlines the US-related nature of this quest for theory in the discipline, the reasons for which one could find in Stanley Hoffmann's exploration into IR's nature as an American social science. In this context, the quest for applied science has not only been an important part of the American society, but also of US governments that started to perceive themselves, and were also perceived, as a superpower in the post-1945 era. Therefore, a theoretical social science was something that could fulfill all these goals.⁹⁴ The classical position against desires for scientificity was the English School approach with its skepticism toward assumptions of “scientific progress,” as its representatives reminded their colleagues that one was in fact dealing with “a field in which progress of a strictly scientific sort does not take place.”⁹⁵ A similar critique is found in Martin Wight's famous 1966 article, titled “Why is there no international theory?” While he explicitly stated that his usage of international theory does *not* refer to “the theory of international relations,” his general conclusions showing a preference for philosophy of history over international theory actually pointed to a similar understanding of theory's role.⁹⁶ For Wight, theorization was not a possibility for the sphere of the international, but only for the national framework.

Starting from these positions, this study does not limit itself to perceiving the IR discipline as a project that takes its shape merely on the basis of its theoretical features.

93 Bull, 1995 [1972]: 184.

94 Hoffmann, 1977.

95 Bull, 1995 [1972]: 204.

96 Wight, 1995 [1966]: 15.

Thus, theoretical fashions, paradigm discussions, or for that matter, the supposed existence of “great debates” are not the focus of this study.⁹⁷ When looking to the German and French IR and the way the disciplinary communities in these countries progressed towards an institutionalized form within the given university structures (themselves undergoing constant change), the focus will go beyond the reproduction of theoretical debates. I aim to underline how individual scholarly and institutional academic interactions shaped their respective IR communities under conditions of general contingency and transnational dynamics. Theories' role in explaining these processes of gradual development will be limited to the extent of their relevance in the respective dimensions of scholarly and institutional preferences. At the same time, my goal is to use the elaboration of German and French disciplinary formation processes as a means for pointing to the inherent divergences that have a continuous impact on their respective IR communities, creating variations that cannot easily be overcome so that a global or even Americanized IR discipline could arise.

II.4. Plurality of IR: Difference and Dissent in the Discipline

What is the relevance of different types of IR? Even if one accepts the plurality of IR, it is still questionable whether going beyond a US-American IR provides any benefits. In this regard, I use an approach that is derived from two recent works focusing on the necessity and functions of dissent and difference. While the two books underline

⁹⁷ For the most comprehensive analysis of IR's supposed first great debate between realist and idealist scholars see the contributions in Schmidt, 2012.

the significance of these two features for societies, it is possible to use these ideas also when looking at IR's scholarly community. This section provides a short explanation of the advantages of focusing on difference, and implicitly on the benefits of having different ways of “doing IR.” Following from the previous section's explorations of the necessities and advantages of a Europe-focused disciplinary history, it becomes possible here to extend this frame to the more comprehensive structure of difference's significance for IR, whereby not only ideational-theoretical, but more important for the present study, the institutional and scholarly trajectories are emphasized.

In his book *Why Societies Need Dissent* Cass Sunstein offers a helpful argument that underlines the importance of dissent in groups and societies. Although his arguments are used primarily in the context of American society, a small shift enables one to understand the useful role that dissent plays in academic communities also. This function of dissent was a point acknowledged by the Kuhnian understanding of paradigms according to which a new generation was supposed to distinguish itself by disapproving of earlier ways of scholarly undertaking and presenting its new tools for research and study.

In the context of Sunstein's book, one of the most relevant points concerns the idea of conformity and its comfortable position for a group or the society at large. However, it is only via dissent that these very units can broaden and revise their initial perspectives. Furthermore, the way social cascades – that is “large-scale social movements in which many people end up thinking something or doing something because of the beliefs or actions of a few 'early movers,' who greatly influence those who follow”⁹⁸ – function

98 Sunstein, 2003: 54.

shows us the dangers of remaining fixed to a given scholarly point, be it a certain theoretical approach or a definite way of undertaking research or determining methods to be employed. Connected to this is the idea of reputational cascades in which people follow a group's generally shared idea even if they individually understand the problems with the position. Joining the crowd is just a means of protecting one's reputation among the peers.⁹⁹

In *The Difference* (subtitled *How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies*), Scott Page provides a similar argument based on the assumption that diversity can be more significant than ability. Here, cognitive differences are put together under the label of diversity where they include not only diversity in perspectives but also in interpretations as well as in heuristics and predictive models.¹⁰⁰ The general conclusion reached by Page is that “cognitively diverse” groups “perform better than more homogenous ones,” while “collections of people with diverse cognitive toolboxes and diverse fundamental preferences ... locate better outcomes and produce more conflict.”¹⁰¹ Therefore, the very existence of diversity can help in reaching better outcomes, if the simultaneously inherent conflict potential can be subdued.

Both authors mention the concept of groupthink as a significant threat that stands in the way of reaching better outcomes.¹⁰² While IR as a discipline has been quite familiar with this latter concept,¹⁰³ it could make good use of the two approaches discussed here in

99 Sunstein, 2003: 74.

100 Page, 2007: 7.

101 Page, 2007: 299.

102 More broadly in Sunstein, 2003: 140ff and Page, 2007: 50.

103 For IR's groupthink see Janis, 1974.

analyzing its own conditions. First, if we carry the explanations of Sunstein and Page into the realm of IR scholarship, it becomes possible to more clearly witness the immanent threats of an IR dominated by US scholarship. If, for instance, we take into consideration the conditions prevalent in US universities, then it means the financial situation of the scholar, tied with his/her wish for tenure-track positions, can easily pave the way for reputational cascades. This signifies these scholars would prefer not to be seen standing in opposition to powerful scholarly fashions, accepting mainstream theories or popular research methods in spite of potential alternative ideas they may hold. Such a preference obviously precludes any effective change, leaving only a limited playing field delimited by the gatekeepers to an imagined range between the rationalists and the reflectivists.¹⁰⁴

A second point relates to the actual capacities of US IR due to its power arising from financial resources, academic size, think tank and government connections, features that were always prominent in the American context.¹⁰⁵ In this regard, Page's focus on diversity's advantages over ability comes to mind. All the stated benefits of the US IR structure could be challenged once one considers the lack of diversity, notwithstanding the role non-US scholars played and continue to play as participants in the American IR epistemic community.

104 For just such a call of limited options see (American) International Studies Association (ISA) presidential speech by Keohane, 1988. In this speech Robert Keohane presented a widely accepted framework according to which scholars following the general “guidelines” of positivists social sciences were rationalists (including mainstream realists and liberals), whereas scholars with more critical approaches who distanced themselves from a too positivist understanding of science were called reflectivists (including feminists, Critical Theory scholars, post modernists).

105 Hoffmann, 1977.

Under these conditions, it becomes essential to acknowledge the need for a discipline that is open to diversity and difference. If the conditions for its realization cannot be provided in the US alone, then it is evident that a global opening shaped by the various geocultural epistemologies around the world has to contribute to the discipline. Parochialism and self-perpetuating positions can only be challenged if one does not ignore IR's non-US communities. It is in this framework that I propose to turn to two cases of continental European IR. Understanding how the discipline was born and developed in its German and French versions can contribute to contextualizing IR as a discipline within the modern social sciences and to comprehend its functions, while going beyond the boundaries prevailing in US scholarship.

A focus on institutional and scholarly (agential) aspects of IR's continental European developmental trajectory can serve as a means for rejecting the American disciplinary position's taken-for-granted status. Different practices and varying historical pathways can illustrate directions in which non-American worldviews and distinct choices have been making an impact. At the same time, a broader perspective based on the inclusion of transnational dynamics paves the way for understanding how different pathways and the hybrid outcomes of these contingent developments demonstrate the relevance of non-singularity in the discipline of IR, rejecting analyses that interpret the overall discipline of IR as an American enterprise.

II.5. Europeanizing IR: The Discipline and its European Dimensions

In the next three chapters, I turn to the disciplinary history of IR in its European context, starting with the interwar and early post-Second World War role of the International Studies Conference (ISC) and then focusing on German and French IR's trajectories, mainly in the temporal frame emphasizing the 1930s-1970s period in consideration of discipline's gradual establishment during these years. First, it is important to take note of relevant scholarship in IR which has provided significant contributions in this area of research. I discuss here recent studies which have given birth to important insights about IR's developmental trajectory in Europe. Underlining their most useful propositions and the analyses they developed, I also explain how this study differs from these earlier works in regard of its scope and the framework upon which it is developed.

Looking to the state of scholarship that deals with European IR, one notices that it is a quite narrow one. Although the post-Cold War period has witnessed a rise in relevant studies, it is still possible to assert that this aspect has been rather neglected. Certain reports have provided useful insights thanks to their ability to capture the conditions that prevailed in the discipline at given times. Recently, monographic research on German and French IR has become available to a more detailed extent.

A general and country-specific view for the 1970s came from a work commissioned by the Ford Foundation, pointing thus to the interests of US philanthropies in advancing the discipline in line with its American position.¹⁰⁶ The report looked at the case of

¹⁰⁶ See Ford Foundation, 1976.

International Relations studies in six European countries, including France and Germany, and is a helpful source for the case studies. However, these reports were rather heterogeneous as they tried both to list all IR-relevant institutions in these countries, discussing their research areas and to summarize all contemporary research done in these European IR communities, including non-university think-tank structures.

Before the Ford reports the UNESCO had also initiated state of the art surveys, such as the 1954 report prepared by Charles A. W. Manning who brought together the answers to a general survey sent to scholars from different countries.¹⁰⁷ In the interwar period, the IIC, the predecessor to UNESCO, was engaged in similar projects that presented general overviews of IR studies which were undertaken by its organ for IR studies, that is the International Studies Conference (ISC). Its two conferences and their consequent reports will be discussed in the next chapter, providing direct insights about scholars' self-perceptions regarding IR's status as an emerging (candidacy for a) discipline.

An intense scholarly engagement with IR's European developments begins only in the 1990s. It was in that period the European Consortium for Political Research's (ECPR) Standing Group on International Relations (SGIR) was able to organize continental conferences which generated a meeting point for European scholars of IR. A possible reason for this late blossoming can be found in the atmosphere of the post-Cold War era, a point in time that was supposed to inaugurate another global relevance for the “old continent.” Following half a century of relative isolation or ignorance, the idea was that

¹⁰⁷ See Manning, 1954.

the hour of Europe has come again. These initial awakenings paved the way for studies that turned their gaze on the state of IR in Europe.

At the start of the century, Knud Erik Jørgensen's article that saw in “continental IR theory ... the best kept secret” of the discipline provided an important reference point in terms of IR's self-reflexivity in the European context. By providing a model that based itself on a cultural-institutional context, he aimed to go beyond the externalist/internalist dichotomies prevalent in IR. His alternative model includes three major parts: political culture of a region or country, the organizational culture of science bureaucracy and university system in that locality, and the habits, attitudes, professional discourses within social sciences there. I take these features into consideration in the German and French cases, engaging them into the two specific axes of institutional and scholarly-agential dimensions.

While presenting a useful frame for understanding the various theoretical approaches that had dominated European IR in the earlier decades, Jørgensen's focus also clarified the lack of the much emphasized “great debates” in European IR, if one allows for its very existence suggested by the older traditional historiographical mainstream.¹⁰⁸ For him, the possibility of an Anglo-American vs. continental European divergence was there, and one of the main reasons for this was rooted in the fact that continental debates differed from the IR mainstream in the US and the UK. Not to be forgotten was the role of the English language for the Anglo-American sphere as American and British scholars

108 Jørgensen, 2000: 13-18.

ignored non-English scholarship, which was a common linguistic difference (up until recently) of their continental counterparts.¹⁰⁹

In 2003, Jørgensen would extend his search for a richer IR community onto the global stage. His call for a “six continents social science” of IR came in the context of ongoing preparations for the World International Studies Committee's first conference, which took place two years later in Istanbul. It was important that he did not overlook the 1938 Prague conference, which had been organized by ISC – an organization which is the subject of analysis in the following chapter. Jørgensen dealt with the trajectory of the discipline by pointing to its complicated relationship with politics. He referred to British liberals, who (as members of the *Pax Britannica*) were interpreted as having led to the founding of IR. In the post-1945 era, in line with the Hoffmann analysis, it could be said it was the US turn for global and disciplinary leadership. However, he also showed that “systematic studies analyzing the deeds (and vices) of relations between IR and different disciplinary environments are very rare.” It is useful to recognize that law, sociology, history or philosophy can be disciplines inclusive of IR. While political science incorporated it in the US case, in the UK one could more easily speak of a separation, or at least the failure of political science to turn IR into a subdiscipline.¹¹⁰ Such differing degrees of political science and IR interaction also influence the present study, which starts by focusing on International Relations as a distinct discipline, but allows for its merger into political science as a subdiscipline at certain phases of its developmental

109 Jørgensen, 2000: 26-28, 31.

110 Jørgensen, 2003: 333.

trajectory in continental Europe. This explains why I provide at the same time detailed analyses of German and French political science in order to explain simultaneous developments in the case of IR.

In 2006, Jørgensen, joined by his colleague Tonny Brems Knudsen edited an important volume. Titled *International Relations in Europe*, this book brought together various scholars with chapters on national and regional IR communities in Europe, expanded by more general analyses that included a conclusion written by Brian Schmidt. In their joint introduction to this work, Jørgensen and Knudsen kept a model that resembles the cultural-institutional framework provided by Jørgensen's 2000 article. Thus, the political culture, the organizational culture and the “internal” elements of habits and professional discourse are of relevance. In the German and French cases, I will consider the academic-institutional dimension and scholars' (agential) contributions under the general socio-political conditions that were all open to interaction with transnational dynamics triggered by non-French and non-German actors' active engagement, that is the American foundations as well US government officials and scholars with American experiences.

In the present study, I will deal with these factors without necessarily following the proposed tripartite division of these scholars. As will become more visible in the case study chapters, on many levels such pre-set analytical categorizations lose their clarity. The dimension of transnationality provides an important challenge in this context , as its dynamics can weaken the hermetic boundaries provided by the political, organizational,

and scholarly-level divisions. If the influence from abroad and the nationally determined forces interact, and if their diversified impact in turn shapes the disciplinary structure, then the question arises to what extent the specific elements are distinct from each other. In the case of their third dimension, the habits and professional discourse, Jørgensen and Knudsen state their model continues on the frames provided by Brian Schmidt's approach of looking at the academic discourse. The reason for this following is that "political culture seems unable to explain very much of the tendency in some places to treat theory as a fetish, representing the highest and most valuable form of knowledge."¹¹¹ However, a turn to the US case would make it possible to counter this claim by pointing to the ideational connections that shaped American IR. Stanley Hoffmann's explanations for the American tendency for applied science that can be reached via coherent theoretical developments on the one hand, the Cold War-affected scholarly work for the governmental and military establishment on the other, testify to the weakness of isolated internalist narratives about the discipline's advancement. These studies highlight the political and scientific interwovenness, which also plays a decisive role in continental Europe under conditions of transnationality.¹¹²

The authors provide a rather skeptical approach with regard to the question of IR's origins, as they think "that the search for origin is essentially futile business, although very functional in terms of identity-building."¹¹³ As I will point to when discussing the

111 Jørgensen and Knudsen, 2006: 6.

112 See Hoffmann, 1977; for examples of such Cold War works see again Kuklick, 2006 and Solovey, 2001.

113 Jørgensen and Knudsen, 2006: 7.

more historically intended approach of Torbjørn Knutsen at the start of the next chapter, for practical purposes, origins carry a significant weight. It is only after these are determined (according to clearly defined criteria) that one can turn to presenting the developmental trajectory of the discipline in various national or regional contexts. It is in this regard that the following chapter (chapter III) can be approached, taking into account the historical framework it provides.

In 2004, a book completely devoted to European IR provided another contribution. Jörg Friedrichs' *European Approaches to International Relations Theory* had a narrower focus. While his analysis built upon the nature of IR in three continental European cases, French, Italian and Scandinavian ones, his general approach did not originate from research on disciplinary history. Rather, he chose to find certain characteristics of these three countries/regions and then turn his attention to recent theorizing taking place in these localities. A direct engagement with the broader developmental trajectories with detailed analyses of their specific features was not provided.

His major analysis concerned the relationship of these cases towards the US model of IR, which was (set as) more or less the ideal model. Whereas the French were interpreted to ignore the Americans and just go on with their isolated and perhaps introverted research (what Friedrichs categorizes as academic self-reliance), the Italians were, in their turn, just imitating their US counterparts (representing, in his terms, a resigned marginality). The praise was left for the Scandinavian IR community which was shown to have succeeded in establishing a viable cooperation with American IR scholarship,

without necessarily becoming mere reflectors of approaches generated by the former. It was in this framework that the Nordic *semi-periphery* (in his analysis, the European IR communities in general are in that position with regard to the US *center*) had managed to reach the global market of ideas and concepts in the discipline via their capacity, in his terms, for multilateral research cooperation.

The continuing American impact on IR scholarship is due to the role of English language as a modern *lingua franca*, the editorial selection policies that prefer American style texts, and the overall size of the US community. For Friedrichs, “the prevailing self-image of International Relations as an American social science is itself an important stabilizer of American hegemony.”¹¹⁴ Important also are his assertions that the main disciplinary histories of IR are not correctly reflecting the development of the discipline in its Western European context. Such a picture is not disconnected from the useful way in which “the standard account of disciplinary history works as a powerful social construction.” It is in this regard that US IR reaches its predominant position by daily reproductions of its power. Interestingly, Friedrichs asserts that there is no need for Europeans to challenge the US dominance in the discipline because “hegemony is not necessarily and always a bad thing.”¹¹⁵ However, such a suggestion overlooks the fact that a hegemonic position also serves to narrow the existing confines of the discipline, thus weakening the possibility of an IR with a viable plurality. As shown when discussing two significant works focusing on the important contributions of dissidence and difference

114 Friedrichs, 2004: 1-2.

115 Friedrichs, 2004: 14-16.

(by Sunstein and Page), it is thanks to constant innovation and divergence of ideas that not only societies but also scholarly communities can manage to stay up-to-date and to undergo intermittent processes of widening their perspectives.

Friedrichs asserts that “there is a fit between the intellectual hegemony of American IR and the realities of power politics. The USA is the one and only country with the capacity to project power on a truly global scale; it seems natural for American IR to set the intellectual agenda about international power as well.”¹¹⁶ While this suggestion about the connection between the ideational and political dimensions of world politics and IR points to issues raised in this study, Friedrichs also speculates about the possibility of a Eurodiscipline of IR. He approaches this concept cautiously, seeing no unified model that could be generated from individual national levels, as “it is problematic to aggregate the different intellectual environments within which European IR scholars operate into a joint IR community.” The chance for an alternative, nonetheless, still exists. An emerging Eurodiscipline would need, in his opinion, “a revised account of disciplinary history.” It is at this juncture that Friedrichs sees possibilities to face the American hegemony in the discipline, as disciplinary history can have a certain function in challenging the usual accounts of IR as a more-or-less American social science.¹¹⁷ In the light of this, the present study's case studies of German and French IR can be understood as an effort to establish such a separate focus on IR in continental Europe.

116 Friedrichs, 2004: 17.

117 Friedrichs, 2004: 19-21.

An engagement with the idea of Eurodiscipline also emerges in a study by Osmo Apunen, in which he discusses the European focus on IR and more broadly world politics (and its study) in a larger 20th century context. For him, it is in the aftermath of the Second World War that “American professional practices entered into different European countries,” meeting not necessarily a warm reception in these localities. However, he also refers to Finland or Sweden that had already started to offer courses on International Politics in the 1920s, closely following the British lead that derived from the establishment of a chair at Aberystwyth.¹¹⁸ Thus, it becomes clear that the pre-1945 years witnessed European scholarship in this area. An important point that is left out of his analysis, and which is of relevance for the present study, concerns the role of interwar developments shaped by the intensive engagement of US foundations for advancing IR studies in Europe. This aspect as well as the post-war continuation of their involvement has to be understood within the broader framework upon which I develop my analyses, that of transnationality. Such an extended analytical tool paves the way for presenting a more comprehensive disciplinary history of IR's European history.

Last but not least, two works deserve special note for the way they turned their attention to IR's disciplinary structure in continental Europe. One of them, a 2008 dissertation written by Henrik Breitenbauch at the University of Copenhagen, concerns the French case. To paraphrase Shakespeare, one could say – in a positive manner this time – that “something is *fresh* in the state of Denmark,” at least when it comes to new analyses of IR's disciplinary history in Europe. From Wæver to Jørgensen, and in turn to

118 Opunen, 1993: 2-3.

a PhD thesis on French IR, it seems that the Danish community is showing its active participation in IR scholarship in this realm of sociology and history of the IR discipline.

While Breitenbauch presents a very detailed study, dealing with the reasons for French distinction in IR, it is mainly through analyzing the linguistic, especially rhetorical, skills and differences therein between the French and the US/UK/English-writing IR that he approaches the issue. For this reason, his work, which I will refer to more broadly in the French chapter, only focuses on the disciplinary structure as a side issue. His perspective is one that underlines the way the French writing style of *dissertation* (not to confuse with dissertation as thesis) generates a lesser degree of adaption to international US-dominant IR scholarship. The reason is that American ways of essay writing (that is, *papers*) present an obstacle to French authors' international access to (American-dominated) academic journals because their articles are developed and written with a different purpose in mind, not considering the more influential global-US standards based on American styles of writing articles.¹¹⁹

This different focal point of Breitenbauch's approach is made clear when he explicitly writes that “[t]he question on how to account for the origins of French IR cannot be answered comprehensively,” as his dissertation deals mainly with the way such form- and style-related differences of French scholarly world have shaped the discipline there. In this regard, it is looking at various stylistic elements like the French way of writing essays/articles, that is *dissertation*, and at differences between French and American social science paradigmatic variations that constitute his research subject. As a

119 Breitenbauch, 2008.

consequence, the present study distinguishes itself by providing the first detailed study of French IR's developmental trajectory by focusing on its institutional and scholarly-agential dimensions.

The other important contribution comes from Katharina Burges who wrote a history of German IR's developmental trajectory that covers the period until the early 1960s, starting from the early 20th century.¹²⁰ She supplies a broad narrative that deals with the way German institutes took shape, and clarifies various scholars' involvement in the process, contributing in important ways to the scholarship. Burges' study is indeed a very detailed one, and provides a useful source for my own research. However, it differs from my analysis of German IR's historical pathways in not combining the institutional and scholarly (agential) dimensions of the discipline and by not focusing as directly on the impact of the transnational dynamics that have led the newly emerging (West) German IR to a contingent path. In addition, I employ a disciplinary history approach that includes an intensive textual analysis turning in many instances to the debates that shaped German IR which distinguished it from the American and other IR communities. My position that acknowledges the relevance of transnational dynamics and the emerging hybridity, in addition to offering a comparative setting for understanding German IR's 20th century trajectory, aims to present new explanations in a broader analytical framework. An intensive engagement with divisions emerging within the West German scholarly community also clarifies my focus that is based on the wide-ranging influence of transnational dynamics in this process.

¹²⁰ Burges, 2004.

Burges offers an interesting conclusion, as she mentions the significance of democracy for IR's development in the US and UK cases. She tries to explain the reasons of German IR's weaker status as a field of study by suggesting the existence of a possible German *Sonderweg* also in the case of the discipline,¹²¹ while also pointing to the limited sovereignty of the West German state as another cause of IR's less developed state in Germany.¹²² With regard to her claims, I want to emphasize an alternative perspective. In this context, the French comparison will play an important role, as IR scholarship in France can be similarly interpreted to be part of a rather weak discipline. Such a comparison enables one in turn to reject the democracy, special circumstances and sovereignty claims to a considerable extent. The reasons for the discipline's late-comer status in France and Germany and their concomitant delay in becoming academically established disciplines have to be sought elsewhere. This will be the subject of the case study chapters, which underline the effects of transnational dynamics in generating contingent pathways for IR's developmental trajectory. In this context, it is the emergence of unforeseen hybrid IR communities that determines the shape of the general picture.

Before analyzing the developments that marked interwar IR, and the general functions of American foundations supportive of IR's advancement, it is useful to emphasize the main points presented in this chapter. I discussed the most important studies of IR's disciplinary history and stressed the lack of works in the continental

121 The concept of *Sonderweg* (special path) refers in a historiographical context to the idea that Germany had a distinct process of modernization that differentiated it historically from its Western neighbors such as Britain and France. Nowadays much contested, this idea was a broadly used means of explaining the German history leading to the Wilhelmine authoritarianism and the Nazi dictatorship.
122 Burges, 2004: 183-191.

European framework. A critical study of IR's European developmental trajectory emerges as an important means of expanding scholars' self-perceptions by demonstrating the interwoven nature of political and historical processes that mark the discipline's emergence and institutionalization and by pointing to the divergent pathways IR has taken in various contexts. The general claim is that disciplinary history of European IR communities is relevant as it questions the mainstream narratives of IR's American uniqueness. I stress that the dissent and difference immanent to the discipline can be better clarified by understanding IR's diversity even within its Western context. For this reason, the present study aims to connect critical disciplinary histories of IR to a study of European IR, using this framework to explain the discipline's transnationally shaped nature and the factors that generated its hybridity in German and French cases.

CHAPTER III. IR IN EUROPE: DISCIPLINARY ORIGINS, THE INTERNATIONAL STUDIES CONFERENCE AND US FOUNDATIONS

In this chapter, I provide explanations that set the context in which to discuss the separate developmental trajectories of IR studies in Germany and France in the 20th century. By pointing to broader aspects of the discipline's historical development, and emphasizing the role played by a much neglected interwar organization, the International Studies Conference (ISC), as well as clarifying the general features of American philanthropies (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation) with regard to their support for the development of social sciences, in this case more specifically of (political science and) IR, it becomes possible to gain a better understanding of transnational dynamics whose impact shaped the discipline in continental Europe.

The present chapter aims to highlight three points. First, it shows that IR had roots in the late 19th century as an intellectual project, although this did not mean that its academic institutionalization and disciplinary standing were settled until the mid-20th century. This becomes most clearly visible in the case of the ISC. The debates during ISC conferences in the interwar years illustrate the lack of IR as an established discipline, as its interdisciplinary character and non-departmentalized university structure weakened calls for greater advances. Second, a general analysis of American foundations explains the reasons of their interest in IR as an emerging area of research (and study). The three big

philanthropies aimed to generate conditions favorable for (global) reform while continuing to support a world dominated by Western powers. Such a project necessitated a significant intellectual investment that included knowledge production in related areas. IR was an ideal candidate for this, as advancing this subject meant at the same time creating new interconnected elites. This connection between Americans and Europeans is important because such conditions allowed scholars and foundations to cooperate for longer periods. This ties to the third point which concerns the role of international scholarly associations in the interwar and post-1945 period. The ISC and post-1945 international scholarly associations and organizations made it possible for scholars to interact, and served as multipliers for the expansion of dominant ideas of IR. Even in the interwar years, the numerical power of continental European participants at ISC conferences would be balanced by American and British scholars' impact thanks to more advanced institutionalization of IR studies in the US and UK. The post-1945 period witnessed the standardization of political science and IR through the American-directed International Political Science Association (IPSA) and, more broadly, through UNESCO. Transnational dynamics are visible in this context as national and international associations interacted with governments and scholars in drawing the future path of these new social sciences in Europe (and beyond).

I first discuss an important analysis by the Norwegian IR scholar Torbjørn Knutsen who refers to the late 19th century as IR's actual birth point. While discussions in the German and French chapters show the greater relevance of the 20th century, it is still

useful to take into consideration the position developed by Knutsen in order to understand that IR was not an area of study that came onto the academic stage in a *deus ex machina* fashion. Later, I turn to the history of the ISC and its two conferences, 1938 in Prague and 1950 in Windsor. The meeting in the UK was also its last gathering in the form of a general conference. Both conferences had a shared topic of discussion: the teaching of IR. Thus, they provide a helpful setting from which to develop the later analyses in the two country chapters as they provide early insights about IR's disciplinary capacities as debated by its own scholars. I conclude this chapter by underlining in a separate section the general characteristics of US philanthropies, referring to their global interactions so that their German and French involvements (which I discuss in the country cases) can be understood from a broader perspective.

III.1. Does IR Have an Origin?

A recent case for a chronologically earlier beginning for the discipline was put forward by Torbjørn Knutsen who spoke of “a lost generation” of IR scholars whose contributions to the discipline are largely ignored by the later disciplinary self-understanding prevalent among the members of today's IR community. Similar to earlier critiques, Knutsen sees the demise of the (until now) dominant myth of IR's origins, with its major focus on the great debates because it is not able to face revisionist historical research. In this context, mainstream explanations that see IR's development only in the mid-20th century's idealists vs. realists confrontations are overcome.¹²³ Instead, he

¹²³ According to the usual narrative of IR's historical development, the discipline took shape via a number

advocates the use of a different approach, namely a method of regress, which mainly consists of tracing the references of earlier major works in the discipline. Obviously, there should be a point in time at which one has to stop. In Knutsen's opinion, this is the period around the 1890s because it is marked by a greater number of texts that also contain an analytical approach, differing from the more descriptive works of earlier decades.¹²⁴

While I will deal with this issue of actual origins of IR, especially when looking at the relevant German scholarly debates on the origins of the discipline, it is important to explain why this aspect of foundational specificity plays an essential role. These choices determine what periods a disciplinary history of IR has to cover. Even if it is based on only one of the multiple factors such as scholars, literature, concepts, institutions or state connections, the era one identifies as the formative period shapes profoundly the way the emerging narrative is presented. As I tried to clarify in the discussion of Hobson's recent revisionist account of IR's Western origins, it is always important to note the places in which first trials for a structured study of world politics – the outcome of which would be the IR discipline – could be witnessed. In this regard, Knutsen's assertion that the early authors focusing on world politics were mainly from the contemporary great powers like Great Britain, France, and Germany testifies to the significance of such an understanding. This reiterates my earlier point about the ties between actual world political power and

of formative waves/debates. The first one is located by many scholars in the 1930s-1940s, and had the less scholarly inclined idealists who faced their realist colleagues who were prone for more scientific research (at interested in power instead of values). On the other hand, the sources mentioned in fn. 2 (chapter I) provide a successful rejection of these narratives.
124 Knutsen, 2008: 652.

the way this power is substantiated via scholarly studies, in a simultaneous or even *ex post facto* way.

Knutsen points to the fact that the early authors were not only academicians from separate fields such as history, law, and the newly emerging social sciences, but also journalists, diplomats, and activists, concentrating their research and thought in the areas of war, wealth, peace, and power.¹²⁵ It is therefore possible to perceive these areas as loosely connected to the ongoing transformation of the era, ranging from the colonial expansion of the late 19th century to questions of sharing world capital. For Knutsen, security is a common thread of studies undertaken in that period.

With regard to country-specific developments in the area of world political scholarship, Knutsen mentions the French *Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques* (ELSP, founded in 1872) in Paris, whose role will be discussed in detail in the chapter on French IR. He sees this institute's weight in world political studies decreasing in the later 19th century, with a similar comment concerning the social sciences in Germany in the case of their concept of *Staatwissenschaften* (sciences of state).¹²⁶ The more relevant studies on world politics derived, according to Knutsen, more from German historians of the period, including famous names like Leopold von Ranke and Heinrich von Treitschke. However, as I will demonstrate in both cases, the 20th century witnessed a gradual concentration of world political studies in the domain of IR

¹²⁵ Knutsen, 2008: 653-654.

¹²⁶ It is important to underline the broader meaning of the German concept of *Wissenschaft*. While I translate it as science or knowledge, it is useful to bear in mind that this word refers to an intensive scholarly engagement that aims to bring about more knowledge through research.

specialists. It is in this regard that my focus on German and French institutions and scholars of the period will analyze the extent to which IR became a more independent scholarly enterprise. In the American case, Knutsen sees in the large number of universities a possibility for more discussion, paving the way for the relevant sections within the American Political Science Association (founded in 1903) that dealt with world politics, be it the aspects of international law or politics and colonial affairs. Paul Reinsch and his early books on world politics are mentioned, as well as the fact that classes on world politics were taught by him at the University of Wisconsin in the 1900s.¹²⁷ This points to the early influence of an independently structured IR discipline in the US case, explaining also the reasons for its more developed nature.

A general proposition concerning the more advanced state of Anglo-American scholarship in IR relates to the existence of private sponsorship for debates on world politics, a reflection of the powerful civil society in these two countries. However, as will be shown in the case studies, non-governmental influences also played a significant role in the European IR communities. While it is undeniable that the Garton Foundation (founded by the rich English businessman Sir Richard Garton in order to promote the views of Norman Angell following his book *The Great Illusion*) or Round Table (a group bringing together elites across the British Empire) contributed much to debates on the nature of world politics, such undertakings cannot be seen as exclusive Anglo-American

¹²⁷ Knutsen, 2008: 659-660.

enterprises, as the analysis of their European counterparts in consequent chapters will show.¹²⁸

In line with more general historical analyses of IR, Knutsen concludes by accepting the bigger impact of the First World War in triggering advanced studies of world politics. Many things written during the war can be counted among the first textbooks of the new discipline. Nevertheless, he still insists on the earlier impact of the late 19th century socio-economic and political changes on the creation of IR as a distinct area of interest, and contrasts the issue-wise broader literature of the pre-war period with the interests of the post-1918 period that were more narrowly limited to war and peace.¹²⁹

Knutsen's approach provides a helpful guide in the sense of making the IR community aware of the fact that earlier studies on world politics were not necessarily of an academic character; they had a broader field of engagement that aimed to reach the public opinion, political movements, earlier NGOs, and to connect to newly emerging institutes of social – and political – sciences. I turn to the issue of disciplinary origins again during the German IR, by pointing to German scholars' interpretations and analyses of this issue. First, it is important to discuss the special role played by the International Studies Conference (ISC), an influential organization that served mainly in the interwar period as a meeting place for scholars with different backgrounds showing a common interest in IR studies.

128 Knutsen, 2008: 662-666.

129 Knutsen, 2008: 668.

III.2. IR's Forgotten Past: The International Studies Conference (ISC)

In 1938, the International Studies Conference (ISC), the most important organization bringing together experts on international relations in the interwar period, held its annual meeting in Prague. The records of this Eleventh Session were published the next year, on the eve of the Second World War. I will focus on the discussions and presentations held in Prague in order to underline how European debates extensively shaped the development of IR. Afterwards, I will engage similarly with the last ISC conference held in Windsor in 1950 and point to important points highlighted throughout the meeting.

These two meetings will provide a useful revision to the prevailing wisdom in IR that sees the discipline as limited to – using a label proposed by Kalevi Holsti in his study of the discipline's scholarly publications and impact – an American-British condominium.¹³⁰ Debates from the late 1930s and early 1950s show that indeed American and British, or to use a much favored French expression, Anglo-Saxon approaches have been at the forefront of efforts to generate a certain way of doing IR. The very fact that both meetings had British scholars as their rapporteurs can be interpreted as a sign of the contemporary eminence of UK scholars in the newly emerging study of IR. At that time, the British IR community had a privileged position due to their already established IR chairs and their bridging function between the two sides of the North Atlantic. However, the discussions in these two meetings also demonstrate that continental Europeans were, in turn, busy coming up with their different explanations and expectations with regard to

¹³⁰ See Holsti, 1985.

a newly emerging scientific undertaking, demonstrating their commitment even in the earlier phases of IR's disciplinary history.

III.2.a. An Internationalists' *International*: The origins and features of ISC

The League of Nations' main body on scholarly collaboration was the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC). It included among its members world-renowned scholars such as Henri Bergson, Albert Einstein, and Marie Curie.¹³¹ According to Daniel Laqua, the main aim of this League of Nations organ was to promote intellectuals' social relevance by aiming at the creation of a functioning order that could furthermore help in stabilizing the world of the interwar years.

This organ made an important decision about the relevance of world political studies in its Fifth Assembly, the resolution underlining “the fundamental importance of familiarising young people throughout the world with the principles and work of the League of Nations, and of training the younger generation to regard international cooperation as the normal method of conducting world affairs.” Following this, a later establishment, the Paris-based International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) was given the secretarial task of realizing just such cooperation by bringing together various organizations focused on world politics and the study thereof.¹³² Alfred Zimmern, famous as the first professor of International Politics at the Aberystwyth and later Montague Burton Professor of IR at Oxford, was the deputy director of IIIC,¹³³ a point of

131 Laqua, 2011: 224.

132 Riemens, 2011: 916.

133 Laqua, 2011: 224 and Riemens, 2011: 921.

relevance when thinking of his role as a personal coordinator between this mechanism for world-wide intellectual cooperation and the co-operation processes of IR scholars.

Initially called the Conference of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations and founded in 1928 in Berlin, this international organization for collaboration between IR experts would change its name to International Studies Conference (ISC) in 1933. Members were not governments but national committees that were representing various organs, mostly scholarly institutes, of their individual countries. In addition to these direct ISC memberships, individual institutes were to become affiliated members. For instance, the UK had a British Co-ordinating Committee that included representatives from the LSE and the Royal Institute of International Affairs.¹³⁴ The number of countries whose institutes were part of the ISC structure was 37 by the late 1930s; the US was also represented, although being outside the League of Nations structure in general.

The function of the ISC was recognized by the League of Nations which reported that “permanent and autonomous bodies, like the International Studies Conference, involve frequent meetings of technical committees of professors of political economy, sociology, history, international law, and racial geography [sic!], and of writers specialising in the study of international relations.”¹³⁵

From Germany, not only the DHfP, but also the Hamburg-based *Institut für Auswärtige Politik* (Foreign Policy Institute) as well as an institute for international law were participating in the ISC, while *Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques* (ELSP), *Ecole*

134 Long, 2006: 604 and Riemens, 2011: 920.

135 Long, 2006: 605.

des Hautes Etudes Sociales and *Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales*, all three of them in Paris, were the French participants, joined by the University of Paris' Law and Letters faculties. The Geneva School of International Studies (IHEI), founded with the support of US foundations, was another member institute. ISC's first meeting took place in Berlin in 1928, at *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik* (DHfP, the German institute that introduced major political and international studies in the interwar era, which I analyze in the German IR chapter). It was a means for providing IR scholars with a platform through which they could interact, thus filling a gap in the area of academic cooperation. In the 1930s, the decision was made to deal with contemporary issues, choosing topics of policy-relevance that would be studied by scholars in order to prepare joint reports. At the twelfth conference, convened in August 1939, "international organization" was chosen as the next topic of study. Interestingly, in the crisis-laden years of 1935-1937 the subject of study was "peaceful change." In this regard, it is important to note that the ISC was interested not in individual assessments of scholars, but more in the reflections of a particular country that would be carried over into the scholarly reports. This can be seen as a means of providing useable "guidebooks" that would clarify various differences between national positions at a time of significant conflicts in the world political arena.¹³⁶

In addition to these biannual studies, the reports written for the annual meetings provide useful sources for the history of the discipline. For instance, it was Zimmern's ISC report that mentioned the idea of an idealist vs. realist setting in debates on world affairs. Even earlier, in 1934 and 1935 meetings, delegates from fascist Italy had rejected

¹³⁶ Riemens, 2011: 917-919 and Parmar, 2011: 290, fn. 189.

notions of collective security while emphasizing the utmost significance of national interests.¹³⁷

Among all these ISC meetings, the 1938 Prague meeting deserves special emphasis. As also acknowledged by Knud Erik Jørgensen, the debates in Prague, the city itself in the focus of world attention in those months, were finally about the very nature of the discipline's definition.¹³⁸ It was in that meeting that the participants were given copies of a recent study by S. H. Bailey from LSE. Its title, *International Studies in Modern Education* made clear the topic, its general conclusion underlining the rather advanced nature of IR in the US and the UK due to the stronger position of social scientific studies in the Anglo-American countries. In his study, Bailey went on to emphasize the less flexible nature of continental European universities, seeing the French as the model example with their more conservative approach to new departments, thus disabling advances similar to the ones made in the US by the establishment of political science as a separate discipline. The French focus on law apparently prevented such an approach. As a consequence, he categorized four types of countries, also using the 1932-1933 international inquiry that had resulted from the wishes of the League of Nations, the ICIC as well as the ISC. This interest for IR had made surveys of this scholarly area possible across the world, providing useful information on the differences of studying world politics in various countries. His first category consisted of the US and the UK where there existed not only perfect access to resources but also a good institutional setting.

137 Riemens, 2011: 921.

138 Jørgensen, 2003: 330.

Countries like Australia, Canada, France, Italy and Japan formed the second group, the common feature of which was the local institutions' willingness to advance IR studies. Countries with less advanced institutionalized structures for scholars marked the third group, Belgium, India, and Czechoslovakia being some examples. The last group included all the remaining countries which lacked both the resources and the scholars necessary for the study of international affairs.¹³⁹ With some generalizations, it should be possible to assert the existence of a similar 4-layered IR hierarchy even in the early 21st century.

III.2.b. The 1938 ISC Prague Conference

In the 1935 London and 1936 Madrid meetings, ISC members decided to focus more directly on “the nature and scope of international relations as an academic subject” as well as how it can be taught at universities. Thus the way was paved for the 1938 Prague debates that focused not on IR's various study objects, but on this emerging area of study as such. One has to note that this enterprise was completed at a time when similar efforts were underway in various national contexts. The US had its 1937 reports of IR, French scholars prepared their own assessments about social sciences in France that included IR as a separate subject (which I discuss in the chapter dealing with French IR's disciplinary history), in 1938 Oxford University Press published a British overview of IR's place in modern education for the UK context. Contributions came from the Rockefeller

¹³⁹ Riemens, 2011: 922-925.

Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, showing the important support from American philanthropies for the development of IR's scientific establishment.¹⁴⁰

In the 1939 volume titled *University Teaching of International Relations – A Record of the Eleventh Session of the International Studies Conference Prague 1938* included its editor's, Oxford IR professor Alfred Zimmern's earlier introduction report presented to the 1935 London ISC meeting. There he pointed to the way that the study of International Relations was described at the University of Oxford's examination statutes and regulations: “includes the study of the relations both between governments and between peoples, and of the principles underlying their development.” While Zimmern sees in this definition a case of “British vagueness,” it provides a useful starting point for understanding the broad nature of dealing with world political phenomena and processes, as both states and peoples are seen as constitutive bodies, thus providing an implicit core of future British ideas on international society. This aspect of the discipline, what one might call the “broad-ability” of IR, led to Zimmern's half-sarcastic remarks: “Thus, in the interests of the Conference itself we might well inscribe on our banner the words: *Nihil humana alienum a nobis petamus.*” Influenced by the contemporary concept used by Mussolini, Zimmern talked about IR as “not a single subject but a bundle of subjects,” that is “a fascio.” For him, the study of International Relations provided in the end “a point of view.”¹⁴¹

140 Zimmern, 1939: 3, 6. As the rapporteur was Zimmern, his name is used when referring to the report and the written and spoken contributions provided by other scholars, although their specific names/positions are mentioned directly when I refer to them in the main text.

141 Zimmern, 1939: 7-9. Of course, this famous Latin expression is most closely associated with Karl Marx, who used a similar expression to summarize his general interest in the human being and the

Definitional differences already marked ISC meetings as a French professor would note in 1935 meeting that English used to call it international relations, while in France one tended to speak of international politics. At the 1938 Prague meeting, Alfred von Verdross, from the Austrian Coordinating Committee for International Studies, presented a similar differentiation when he asserted that international relations was an “Anglo-Saxon expression” with “multifarious meanings.”¹⁴² However, as will be seen later, the French were also using the label of international relations, as their 1937 report on social sciences would show.

At the 1938 conference, Zimmern presented a preliminary memorandum in his capacity as the rapporteur, defending IR as “a distinguishable body of material which lends itself to separate study under the name of International Relations” which deserves to become a subject for university teaching. Now, it was time for him to start a detailed discussion on how to implement IR as a subject of study, including the actual locations at which to provide IR teaching.¹⁴³ From one perspective, it becomes possible to recognize in the 1938 meeting the origins of IR's final academization. While chairs of International Relations already existed by that time, the real explosion was to take place in the mid- to late 20th century because only then did the discipline become truly global in terms of its academic teaching. Therefore, one could see in this whole process the realization of a project that was based on establishing IR as a separate academic discipline.

humanity. Its English translation would be “Nothing human is foreign to me.”
142 Zimmern, 1939: 13, 23.
143 Zimmern, 1939: 16.

The discipline's interwovenness with contemporary events, with ongoing developments in world politics can be most usefully demonstrated by pointing to the opening of the Prague meeting in May 1938 by the Czechoslovak minister of social welfare and his opening speech at the inaugural meeting. There, a minister of this small Central European democracy, already threatened by Hitler's Germany would refer to ISC's previous work on the issue of collective security: "When the whole world was once more confronted with the question of war, with the threat to the existence of certain free States, you decided to discuss scientifically whether and how the world can be reformed and how social relations can be bettered by peaceful means."¹⁴⁴ On the other hand, this statement also presaged in an ironic fashion the failure of IR to succeed in fulfilling its original promise of providing tools for solving world conflicts in non-violent ways. Only a few months later, the Munich Agreement would follow, and one year after the ISC conference, Czechoslovakia was already dismembered.

An important aspect that points to the dominance not of Anglo-American but continental European participation emerges from the list of participants at the 1938 conference. While scholars from British and US institutes are a visible presence, ranging from the rapporteur himself (Alfred Zimmern) to John Eugene Harley, a professor of political science at University of Southern California who participated in the Prague meeting as an observer, and to the dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, it is also essential to consider the interest shown by continental European institutions and their scholars. While the French Henri Bonnet's directorship of the International Institute

¹⁴⁴ Zimmern, 1939: 207.

of Intellectual Co-operation (the League of Nations-connected unit under which ISC came into being) at the time is understandable by considering its being supported by the French government, the conference numbers highlighted a Central European dominance. Out of 55 participants, 12 were from Czechoslovakia, explainable by the venue of the event. Prague as the meeting place also clarifies why so many people (16 of them) came as representatives from the neighboring countries of Central and Eastern Europe, namely Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary. Two Australians and one Chilean represented two continents, whereas Japan and Brazil had sent three observers. For the Western European countries, France, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, and Switzerland had each their representatives, ranging from one to three. The British delegation included 5 and the American 4, with the Canadians another two.

From all these figures, one can infer that the ISC was not an Anglo-American enterprise, notwithstanding the visible influence of these two countries in the emerging discipline of International Relations. With regard to the study areas of these scholars, the picture is one of mixed origins, as there were political scientists, economists, scholars of international law, and historians. This dimension provides a useful means for understanding that International Relations was a research concentration in which scholars from various disciplines were coming together.¹⁴⁵

145 Whereas the future course of IR has become one highly correlated with political science, the legacy of a broader international focus lives on in the shape of the North American International Studies Association (ISA) and other national-regional association as well as the newly established World International Studies Conference (WISC) which include specialists from many disciplines in their conferences.

On the other hand, Germans were not present, with the exception of a single observer from Heidelberg University. Although the founding meeting that generated the ISC had taken place ten years earlier in Berlin at DHfP, the Nazi takeover had detached German scholars from this international association in line with Germany's withdrawal from membership in the League of Nations. With regard to the interest shown by American foundations was significant the participation (as observer) of Tracy Barrett Kittredge in his capacity as the assistant director at the Social Sciences Division of the Rockefeller Foundation as was that of Malcolm Davis (full participant and chairman of meetings held on “economic policies in relation to world peace”), the associate director of the European Center (in Paris) of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The conference's opening also witnessed a general summary of the situation faced by this newly emerging area of study. According to Zimmern, for a decade, the ISC and scholars associated in its projects “have been engaged in practicing international relations, in discussing problems; today, we are asking what this new subject is.” In his narrative, IR was “a child of the [First World] war, a product of wartime conditions.” In the UK and many other countries, people would discover in the war and the early postwar context that their knowledge about the broader world and its different political constellations was insufficient. As a consequence, this initial situation, combined with a quest for more information and also a search for overcoming conflicts paved the way for an emerging discipline of IR.¹⁴⁶

146 Zimmern, 1939: 212, 216.

On the other hand, in Zimmern's assessment, the dominant features of IR had changed, no longer resembling its post-First World War characteristics. These earlier aspects had been tied more to descriptive works, offering more on an informational level. However, by the late 1930s, he saw these features more represented by structures like the Royal Institute of International Affairs, but not by IR specialists. The scope of IR's subjects was not limited to issues of League of Nations, or the diplomatic system anymore. While Zimmern acknowledged that many textbooks kept their focus on interstate relations, he was quick to offer a broader perspective. All scholars agreed, in his opinion, that IR's subject has gone beyond such a narrow focus.¹⁴⁷ This meant that states were not the only thing to be studied by IR scholars. The usual post-1919 research agenda tied to the League and its functions was seen as not serving the expectations from world political studies that were in need of expansion. This shows that a desire for broadening its research and study dimensions existed already in the pre-1945 period, with scholars suggesting leaving behind the earlier role of merely descriptive-informative studies.

Zimmern was also critical of what one could call the utopians. While their impact was also relevant, he sees in this circle of scholars more “sentimentalists” who have been more prone to wishful thinking instead of providing fact-based studies. However, his position is also one that rejects a preference for “ethical neutrality.” Opposing the views of a fellow British scholar, Charles Manning, Zimmern asserts that “the effort of the scientist is itself a moral effort, because the search for truth is part of the whole of morality.” He stated explicitly, on the other hand, that Manning's proposition was

¹⁴⁷ Zimmern, 1939: 225-226, 252ff.

acceptable in the sense of first “see[ing] reality, and thus later on [deciding] what should be done in order to make the world better.”¹⁴⁸ These statements can be taken to be among the first proposals developed in the context of IR's ethical-normative functions, an issue of much prominence in the discipline's later periods.¹⁴⁹

The topic of academic freedom, an issue of intermittent debate in IR circles (as will be also discussed in the context of German and, more specifically, French IR contexts) was also prominent in the Prague debates. Brooks Emeny, a professor from the US had to withdraw his words of critique directed at the European colleagues and its educational conditions. Dietrich Schindler, a Swiss professor, in his capacity as the chairman of the second meeting, defended the old continent by asserting that “freedom of teaching is guaranteed by the Constitutions of most of the democratic and liberal countries, which are still in the majority in Europe.”¹⁵⁰ While this defense can be seen as rather surreal, taking into consideration the demise of democratic regimes even before the Second World War, it shows the significance given to saving Europe's reputation in the face of American challenges in the area of academic status.

What was the state of American IR compared to European contributions? According to Halford Hoskins, the Fletcher School Dean, “in recent times there has been a great growth in interest in international affairs in the United States.” US scholars were able to

148 Zimmern, 1939: 217, 229.

149 It is important to note in this context that Manning would emerge in the later parts of the 20th century as an apologist for Apartheid in South Africa, his country of birth. As a consequence, his strong anti-normative position in IR debates, as seen in his opposition to Zimmern's more normative stance, has to be rethought in a wider framework. Also significant is the fact that Manning was excluded from the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics that stood at the origins of the English School in IR. For more details on these aspects, see Dunne, 1998.

150 Zimmern, 1939: 312.

use the conferences of the ISC to praise their advances, as the study of IR had extended to many graduate schools and university departments. Interestingly, he refrained from using the label, International Relations, preferring instead International Affairs. The reason was that the former was seen as too broad an area of study by American scholarship.¹⁵¹ European self-appraisal, on the other hand, came from Paul Guggenheim, from the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies (IHEI). He did not only comment on the international character of his school, which was founded with the support of the Carnegie Endowment in the mid-1920s, but also mentioned the epistemological advantages of this internationality. Thanks to international interactions going on in Geneva and at this institute, scholars affiliated with IHEI were able to “constantly revise their viewpoints.”¹⁵² In fact, the geo-epistemological conditions at Geneva can be interpreted as a feature of a combination of European academic traditions, the international presence in the city thanks to the League of Nations as well as co-operation with Americans that started with its very founding and the CEIP involvement in that process.

Paul Guggenheim, a professor at IHEI in Geneva used the debates to criticize what he perceived as the parochial nature of IR studies prevailing in many countries. With the exception perhaps of “the Anglo-Saxon countries, whose interests are world-wide in many fields,” he asserted that the general approach was one in which scholars were choosing to study issues of direct relevance to their country. Such a preference was “not

¹⁵¹ Zimmern, 1939: 312-313.

¹⁵² Zimmern, 1939: 314.

unnatural”); however, it presented a threat to the further development of IR.¹⁵³ Guggenheim's suggestion presents an early sign of the reasons for Anglo-American ascendancy and dominance in IR studies. The geopolitical omnipresence of these two countries that arose in the late 19th and early 20th centuries from the British power, and in the case of the mid- and late 20th century from American power, had brought about their immanent interest in matters international. Therefore, the reasons for these two countries' and their scholars' major position in the discipline of IR can be tied to their global interests and the necessities this generated for more knowledge of others. Under these circumstances, it becomes possible to understand why IR in its *institutionalized* version first took shape in the UK and the US. However, still to be noted is the importance of not taking the institutionalization dimension for the whole of IR, not ignoring the great interest shown by scholars and pundits for IR and world politics even in the absence of its academic establishment.

When Zimmern presented the final report of the 1938 conference, he was still not able to answer certain essential questions, showing the existence of conflicting viewpoints that made it impossible for the participants to agree on a shared position. One of the heavily debated areas was the previously mentioned aspect of value neutrality. No conclusion was reached in that regard, as some scholars perceived IR studies as a normative undertaking, whereas others favored a strict detachment from a chosen normative position. On the other hand, a unanimously supported statement pertained to IR's scope. In this regard, scholars agreed that inter-state relations should not provide the

153 Zimmern, 1939: 315.

boundaries for their subject, thus going beyond studying the League of Nations and international organizations.¹⁵⁴

Important for recognizing the already active engagement of American scholars in the domain of IR, it is useful to turn to Zimmern's final remarks that “the study of international relations is very much more systematically developed in the [u]niversities of the United States than in any other part of the world and that this development has taken place almost entirely since 1918.”¹⁵⁵ Therefore, although the structure of the ISC with its predominantly European members, and its representatives from all five continents pointed to an interwar organization not dominated by Anglo-Americans, in the specific level of IR scholarship, even this earlier period witnessed the important contributions by these two countries. Nevertheless, the 1938 and 1950 conferences also served to provide a picture of IR, both in its organizational and scholarly aspects that made the active participation of continental Europeans visible. In order to provide a broader understanding of these dynamics, I turn now to ISC's last conference in Windsor, whose debates were edited by Geoffrey Goodwin in the following year. This report serves as another marker of discipline's developmental pathways.

It is important to understand that these two conferences point to a different dimension of IR in the late interwar and early post-Second World War years. Instead of the much repeated claims of idealist-realist debates, in which scholars such as E. H. Carr (in his famous book *The Twenty Years' Crisis*) criticized “utopianists” with their League

154 Zimmern, 1939: 325ff.

155 Zimmern, 1939: 323-333.

of Nations and international law interests and defended the relevance of national interests and power politics, this period arises in a broader light when the two conferences are taken into consideration. The debates that I highlight demonstrate that IR's academic standing and prospects were discussed by both European and American participants in a way that did not remain focused merely on theoretical or paradigmatic concerns. The influence of American foundations and international scholarly associations as well as ideas about the emerging discipline's university future played a significant role in shaping the conference agendas.

III.2.c. The 1950 ISC Windsor Conference

In 1950, the ISC organized an important post-World War II meeting in Windsor, which followed from the previous year's administrative gathering in Paris. The list of Windsor participants included Jacques Chapsal (Sciences Po's director), Jacques Lambert, who had by then also become active at FNSP in addition to his Lyon law professorship, and Jacques Vernant, by then the ISC secretary general. Among non-French participants were the ISC chairman H. O. Christophersen from Norway, Frederick S. Dunn from Yale and the director of its Institute for International Studies, the associate director of CEIP, Malcolm Davis as well as Charles Manning, a University of London IR professor. They were joined by scholars from diverse locations and institutions such as LSE, Brussels, Aberdeen, UNESCO, Amsterdam and Australia.

The meeting was to deal with a report exclusively prepared for its participants to discuss, written by Charles Manning. Under the new conditions of post-1945, IR specialists faced a brighter future, one strengthened by the 1948 UNESCO resolution taken at its Utrecht conference. This resolution decided “that all those Universities not already possessing Chairs or Departments, and not otherwise providing for teaching and research on the subject of International Relations, be urged as soon as possible to establish such Chairs or Departments, or make other provision for such systematic teaching and research.”¹⁵⁶ In Manning's opening report, it was recognized that interwar IR had shown significant advances and witnessed an increasing number of institutes taking part in the work of ISC. However, he also added that on the level of university education, only a limited number of places had established independent departments in IR.

As World War II had interrupted ISC activities, now there arose a new opportunity to make up for the lost time. In Manning's opinion, this era was also important to go beyond its interwar record because IR as a discipline was partially to blame for the great catastrophe of the Second World War. He pointed to the effects of “academic complacency” that had played a certain role not to be overlooked in analyzing the causes of that war.¹⁵⁷ Such a statement is important, as it shows the worries of IR scholars even before the onset of the Cold War confrontation that co-evolved with the emergence of IR's university teaching. Therefore, it becomes visible that academicians were already

156 Goodwin, 1951: 11. As the rapporteur was Geoffrey Goodwin, his name is used in referring to the 1951 volume and the contributions provided there by other scholars, although their specific names/positions are mentioned directly when I refer to them in the main text.

157 Goodwin, 1951: 25.

expecting more effective consequences from their work that could change the state of world politics.

It is important to underline that despite its global connections, the ISC had been a place dominated by Europeans. In the post-World War II period, ISC's gradual demise and end can be seen as being in harmony with the concomitant rise of the US to superpower status, and American influence in shaping the post-1945 social sciences. The early American influence in UNESCO as well as its impact within various international scholarly associations emerging in those years would make US impact more visible in the development of the social sciences after the Second World War.

At Windsor, the participants presented a statement on university teaching of IR that urged the discipline to take its place among other social sciences. Furthermore, IR was thought of largely in the context of international society, which itself was seen as insufficiently studied.¹⁵⁸ However, calls for an independent discipline of IR were to meet some objections, although not to the same degree as at the ISC's 1937 meeting in Prague. IR could be a “distinct subject” but for some it was still not a new discipline, but only an interdisciplinary undertaking.¹⁵⁹ The participants agreed to disagree on various aspects, an issue emphasized by Manning's summary of 17 points in which scholars showed *pro* and *contra* positions about the prospects of a more broadly institutionalized university teaching. No clear dominant perspective emerged on the possibility of its relevance as a subject matter, with regard to its potentials as a matter of teaching as well as about the

158 Goodwin, 1951: 36.

159 Goodwin, 1951: 37.

aims of such programs to be established at the university level. While the conference's main goal was to reach a consensus on the prospects of the university teaching of IR, the participants could not come to a decision on the feasibility of it as a separate area of study within the academic world. More interdisciplinary understandings were confronted by a newer scholarly generation in the opinion of which IR could arise as a separate discipline.

The differences among the scholarly positions were recognized by Dunn, the director of Yale's Institute for International Studies, who said that an abstract definition of IR could not emerge, as such definitions were “always for a purpose.” Becoming a constructivist *avant-le-mot*, Dunn asserted that “at one time what you mean by International Relations may not be the thing it would mean at another time for another purpose.”¹⁶⁰ This clarification summarized the debates held during the meeting because all scholars brought to the agenda their individual positions that were heavily influenced by national academic and socio-political cultures from which they came. For instance, the French could not overcome the legacy of a broader approach to IR that did not enable a direct subdisciplinary status under political science, such as was found in the US.

The position of Malcolm Davis, the CEIP associate director was significant. For him, IR's development “calls for constant foresight in terms of thinking about the forces coming from the fields even of other sciences, the natural sciences, which affect international relationships and international life.” Merging in his talk physicists and atoms and political scientists, he asked for “a fruitful interchange of thought” that could enable better means of dealing with “the emerging problems, or perhaps the old problems

¹⁶⁰ Goodwin, 1951: 40-41.

in new outlines, with which we shall constantly be faced.”¹⁶¹ This attitude showed a tendency that was valid among US foundations who stood decisively behind newly emerging disciplines like political science or IR. There existed this assumption about a linkage between research and study (undertaken by scholars) and the benefits that could be reached by turning to their work so that one could overcome the conflict-ridden international system, or guide policy-makers toward moderate destinations. At the same time, the presence of an American foundation's representative points to a continuing interest shown by US philanthropies for the advancement of IR as a discipline that could provide new insights on world politics.

For the French scholar Vernant, the teaching of IR should be about providing students at the undergraduate level with “a method which will enable them in constantly changing situations to adapt a scientific perspective in which to study these situations, to analyse them by virtue of a specific orientation of the mind.”¹⁶² The idea was to use IR as a means for helping the students to be more fully prepared for a world that was undergoing constant change. On the other hand, his co-national, Chapsal, the Sciences Po director, was in favor of a more limited IR, one that would teach basic facts and provide some necessary data so that they could undertake “exact analyses.” A general engagement with IR subjects was seen as too challenging for students in the early stages of their studies.¹⁶³

161 Goodwin, 1951: 42.

162 Goodwin, 1951: 49.

163 Goodwin, 1951: 46.

It is important to understand what kind of factors influenced the development of varying perceptions about IR among scholars from different national backgrounds. One significant answer was provided at the meeting. A professor of human geography from the University of Geneva suggested that the differences between “the Anglo-Saxon and continental conceptions” of IR, “in regard to objectives, methods, institutions” were triggered by “historical as well as geographical reasons.”¹⁶⁴ Leaving aside his possibly personal-scholarly reasons for underlining the influence of geography, it is helpful to consider this aspect as a point of departure. Therefore, the debates at the 1950 ISC meeting demonstrated the existence of a divide that was more visible than at the time of its pre-World War II versions. In that regard, the war experiences of relevant participants and of their countries could be interpreted as having further determined the future course of various scholars' approach toward the study of IR. In that regard, while political science and subsequently IR would go through a process of rebirth in West Germany, in the French case, one could detect the actual emergence of a weak political science and IR. The weakness of French IR could be also explained as a result of the dominant position of legal studies, thus putting obstacles on a separate disciplinary enterprise, and the lack of theorization which would become the modern common denominator of IR studies under the influence of American scholarship.

It was only natural that the most influential American participant of the meeting, the Yale professor Dunn would underline the role of “modern Social Science” in order to “gain the self-awareness which permits objectivity in interpreting the data of the society

¹⁶⁴ Goodwin, 1951: 50.

in which one finds oneself.” For him, “the full range of human action” was now open to be studied and thus to be discovered.¹⁶⁵ The disinterest of continental Europeans to such a tendency for general theorizing would be a major point of difference from their American colleagues.

In the case of Sciences Po, Chapsal informed other participants of the meeting that French students were willing to take IR-related courses when these were offered. Establishing new departments and chairs would be a useful way of extending the supply-side of IR. However, for Chapsal it was also important to educate a certain number of students who would become prospective advisers to decision-makers.¹⁶⁶ Thus, IR was perceived not only as a general means of enabling students to reach a certain level of expected knowledge on the international dimensions, but also for preparing them to have important future careers. At one point, however, the director of Sciences Po was more direct in his skepticism about IR's separateness and suggested that “a[n independent] department [of IR] is... inconceivable” as “more traditional and classical disciplines” would be too much challenged as a result of such a move. Older disciplines such as history and law would have to face the discipline of IR, which was itself quite rich in the sense of being an intersection of many scientific fields, including these two competing and more established fields.¹⁶⁷

During the debates, the issue of inter-generational differences was explicitly mentioned as a factor that could explain scholarly opinions and backgrounds. According

165 Goodwin, 1951: 51.

166 Goodwin, 1951: 57.

167 Goodwin, 1951: 64.

to a participant from the University of Geneva, scholars under 50 would not accept a synthesized structure of IR, being more prone to see in the discipline an independent study whose birth they were witnessing. This observation demonstrated that a gradual standardization was setting in. Notwithstanding the inconclusive nature of the debates held at Windsor, this remark illustrated that the younger scholars were following a certain approach that was more structured with regard to its dimensions of interests, compared to the older generation for whom IR was a very broad field of study. A gradual departmentalization could take shape once this new generation could advance its paradigmatic revolution in a Kuhnian fashion.¹⁶⁸

Another relevant analysis in the meeting came from Dunn who referred to a feature shared by all social science disciplines at their earlier stages. For him, this concerned the uncertainty when answering the question whether an emerging discipline had its own methods or vocabulary through which it could create its distinct niche in the general social scientific spectrum. While dynamism marks the initial periods of a new discipline, there arises a significant future threat for the discipline if tying itself on one of its original methods and conceptual tools without staying open to future changes. At this juncture, Dunn perceived the danger of complacency that could even “in some cases preven[t] them from seeing that the groups of problems that originally concerned [the discipline] have somewhat lost their importance.”¹⁶⁹ This is a significant and early warning that

¹⁶⁸ This means that ones scholarly generations change (through retirement, passing away, losing influence), then it becomes for new scholars to more easily defend and advance their different approaches as the former gatekeepers have lost their initial power. For these aspects see Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.

¹⁶⁹ Goodwin, 1951: 59.

illustrates to a certain degree the prospective paths taken by the discipline's earlier antagonistic paradigms, idealism and realism with regard to challenges they were to face with changing times, that is when their initial approaches shaped under the conditions of a given world political context were no longer the same. That this possibility was recognized as early as 1950 shows the importance of looking back to the discipline's long trajectory when considering its present difficulties.

When it comes to differences between the position of IR in France on the one hand, and in the US or the UK on the other, Chapsal suggested reasons could be found in “the enormous superiority over the Latin systems of the Anglo-Saxon systems as regards the flexibility of University life, and the freedom of initiative – the free enterprise which is there manifest – and that... may make for a swifter development in Anglo-Saxon countries than in others.” However, such a direct statement, which recognized the obstacles that French scholars could face due to the features of their academic structure, was quickly softened when he added that continental universities were not “as fossilized” and “bureaucratic institutions” as they were perceived to be.¹⁷⁰ Chapsal spoke in fact from a position of experience, as it was he who had witnessed all the recent changes that his ELSP/IEP Paris had undergone in a dozen of years since the late 1930s (on these changes, see chapter IV below).

The very name of the discipline continued to generate controversies. An Italian participant in the meeting would declare: “You Anglo-Saxons... habitually use the phrase 'International Relations' and under this name you envisage a very particular and

¹⁷⁰ Goodwin, 1951: 61.

individualised subject; whereas with us the phrase 'International Relations' is an expression of the vaguest and widest kind. We are inclined to see in it rather a congeries of subjects than a particular discipline.”¹⁷¹ It is interesting to note this suggestion, as by that point one could have expected that at least the naming issue would be set aside, especially when considering that there existed a long pre-World War II history of ISC meetings and conferences held on the topic of IR. However, at the same time, this Italian objection can be seen as an instance of perceptual differences that were raised by the labels themselves, but for which the naming processes became just a symbolic marker. What the Americans, or previously the British, had in mind did not reflect the practical world political experiences of Italians and others, hence IR being interpreted varyingly among the participants of the ISC meeting.

The conceptual and institutional problems of IR were not limited to an international difference that had set the continentals against their Anglo-American counterparts. The uncertainty was also effective with regard to the conflicting meanings of International Relations and what Manning called “international studies in general.” According to him, universities were not clear with regard to differences between these two ideas. Such ambiguity created as a consequence an environment in which one could fail to see IR “as an independent discipline.”¹⁷²

The call for moderation in promoting the further development of IR as a discipline came from Lambert, the scholar held the peace chair at Lyon's Faculty of Law in the

171 Goodwin, 1951: 62.

172 Goodwin, 1951: 62.

interwar period. This influential professor with an international law background proposed to stay away from a possible “superiority complex” that follows “an educational innovator.” Many scholars assumed that “those who did not invent his branch of study are out of date.” While Lambert shared this critique at the account of more traditional scholars, in whom the reformist scholar saw “stupid, sleepy reactionaries... [who] must be shaken up,” he advised that it should be a gradual process by which a more updated discipline could be developed. Otherwise, traditional scholars of older disciplines would be triggered to react negatively, thus presenting an obstacle to IR's further advancement.¹⁷³

Such statements show the concerns of the early post-World War II community of IR specialists who were the ones undertaking the heavy work of establishing an independent academic discipline. While the preceding debates of the interwar period were significant, it was in the late 1940s and 1950s that the institutionalization of IR equaled its effective creation as a separate disciplinary undertaking. In cases where its independence was more limited, IR would be put under the heading of political science, thus making it into a subdiscipline in many instances.

As usual, with regard to the developmental trajectory of the discipline and its significance among other social sciences, the American position was different, where the already strong institutional set-up and scholarly richness of the US experience had provided a much better environment for the development of world political studies. For the director of Yale's Institute for International Studies, certain countries lacked “the

¹⁷³ Goodwin, 1951: 62.

preconditions for the emergence of the modern Political Science of International Relations.” This point was very significant, as it underlined the necessity for an academic community of having first reached a certain level of social scientific development so that a newly emerging discipline such as IR could be properly studied there. Without a proper political science and sociology, Dunn asserted, IR would remain “as a special extension of International Law or of Diplomatic History.”¹⁷⁴ When taking this proposition as a starting point, it becomes clear that at least in the case of French IR, this premonition has come to reflect the state of IR's much slower development there. Its two strong competitors, International Law and Diplomatic History have managed for a long time to face a political scientifically weak French IR scholarship whose connections to sociology (in the form of scholars like Aron, Vernant, and later Marcel Merle) did not suffice to counter the influence of law and history. As a consequence, in the absence of an advanced political science community, IR in its modern American guise could not emerge.

III.2.d. Post-Second World War: UNESCO's birth and the demise of ISC

In the post-1945 period, UNESCO took over the role of its predecessor from the time of the League of Nations, the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC). The political science branch of the new form of international cooperation came into being in 1949 when the International Political Science Association (IPSA) was established, triggering similar foundations in national contexts, with the French association (AFSP,

¹⁷⁴ Goodwin, 1951: 65.

Association Française de Science Politique) coming into being in 1949, the British one following in 1950, and the West German in 1951.¹⁷⁵

With regard to UNESCO, its Social Sciences Division had played a major role in the post-World War II years in furthering the world-wide development of the social sciences. Although the idea of social sciences was, in the eyes of many European scholars, not that separate from humanities, UNESCO's following of the US model paved the way for a distinct division for social sciences within this international organization. The intra-Western collaboration within UNESCO was not always easy. At one point IPSA's French secretary general objected to a statement about "France and Italy falling below Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian pedagogic standards" in the development of the discipline, upon which the observation was quickly removed.¹⁷⁶

Under these circumstances, while this new political science organization was established in 1949 through the efforts of UNESCO, the ISC was moving toward an early end. Not only was American support lacking, but also the new international scientific organization wanted to advance a more democratic scientific community, thus overcoming the institutional background of ISC that lay in the more elitist IIIC.¹⁷⁷ In the words of the era's IPSA president, the political scientific opposition toward IR was clearly expressed: "[I]nternational relations should be considered as an indivisible part of political science... It was completely illogical to divide State politics into two separate subjects, according to whether they concerned internal questions or relations with foreign

175 Adcock and Bevin, 2010: 73.

176 Selcer, 2009: 309-310, 316.

177 Long, 2006: 608-610.

countries.” As David Long succinctly summarized, “[t]he project to solidify and universalise the predominantly American perspective on political science as an academic discipline included removing the threat of disciplinary fragmentation that a separate study of IR posed.”¹⁷⁸

Hans Morgenthau would state as late as 1952 that IR had not succeeded in “acquir[ing the status of an] intellectual discipline.” Morgenthau recognized ISC's role in the interwar period, but saw it as more ambiguous with regard to its practical results, as, in his opinion, IR has not reached yet a well-developed disciplinary status.¹⁷⁹

Nevertheless, taking into account the work of the ISC, in the context of its 1938 Prague and 1950 Windsor meetings, demonstrates the essential contributions provided by this scholarly organization. This significance of ISC was also recognized at the start of the 1950s by Pierre Renouvin, as its various conferences and study groups contributed to the development of interwar IR.¹⁸⁰ It is important to understand that this active French scholar was seeing in the ISC the means of advancing studies with an international dimension in the pre-World War II years. Even more significant is the fact that Renouvin was praising the ISC at a time when its position was becoming less favorable in the eyes of UNESCO to which his report was addressed.

Marie Scot suggests, with regard to the possible prospects of a post-1945 ISC that it should still have been possible to advance IR under UNESCO's guidance via this same

178 Long, 2006: 615.

179 Morgenthau, 1952: 647-649.

180 Renouvin, 1950: 563-565.

ISC.¹⁸¹ However, this is incorrect, as recent scholarship has underlined that it was the new powers given to UNESCO which undermined the survival chances of ISC, with its pre-war origins. Next to post-1945 created organizations like IPSA or the International Sociological Association, the ISC was seen as too old, and instead of adapting it to the new conditions, the higher authorities chose to bring its existence to an end, notwithstanding much opposition from within ISC circles.¹⁸² This move would in turn pave the way for a more effective incorporation of IR into the discipline of political science because the ISC structure was not completely dominated by scholars with a pro-political science stance. The move after the Second World War, especially in the early 1950s to attach IR to political science was thus made possible, once the separate existence of ISC was terminated, thus leaving the domain of IR to IPSA. A later report published by UNESCO in 1954 on behalf of ISC dealt again with the aspects of IR's university teaching. This report by Charles Manning was the last visible activity of ISC, whose end became a reality once UNESCO support was finally discontinued in this same period. Before that, in 1949, Malcolm Davis, the CEIP official who had by then become ISC's chairman, had resigned, pointing to American disengagement from this club of “internationalists.”¹⁸³

This whole process has to be understood in the context of an American takeover of the disciplinary structures. As the US was very advanced in the domain of political science, its initial postwar engagement in UNESCO enabled it not only to dominate IPSA

181 Scot, 2001: 112.

182 Long, 2006.

183 Long, 2006: 608.

but also to pose a challenge to a more pluralistic understanding of political science(s) in Europe. The American Political Science Association (APSA) had also a significant weight due to the size and role of the American scholarly community. From British political studies to French and German political sciences, the European experience demonstrated a broader understanding of the subject matter of politics. However, the global power of the US, coupled with its dominance in political science's "singular" version, paved the way to undermine the influence of, and consequently terminate, ISC. This strengthened America's disciplinary position even in the area of IR, using IPSA as a standardization tool for generating a mainstream understanding of political science that would broadly affect the post-1945 academic world. The founding of the North American International Studies Association (ISA) shortly afterwards would serve as a testimony to this, being US-centered and dominated to a significant extent by political scientific approaches. This was then an end of IR's more interdisciplinary nature in the interwar period, turning it into a political science subdiscipline.¹⁸⁴ Certain institutional holdouts would remain, like the School of International Relations of the University of Southern California. These institutions would continue to be open to a more interdisciplinary IR that is more than a political science subdiscipline.

What happened in this post-Second World War interaction was that "Europeans selected and adapted components of the American social science model, a model that itself was a product of [t]ransatlantic exchange." It was only natural in the context of this period that the Social Sciences Division published *International Manuals in the Social*

¹⁸⁴ Long, 2006: 619.

Sciences the goal of which would be to “provide future representatives and negotiators from different countries with a common basis of facts and vocabulary, thereby immensely facilitating international understanding and agreement.” The general function of UNESCO consisted of “coordinat[ing] the perspectives of intellectuals who represented national cultures in order to construct a *synoptic* view of the world community.”¹⁸⁵ This was rather a difficult undertaking, as post-World War II political science was burdened in its national contexts by differing traditions and approaches. In the US, other social sciences as well as psychology were more powerful, while the British were shaped by the weight of moral philosophy. In the French and German contexts, respectively, Roman law tradition and constitutional and administrative law had more shaping power. In the case of the Soviet Union, the determinant was obviously a Marxist-Leninist one.¹⁸⁶

These dimensions of disciplinary infighting and shifts will serve as a useful means to understand the detailed disciplinary history I provide for German and French IR. Developmental trajectories for IR studies in continental Europe were not only going to be shaped by domestic influences but also by these larger dynamics affecting the post-1945 development of political science and IR on a more general level. In order to clarify another significant dimension of these transnational dynamics, I will turn in the next section to the overall role of American foundations that played a very important role in these processes. While I discuss their individual involvement in the German and French cases separately, here the analysis will be on their general nature, offering a broader

¹⁸⁵ Selcer, 2009: 317-318, 326, emphasis mine.

¹⁸⁶ Coakley, 2004: 190.

picture concerning the functions of these US philanthropies in order to prepare the basis for the explanations in the following chapters.

III.3. IR and the US Philanthropies: Foundations and IR's Founding

The role of US philanthropic foundations is a factor that cannot be neglected when analyzing the development of IR, because they did not only shape the discipline in the US but also around the world, with particular impact in continental Europe. I will now explain the goals these organizations had, and highlight their general features. Such an explanation is useful as three American foundations, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), the Rockefeller Foundation (RF), and the Ford Foundation will be shown in the German and French chapters to have played influential roles in the development of their respective political science and IR communities.

When looking at US foundations, first it is important to understand their position in their home country. These were philanthropic institutes established in order to work on issues of reform. They were founded by America's multimillionaires who wanted to create a positive and widely visible legacy by helping different social strata. The Carnegie Endowment had more global ambitions from its start, whereas the other two foundations would expand to the international scene in a more gradual way. These early 20th century foundations have their modern counterparts in the shape of the Gates Foundation or George Soros' Open Society Foundation.

According to Inderjeet Parmar's neo-Gramscian approach, the three US foundations, which would have a significant impact on IR scholarship, can be interpreted as centers of the (East Coast) Establishment. While acting in order to oppose the domestic situation of the interwar years that was favoring isolationism, they promoted the idea of liberal internationalism and managed to “socialize and integrate American and foreign elites.” Parmar suggests that they were trying to build an international order which would be in line with US interests. For this purpose, they aimed to generate a network of scholars, diplomats, and other elites ranging from the US to Europe as well as to developing countries. In this context, the three big foundations did not always reach their goals of their larger aid programs which had socio-economic dimensions. However, as Parmar states, they succeeded greatly in creating “sustainable elite networks that, on the whole, supported American policies.”¹⁸⁷

They were institutes with state, political, corporate, and ideological ties, going beyond a narrow philanthropic engagement consisting of monetary assistance. Their trustees and directors were personally connected with the two leading US political parties, served as board members in various corporations, and promoted ideas broadly associated with the concept of liberal internationalism. These three foundations established close links with the federal government, the unit with which they were most directly engaged and the promotion of which was their major concern in the early 20th century, as states-level policies were seen as an obstacle to their favored internationalism. However, in the 1920s and early 1930s they were not that close to the federal state. Their

¹⁸⁷ Parmar, 2011: 3.

eventual prominence developed in the post-World War II era, when they were not only helping the State and Defense departments (continuing on a path that had its origins in the world wars), but also supporting US universities in the development of area studies as well as IR programs. In addition to helping elite universities like Harvard, Yale, and Princeton to build special seminars or advanced research programs that were not shying away from political or military connections, they also promoted a certain way of doing social science. Positivist methods and policy-related use of knowledge were interwoven with each other and helped to create the “military-intellectual complex.”¹⁸⁸

While at many points, their positions coincided with US policy positions, during the McCarthy years they took care not to comply with all the wishes of domestic political circles. These American foundations shared a major goal, one related to creating an international elite of knowledge who could contribute to the ideals of promoting a global order based on peace, democracy and a market economy. According to Ludovic Tournès, US foundations' arrival in a country does not present a case of direct intervention that infuses the local academic system with ready-made American ideas. There is always a role played by local reformist forces whose actions could have started ahead of the active support provided by the American philanthropies. In this regard, instead of a US model that is diffused, it is better to understand this process as one of interaction which engenders a co-produced change in the area in which Americans and local forces focus jointly.¹⁸⁹ What needs to be emphasized is that one should understand these processes as

¹⁸⁸ Parmar, 2011: 5-7, also see Müller, 2010.

¹⁸⁹ Tournès, 2011: 5-13.

transnational dynamics, as also pointed out by Tournès or Helke Rausch (see the German chapter), while at the same time also understanding the contingent ways in which such interactions generate results that do not reflect expectations initially carried by the participants of such projects.

An important point presented by Parmar concerns the fact that the creation of a broad scope of intellectuals helped the “'harmonization' of divergent social and economic forces and the perpetuation of unequal systems of national and global power.” Like his focus on the specific case of networked scholars in developing countries, this model can also be of relevance when looking at the American influence in continental Europe. Therefore, the constant focus of US foundations on the European scene, with their roles in shaping of IR programs in Germany, France, and elsewhere testifies to this quest for incorporation. As will be seen in the German and French cases, the main point of Parmar's approach is validated to the extent that “the construction of global knowledge networks is almost an end in itself; indeed, the network appears to be their principal long-term achievement.”¹⁹⁰ Thus, even when failing to establish in these countries an IR studies modeled on the American model, the foundations could still be seen as having at least co-shaped the development of the discipline.

When one looks at the relationship between foundations' position and the production of social scientific knowledge, it becomes important to note the comment of Joseph Willits who was the director of RF's social sciences division. He asserted that “social scientists are as much justified in making their skills and knowledge available for the

¹⁹⁰ Parmar, 2011: 10-11.

conduct of the war as the natural scientist who works on gun sights.”¹⁹¹ Although the context of this comment, the war year of 1942, after the actual US involvement in World War II, provides a certain explanation, one can also deduce that such assumptions were not limited to war time engagements. According to Parmar, foundations helped to promote a dual structure: realism in IR for universities, and globalism for the educated classes at large against the earlier domination of American isolationism.¹⁹²

The Rockefeller Foundation's role in the creation of Yale's famous Institute of International Studies (YIIS) in 1935 with substantial financial support, or the Carnegie Endowment's help in the development of Princeton's research seminar in early 1940s that made military issues part of academic interests¹⁹³ show how these philanthropic institutions provided an essential means of presenting a certain type of international understanding via their focus on IR education. As a consequence, it is no coincidence that it was the RF that organized the 1954 conference on IR that can be seen as part of a general involvement on its part to influence the way political science would develop.¹⁹⁴ In the same period, it was Rockefeller's Kenneth Thompson who supported the establishment of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics whose members would later rise to prominence in the form of the English School of IR.¹⁹⁵ As Tim Müller demonstrates, a similar engagement took place in the area of political theory

191 Quoted in Parmar, 2011: 65.

192 Parmar, 2011: 65.

193 Parmar, 2011: 68-76.

194 See Guilhot, 2010.

195 See Dunne, 1998.

at a time when Marxist influences with a Soviet touch had to be opposed by presenting some coherent and powerful ideational tools that could help in providing an alternative.¹⁹⁶

The interwar years marked by conflicting nationalisms hugely disfavored the opening of the social sciences beyond the national frame. In this regard, social sciences had a “subordinate position vis-à-vis established disciplines.” which meant that under such circumstances the role of foundations was essential, as with the RF in the 1930s or the Ford Foundation in the Cold War period.¹⁹⁷ It was not coincidental that IR as a subfield, and then to a large extent as an independent social scientific discipline, played its part during these years. Even earlier, in 1938, the first organized meeting had taken place between internationally active American foundations and governmental officials in the State Department so that they could discuss how to work together in the area of international cultural relations.¹⁹⁸ Earlier efforts and later engagements of US philanthropies and the American government, elaborated in the German and French cases, have to be understood as realizations of these broader expectations.

An example of earlier attempts by US foundations to influence the study of IR was the support given to the International Studies Conference (ISC) (a body founded by the League of Nations' organ the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation [IIIC]). Here, James Shotwell, an important American political scientist, was the chairman of this important body's US national committee, while both RF and CEIP were big financial

196 See Müller, 2010, chapter 4.

197 Heilbron et al., 2008: 155-157.

198 Berghahn, 1999: 400.

contributors of ISC.¹⁹⁹ As pointed out earlier, the withdrawal of US funding was a major reason in the later demise of ISC in the early 1950s.

At ISC's 1938 Prague meeting discussed above, a RF official, Tracy Barrett Kittredge presented to his international audience of IR scholars three questions which he saw as being of importance for his foundation. First, the foundation wanted more knowledge about the phenomena of international life or world order to be generated. Another issue concerned whether “the efforts of the organised society” were succeeding in “deal[ing] with these phenomena?” The last question was: “What can we do about it? To what extent can these processes, which appear to be revealed by the purely scientific study of the phenomena, *be subjected to control?*” Furthermore, he informed his audience in Prague that “we can make use of the better knowledge of these processes in order to bring about the kind of world which we ourselves think we want.” Carefully, he would add that the Rockefeller Foundation “has no opinion about these questions.” However, their goal was to have IR scholars undertake studies that would provide answers or certain clarifications to these questions.²⁰⁰

This dimension of control is not a coincidence. To the contrary, it is in line with American philanthropies' general interest in a certain social reform that had by then entered the domain of world politics. Scientific expertise was expected to provide useful tools in bringing the anarchic universe of international affairs into a less conflictual condition; and foundations expected to gain helpful insights from a discipline to the

199 Parmar, 2011: 95.

200 Zimmern, 1939: 244-246, emphasis mine.

development of which they would henceforth closely contribute. It was in this context that Kittredge talked about the Rockefeller support “for the Secretariat of the Conference and for the preparatory studies undertaken by the various national co-ordinating committees,” demonstrating the broad scope of their contributions to the advancement of IR studies. As a last point, he pointed to five areas in which RF's interest in IR focused: research, training of future researchers, successful diffusion of research results, support for publications, conference, and similar events as well as serving as guide for internationally active agencies.²⁰¹

The emphasis on control meant that IR scholarship (and broader social sciences) was perceived as a tool for providing useful ways of keeping (world) politics in a manageable state. Alfred Zimmern noticed these points put forward by the RF representative, and said later during the conference that “the universities had also a part to play side by side with governments *in this process of control*.”²⁰² Therefore, it is necessary to state at this juncture that leading IR scholars were answering positively the approaches of US foundations. Also in the concluding session of the same conference, the Czechoslovak official presiding the meeting was quick to thank CEIP and RF “without whose financial aid our conference could not exist.”²⁰³ However, already by that time, the Rockefeller Foundation was becoming less enthusiastic in supporting ISC. One official from its Social Sciences Division stated that the increase in political tensions would turn the organization into an academic one instead of leading it to engage more intensively with

201 Zimmern, 1939: 316-319.

202 Zimmern, 1939: 244-246, 248, emphasis mine.

203 Zimmern, 1939: 337.

issues of contemporary developments in a more realistic fashion. The fact that RF expectations were not met due to ISC's more formal activities, resulting in conferences and publications that failed to have a major impact on the non-scholarly public, was leading the foundation to revise its earlier enthusiastic support to ICIC through which ISC was being founded at the time when the Second World War was to start.²⁰⁴

In the specific case of IPSA, whose role was elaborated above, the involvement of US foundations shaped this international platform for political scientific cooperation to an important extent. Its secretary general for the 1949-1951 and 1956-1960 period was the director of CEIP's European Center, housed in Geneva in the aftermath of the Second World War. This same person, John Goodmaghtigh, a Belgian law professor, was also the director of the Belgian Institute of International Affairs, pointing to the complex way in which scholarly-foundational-international cooperational paths merged into one another even on personal-scholarly levels. Another American philanthropy, the Ford Foundation was a significant contributor to the IPSA, demonstrating the close interaction between an initially US-dominated world political science organization and American philanthropies.²⁰⁵ These examples further clarify the broad engagement of these US foundations in the promotion of a certain understanding of social sciences. Looking at German and French political science and IR will provide detailed analysis about the roles of these units in specific country cases.

204 Rietzler, 2008b: 27, 5.

205 Scot, 2001: 56.

A main point that emerges from this chapter, and builds the basis for the following analyses of German and French IR, is that foundations played a role that should be taken into account when looking to the developmental trajectories of IR. It was not only in the US and the UK that this support was an important part of the discipline's empowerment. While Hedley Bull and Adam Watson would, in the preface of their 1984 book *The Expansion of the International Society*, thank the Ford Foundation, and members of the English School's original institutional body, the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics would ask the Rockefeller Foundation for additional support in the period covering the late 1950s to early 1970s, similar developments shaped German and French IR communities.²⁰⁶ The essential function of American philanthropies was to contribute to the emergence of a new discipline not only in its Anglo-American journey, but also in the more difficult terrain of continental Europe that witnessed major opponents such as older established disciplines and traditional ways of university teaching.

The other point that ties this chapter to the case studies of German and French IR's developmental trajectories concerns the history of interwar and early post-Second World War debates on the discipline's future as an independent area to be taught at universities. As I analyzed the 1938 and 1950 conferences, which distinguished themselves from other ISC events by their focus on the university teaching of IR, it became possible to understand that IR's prospects were already a subject of debate in these years. It shows that the post-1945 pathways of IR's German and French did not only take shape by the

²⁰⁶ See also Dunne, 1998: 104-105.

mid-20th century influence of a more influential American IR, but earlier factors that enabled a greater space for transnational dynamics to play an essential role in continental Europe. The positions of European scholars were not negligible, as the ISC itself was an organization in which Europeans dominated. In this context, interwar IR with its European dimensions has to be noted when approaching the trajectory of the emerging discipline in 20th century Germany and France.

CHAPTER IV: THE DISCIPLINE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GERMANY

In the preceding chapter, I showed how IR was not a post-1945 invention. The (early interwar) interest of continental Europeans in studying the international in a pluralistic way becomes most visible in the ISC. It was no coincidence that its foundational meeting was held in Berlin's DHfP in 1928, as German scholars showed significant interest in the subject of world politics. However, the involvement of American foundations, and, after 1945, of US military and government officials would play a greater role in paving the way for the institutionalization not only of political science, but specifically of IR as an area of study in West German universities, enabling its establishment. In this chapter, I analyze the processes that generated favorable conditions for the (largely mid-20th century) empowerment of this new discipline in this new country.

Among my major findings in the (West) German case is the suggestion that no American-style IR came into being despite the heavy interference of American actors. The reasons of this can be found in the hybrid IR that resulted from the interactions between German, American, and international actors in the shape of scholars, officials, foundations, and associations, as well as university structures. While the details are provided throughout the chapter, it is important to note that (West) German IR developed thanks to the support provided by non-German actors. However, it was German local forces interacting with outside actors that paved the way for transnational dynamics

giving the new discipline its final shape. No quantitative and behaviorist position dominated the German IR, but its gradual move to a subdisciplinary position under political science was determined by the American influence.

Another important point concerns the temporal backwardness of (West) Germany, lacking the degree of American intensive engagement with IR in the form of specific academic publications and major associational structures. It was mostly via political science journals and associations that German scholars dealt with IR, as separate IR journals were founded only in the late 20th century. This should not make us ignore a third feature that pertains to the German influence on the development of American political science and IR. I show how German professors immigrated to the US not only in the 1930s but also during the 19th century. It was thanks to their efforts that German university reforms of the Humboldtian spirit were carried over to the other side of the Atlantic, which led to the creation of the first American political science PhD programs. Similarly, German-Jewish scholars contributed to the broad institutionalization of IR in the American universities in the mid-20th century, when their European-related ideas gave new directions to American social scientists.

When studying the development of the study of world politics as well as the later emerging disciplinary structure of IR in (West) Germany, I focus on three aspects. Two of these will focus on institutional and scholarly-agential dimensions of IR's development in 20th century (West) Germany. For the institutional level, I describe the significant function carried by a Berlin establishment for the study of politics. *Deutsche Hochschule*

für Politik (German School of Politics, DHfP) played a major role in the development of general studies on politics while also providing the first institutionalized place for study and research on world politics. Its Weimar era origins and the later re-founding in West Germany after the Second World War is useful for understanding how world politics advanced as a study topic among German scholars. The scholarly aspect, on the other hand, pertains to the role of a German scholar whose engagement in this area of study stretches from the years of Weimar Republic into the important early years of post-World War II West German IR. By using Arnold Bergstraesser as a focal point of approaching German IR's development, I aim to provide a sufficiently broad but still distinctive analysis of this scholar that serves also to clarify West German IR.

In addition to providing analyses about both the institutional and scholarly-individual perspectives, I will also consider in more detail the general developmental trajectory of German political science and IR in its totality, sometimes focusing more on the general political scientific developments when it covers and/or overlaps with the IR discipline. I engage with multiple dimensions by presenting a general framework of German political science and IR as separate disciplines emerging mainly in the mid-20th century, showing the institutional and scholarly dimensions of their development, pointing to specific features of the German understanding of IR, and explaining its divergence from other significant IR communities. Overall, my goal is to provide a developmental narrative of German IR that shows how different IR communities come into being. In this regard, institutional structures play a significant role. A major conclusion concerns the rather

contingent dynamics that shaped present German IR scholarship. One important cause of this is the impact of the US through its foundations and scholarly contacts as well as the historical trajectory through which German scholars passed. These factors prevented a pre-determined direction for IR's emergence in West Germany. The disciplinary history I present is one of non-linearity, and also one of transnationality. While I start from national IR assumptions, the conclusion is one that goes to a certain extent beyond national borders as both the institutional and scholarly dimensions are shaped by forces beyond the national. In this context, I hope that the study serves to point to new directions in debates about IR and its disciplinary history.

As the development of political science as a university discipline is strongly connected to the emergence of IR, at some points, their histories will be discussed together in order to provide better clarification of conditions that enabled the further development of International Relations as a separate area of study in (West) Germany. The overall framework will present an analysis of the Weimar era interwar period as well as the West German trends in the years of the Cold War, with a bigger focus on the early stages of IR's emergence in the 1950s to mid-1970s. It is in the concluding chapter that I will discuss the post-Cold War state of German IR in connection with its French counterpart.

It is important to note that I use all these institutional and scholarly (agential) axes in the context of transnational dynamics that are most clearly visible in the West German case in the specific involvement of the US government officials in their capacity as West

Germany's temporary rulers in the aftermath of the Second World War. While I deal with the interwar involvement of American philanthropies and the impact they had on German IR of the era in a separate section, structure-wise it becomes difficult to cut off the West German developments from the concomitant influence of US actors, be it foundations, government, or returning or visiting former emigrants, some of whom became American citizens in the war years or shortly afterwards. Their engagement in the development of post-1945 West German IR is explained throughout the sections whose focus is on this same period.

IV.1. 19th Century German Political Science: A Period of Failure

I begin my analysis of German IR's long journey toward disciplinary establishment by turning to the broader trajectory of German political studies. Using the important disciplinary history of German political science, written by Wilhelm Bleek, it becomes possible to highlight the general context that has led to the actual establishment of (world) political studies in the early 20th century.

German political science itself can be seen in terms of a longer history that reaches back to the Middle Ages. In an important study of the discipline's history in Germany, Wilhelm Bleek sees for instance the *professiones ethices vel politices* as earlier forms of political science professorships in those periods. A significant dimension underlining the connections between politics and scholarship is found in the impact of Protestantism, as Bleek shows that state-building practices undertaken by Protestant princes paved the way

for further advances in political education. From that point on, one notices the correlation between the teaching of politics and the rise of modern state, where the latter determines the form and content of the former.²⁰⁷

In the 18th century, new political study areas like *Policey*, *Ökonomik* and *Kameralistik* (policy science, economics, cameral science) emerged. However, liberalism's rise would lead to a decrease of interest in these areas because these studies had been closely affiliated with the state policy of intervention. According to Bleek, political science has been more relevant at times of reform.²⁰⁸ Hence the role of professors was also influential in the reformist policies of the 19th century before they got crushed in the middle of the century after the failure of the 1848 revolution. Scholars such as Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann and Robert von Mohl would participate in the Frankfurt assembly experience, before leaving it after the prospects of a democratic Germany were crashed. When the expectations for a successful revolution did not materialize, it was only natural that these liberal scholarly circles lost their influence. The concomitant acceptance by the German bourgeoisie of a rather repressive Prussian state that would shape Germany following the 1871 unification was another obstacle to a liberal society with academic openness. Not unlike the 20th century cases, pressure at home led some important scholars to emigrate. Johann Louis Tellkamp, for example, chose to leave for the US where he would teach at Columbia only to return in 1846 to another German university where he was to share his American experience. This was not

207 Bleek, 2001: 23, 65-71.

208 Bleek, 2001: 84-87, 102.

always a welcome practice, as many Germans found his constant reference to America boring.²⁰⁹

Another major result for professors, who were over-proportionally involved in liberal reformist movements of the mid-19th century failure, was the rather disconnected nature of their theories from the practical implications of the revolutionary action. The continuation of a state policy that saw officials with a legal studies background (*Juristenprivileg*) as ideal candidates for state service further diminished the position of political education. Under these conditions, politics became merely a teaching position with not much of a prospect for actual research.²¹⁰ The fact that power and the state were perceived interconnectedly led to von Treitschke's assumption of politics as arts of state (*Politik als Staatskunst*). In such a framework there would be even less need for politics as a discipline of study because it differed from approaches prioritizing empirical-law-like structures or analyses based on the idea of great-statesmen.²¹¹

While emphasizing the interconnected nature of the development of politics as a field of study with other countries and regions, Bleek not only provides a picture of German scholarship that is influenced by continental traditions, but also points to the impact of German scholars abroad. Concerned with an oppressive German state, a very important name in the development of political science, Francis (Franz) Lieber left Germany like his colleague Tellkamp. He arrived in the US where his efforts played a major role in shaping the initial features of the discipline of politics. At Columbia College, he was

209 Bleek, 2001: 133-134.

210 Bleek, 2001: 135-139.

211 Bleek, 2001: 149-155.

successful in his attempt at changing the name of his university chair. Thus, it was no longer called “chair of history and political economy” but “chair of history and political *science*,” the first time that a chair explicitly carried this name.²¹²

Whereas the Lieber connection provides an interesting aspect of the transnational influences decisive in the development of academic programs and research areas, a further aspect made this even more relevant. For example, a student of Lieber, John W. Burgess, undertook part of his studies in the home country of his professor, being one of some 9000 American students who studied in Germany between 1865 and 1914. Once Burgess became a professor at Columbia, he managed to follow the German lead in university reform that was a consequence of Humboldtian changes in the early 19th century. Doctoral programs were established in the US, including political science. Furthermore, the founding of a School of Political Science (more modeled at the Parisian ELSP) at Columbia and the publication there of *Political Science Quarterly* were important advances in the effective cohesion of political science as a discipline. Interestingly, one third of the book reviews in this American journal were devoted to works published in German.²¹³

The picture that emerges at this juncture is one in which early German scholars had an important say, even after leaving their country. It was not only their ideas carried across the Atlantic that shaped the birth of US political science, but also the German university structure leading to a broad revision of American higher education. The third

212 Bleek, 2001: 180, emphasis mine.

213 Bleek, 2001: 183-185.

aspect was student exchanges as seen in the case of Burgess who had studied in Tübingen. In the pre-WW I years, the general degree of academic exchanges were so high that there were fellowships named after Kaiser Wilhelm and Theodore Roosevelt for American and German students who visited universities in the other country.²¹⁴ Another case concerns Carl Joachim Friedrich who had immigrated to the US in the early 20th century and came to postwar West Germany where he did his utmost to help in the creation of an independent discipline of political science, which he saw as a necessity for a democratic society.²¹⁵ He was also to be closely engaged with German-Jewish emigrant scholars in the US (as shown later in the case of Bergstraesser).

The main reason for seeing in this period a general failure of political science is that liberal reformist professors' weakness in the mid-19th century and the subsequent docility of the German bourgeoisie meant that university structures did not develop in a way that could support the further establishment of political scientific studies. The fragility of liberal professors who had done the most to advance such studies resulted in a decreased importance for this area of study.

IV.2. Weimar and IR: DHfP and German Approaches to the Study of World Politics

As this study focuses, to a greater extent, on the institutional and scholarly aspects of IR's disciplinary history in Germany (and France), the dimension of its ideational, conceptual, and theoretical features is of a secondary importance. At the same time, the

214 On German-American cultural relations in the 20th century see Füssl, 2004.

215 Bleek, 2001: 27-28.

historico-political conditions are an important factor that stand in the background.

Therefore, I use this introduction to the pre-1945 period for presenting a brief analysis of the circumstances shaping German approaches to the international dimension, and turn both to the political and ideational context.

The broader legacy of the First World War influenced Germans' self-perceptions in a new European environment. They lived in a country that had lost the 1914-1918 war, but the defeat was explained differently by different groups. The Weimar Republic's weakness became more visible when a World War I military leader, general Hindenburg was elected to the presidency, although his animosity to the democratic regime was no secret. As Weimar Germany emerged on the basis of a tripartite coalition between social democrats, Catholics, and liberals, these same forces would play an important role in the advancement of German political studies and the founding of DHfP. The 1930s and the coming of the Hitler dictatorship affected this school, destroying its academic cadres, standing, and later, existence.

The pre-1945 period of German world political thought has been marked, also in a retro-active fashion, by the impact of *Geopolitik*, a specific approach to space, influenced by the earlier studies of the German thinker Friedrich Ratzel. While the Nazi focus on space and race created a difficult tension to overcome for German geopoliticians because space alone was the only factor of relevance for the latter, the Allies had a general perception of Karl Haushofer's work that had its origins in the stories about “the thousand scientists behind Hitler.” Many expected to find in Munich a huge research institute led

by this German geopolitician whose son was executed, in the final periods of the Second World War, by Hitler's regime. Americans and British ignored that the Nazi association of *Geopolitik* was also a result of the Nazi efforts to appropriate it for their purposes, turning it into a *Grundprinzip* (basic principle) and not to political science.²¹⁶

The general conditions under which German scholars studied world politics and issues of international dimensions were marked by this post-war legacy in which DHfP was one of the influential organizations to connect with the broader world. It did not only evolve into a school where (world) politics would be studied, but also into an institute that was among the first members of the ISC, hosting its founding meeting in 1928. The school leaders' close ties to the American foundations can be understood in regard of their mostly liberal nature, and a relative distance from German nationalist-conservative forces. All this meant that the mainstream German scholars and schools as well as institutes (DHfP, but also the Hamburg-based IAP) were able to go beyond the domestic conflicts in Weimar Germany and tie to the international level both in their studies and their scholarly connections.

This section turns (in its subsections) to a discussion of German interest in international affairs and in ways of studying it. The institutional advances relevant for this dimension are explained in two subsections dealing with DHfP, and more briefly, with the Hamburg-based *Institut für Auswärtige Politik*. I conclude by looking at the interwar support provided by the Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations for the development of social and political science, and in this context also of IR. Such a

²¹⁶ See Paterson, 1987: 107 and Bassin, 1987: 115, 128.

structure emphasizes the impact of transnational dynamics in shaping German IR as early as the interwar period.

IV.2.a. German interest in the world and its politics

In Germany, ideas for the political education of the citizenry were most importantly advanced by Carl Heinrich Becker in the last period of Wilhelmine Germany. Earlier, the founding of oriental and colonial institutes in the late 19th century had set the stage for basic linguistic and cultural training about foreign places. At the time of the First World War, this Prussian state secretary and the later minister of culture and education in the Weimar years was to assert that “political thought ... has to be taught, the young German has to be politicized.”²¹⁷ In 1917 he presented a memorandum to the Prussian parliament asking for a broad “study of the abroad” (this is the literal translation of *Auslandsstudien*, a concept that could be made much more IR-pertinent if translated as “foreign studies” or better as “international studies”).

The memorandum reflected a clear position that connected the necessity of scientific studies of world politics with Germany's own international standing and the citizens' knowledge thereof. In Becker's own words “knowledge/experience of abroad is for a world people not only a tool of its officials abroad and its interests there, but also an indispensable part of its national education.”²¹⁸ According to him, the relevant form of international studies should have an interdisciplinary nature and be aimed at the political

217 Bonniot, 2008: 65.

218 Festschrift, 1926: vii.

education of citizens, with a special focus on the world political dimension.²¹⁹ It was as a consequence of this policy suggestion that a few years later Weimar Germany had many scholarly institutes of foreign studies. In a volume in honor of Becker's 50th birthday, one could already note contributions from various scholars from these units, ranging from the University of Kiel's Institute for World Economy and Naval Traffic to the University of Berlin's Hungarian Institute, from the University of Breslau's Eastern European Institute to DHfP (German School of Politics).

By then, the editor of the important *Preußische Jahrbücher*, Walther Schotte, was already pointing to advances made in Germany with regard to studying the world. However, he thought that the world political dimension was still not as developed as the historical or geographical aspects. International politics had to be understood more broadly by going beyond individual foreign policies. This was “the final goal of foreign political education.” In his concluding remarks, Schotte asked for a holistic approach overcoming the focus of economics on raw materials or an emphasis put “by the new special science of geopolitics on struggle for space.” Only by taking “the problems of world politics in their totality and connectedness” could they become “objects of an independent science of world politics.”²²⁰

However, an initiative that had carried great weight for Becker was never realized. The idea of founding an institute for “modern state science” (i.e. political sciences) in Berlin according to the plans of the important German historian Otto Hintze came to

219 Bonniot, 2008: 67ff.
220 Schotte, 1926: 184, 190.

nothing; but Becker's quest for advances in scientific politics, that is a political science, led to the creation of DHfP (*Deutsche Hochschule für Politik*, German School of Politics), an institute that had also gathered his support against a rival school, the *Politisches Kolleg* behind which stood more conservative-nationalist circles.²²¹

IV.2.b. DHfP in the Weimar years

The success of DHfP was also thanks to a broad list of founders. The initial idea came from Friedrich Naumann, the leading figure of German liberalism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Internationally famous for his book *Mitteleuropa*, in which he had proposed a Germany-centered zone in the central-eastern parts of the continent, Naumann's national-liberal ideas had a large influence. He was, however, less knowledgeable in the general area of foreign policy, perceiving it not as an ideology but as a result of the national will. While preferring public opinion to diplomats' elitist secretaries, he did not find peace movements of much significance and thought of war as being something quite natural.²²² Naumann's later desire to promote political education led to efforts by his followers after his death to realize this plan with a broader structure.

Ernst Jäckh, a scholar who was an important expert on the Orient like Becker,²²³ stood as the main figure behind the school's foundation. A one-time adviser to Naumann on world political issues,²²⁴ Jäckh's role in this process showed that DHfP was a legacy of

221 Bonniot, 2008: 73-74.

222 Shanahan, 1959: 214-218.

223 Bonniot, 2008: 65.

224 Shanahan, 1959: 197.

Naumann, with its founders generally positioned in the political center of the new Weimar Republic. The new school was supposed to be a center for the education of the citizenry that would be in line with the principles of the newly established republic. This meant that extremist forces were to be left out. Jäckh was a liberal, while social democrats (Walter Simons) and business leaders (like Robert Bosch) became members of its foundational committee.

In the 1926 volume honoring Becker, Theodor Heuss, not only a DHfP scholar but also a liberal member of the *Reichstag* (the German parliament) was already praising the role of his institute in the creation of political science in Germany. While defending a (Max) Weberian position of detachment from politics when doing scientific research, he saw in DHfP a reflection of the “political and economic fate of the state and nation.”²²⁵

DHfP is in its origins an interesting example of historical path-dependency in institution-building in the sense that its founding was a self-acknowledged imitation of the Parisian *Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques* (ELSP). Ironically, this French institution had been founded in the aftermath of the French defeat against the Prussians in the 1870-1871 war. At that time, French elites were looking to the other side of the Rhine where they saw the origins of Prussian superiority on the battle field as a natural consequence of German intellectual dominance that had emerged from the successful university reforms of the Humboldt era. The reforms were reflected in the modernized structure of the University of Berlin.²²⁶ In both schools' foundations, a lost war, a

225 Heuss, 1926: 160.

226 Gangl, 2008b: 79-80.

transition from monarchy and a general reform of the education system accompanied these private institutes of political education. A process that had started with the victory of the revolutionary and Napoleonic armies had led to the restructuring of the German university system, which was later to pave the way for a similar policy by the elites of an emerging Third Republic in post-1871 France.

The leading names of these two institutions explicitly pointed to the interconnected nature of ELSP and DHfP. For the director of ELSP, Emile Boutmy, it was “The University [of Berlin] that had won at Sedan,” whereas the president of DHfP, Ernst Jäckh asserted at the founding ceremony of his institute that “[i]t was the Ecole Libre that has politically won in the [First] world war.”²²⁷ Jäckh even asserted that his idea for such a school of politics took its final shape when he was travelling from Sofia to Constantinople, using the long train journey to chat with the German count Wedel who informed Jäckh about his studies at the Parisian ELSP, praising this institute's role as a “center of the spiritual and national rebuilding.” In a letter to Becker, Jäckh wrote that this experience convinced him even more to found the DHfP, thus following the recommendations of Becker.²²⁸ It was Becker who had laid the ground work by saying that this new institution should focus on “all political science areas ... without the consideration of party orientation,” seeing in the school the embodiment of a national spirit.²²⁹ Similarly, many years later, the post-World War II refounder of the school, West Berlin's future social democratic mayor Otto Suhr was to state that it had not been a

227 Gangl, 2008b: 92.

228 Jäckh, 1952: 10-11.

229 Bleek, 2001: 203.

coincidence that the post-World War I founding of the DHfP did not differ from the ELSP's founding in the aftermath of the French defeat in 1871.²³⁰

On October 24, 1920 the founding ceremony of the DHfP took place. The importance given to the School was underlined by the presence of Friedrich Ebert, the social democratic first president of Weimar Germany, at the opening. In addition to support from very important liberal businessmen like Robert Bosch and Carl Friedrich von Siemens, the Prussian state (where the school was located) also contributed by donating a building. In its early years the politician and maker of the Weimar Constitution, Hugo Preuß as well as the famous historian Friedrich Meinecke also taught there, while the liberal Theodor Heuss, the social democrat Hermann Heller, and the right-wing Adolf Grabowsky were scholars who demonstrated the faculty's heterogeneous structure.²³¹

An important name who was representative of elites' contribution to the new academy, the then foreign minister Walter Simons added that Germans were now consciously taking the French path “and founding after our defeat” this new institute.²³² Even many years later, it is interesting to note that Heuss was to defend the school's policy of admitting foreign students, saying that Germany or its politics were not secrets, and that German students could also gain different experiences by interacting with these students coming from abroad. The Parisian counterpart was not forgotten when he asserted that it was better to have these students educated in Berlin instead of the “great

230 Suhr, 1952: 33.

231 Bleek, 2001: 203ff.

232 Gangl, 2008b: 93.

propaganda place” in Paris, namely the competing ELSP located in the French capital.²³³ Similarly, as Schotte reminded in 1926, during the 1917 debates about international studies, following the memorandum of Becker, a liberal member of the Prussian parliament had suggested using the Parisian school as a model for German foreign policy studies. The focus had to be on the practical uses of a new form of knowledge that dealt with the foreign and the international.²³⁴

From all these mutual assertions and similar perceptions about the power and influence of the other, as well as the prominence given to the education of/on politics, there arises a clear picture about the significance of knowledge at a time when change is omnipresent. It is in this context that one sees the elites of the Weimar coalition gathering for the establishment of a school that will educate the citizens and also create new intellectual elites for the republic. This dual function, to be a school for the citizenry's political education and to provide knowledge about politics and the world at large to prospective leaders of the Weimar Republic remained as a permanent source of tension throughout DHfP's existence.²³⁵

In the analysis of Detlef Lehnert, DHfP is not seen as a bastion of democratic forces. Its scientific character is similarly questioned. In the late 1920s, DHfP witnessed an increase of conservative-nationalist faculty members, thus weakening the Weimar coalition frame of the school. The German nationalists were especially influential in the areas of foreign, geopolitical and ethnic studies. Many scholars challenge the view that

233 Heuss, 1926: 160, 162.

234 Schotte, 1926: 184-185.

235 See Gangl, 2008b.

the school's Academic Division, created in its later years, was a major game-changer, as it did not attract much student interest.²³⁶

An important aspect concerns the increase in the relative weight of courses dealing with world politics, international law and regional studies. In the first few years it was around 20%, but by 1933, just before the Weimar Republic came to an end, this figure had risen to 40%.²³⁷ However, despite the international connections of DHfP and its liberal leaders like Jäckh, the majority of courses on international politics were not taught by the pro-Weimar faculty; scholars associated with nationalist-conservative ideologies had a bigger role. Left-liberal scholars offered 7 courses compared to the right-wing faculty's 14 courses within the Academic Division. Accordingly, Lehnert sees in this interest in world politics a certain form of “internal emigration” for the nationalist-conservative members of the DHfP. By teaching world politics, they were able to turn their back on Weimar democracy in the sense of their scholarly engagement which ignored the domestic area that was marked by, in the eyes of these scholars, the disliked features of a democratic regime.²³⁸

Eckart Kehr, a German historian whose main impact would emerge posthumously, was another important instructor at the school. His challenge to the conservative-nationalist accounts of the German role in the First World War generated big problems for him (he remained in the US, being already there as a visiting scholar, at the time of the Nazi takeover). His writings were later collected and published as *Der Primat der*

236 See Lehnert, 1989.

237 See especially the table in Lehnert, 1989: 452.

238 Lehnert, 1989: 455-457.

Innenpolitik (The Primacy of Domestic Politics). Although the volume's title was determined by the editor, a major (West) German historian, Hans Ulrich Wehler, this concept reflects Kehr's approach that questioned the readiness of the German bourgeoisie for militarization at a time when no foreign political needs justified a policy in favor of building a powerful navy. Anti-British and anti-Russian policies of the Wilhelmine period are interpreted as a “foreign policy exit” the logic of which was to be located in domestic class coalitions.²³⁹

At such a juncture, a founding member of the DHfP, Adolf Grabowsky had a completely conflicting position that asserted the primacy of foreign policy. This right-wing professor had been the director of the geopolitical seminar in the school since 1925. For him, the space was much more relevant than “the false abstractions of all previous theories of the state.”²⁴⁰ The victors of this debate on primacy were the right-wing faculty, and the general prominence given in the school's studies to foreign policy seems to have contributed to the nationalists who gained the upper hand versus left-liberals like Kehr.²⁴¹

Otto Hoetzsch was another leading name among DHfP's nationalist professors who had openly acknowledged the ultimate aim of political research and studies, to wit, “to raise a people (*Volk*) ... to the ancient height of statal power and position.” He was joined by others like Georg Cleinow and Max Hildebert Boehm, who respectively saw in their courses a means of withstanding the Bolsheviks and of providing “a historically deeper and *bloodreacher* [*blutreicher*] conception” about German people who was seen as

239 Blank, 1970: *passim*.

240 Söllner, 1991: 53-54.

241 Bleek, 2001: 208.

divided because of various factors.²⁴² Hoetzsch was also a parliamentarian of the nationalist-conservative DNVP who rose in 1932 to the directorship of the study group Foreign Policy and International Studies (*Aussenpolitik und Auslandskunde*) within DHfP.²⁴³

The emerging picture is one in which the domain of international politics at DHfP was dominated by right-wing scholars whose approach was shaped by ideas about a reemerging German power in the world. Whereas the school's more centrist founders cannot be seen as figures who opposed a renewed German influence, it was the more assertive nature of the right-wing faculty that differentiated the latter from their moderate colleagues associated with political parties supportive of the Weimar regime. Therefore, it is important to recognize both the ideas of Jäckh and his friends who saw in DHfP a means of providing the weakened Germany of the post-1919 period with an institute capable of generating new elites carrying necessary knowledge as well as the weight of ideas of the nationalist-conservative faculty (many of whom had joined the school after its unification with the right-wing Political College). This second group tried to advance their ideational power by focusing on geopolitics, ethnic studies, research on the East (*Ostforschung*, that is studies of Central-Eastern Europe), contributing thus to an expansionist approach.

Jäckh was later to be full of praise for “his” DHfP. In his 1952-written retrospective, following the re-founding of the school in West Berlin, his readers would learn that the

242 Söllner, 1991: 52, emphasis mine.

243 Burges, 2004: 48.

interwar predecessor was so successful that one US president had referred to this German institute when pointing to the necessity of political education. Another reference is to a British politician who saw in the Weimar DHfP “the most renowned institute on the continent.” The highest level of this self-praising narrative is reached when he cites a leading name of ISC who had the following words for DHfP in his speech for its tenth birthday celebrations, held interestingly in the *Reichstag* building in 1930: “[DHfP] is praised abroad as one of the most beautiful and most fruitful creations of postwar Germany. There is no scientific institute that arouses greater international interest – thanks to its spirit of scientific freedom, political responsibility and interstate cooperation.”²⁴⁴

The role of DHfP can be better understood when taking into account German elites who wanted to contribute to the international empowerment of their state. In that context politics was approached more in terms of statecraft rather than a more theoretical analysis.²⁴⁵ However, at a point at which there was no institutionalized political science, the importance of the school was to promote the study and also some (not very advanced) research on politics, with a special emphasis on foreign political and international dimensions. The case of Siegfried Landshut, an important name in post-World War II German political science, points to the overall weak position of political studies in Weimar Germany. When trying to get a professorial position (*Habilitation*) in the field of “politics,” he was not allowed to undertake the necessary application by directly asking

244 Jäckh, 1952: 6.

245 Söllner, 1991: 49-50.

for political science to be his field. Professors of the time did not see it permissible to allow a scientific degree/position in politics.²⁴⁶

Before turning to another relevant institution focusing on the world, it is important to explain the end of DHfP in its liberal interwar structure. When the Nazis came to power, Jäckh's insistence on his school's survival was not successful. It was Hitler himself who informed the school's director about Goebbels' intentions to put DHfP under the control of his ministry. A meeting with the Nazi dictator did not help Jäckh from preventing the consequent *Gleichschaltung* (putting under Nazi control) of his school, thus starting a process that would completely change its whole nature. In the meantime, Jäckh would emigrate to the UK, only to return to Berlin for the post-1945 refounding of his school under completely different conditions.²⁴⁷ After the takeover by the dictatorial regime, the Nazi and SS-affiliated people (using here the word scholar would be improper) reached its highest point, before the final in merger into the Berlin-based *Auslandswissenschaftliche Fakultät* (AWF, Faculty of Sciences of the Abroad/Foreign).²⁴⁸ The school had in fact lost its influence shortly after Nazi control started, with its student numbers decreasing from 1000 to 500 within four years. Only four scholars of the pre-Nazi era would remain at DHfP in 1937, which points to a significant rupture of German political science.²⁴⁹ A substantial number had to leave due to their Jewish or leftist roots,

246 Bleek, 2001: 227.

247 See Korenblatt, 2006: 415 and Eisfeld, 1996: 36-37.

248 For a study on Nazi's use of studies dealing with international phenomena and the way they instrumentalized science for their racist and expansionist purposes see Botsch, 2006.

249 Burges, 2004: 112, 108.

while many turned toward an “internal emigration” leaving the public life, whereas important figures such as Jäckh had also left the country.

IV.2.c. The Institute in Hamburg: Far from Berlin, close to the world

In Hamburg, there emerged another important institute, which contributed significantly to Weimar Germany's thinking on international affairs. *Institut für Auswärtige Politik* (Foreign Policy Institute – IAP) was founded in 1923 by Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy who had participated as a German delegate at the Paris Peace Conference. Originally starting its work as a research center focusing on the causes of the First World War, IAP counted among its supporters not only the liberal Hambourgian business circles but also the Rockefeller Foundation as well as German ministries.²⁵⁰ Although this center was geographically distant from Berlin and thus did not have the impact of DHfP, its ties to the important Hansa city where it was located and whose generally liberal spirit it overtook, made of IAP an important factor in the generation and analysis of German views on world politics. The IAP founder Mendelssohn-Bartholdy was also a professor of international law at the University of Hamburg, and it was thanks to his efforts that the institute started to publish the journal *Europäische Gespräche* (European Talks) which managed to bring together leading voices on world politics in its pages.²⁵¹

250 Gantzel-Kress and Gantzel, 1980: 199.

251 Burges, 2004: 67-72.

Mendelssohn-Bartholdy was internationally well connected, serving as a member for the Rockefeller Foundation's German local fellowship committee. Interestingly, while other members of the committee were more traditional in their preferences, he was prone to American ideas of social science. It was no coincidence that RF was itself interested in developing the study of international relations.²⁵²

In terms of IR, it is useful to look at the IAP charter that listed as its goal “the scientific observation and recording of the political and economic forces determining the foreign policies of states and – through the study of history – the finding out of the regularities governing interstate relations with a view to providing training in foreign policy.”²⁵³ According to Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, who shared his views concerning the institute's aims at the opening ceremony, the institute carried the goal of “serving for peace.” However, it would be too much, he asserted, to expect from “diplomacy and even the *science of foreign policy*” to make the war disappear.²⁵⁴ In regard of these statements, it becomes visible that IR as such was still not much developed in post-First World War Germany. The institute's position is more one tied to the analysis of world politics in a think-tank-like manner. Therefore, certain assertions that see in IAP the world's third international affairs institute, following the British Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) and the American Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), seem to be valid as far as the three of them shared both a liberal internationalist worldview and a research center

252 Fleck, 2011: 45-46, 68.

253 Gantzel-Kress and Gantzel, 1980: 251 fn. 11

254 Burges, 2004: 75.

structure that was detached from universities. No actual academization was to mark these three institutes, demonstrating thus their more policy-related features.

An important cooperation between IAP and Berlin's DHfP concerned the publication of a series of books on international affairs. Started in 1927, this series titled *Politische Wissenschaft* (Political Science) was supported by the Rockefeller Foundation with annual monetary contributions.²⁵⁵

IV.2.d. US foundations and German studies of world politics during the interwar period

Two US philanthropic foundations, the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) played major roles in DHfP's interwar development. At that time, Germany had to confront major difficulties due to the international scientific boycott it faced in the post-First World War years. This boycott, defended especially by the French, could only be overcome in the mid-1920s. It was thanks to US actions supported by wartime neutral countries that the French were convinced to allow the German scholars to gradually rejoin the international scientific community.²⁵⁶ German scholars' pro-war position in 1914 was a main reason for this reaction.

In the case of Max Weber, for instance, he took a more critical position only in 1917, after initially having seen the war as something “great and wonderful.” The famous “call

²⁵⁵ Gantzel-Kress and Gantzel, 1980: 251 fn. 11 and Burges, 2004: 74 fn. 141

²⁵⁶ See Fuchs, 2002: *passim*.

of the 93” that included scholars, intellectuals and artists as signatories was aimed at defending the German war policy.²⁵⁷ It shocked British and French public opinion as well as their scholars who were very critical of the German move to occupy Belgium, a country that was neutral.²⁵⁸ This situation showed the problematic pro-state, pro-war attitude of most German scholars, demonstrating the mentality prevalent at the time of the transition to a new, democratic regime, the Weimar Republic, founded in 1919.

In the last years of the Weimar Republic, Jäckh was constantly trying to convince the Rockefeller Foundation of his school's successful scientific position. This period, marked by a general financial decline, witnessed more Europeans looking for increased US funding. In this context, he asserted that DHfP was undertaking a significant move toward academization. Its recently created Academic Division provided a useful showcase, testifying to the school's gradual overcoming of its less scientific origins. However, the big words and promises of Jäckh were not taken at face value. Contemporary internal evaluations of the foundation were skeptical. That the school had managed to found the discipline of political science in Germany, for instance, was not seen as an argument reflecting the exact nature of its true and nevertheless significant accomplishments.²⁵⁹

Notwithstanding aspects that did not completely satisfy RF, under the actual conditions of the early 1930s, another RF report saw in DHfP “a real ray of light in Germany, as far as an objective attitude in connection with international affairs is

257 Mommsen, 2000: 178-239.

258 Fuchs, 2002: 273.

259 Among others see Rausch, 2007: 93.

concerned.” One has to understand the moves of the foundation in a context that was shaped both by the failure of efforts to create a Stresemann Foundation which would be a peace research center similar to CEIP (the Carnegie Endowment itself was supposed to fund it, but the project became obsolete) as well as the shelving of the project for supporting another significant Berlin institution, namely the Kaiser Wilhelm Institut for Comparative Public Law and International Law. If that plan had been realized, this institute would have been turned into a center for the study of international relations and international law, expanding its area of research more toward a broader IR framework.²⁶⁰

CEIP's relations with the school were developed as a consequence of the ongoing contacts between Jäckh and Nicholas Murray Butler, who was the president not only of this foundation but also of Columbia University. Following the former's visit to New York in 1924-1925, it was Butler's turn in 1926 to go to Berlin and meet with the DHfP people. The result of these ties emerged in the form of a visiting professorship in March 1927: the Carnegie Chair for International Relations and History.²⁶¹ (A similar chair was already present in Paris, again through the efforts of the CEIP.) The chair enabled both DHfP's students and the interested public in Berlin to listen to many prominent figures involved in the area international affairs. Ernst Robert Curtius from Heidelberg, André Siegfried from Paris, James Shotwell from the US as well as Polish and Italian scholars made the list in the late 1920s.²⁶² This whole process was a sign that DHfP was

considered as a significant institution through which the Carnegie Endowment could

²⁶⁰ Rietzler, 2008a: 71-72.

²⁶¹ Rietzler, 2008a: 69-70.

²⁶² Czempiel, 1965: 276.

contribute both to Germany's democratic order and broaden studies in the area of IR that were in line with its expectations.²⁶³ A full chair would be established at the start of the 1930s, but the conditions surrounding the Nazi rise would lead it to failure within a few years.

A more successful cooperation was built with the *Institut für Sozial- und Staatswissenschaften* (Social and State Sciences Institute), established under the leadership of Alfred Weber in 1925. However, this was a center the research of which was more on culture and state sociology and less on (international) politics.²⁶⁴ The Heidelberg institute which had a center-left profile and (unlike DHfP) no concentration of right-wing professors, kept receiving financial aid from the Rockefeller Foundation until 1937, into the years of the Hitlerite regime. In this policy of continuation, the scholarly fame and personal integrity of this other Weber brother was a factor that had made him trustworthy even during the years of the Nazi dictatorship.²⁶⁵

IV.3. Post-1945 Paths of West German International Relations

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Germany, this time a divided one, had to face the consequences of its racist-expansionist policies the legacy of which was more dramatic compared to the 1914-1918 war. It is important to briefly present the historical-

263 See Winn, 2006. This article also explains CEIP's general position in post-First World War Europe and its broader engagements for promoting peace by advancing such scholarly ties.

264 Bleek, 2001: 227.

265 Rausch, 2007: 93-94.

ideational conditions that affected the general context under which IR was to be established before turning in detail to its disciplinary trajectory.

For some German historians, the post-1945 years marked a major turning point in the sense of paving the way for Germans' decisive turn to the West, while others interpreted this period as demonstrating the German quest for security. For Heinrich August Winkler, a major historian of modern German history, “the long path to the West” finally enabled Germans to become a real “Western” nation by establishing an effective democratic system and distancing themselves from totalitarian systems.²⁶⁶ The ultimate stage of this Westernization would be the end of the East German state and German re-unification, but many of the “Western” features of modernity were already present in the West German state. For another historian, Eckart Conze, West Germans' main worry was to secure their security. They had to accommodate to new conditions, and this meant that Westernization could take shape more easily because the prospects of unification were closed. Under such circumstances, social and political changes leading the country toward the West were the only option.²⁶⁷

Whereas the initial years of the West German state had been shaped by the hegemonic position of the Christian Democrat chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, the political conditions would change in the 1960s. As a result, the Social Democrats, led by Willy Brandt, took over the government in a new coalition with the liberals.²⁶⁸

266 See Winkler, 2010.

267 Conze, 2009: 107.

268 The same period would be marked by societal changes, creating also reactions within the academic world, as radicalized students would show their discontent with even social democratic professors, in one famous case attacking a political science professor at the Otto Suhr Institut of the FU Berlin.

While the Brandt government came forward with a new policy of *Ostpolitik* that aimed to create friendlier relations with the Eastern bloc, the postwar academic world was one marked by greater openness to cooperation with the West, overcoming the more nationalist tendencies of the past. It was as part of this change that (West) German scholars became part “of a transnational enterprise oriented toward Anglo-American models.”²⁶⁹ This signified that a more intensive interaction with US scholarly community arose as a new reality. However, as I show below, these closer ties created dynamics that would trigger many scholars (especially of the younger generation) to transcend the American dominance in the academic world. These scholars played a significant role in turning their US-gained knowledge to more US-critical directions, trying to expand the space of scholarship to more neglected dimensions such as the Third World, peace research, and Marxist ideas.

It is also important to understand the general position of the political science discipline to explain the conditions relevant for the emergence of (West) German IR. In this context, the most important starting point is to see the international and internal forces at work in the aftermath of the Second World War. The later understanding of post-1945 West German political science as a *Demokratiewissenschaft*, that is a science of democracy, was to provide a broadly accepted conceptualization. Only with the 1968 student generation and the rise of critical voices, there followed a more skeptical attitude toward West German self-perceptions with regard to the role of political science. The initial reason for such a labeling derives from the fact that a post-Hitlerite West German

²⁶⁹ Jarausch and Meyer, 2003: 194.

state positioned alongside the Western allies found in political scientific education a means of providing its citizens with the civic knowledge necessary for a functioning democratic system. Many years later, when its critics came forward, they would point to the failure of this role, as German political science had limited itself to an aloof position from which no sufficient engagement with the post-war society and state was to take place.²⁷⁰

In the emergence of a postwar political science, multiple layers of actors had their part. Next to the role of German(-Jewish) scholars who were to return permanently or to have significant influence in their capacity as visiting professors, Western occupying powers, especially US authorities, played a decisive role. On the other hand, many Germans who had not emigrated but spent the years of dictatorship and war in a so-called “internal migration,” i.e. not leaving the country, but living in an isolated and detached way, were to return as scholars to the universities. A big challenge was to come from scholars who opposed the very idea of political science. This group mostly consisted of scholars engaged in the powerful disciplines of law and history.

In the case of (West) German IR, and more broadly in political science, the impact of factors that are at the intersection of “science proper” and politics can be demonstrated not only with regard to the interwar but also the post-World War II era. While understanding the impact of a US-shaped understanding of a scientific study of (world) politics, it is still necessary to take into consideration the influence of the German university structure and German emigré scholars in the late 19th and early 20th centuries

²⁷⁰ Ziebura, 2003: 18.

upon the actual birth and development of the US political science. As exemplified by the cases of Lieber and Friedrich, it was German scholars who contributed to US scholarship's updated modern understanding of political science. Similar effects were seen much later, in the post-World War II period, a time when German political science itself was undergoing a process of rebirth. Many German-Jewish emigrant scholars who made themselves political scientists, following varying levels of adjustment to dominant US versions of science, contributed significantly to the US IR discipline, as names like Hans Morgenthau and John Herz provided the building blocks of a realist IR with their Europe-related insights shaping the features of post-war IR in the US.

When Ned Lebow discusses the development of US realist IR, he rightly mentions German-Jewish emigrant-scholars like Morgenthau and Herz. Focusing on the close connection between their life experiences and research agendas, he points to a path one should not lose sight of when analyzing the way scholarly research was triggered by their surroundings. While some scholars like Adorno would dislike this US academic experience, not least due to American assumptions about objectivity in science, many others reached important positions there. Their insights derived from German idealism, Marxist understanding as well as historicism would provide important sources of fresh ideas to American social science by providing a comprehensive approach to research.²⁷¹ It is important to keep these two-way impacts in mind before turning in a more detailed fashion to analyzing the developmental trajectory of post-1945 West German political science, and more specifically, IR studies. The examples presented here make it clear that

²⁷¹ Lebow, 2011: 562, 549-550.

transnational dynamics at work had origins in previous periods, and were not necessarily leading to a pre-destined track for the future development of scholarly activities in the new West German state. In this intense period of American-influenced development of political science and IR in post-1945 West Germany, the engagement of US actors is explained throughout the various subsections instead of a detached analysis in a single subsection that would cut off their story from the broader analysis.

IV.3.a. The emergence of a West German DHfP: from school to university

The post-World War II refounding of the German School of Politics took place on January 15, 1949. This time, the main actors behind the efforts to reestablish DHfP were social democrats who had the support of Christian democrats and liberals. While the date precedes by a few months the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany under the guidance of the Western powers), the “new” DHfP was to become a major symbol in the academic life of Berlin's western part, as the city itself was destined to serve as a marker of the divided Cold War world.

The post-1945 praise for the interwar DHfP did not differentiate between its more liberal circles, and its nationalist cadres, ignoring also the extent to which scholars like Jäckh were open to certain negotiations with Hitler's regime (although they could not secure the realization for their proposals that would pave the way for school's further existence in the Hitlerite period). West Germans thought about using this institute's prewar history as a tool for framing a positive picture of German political science's pre-

Nazi successes.²⁷² On a more general level, the aftermath of the Second World War meant that (West) German political science was to take a new shape. Such a point could be interpreted either as a restart, as a completely new start, or as a part of longer processes of rupture and continuity.²⁷³ The frame I develop here is based on the idea that the two eras of DHfP differed, while recognizing its contributions to the development of IR studies in both periods. It is not possible to ignore the fact that ISC's first meeting had taken place in 1928 at DHfP. However, in line with the broader transnational dynamics that gave the most important impetus for the actual institutionalization of political science, and more specifically of IR, it is necessary to focus on the post-1945 period. My analysis is one that starts from continuities as well as new starts, depending on the aspect one employs.

Looking at the context of its founding, that is, the days of a blocked West Berlin, it was understandable that the pro-West German parties in the city assembly chose March 18, 1948 for debates concerning the refounding of the DHfP. This was the hundredth anniversary of the 1848 revolution.²⁷⁴ Therefore, a DHfP reborn in the aftermath of World War II was to be given a role not unlike its Weimar era predecessor that had been seen as the promoter of the then new Republic. Now, 28 years later, it was the social democratic-led pro-Western coalition that used DHfP as a means of replying to the pro-Soviet authorities in the eastern part of the city.²⁷⁵ Thus, there was a functional similarity with the times of the Weimar era, when the pro-Republican political parties, including similar

272 Buchstein, 1999: 208-209.

273 For an extended analysis of these aspects see Laborier and Trom, 2002.

274 Göhler, 1991b: 146.

275 Söllner, 1996: 281.

formations from the major center-left, centrist and center-right positions, had stood behind the 1919 founding.

Among the names whose efforts led to the new DHfP was Otto Suhr, a scholar-politician who at that point presided over the Berlin city assembly and was later to become the first mayor of West Berlin. A former member of the Weimar-era DHfP faculty, and the future first president of West Germany, the liberal Theodor Heuss also supported the school and wanted it to “make Germans more adept [*geschickter*] in the management of their political business.” Also helpful to note is the statement of Suhr who had become the first director of the re-founded DHfP. According to him, a “*Diplom-Politiker*,” that is a politician with a (university) degree, was something unnatural.²⁷⁶ Consequently, the reborn school was again in the shape of a non-university institute. These claims about the duties of this re-founded establishment demonstrate that, in its initial stage, it was not supposed to be a major center of political scientific studies.

The post-World War II DHfP had quite a heterogeneous structure, and its departments included not only social policy, economics, philosophy and sociology, history and geography but also political opinion and consent building as well as foreign studies and foreign policy. This list gives a clear idea of the rather broad scope covered by the school, further underlining the nature of the institute that saw political education as its main duty. Its structure became a major problem in the 1950s which reflected similar difficulties that it met in the 1920s with regard to the issue of academization. Whereas

Otto Suhr himself was to lament in 1950 the lack in “the clarification of politics as

²⁷⁶ Göhler, 1991b: 144, 152.

science,” for Ernst Fraenkel, a scholar who contributed much to the development of post-1949 West German political science, it was important to turn the school into a center of an independent discipline. He added that “the study of auxiliary sciences [*Hilfswissenschaften*] was too academic” while politics itself was not dealt with at the school in a sufficiently academic manner.²⁷⁷

This quest for a scholarly study of politics, that is for the actual study of political science was also supported by the student body. In a 1952 analysis of the newly re-founded DHfP, Suhr mentioned the complaints of students who were asking for more academic studies, going beyond the four-semester structure and for including a diploma program as well as more courses on world politics and foreign policy. It is interesting that Suhr refers in this context to the old DHfP's successes in these areas, the realization of which he sees possible under the challenges generated in a city that was at the forefront of a divided world.²⁷⁸

Such was the need for change that an institutional relationship with the Freie Universität Berlin (FU Berlin) was initiated in 1952. The following year witnessed the creation of *Diplom* (undergraduate degree) studies which was accepted by 1956 to lead to an “undergraduate degree political scientist” (*Diplom-Politologe*). The institutional merger with the West Berlin-based FU Berlin led finally in 1953 to the inclusion of DHfP into the former's newly established Otto Suhr Institut (OSI). This inter-faculty institute in West Berlin emerged henceforth as the biggest political science center in West Germany.

²⁷⁷ Göhler, 1991b: 154-155.

²⁷⁸ Suhr, 1952: 37.

However, the efforts to make the DHfP join the university were met with opposition. Many professors within the university disliked the increase of political science's influence that would be generated by such a merger.²⁷⁹

IV.3.b. A chair for studying the international: Eugen Fischer-Bailing and his work

After a short period marked by Carl Dietrich von Trotha, the recently established chair in foreign policy in DHfP was given to Eugen Fischer-Bailing. This latter scholar had a traditionally formed interest in world politics and saw, in his own words, “no better introduction to international political behavior than the papal documents of the Middle Ages.” His involvement during the First World War in the German Army High Command's Foreign Division (*Auslandsabteilung der Obersten Heeresleitung*) and the Cultural Department of the German Foreign Ministry were useful means for a direct encounter with foreign policy issues, in addition to the experience provided by the war itself. His most important engagement in the Weimar years was to work as the leading manager in the parliamentary research committee that dealt with the issue of war responsibilities (*Schuldfragen*). Fischer-Bailing even asserts that his research work there provided “the first example of political science work in Germany.” It was only after World War II that he returned to the academic life that he had left in 1913.²⁸⁰ The later DHfP merger into the FU Berlin's Otto Suhr Institut would make him the first official professor in Berlin with a chair in the field of world politics.

279 Ziebura, 2003: 18.

280 Fischer-Bailing, 1960: 5.

Fischer-Bailing plays an important role in the development of German IR, as his 1960 book with the title of *Theorie der auswärtigen Politik* (Theory of Foreign Policy) was among the first publications providing a direct engagement with IR.²⁸¹ His study analyzed in four sections different dimensions of foreign policy: first, foreign policy as a power political relationship between states; second, the ties of foreign policy to other dimensions like religion, science, arts, economics, public opinion and (international) law; third, the details of foreign policy processes in the sense of diplomacy techniques and foreign ministries' role; and fourth, international organizations (originally called “supranational” in the book). Notwithstanding remarks about its theoretical contributions, the book resembles earlier IR books of the 1940s published in the US, which aimed to prove their readers with a general introduction to world politics. Even his definition of the theory of foreign policy is based on the state-centric understanding of the period, seeing it as “nothing else than the teaching of the interests of sovereign states and their validation” (*Geltendmachung*).²⁸²

When Fischer-Bailing dealt in the first section of the book with functions of foreign policy, it is interesting to note the rather philosophical nature of his analyses, marked by references to various factors like humanity, violence, and interests, not very different from Morgenthau's or E. H. Carr's approach. One of the main emphases made in the preface concerns his wish for the “devaluation of borders” (*Abwertung der Grenzen*).

While asking for a power politics that can guarantee the survival of humanity, he

281 Burges, 2004: 171. According to Burges, it was the first theory-connected IR publication in West Germany.

282 Fischer-Bailing, 1960: 18.

mentions that this is made difficult by borders, but also sees in forces like religion and science dimensions that have managed to overcome these borders. In this framework, he thinks that the book itself has to be a means of overcoming ideological borders that are among greatest threats to peace.²⁸³ This is an interesting approach and shows the normative quest that is carried over to a study of foreign policy. A second-order (that is research-based) interaction with the first-order of world politics itself is thus explicitly interpreted as an element that can contribute, however narrowly, to a more peaceful world.

Of much relevance is the fact that Fischer-Bailing's book was one of the early products of the DHfP's merger into Otto Suhr Institut at FU Berlin. Published as the sixth volume of the institute's "science of politics" series, the book had come to life thanks to the support of the Rockefeller Foundation, a fact acknowledged by the author himself at the end of his preface. This also demonstrates the continuing interest shown by US philanthropies in furthering IR studies. It was no coincidence that both the Rockefeller and the Ford foundations contributed, in addition to the US Department of State, to the founding of the FU Berlin in the first place. Developing close connections with West German scholarship was now serving as a means of strengthening the American position in the overall Cold War confrontation, and the foundations contributed to this to the extent of their capacities.²⁸⁴

283 Fischer-Bailing, 1960: 4-5.

284 Rausch, 2010: 133-135.

An analysis of the literature used in his work provides a useful frame to interpret the way post-1945 West German IR developed. When looking at the bibliography presented in a topic-based way, there emerges a clear preference for traditional figures. In the area of power, for instance, the writings of Cardinal Richelieu and von Moltke, Empress Maria Theresa and von Treitschke are joined by their “updated” counterparts like Morgenthau and Niebuhr. In the areas of peace, disarmament, courts and international law, Carl Schmitt's 1950 book *Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Ius Publicum Europeum* is there alongside Bertha von Suttner's famous anti-war book of 1889, Saint-Pierre's text on eternal peace from 1713 in addition to Lenin's and Kant's well-known works on peace. In the section on general publications, Karl Haushofer's 1927 book on borders as well as John Herz's *Political Realism and Political Idealism* book published in 1951 are mentioned, but also Adolf Grabowsky's (former right-wing professor at the Weimar era DHfP) 1948 study *Die Politik* (Politics).

IV.3.c. Founding a discipline: conferences, decisions, implementation

In the early years of postwar West Germany, the academic establishment of political science as a separate discipline was a heavily contested idea. While the occupation authorities saw it as means of creating civic education for future generations, scholars from law and history disciplines perceived political science as a challenge to their own academic status. These two areas themselves included political *sciences* (in the plural version) but opposed a separate field of politics in the form of a separate singular political

science. American re-education efforts combined with the rise of pro-political science scholars paved the way for the discipline's actual founding in West Germany. It is important to understand that all this was taking place in a society still feeling the impact of the Hitlerite dictatorship and war years with all its consequences. Under such circumstances the very idea of political science was anathema to many people. The anti-politics climate was responsible for broadly shared feelings of rejection against its study.²⁸⁵

Unlike the law professors, there has been a clear break with the Nazi years in the area of political science and its scholars. Whereas legal professors were heavily burdened due to their Nazi-era positions, the majority of future political scientists had been either emigrants abroad or chosen domestic isolation.²⁸⁶ While DHfP was affected by the Nazi takeover early on and lost its structure toward the end of 1930s, it was reborn in a democratic fashion in the postwar period. The break with the Nazi years provided even more reasons for a pro-political science approach after the war.

In the case of American officials, their positive attitude toward its teaching arose from a critique of Germany's traditional emphasis on legal training. US authorities thought it was time for civil service employees to undergo civic education via a study of politics instead of Germans' preference for law. American initiatives were also a result of German emigrant-scholars' impact. Names like Ernst Fraenkel, Franz L. Neumann and Karl Loewenstein provided Americans with much information that supported the teaching

285 Mohr, 1995b: 14-16.

286 Lietzmann, 1996: 41.

of politics in German universities as a separate discipline. Interesting in this regard is that the introduction of political science was defended by references to German scholars of politics in the previous centuries, like Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann and Robert von Mohl.²⁸⁷ These two professors were influential names in 19th century German studies of politics, before interest was lost following the oppression of 1848 and the later docility of German bourgeois vis-à-vis Prussia's oppressive state mechanisms.

The opposition to political science as such asserted that this separate and new discipline was being “imposed from abroad” and serving “ulterior purposes” of US foreign policy goals. However, one should add that emigrant scholars themselves were not always in line with US positions, as many of them would end up, for instance, rejecting German rearmament, a policy advocated later by Americans.²⁸⁸ The idea that political science was an “American discovery” was also rejected by Otto Suhr, similarly referring to Dahlmann and von Mohl in order to point to the earlier roots of political science in Germany. For Suhr, the post-1848 regress in the influence of German scholars and political science itself could now be overcome in the new DHfP of the post-World War II refounding.²⁸⁹

What emerged in this context can be seen as “a process of amalgamation” which would generate “a specific West German form of political science.”²⁹⁰ As stated with regard to the general framework of this study, the interactions between Americans

287 Lamberti, 2008: 270-272.

288 Lamberti, 2008: 278.

289 Suhr, 1952: 39-40.

290 Köhl, 2005: 38ff.

military and civilian officials, US foundations, German scholars and state representatives, and returning or visiting former German-Jewish emigrant scholars made it possible for political science and IR to advance as disciplinary projects. However, their future paths were not going to follow traditional German models, nor become a direct imitation of the US version of IR studies. Transnational dynamics were shaping the discipline, giving it a distinct shape.

A particular role was played by Loewenstein who assumed that political education would lead to a new generation that would be armed with much needed civic political knowledge, thus paving the way for a democratic (West) Germany. Scholars like Ludwig Bergstraesser (a distant relative of Arnold Bergstraesser, member of the Social Democrats) and Alfred Weber, who were important social scientists even in the Weimar years, were now convinced by Loewenstein to get engaged in this new process.²⁹¹

Three important conferences provided the necessary venues for an organized establishment of political science. The first one took place in Waldleiningen in September 1949. As Bleek reminds in his account, in those same days the West German state was being created in Bonn, thus hindering Theodor Heuss from participating, as he was to be elected as the Federal Republic's first president. The subject to be discussed in Waldleiningen was “the political sciences at German universities and colleges.” In addition to 87 German participants, there were also twelve foreign political scientists present in the audience, including the president of APSA.²⁹²

291 Lamberti, 2008: 272.

292 Bleek, 2001: 266 and Lamberti, 2008: 272.

Not only was this conference financed by Americans, but also its German organizers, namely the government of the Hessian state, were influenced by the US authorities in order to prioritize education in the area of politics. The most important result of the conference was its call for the establishment of “chairs in political science, especially in world politics, political sociology, comparative government, contemporary universal history, and political theory.” It is useful to note that this division was formalized at the Waldleiningen conference for the first time.²⁹³ The structure that was set up in this meeting demonstrated that IR would henceforth be a research field within the discipline of political science, leaving behind the previous influence of historical and legal studies on the study of politics.

Continuing opposition from the side of established disciplines and university leaderships forced two subsequent meetings in 1950. In that same year the US High Commission in West Germany had supported four scholars to come to Germany in order to help develop ways for the introduction of political science.²⁹⁴ The first conference, organized at the newly refounded DHfP, was insistent on its reference to “an independent science of politics.” The meeting had an interesting name: “The science in the framework of political education.” According to its conclusions, under “the present German reality this political science” can be advanced by the establishment of independent research units as well as chairs at universities, thus creating a separate discipline at the academic level. The political concerns were clear when it was asserted that “the science of politics can

293 Gantzel-Kress and Gantzel, 1980: 206, 253 fn. 24.

294 Lamberti, 2008: 273.

only contribute to political education, which connects knowledge, experience and civilized behavior [*Gesittung*]. The transfer of a high level of political knowledge ... supports the sustainable political self-education of the German people.” The new DHfP seemed to follow its old version when it was explicitly stated that “support from philosophy, history, law, economics” was needed in order to realize the discipline's goals.²⁹⁵

In June 1950, a third conference started in Königstein, again initiated by the state government of Hesse. Hesse had by then, unlike many other West German states, already three chairs at its universities for “scientific politics” (*Wissenschaftliche Politik*), an earlier label for political science. The conveners asked in the meeting for the establishment of political science chairs at every university.²⁹⁶ This by itself was no easy process, as seen in the case of the West Berlin's Freie Universität. There, the academic senate had voted in October 1949 against the establishment of political science because “no mere imitation of American conditions could take place at German universities.”²⁹⁷ It would only be in the 1960s that the call for separate chairs of political science was finally answered by the majority of West German universities. Only in 1954 did the West German university rectors adopt a resolution enabling the establishment of separate political science chairs. As late as 1959, there were scholars, like the historian Gerhard Ritter, who saw in political science just something “new, US-imported.”²⁹⁸ However, the

295 Suhr, 1952: 41-42.

296 Bleek, 2001: 267.

297 Göhler, 1991b: 159.

298 Bleek, 2001: 278.

major debate looked as if it had been won by groups in favor of a separate political science discipline. Even the issue of labels was significant. Political sciences (*politische Wissenschaften*), an approach favored by legal scholars, historians and others who saw no separate discipline of politics, was no longer talked about. Instead, the singular form of political science (*politische Wissenschaft*) was adopted, underlining the inherent distinction of its disciplinary nature.²⁹⁹

Having seen the way a postwar political science developed in West Germany, it is important to note the fact that International Relations/International Politics/World Politics has been at the roots of the new discipline as early as the 1949 Waldleiningen conference, in which the study of world politics had been primarily mentioned amongst the study/research areas of a discipline of politics-in-founding. This period was marked to a certain extent by the slow take-over of IR by political science, detaching it from the fields of history, economics, and law.³⁰⁰

IV.3.d. Organizing for and fighting over political science: West Germans' political science association (DVPW) and critics of West German political science

Following the conferences, another important step toward the full establishment of the political science discipline in West Germany was taken. On February 10, 1951, *Vereinigung für die Wissenschaft von der Politik* (Association of the Science of Politics) was founded. Alexander Rüstow, a scholar whose main area was economics but who had

299 Söllner, 1996: 279.

300 Gantzel-Kress and Gantzel, 1980: 255-256 fn. 36.

an overall interest in social sciences, was chosen as the first president. Previously, he had taken part during his emigration in the restructuration of Turkey's university system. A very important German scholar, and the preceding owner of Rüstow's new chair at Heidelberg, namely Alfred Weber became the honorary president. However, the initiative was interestingly taken by a left-wing scholar, Wolfgang Abendroth when he contacted the director of the DHfP, Otto Suhr, with a proposal to establish an association for political science. This led to Suhr's subsequent engagement by using his school's influential role in West Berlin.³⁰¹

Throughout this process, US authorities continued to play a decisive role. Officials within the High Commission convinced German scholars that an organized structure for German political scientists would be important in order to grant them funds that were destined for the establishment and development of political science chairs. As a consequence, there arose a further incentive for founding an association.³⁰² Already in 1952, the high-standing of postwar West German political science was demonstrated in the association's first meeting following its establishment. Behind this meeting stood the resources provided by Americans.³⁰³ Here, the former DHfP scholar and the then president of the West German state, Theodor Heuss gave the opening speech, emphasizing the role of political education in a rather pragmatic fashion. Interestingly, it fell to Carl Joachim Friedrich to actually point to earlier political science traditions in Germany, although he himself had taught in the US after leaving Germany in the early

301 Bleek and Lietzmann, 2003: 75-77.

302 Lamberti, 2008: 273-274.

303 Söllner, 1996: 280.

20th century.³⁰⁴ In addition to the goal of political scientists of promoting their discipline and the related US support, the recent founding of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) in 1949 had clarified the need for a similar national structure in West Germany that could pave the way for a separate science of politics and manage to follow global tendencies.³⁰⁵ In 1959, the association would take its current name, *Deutsche Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft* (German Political Science Association, that is DVPW).

While the founding of the new DHfP outside the university structure was a consequence of many objections held at the university levels, the establishment in West Berlin of a political research institute (*Institut für politische Wissenschaft*) was a result of Franz L. Neumann's efforts. Having been in connection with Americans and promising to secure significant financial aid, he turned to the Freie Universität Berlin that had finally to accept the establishment of this research institute. Due to its very nature, however, it was not focused on teaching, and can be interpreted to have presented a lesser challenge to the university's other structured disciplines that could count on more time before having to face a separate political science department.³⁰⁶ One year before DHfP's own merger, this institute would be incorporated into Otto Suhr Institut at the Freie Universität.

The most relevant public aspect of postwar political science pertains to its role in general education, as high schools started to offer classes on politics – similar to civic

304 Bleek and Lietzmann, 2003: 80-81.

305 Söllner, 1996: 280.

306 Göhler, 1991b: 158-159.

education. Pro-political science groups that favored more influence for the discipline, against the old tendency that privileged law graduates in public services, did not succeed in prioritizing the new discipline for public service, especially governmental jobs.³⁰⁷ Nevertheless, for civic education classes, their necessary teacher cadres were to be educated by political scientists, a factor that greatly increased the student numbers in the 1960s.

Two books written in the 1970s would pave the way for revisionist accounts regarding the founding years of West German political science and thus create a big disciplinary controversy. One of them, written by a scholar with national-conservative ideas, challenged the general assumptions about the establishment of West German postwar political science. According to Hans-Joachim Arndt's 1978 book *Die Besiegten von 1945* (The Defeated of 1945), it was the failure caused by German scholars' tendency to take for granted post-1945 conditions and putting self-created limits upon their analytic frameworks that disconnected the discipline from Germans' actual problems and from Germany's dividedness. The other scholar, Hans Kastendiek, published a left-wing critique of West German political science in 1977. The approach in his book *Die Entwicklung der westdeutschen Politikwissenschaft* (The development of West German political science) was an anti-capitalist one that saw West German political science as a bourgeois science.³⁰⁸

307 Gangl, 2008a: 13.

308 Bleek, 2001: 416, 215.

Critics were harsh in their attacks, although there was also an acknowledgement about mainstream scholars' disinterest in undertaking historiographical work themselves. With regard to Arndt, even if one acknowledges the acceptability of his call for more focus on the German people's situation and interests in political scientific research, the idea of focusing “*only* on the German situation” was rejected.³⁰⁹ Another scholar asserted the problem was that West German political science was seen as too left-wing by Arndt, and as not sufficiently leftist by Kastendiek.³¹⁰ Arndt's reaction came in the form of accusing the centrist scholars (whom he called the “*juste milieu*”) for using him and Kastendiek as tools in order to make their position in the center more coherent.³¹¹ Opposing the postwar approach of his colleagues who focused on their liberation (*befreit*) by the Allies, Arndt wanted a shift that would recognize their being defeated (*besiegt*). Answering his critics, he interpreted world history and world politics as processes that are in line with national pathways. This degree of Hegelianism led to his counter-proposal, which called for not remaining content with the given order of the post-1949, opposing the West German political scientists for being satisfied with the new “free democratic basic order.”³¹² His reference was, of course, to the role played by West German political science in promoting the 1949 constitutional order that established the framework necessary for this democratic order. This position showed that the new democratic values

309 Faul, 1979: 91-92.

310 Hättich, 1980: 204.

311 Arndt, 1980: 303.

312 Arndt, 1980: 307-309.

promoted by political science were not accepted by all German political scientists, but by a great majority.

It was in this context that the main theoretical and research work in West German political science pertained to totalitarianism theory. Many emigrants who returned to postwar West Germany continued on the path of their earlier work that had emerged in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Franz L. Neumann's *Behemoth* that dealt with the Nazi regime as well as Sigmund Neumann's *Permanent Revolution: The Total State in a World at War* provided examples of the emerging literature on totalitarianism. However, when postwar efforts led to the establishment of a separate political science discipline, it was not the case that West Germans' approach was the same as the American version. For instance, the rise of behavioralism in the US could not be seen in the German case where many scholars of the interwar years were to provide the first generation of post-1945 political science. In this juncture, there arose a new hybrid political science that was not only different from its classical German versions of *Kameralistik* and policy sciences but also differing from the latest US approaches like behavioralism.³¹³

According to a Marxist critique of postwar West German political science, it was the shift to anti-communism that had detached the social-democratic project in political science from its original position, one that was based on developing a theory of society and keeping an anti-capitalist approach among its norms. As a consequence, not only Karl Marx but also Max Weber was left out of the new postwar West German political

313 Lietzmann, 1996: 40-43.

science.³¹⁴ It is in this regard that one can understand an important attack on the idea of German political science as a *Demokratiewissenschaft*. Bodo Zeuner asserted that German political science did not manage to become a science of/for democratization. The ensuing picture was one of a pro-status quo discipline that did not engage with society and its conditions on a level beyond the normative.³¹⁵ Even the broad impact that was understood to be part of German *Demokratiewissenschaft*, including research on, legitimizing of, and teaching of democracy,³¹⁶ did not defy significant attacks that underlined German political science's role as “a legitimating science.” For Marxist critics, the discipline failed to realize its critical role in providing a scientific “control [for] the democratic system.” As a result, de-ideologization was seen as having opened the way for a conservative political science closely connected with the West German political status quo.³¹⁷

IV.3.e. A brief look at academic journals: from ZfP to PVS

An important dimension of German political science pertains to the nature of its scholarly publications. In this context, the most important and chronologically preceding case is the *Zeitschrift für Politik* (ZfP, “Journal of Politics”), founded by Adolf Grabowsky in 1907. With the founding of DHfP, where Grabowsky himself had a significant position through the geopolitics seminar he directed, the journal became a

314 Gantzel-Kress and Gantzel, 1980: 217.

315 Zeuner, 1991: 195.

316 Göhler, 1991b: 162.

317 Gantzel-Kress and Gantzel, 1980: 217.

school-affiliated publication. After it was effectively put under Nazi control, the restart of its post-World War II publication would gain the additional subtitle of *Neue Serie* (New Series) in order to emphasize its de-Nazified West German position.

Notwithstanding its important position as a journal devoted to politics, the Weimar era *ZfP* had a significant number of articles that showed anti-French and nationalist tendencies reflecting certain prevalent interwar positions in Germany. According to Annie Lamblin, elitist anti-democratic ideas as well as some pro-Nazi attitudes marked the journal to a significant extent. The journal was open to these kinds of ideas in order to enable also radical political positions to have access to *ZfP*, while ignoring the difficulties faced by the Weimar Republic. Relevant for the international dimension, the journal's focus on world politics is explained as having derived from a willful neglect of domestic developments.³¹⁸

In the post-World War II period, when the publication restarted in the fashion of “turning a white page,” it was to become the organ for DVPW between 1953 and 1959.³¹⁹ However, this accommodation between Grabowsky, who had returned from exile, and the association did not work out the way both sides had imagined. Finally, DVPW made the decision to found a new journal devoted to publishing political scientific research that would be its own publication. This paved the way for the *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* (PVS, “Political Quarterly Text”), with its first volume appearing in 1960.

Notwithstanding some other journals in (West) Germany, PVS remained the major

318 Lamblin, 2008: 180.

319 Gantzel-Kress and Gantzel, 256 fn. 42.

publication for political science although it has not provided much space for works in IR. The lack of a separate scholarly journal devoted to world political research says much about the underdevelopment of the discipline in West Germany – something that would change much later with the 1994 founding of the *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* (ZIB, Journal of International Relations).

IV.3.f. “Generations”, “schools”, “(r)emigrants”

After the analysis of the scholarly publications in the West German community of political science/IR, it is useful to turn the focus in this subsection to another important dimension that determined the developmental trajectory of IR. In order to better understand the impact of transnational dynamics, I shift to the idea of generations and schools in West German political science as well as the general role played by emigrant-scholars and those who returned to their country in the post-1945 years, becoming thus remigrants. As both generations and (returning) emigrants were shaped by forces beyond the national context, it becomes clearly visible how the future of German IR was influenced by their US experiences.

One aspect that provides a better understanding about postwar political science is the dimension of scholarly generations. According to an analysis made in the circumstances of a reunited Germany, in 1996, four main generations played a role in the discipline's development. The founding *fathers* (no woman was present) were the ones who had been shaped by the historical legacies of both world wars as well as the years of the Weimar

Republic and Nazism. Some of them had emigrated; some remained in Germany in domestic isolation. They contributed to the postwar attempts to establish the discipline. In the late 1950s, the second generation followed, and it was they who gained tenured positions directly as political science scholars, while their predecessors had come to political science from other neighboring disciplines in which they had gained their degrees. A third generation, born in the years of World War II and its aftermath, and thus older than the later fourth generation of post-World War II scholars, included the voices of critique that came out of the student movement of the 1960s, a time when the members of this generation were slowly progressing up the academic ladder. They were also the ones who had spent some of their study and research time in the US and were familiar with new approaches in the social sciences.³²⁰

Another aspect that presents a useful dimension pertains to the role of schools in West German political science. While the remigrant Eric Voegelin is an example of a conservative scholar with his more political philosophical approach in Munich, the Marxist scholar Wolfgang Abendroth was quite influential in establishing the Magdeburg School where he held a chair and led research that had a Marxist and critical engagement with West German society. In this context, the case of Arnold Bergstraesser whose position in Freiburg enabled him in the eyes of many to found a certain kind of approach to political science, the so-called Freiburg School with an emphasis on normative approaches, is also of relevance. His general impact was visible when many former Bergstraesser students were among the first to hold tenured jobs in the newly emerging

³²⁰ See Noetzel and Rupp, 1996: *passim*.

political science departments across West Germany.³²¹ Notwithstanding all these geographically diverse formations, it was the Otto Suhr Institut at FU Berlin that had the biggest quantitative share of faculty, at one time holding 10 out of 24 chairs in all of West German political science. This leap was also furthered by its scholars' general dominance in the field.

The role of emigrants and remigrants (that is emigrant scholars who returned to (West) Germany after 1945) is also important for the discipline's development. As a British scholar, who was also the League of Nations official responsible for German refugees, said, “no feature of the Nazi persecution made such a deep impression on the world as the exile of the university scholars and intellectuals. In the academic world there had been nothing comparable to it since the emigration of the Greek scholars after the capture of Constantinople.”³²² The implications of this were also felt in the area of social sciences. According to Alfons Söllner, a scholar specializing in the area of emigrant scholars and political science, there are a total of 64 scholars from Germany who became political scientists during their emigration years. Out of these 64, 33 had doctoral degrees from law faculties before they left, while more than 20 originated from philosophy faculties (history, etc.) and eight had faculties of state sciences in their background (*Staatswissenschaftliche*). Söllner presents another categorization in which most of them are shown to have written their theses in legal, philosophy-humanities, and sociological

321 Bleek, 2001: 337-341.

322 Burges, 2004: 139.

or economic fields. Only a quarter seem to have used methods connected with political science.³²³

It is significant that more than 50 scholars chose the US as their point of immigration after the Nazi takeover in Germany. Many aid committees were established abroad. In the US, the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced German (later: Foreign) Scholars worked intensively to help these emigrants. The Rockefeller Foundation played a very important role with its support, but there was another dimension to its function which needs more clarification. When helping these scholars in finding academic jobs, the foundation was able to rely on its existing categorizations that had already grouped certain scholars under the label of political scientists. According to Söllner, the RF also had a special interest in scholars from DHfP and Alfred Weber's institute in Heidelberg, as both were closer to the foundation's own ideas about the social sciences.³²⁴ This aspect demonstrates the constructive role the RF played in actually turning German legal scholars, sociologists, and historians into (US-style) political scientists. In this regard, the newly constructed areas of interest served as first steps in making German social scientists and humanities scholars into modern political scientists.

Once World War II was over, more than a dozen of these emigrant-scholars returned to Germany. Others, from Hans J. Morgenthau to Hannah Arendt, Karl Deutsch to John Herz would remain in the US and become important names in the American academic world, while not completely disconnecting from their post-war German colleagues,

323 Söllner, 1996: 10.

324 Söllner, 1996: 15-16.

making use of visiting professorships (like Deutsch) or writing prefaces to books in their research areas (like Morgenthau's for West German realist IR scholar Karl Kindermann's book). According to Söllner, eight scholars remigrating to postwar Germany got also director positions in academic entities. The list includes more conservative scholars like Bergstraesser in Freiburg and Voegelin in Munich as well as the social democratic Fraenkel in Berlin. Interesting to note in this regard is that Berlin was much richer in left-wing faculty, with scholars like Fraenkel, whereas the southern parts of the country included conservative scholars like the former two.³²⁵

The analyses of this subsection presented useful points for preparing the next section's turn to the role and work of Arnold Bergstraesser, a scholar whose institutional and scholarly contributions played a significant role in the development of West German political science and specifically IR.

IV.4. The Curious Case of Arnold Bergstraesser: World Politics from Weimar to West Germany

Arnold Bergstraesser can be seen as one of the most important scholars who influenced the development of post-World War II studies of IR in West Germany. One of his students, Dieter Oberndörfer wrote that Bergstraesser had “as nobody else created the discipline of International Politics in [West] Germany.”³²⁶ Who exactly was this scholar whose presence affected not only the developmental pathway of the post-war Federal

325 Söllner, 1996: 276.

326 Oberndörfer, 1965: 9.

Republic's political science and IR studies but who had also worked at *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik* in the Weimar years before emigrating to the US in 1937? In this section, I aim to use the curious case of Arnold Bergstraesser as a means not only of bringing together these three differing periods but also of investigating his personal career and various engagements as internodal points that influenced his contemporaries and thus contributed to the early shape of West German IR.

After explaining the Weimar and American experiences of Bergstraesser, I analyze his return to postwar West Germany, where his institutional involvements would provide him with a powerful position in the newly emerging discipline of political science as well as IR. Lastly, I set his ideas on world politics and IR into this institutional and scholarly context in order to demonstrate how Bergstraesser's ideational development was a reflection of transnational dynamics shaped by American and German actors.

Bergstraesser's return to West Germany in the early 1950s would start an intensive engagement with German political science and IR community. He presided over meetings in which world political studies were discussed the first time in an extensive way, and wrote the first article in the new German political science journal on the subject of world politics. Continuing on a path that he had developed in the Weimar years, Bergstraesser emphasized the relevance of a more holistic science that would be marked by synoptic analyses, an approach he started to implement in his early 1930s sociological-cultural studies of French society and politics. In West Germany, his international thought, in addition to his institutional networks and initiatives, paved the way for emphasizing the

significance of IR studies for the future of this new country. His American years had enabled to understand the relevance of the newly emerging discipline in the context of a divided world in which power politics and international cooperation were to play an important role for influencing a divided nation's prospects.

IV.4.a. Bergstraesser in Weimar: from DHfP to Heidelberg, the ideas and work of a conservative German nationalist

In the years of Weimar Republic, Bergstraesser was close to the ideological positions of young conservatives who were right-wing nationalists but not Hitlerite national-socialists. As a member of the faculty at DHfP, Bergstraesser counted among the academy's right-wing minority, because it was dominated by scholars closely affiliated with pro-Weimar political parties, namely liberal and social democratic ones. At the time of the Nazi takeover, he did not join his colleagues who emigrated. In the early years of the new regime, he even became a supporter because like many conservatives Bergstraesser saw in the national socialist dictatorship a useful means of fighting (what he perceived as) the communist threat and the degenerate left and liberal circles of the Weimar era.

The early years of Bergstraesser's scholarly work can be seen in the context of anti-science and anti-modernity movements that held many German students and scholars under their influence. Receiving his doctorate in 1923 from Alfred Weber, the brother of Max Weber, at Heidelberg University, becoming a professor for “state sciences and

foreign studies” (*Staatswissenschaften und Auslandskunde*), Bergstraesser was also close (but not its member) in these years to the famous Stefan George circle that included names like von Stauffenberg, which brought together men with a conservative and anti-modernist stance. This made him even more prone to accept alternative understandings of science. His mentor, Max Weber's brother had significantly shaped the concept of “existential science” that was closely interwoven with spiritual and cultural elements, which had further relevance due to their national-integrative power. For Bergstraesser, these positions led to rejecting ideas of “*science pour la science.*” His works in the Weimar period included not only attacks on the Versailles system in a political sense, but on a more general level, he took a position with regard to science that had to be in line with national-pedagogical ideas and practical purposes. After having worked at DHfP he went back to Heidelberg, where Alfred Weber held a professorship and would continue to influence him. Even in the final years of the Weimar Republic and the early Nazi period, he did not change his anti-modernist position and continued to criticize “the mechanization of existence.” A “new totality of man,” and “a real wholeness” was what he wanted. Thus, in 1934, the second year of the Nazi regime, he would write that the “total state necessitates the total man.”³²⁷

The influence these ideas had on his broader scholarly approach led him to use the concept of *synopsis* as a means to turn his research into a holistic dimension. It is interesting to note that the contemporary Prussian education minister, Carl Heinrich Becker saw both sociology and foreign studies (*Auslandskunde*) as fields in which

³²⁷ Schmitt, 1989: 467-477, see p. 476 for the last quote.

synthesis was at the basis of any research. His ideas were shared by Bergstraesser, and his scholarly work in that period and in the later post-World War II years was marked by the way he interpreted cultural-sociological aspects via the lenses of a synoptic/ synthetic understanding. In the background was the assumption, in Bergstraesser's words, that “the science tries to think about the whole starting from the whole.” A holistic view (*Gesamtanschauung*) tied to the interest of the nation and its culture and identity was the ideal starting point of Bergstraesser's scholarly undertaking. In this framework, his 1930 book on France, which was not just sociological, political, or economical a study but a combination of all these dimensions, is for many an example of his synoptic approach to political and international studies.³²⁸ In the 1930s, this book brought him success as its elaborate analysis of French politics and economy – part of a two-volume set on France, co-edited with Ernst Robert Curtius – presented an example of his cultural-philosophical and cultural-sociological approach to country studies.³²⁹

IV.4.b. Bergstraesser in the US: difficulties and changes

An interesting aspect of Bergstraesser's life concerns the period of his emigration years. Due to his origins (a Jewish grandmother), he was put under Nazi pressure and forced to leave his university position at Heidelberg. In 1937, he emigrated and settled in the US after having waited for two years for a passport. A former World War I veteran who wanted to make use of Nazis for his nationalist conservative expectations, he was

328 Schmitt, 1989: 474-475.

329 Fraenkel, 1965: 255.

also close to the circle around Kurt von Schleicher, the last pre-Hitler chancellor later murdered by the Nazi SA.³³⁰ In the US, he lived in California, and became a professor at Scripps, a college for female students, known for its conservative background. There he taught courses on German and European civilization.³³¹

Once the US officially entered World War II on the side of the allies, he became a suspicious figure not only in the eyes of his colleagues, students, their parents, or the FBI, but also among many fellow German(-Jewish) emigrants who were informed about his earlier sympathy for German nationalist conservative ideology and the initial closeness he had towards the Nazi regime. It was Bergstraesser who served as the *Doktorvater* of Alfred Six, a leading name in the SS movement's academic involvement who was to become the director of the Berlin-based AWF, a later institutional merger of schools dealing with foreign and world politics in the 1940s. Bergstraesser's general remarks on this student's dissertation work – the topic of the dissertation was Nazi propaganda, which fully implementing the racist and anti-Semitic content one could – had been positive (“a gain, both in content and methodological approach, for the scholarly literature on the dynamics of the modern state” [sic!]) presenting a problematic example of his academic stance in the early 1930s.³³²

In 1941, Bergstraesser was arrested following the publication of an article in the German emigrants' journal *Aufbau* that had exposed his involvement in the 1932 dismissal of Professor Gumbel from his university position at Heidelberg. Bergstraesser

330 Krohn, 1986: 269, 255.

331 Krohn, 1986: 260 and Lange, 1965: 247.

332 Eisfeld, 1996: 46-47.

was accused of having followed Nazi students' wish to dismiss this professor from his position, as Gumbel was an important anti-nationalist figure in the German university system. Further attacks pointed to his 1933 book *Nation und Wirtschaft* (Nation and Economy) that was rich in comments of a pro-Nazi nature, including praise of the Nazi revolution and calls for a corporatist state. His similar position in speeches given in England in the same year was also put under spotlight. Some other questionable moves (denied by him) concerned an alleged participation in a meeting with Nazi figures as well as flying the Nazi flag at the university after the Nazi takeover.³³³

At that point, Bergstraesser had only a few supporters including Carl Friedrich at Harvard, a professor who had immigrated to the US earlier in the century and helped him to find the job at Scripps College in Claremont. Another figure was Arnold Wolfers, now at Yale, and a former colleague from DHfP in Berlin as well a former German chancellor, Heinrich Brüning, who was then also at Harvard. These supporters wrote letters to the FBI in order to defend Bergstraesser against the accusations, ranging from Nazi espionage to suspicious activities, at the bases of which were the general perceptions about his German nationalism among the Scripps community. Some even thought that he was secretly visiting Germany in those years, although his actual destination had been Switzerland.³³⁴

Friedrich's efforts at the Department of Justice succeeded in freeing Bergstraesser in February 1942. In the meantime, Bergstraesser's and his friends' counterattack focused on

333 Krohn, 1986: 265, 272.

334 Krohn, 1986: 256, 260.

marginalizing the accusers in the eyes of US authorities. The main means of this was to interpret them as extreme left figures who stood in disharmony with the US understanding of democracy. Similarly, Bergstraesser asserted that his stay in Germany until 1937 was marked by an internal opposition to the Nazi regime. Thus, even his comments that can easily be seen as pro-Nazi were, according to Bergstraesser, a means of tacit opposition to the Hitler dictatorship. In September 1942, a second arrest followed. He was freed again (on parole until 1946) in February 1943. With the help of George Shuster (president of Hunter College and a member of the regional Enemy Alien Board) who knew him from his student days in Heidelberg, Bergstraesser succeeded in finding a new job at University of Chicago, which became a necessity as he had to leave Scripps due to the impact of the investigation on the campus. Now he was part of the Army Special Training Program there and the Department of Justice was keen on dealing with the academic critics of his “rehabilitation.” The department's internal memo stated that he was “a very valuable teacher for our military and civilian officials who might become concerned with administration of government in Germany” and hence it was important “to use the special abilities of paroled alien enemies in the war effort.”³³⁵ Bergstraesser taught at Chicago for the next 8 years, becoming a member of its famous Committee on Social Thought.³³⁶

How did the scholarly writings of Bergstraesser take shape in these years of what he would call “internal” migration in Nazi Germany and during the later US emigration?

335 Krohn, 1986: 272-273.

336 Lange, 1965: 247-248.

The answer can be found in Goethe, the greatest symbol of German literature and culture, a constellation of hope for many anti-Nazi Germans in the post-World War II years. Before he left the country Bergstraesser had started to write on Goethe, his article “Man and State in Goethe's Action” being published in a German journal in 1935/1936. In the post-war period, he continued on this track by co-editing a book in German for the University of Chicago Press in 1947, his own chapter being on “peace in Goethe's writings.” The obvious aim of the volume was to present the US – which was a former enemy and now an emerging ally of (West) Germany – with the bright side of German *Kultur* in order to exit from the long shadow of Nazism. This interest in Goethe would result in further publications like *Goethe's Image of Man and Society* in 1949 and the article “Goethe's view of Christ” in the journal of *Modern Philology*. According to his US colleague Viktor Lange, who participated in the memorial services for Bergstraesser held in Freiburg in 1964, this focus on Goethe was a means of finding alternatives to the problems of the 20th century. It was in this context that Bergstraesser became the main organizer of the big meeting in Aspen, held to commemorate the 200th birthday of the great German cultural figure. From Ortega y Gasset to Albert Schweitzer, from Walter Hallstein to Ernst Robert Curtius, many significant names were assembled there thanks to his efforts.³³⁷

337 Lange, 1965: 249-250.

IV.4.c. Bergstraesser in West Germany: institutional weight

Before turning to his studies on world politics after his return to his home country, one needs to consider the broad scope of activities through which Bergstraesser managed to play a prominent role in West Germany. The actual end of his emigration came only in 1954, and thus he was to spend only ten years back in his home country before his death in 1964. Although he was a relative late-returned among his fellow re-migrants, his success is undeniable. Not only did Bergstraesser become the president of the West German UNESCO commission, but he also presided over the Atlantic Bridge Association in addition to advising the Atlantic Institute in Paris.³³⁸ Furthermore, he was the first director of the Research Institute of *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Aussenpolitik* (DGAP, German Foreign Policy Association) before it moved to Bonn. Another very important West German think tank, *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* (Science and Politics Foundation), closely connected to the defense and foreign ministries, was also the result of an earlier initiative by Bergstraesser. His death preceded the creation of its research institute, but the foundation was already established by 1962.³³⁹

With regard to his position within West German political science, Fraenkel remarked that Bergstraesser was already doing political science before he was finally given a chair in political science at the Freiburg University.³⁴⁰ One has to note here that he did not get back his chair in Heidelberg where he had been positioned in the pre-emigration period.

The role of Alfred Weber was a significant obstacle because he saw his former student

338 Oberndörfer, 1965: 12ff and Kiesinger, 1965: 17.

339 Burges, 2004: 182-183.

340 Fraenkel, 1965: 252.

burdened by pro-Nazi positions taken during the early Nazi years.³⁴¹ The years of emigration were for Bergstraesser times of “excludedness.”³⁴² But his return to West Germany provided him with a powerful position from which he would be able to exert his influence within German political science. Thus, Bergstraesser's official remigration that happened relatively late, in 1954, did not hinder him from playing a leading role, after overcoming challenges that had their roots in his political views during the interwar years.

After his return to West Germany, Bergstraesser's new position gave rise to a scholar figure who seemed to be omnipresent. From associations to foundations, from university institutes to policy work, his activities generate a picture of a scholar who was at the center of the new West German state's knowledge-related policies. He was not only the first professor to get an official political science chair, but also stood behind a great number of initiatives at the university-foundations-governments nexus. It is in this context that Kiesinger saw in him a figure who aimed to contribute to freedom by providing its (West German) institutions with cohesion; for Kiesinger, Bergstraesser's virtual omnipresence with regard to world policy-related developments in West Germany was a natural consequence.³⁴³

In addition to all his efforts at institution-building, Bergstraesser was also very active in agenda-setting, that is in determining areas of focus that would become major research domains within German IR in the second part of the 20th century. He founded a research

341 Bleek and Lietzmann, 2003: 78.

342 Oberndörfer, 1965: 12.

343 Kiesinger, 1965: 17.

center at Freiburg University on developing countries, an approach made easier by his earlier interest in comparative and cultural studies, of which his 1930 book on France had already served as a model. After his death, this research unit was named Arnold Bergstraesser Research Institute. Another academic area marked by his impact was the field of American studies. In the founding meeting of *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Amerikastudien* (German Association for American Studies) in 1953 (one year before his definitive re-migration to Western Germany), he presented a paper on research and teaching aspects of American studies in which he opposed the idea of a separate discipline as such, defending instead cooperative arrangements incorporating humanities and social sciences when studying a country.³⁴⁴ Such a proposal was in line with his overall understanding of science, according to which science did not exist for its own sake but in order to provide insights that could be used by the larger society. The way for this could only be reached if more holistic approaches would be established, instead of distinctly separate disciplines. However, this position did not hinder Bergstraesser from putting all his postwar weight into the defense of a separate political science discipline. The reason was his seeing in a distinct science of (world) politics a much needed tool that would both engage citizens and postwar Germany on a constant basis with (world) politics – an aspect discussed in more detail below.

It is as a consequence of these positions that his scholarly assumptions can be understood. Ernst Fraenkel remarked that Bergstraesser was one of the most successful names in the “symbiosis of science and politics,” while his student Oberndörfer explained

³⁴⁴ Fraenkel, 1965: 257.

that for this scholar “all science was at the end a 'political' science” that was there for the public good.³⁴⁵ Notwithstanding earlier conservative nationalist positions, Bergstraesser can be seen in light of his postwar West German position as a representative name in the era's political science and IR. Even Ekkehart Krippendorff, a leading voice in critical political science and IR in West Germany was full of praise for his former professor many decades later when giving his retirement speech at Freie Universität Berlin's Otto Suhr Institut.³⁴⁶

The legacy of Bergstraesser included the influence he had on West German political science through his students. Many important scholars, including Kurt Sontheimer, Hans Maier, Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, and Hans-Peter Schwarz were part of this group who also made good use of their mentor's connections in order to rise to prominent positions in the early decades of post-World War II political science, with Oberndörfer himself getting the second chair for Political Science at Freiburg after Bergstraesser.³⁴⁷

IV.4.d. Bergstraesser's international thought in the context of West Germany

According to his colleagues, Bergstraesser's focus on international politics was the result of a combined US-German experience. The years spent in the US, at a time when the country was reshaping itself as a new superpower of the postwar era, brought him in touch with developments in IR. The close connections between academia, government,

345 Fraenkel, 1965: 253 and Oberndörfer, 1965: 13.

346 See Krippendorff's academic retirement speech “*Unzufrieden*” [Dissatisfied] in Krippendorff, 1999.

347 Burges, 2004: 167 fn. 46.

think tanks (all later emphasized by the famous Stanley Hoffmann piece³⁴⁸) that he witnessed in the US can be interpreted as having played a major role in his later West German engagements and initiatives. It was in those years that IR rose to more prominence, a point underlined by many historiographies as the actual date of its birth³⁴⁹ and also acknowledged by contemporaries.³⁵⁰ Being in the US in those formative years enabled him to directly note these fast changes. In the context of Germany, on the other hand, German “provincialism of public consciousness” was something that brought about his reaction.³⁵¹

For Bergstraesser, studying world politics was a means of providing West Germany with a political scientific *aggiornamento* that was simultaneously aimed at connecting the country to the emerging Western bloc. It is not surprising that Kiesinger, the later West German president mentioned in his memorial speech that Bergstraesser had always wanted to have people with world horizons who could think politically in universal terms.³⁵² Such reasoning led to seeing political science not only as an academic activity revolving around the education of future scholars or the introduction of general political education but also as a process that would create “a scientifically educated responsible elite.” These very people would then provide a strong basis for a properly functioning pluralist democracy.³⁵³ In these terms, one notes the continuation of the earlier Weimar

348 See Hoffmann: 1977.

349 See for instance Guilhot, 2010.

350 See among others Thompson, 1955.

351 Oberndörfer, 1965: 13.

352 Kiesinger, 1965: 17.

353 Fraenkel, 1965: 252-253.

DHfP goal to use political scientific and world political education for generating people with useable knowledge who could make use of this in their future elite positions.

At the ideational juncture, fears and perceptions derived from the years of the Weimar experience and the Hitler dictatorship as well as ideas originating from the US emigration period are clearly at the forefront of Bergstraesser's post-World War II worldview. It was for this reason that he did not interpret the experience of German universities, and political and social sciences in particular, in a way that would lead to more skepticism with regard to the manipulative capacities of these disciplines, which had become visible at the time of the Nazi takeover of and influence on social sciences in German universities. For Bergstraesser, science had political responsibilities and had to be recognizant of them and to realize them. The Nazi experience did not make him shy away from this position. He resisted, contrary to all voices that opposed the (re-)birth of a German political science discipline in the post-1945 period, by standing behind this line of argumentation. Political science was to have political functions, but this time they were going to be in line with the principles of a pluralist (Western-style) democracy. In this context, production of knowledge that would guide policymakers would not be an unwelcome aspect.³⁵⁴

When looking at one the first articles published in the (West) German *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* (PVS), the major academic political science journal of the period, it is Bergstraesser's article that one sees as the first text laying the basis for IR-related discussions. His article in the second issue of PVS (in 1960) carries the title

³⁵⁴ Fraenkel, 1965: 253, 259.

“International Politics as Branch of Political Science.”³⁵⁵ Therein, when defining International Politics as a special discipline of political science, he provides the following description: “totality of activities of states' decision bodies [*Willenskörper*] that deal with their behavior toward other states or state systems as well as to the economic and cultural units represented by them.”³⁵⁶ The picture that arises seems at first glance to be tightly tied to a state-focused viewpoint. However, it is the same author who writes just a few years later that the “nation-state oriented foreign policy of the old Europe” has become part of the past.³⁵⁷ Perhaps this acceptance of broader factors led him to discuss in 1960 the relevance of international law as well as public opinion and international organizations. His conceptual framework is in line with ideas familiar from the US version of IR in the early 1950s. Sovereignty, balance of power, and security are mentioned specifically as Bergstraesser looks for a contextual understanding of them. He states that it is IR's duty “to clarify [these concepts] with regard to their actual political relevance.” It is no longer sufficient to keep taking their meanings as given, deriving them from traditional political thought.³⁵⁸

While acknowledging the power of US IR and institutional structures originating in the likes of the Council on Foreign Relations and its British counterpart the Royal Institute of International Affairs, as well as the continuing search for ways of ending wars as a self-stated goal of the discipline, Bergstraesser makes a move forward by presenting

355 Reprinted as Bergstraesser, 1965h.

356 Bergstraesser, 1965h: 23.

357 Bergstraesser, 1965a: 55.

358 Bergstraesser, 1965h: 24.

the idea of *vordenken* (thinking in advance, thinking ahead), another tool that connects the scholarly arena to the political one. Seeing in the world of the 20th century “interdependences of political actions,” in which domestic social policies – not least due to the Soviet Marxist influence – have come to prominence, which challenge the earlier habits around the primacy of foreign policy, he refers back to the relevance of a cultural-sociological understanding of others, not only for scholarly but for policy purposes also. In this framework, “the global reach of foreign political horizon” emerges as “a prerequisite of decision.”³⁵⁹

Bergstraesser's political position, explicitly shown in the duality he describes between Soviet Bloc totalitarianism and Western democracies, influences the general role he gives to IR. Only a West German academic structure whose humanistic studies could manage to overcome their narrower forms of national-cultural features can pave the way for accessing more universal forms of knowledge, something that is much needed in the area of world politics.³⁶⁰ Here one has to note the concomitant weakness of post-war West Germany in the international system, but at the same time the determined efforts of Bergstraesser to create the conditions necessary for a German international presence in the form of a proper member of the Western democratic-capitalist bloc. The ideational support for this new Germany is to be found in a world political outlook that is less parochial and more universal, recognizing directly the Cold War realities and (for Bergstraesser) the greatest challenge of the 20th century, namely the fact that the world

359 Bergstraesser, 1965h: 24-25.

360 Bergstraesser, 1965h: 26, 29.

has for the first time become truly global, not as a unit but also as a political problem. Under these conditions, the idealist-realist debate in IR does not present a serious intellectual enterprise for him, but merely a “pseudo-controversy.” The 19th century *Realpolitik* is interpreted as a consequence of power state theory (*Machtstaatstheorie*), “the dogmatism of which ignored less visible forces of world politics.” Idealism, too, is touched by his critique when he accuses it for having put too big expectations on securing peace via the supposed joint impact of international morality and international organizations. In his opinion, such expectations were unrealizable.³⁶¹

It is important to recognize the degree to which Bergstraesser accepts the interwovenness inherent in 20th century world politics. In 1958, in the first annual survey volume on world politics he edited for DGAP, it reads that all states have now entered “a single context of impact” so that “[n]o political event, on whatever continent it takes place, remains meaningless for the other participants.” In this general essay that deals with the world of the mid-1950s, there emerges a world politics characterized by mutual dependence and mutual impact, with a balance that is still not stable after the old European equilibrium has been lost with the decline of European powers. In that framework, Bergstraesser sees even bigger dynamics leading to a “labile world balance” because historical problems are not resolved and new ones are added with the influence of domestic social developments. As a result, “power politics of the past is replaced by a multilayered context,” one that includes more than just political factors, extending now to economic and social factors in addition to the usual ideas of national interest. At such a

³⁶¹ Bergstraesser, 1965h: 34-35.

time, “[t]he political world map of the present can no longer be drawn Eurocentrically.”³⁶²

His pro-US attitude becomes visible when he praises its distinct position, while basing his points on the domestic features of American society. The US with its capacity for improvisation, a factor even more important than Americans' entrepreneurial spirit and free market values, is therefore ready for even more success. What to outside observers can look like “a step-wise building of an empire,” is according to Bergstraesser the consequence of this improvisation potential of Americans. The US is not an actual imperialist power in his analysis. Ideas about its imperial policies get an explicit rebuttal in his argumentation, whereas it is the Soviet political system that draws his criticism. The latter is seen as a version of technical-managerial modernization models, while the positively evaluated Western model is rooted in the Christian-antic legacy.³⁶³ It is interesting that no mention is made of the Nazi dictatorship in this long analysis of the Western and Soviet blocs. Politically, the German-(Western European-)US ties are defended by a triptych of interests shared among them. Obviously, the perceived Soviet threat takes first place. However, the ideological commonality arising from the market economy structure is quickly added to the pool of joint interests. Thirdly, the ties to the Third World with its newly independent developing countries play an important role in connecting the US to its West German ally.³⁶⁴

362 Bergstraesser, 1965c: 106-109, 141.

363 Bergstraesser, 1965c: 132-133, 111-112.

364 Bergstraesser, 1965g: 172ff.

Bergstraesser's stance with regard to the role of states comes to the forefront again when he writes that “the scientific research of world politics” has to take states as main actors of the “world political dynamic” into consideration. Furthermore there is a distinct emphasis on the need to separate individual political events from more general recognizable structures and possibilities. According to him, contemporary events by themselves should not be taken as the only present and future givens of world political processes. The emerging message is one with implicit references to a future world order that can be different from the Cold War era of the 1950s. Although the strict connection with the “Free World” is mentioned once again, Bergstraesser does not shy away from paving the way for a contemplative study of world politics open to multidimensionality. This means that certain aspects that were taken for granted in their eras (be it the British colonialism, or Stalin's confrontational Soviet foreign policy) can gradually or suddenly become obsolete factors that no longer play a role in world politics. All this is then derived from and tied back to the impact of cultural differences and intercultural dialogue, elements of great significance in Bergstraesser's general approach that originates from a cultural-sociological starting point. While newly independent nations like India struggle to make progress domestically and on the world political stage, in his eyes, it is also European culture that contributes as a useful guide to the former's quest for technological advances. Taking into account the early Cold War, with all the contextual dynamics of his analysis, including but not limited to decolonization, makes it possible to understand why he was prone to keep constantly underlining the relevance of culture – an

essential part of world politics and thus of IR that was only to make an effective return in the discipline's post-modern years.³⁶⁵ For Bergstraesser, it was this role of culture that brought with it the need for understanding the others and one's own “way of existence” (*Daseinsart*), an assumption that also made the connection with his constant reference to the need for a new style of education that goes beyond the parochialism of national education.³⁶⁶

These connections, in turn, provide a general framework whose main elements are the necessity of a broader (world political) education, aimed at developing a better understanding of the other (thus also advancing the knowledge about the other, a useful policy in a world marked by the Cold War); the relevance of intercultural dialogue, notwithstanding a clear positioning on the side of the Western democracies; and finally, a certain commitment to analyze the changing world with some European cultural sensitivities while acknowledging the effective end of a Euro-centric world order. When explaining politics (*Politik*) itself, in the *Staatslexikon* of the 1950s, an important post-World War II German encyclopedic handbook on state and politics, Bergstraesser wrote that power has to be only “a means not an end in itself” and opposed “absolute authority of the state or people” and “autonomous reason of state” due to their inappropriateness for Christian ethics.³⁶⁷ By focusing instead on its principle of

365 On this late discovery of culture by IR see Valbjørn, 2008.

366 Bergstraesser, 1965c: 143-144.

367 See Bergstraesser, 1965i: 189ff. This is a reprinted version based on the *Staatslexikon* (6th edition from 1956).

subsidiarity, he proposed to organize “an ordered freedom” that included state interventions at points of necessity.

It is not difficult to understand how these suggestions resulted from his ideological background. Now a committed member of the new West German academic elite, having left behind his earlier sympathies for a nationalist conservative revolution, Bergstraesser was still asking for order, the borders of which would be determined, not limitlessly but ultimately still, by the state. Explicitly expanding these assumptions to the domain of international politics, he underlined the necessity of mutual respect for “rights and freedoms of individual peoples as well as containment of one's own claims.” The ultimate order could be found by “the establishment of a universally recognized authority, which would effectively represent the common good of all,” a process where world politics has to make its contribution.³⁶⁸ However, in the Cold War years, he recognized the difficulty of an independent policy that the UN could follow. The two superpowers seem to have the ultimate saying in world politics.³⁶⁹

For Bergstraesser, IR lies beyond a study of legal relations that are part of international law and beyond works of history that are useful sources for world political analysis. For him, it is in the aftermath of the First World War that “the newer *science of politics*” led to the development of the discipline of *International Politics* (emphases in original). The primary role of “Anglo-Saxon countries” as well as the (original) English label of “International Relations” is underlined in his entry on “Foreign Policy”

368 Bergstraesser, 1965i: 189.

369 Bergstraesser, 1965a: 47.

(*Auswärtige Politik*) for the *Staatslexikon*.³⁷⁰ When analyzing the main features of a transformed world politics distinguished from its 19th century predecessor, Bergstraesser recognized in the bipolar structure of the Cold War period a factor generating “universal mutual dependence.” This dramatic difference from the 19th century is furthered by the interconnectedness of domestic social policies and foreign policy. As explained earlier, it was of great significance for this scholar, who was at the forefront of efforts for the construction of a new West German academic community – especially in the area of social sciences as well as the humanities, to point to the impact of social policies on the way foreign policy was implemented. It is in this new framework that “foreign policy today can be thought of and realized only in the world context,” as it is the new great powers on the sidelines of Europe whose ideologies and socio-economic structures provide the main points of struggle around which the new world politics is constructed. Consequently, one sees that again he is emphasizing that “there is for the first time a world politics in the geographically global sense.”³⁷¹

An article that was published in a volume honoring Kurt Georg Kiesinger's 60th birthday serves as another example of the importance he gave to order. The very title, “Hope for a Worldwide Political Order,” can be seen as a continuation of Bergstraesser's emphasis on the idea of order, not only within the limits of a West German capitalist democracy or the Western bloc in general, but also globally. Only such an interpretation allows for his next move, that is, the call for a continued deterrence against the Soviet

370 Bergstraesser, 1965a: 38.

371 Bergstraesser, 1965a: 48-49.

bloc as well as for a “reliable relationship” between the Western and Eastern blocs.³⁷²

Written in 1963, this text points to the possibility of a thaw in inter-bloc relationships, a process that also enables the emergence of a certain degree of order in world politics.

However, one confronts again his preference for the Western bloc, now interpreted not only in terms of freedoms but also as a model for others due to its *homo faber* nature, that is in a position where the West assumes the role model in the form of an entrepreneurial actor.³⁷³

In this analysis, it is again possible to see the interwoven nature of world political developments and the way Bergstraesser's observation of global events shapes his suggestions for the study of international politics. He talks of a world horizon and universal thought, hence the need to broaden one's view of the world and its politics. An area of focus that would be one of his legacies in West German political science, the study of developing countries, also comes to the forefront when he underlines, in a foreign policy context, the importance of development aid and the bilateral and multilateral contexts in which this can take place. However, his major conclusion pertains to West Germany's influence in world political terms. For Bergstraesser, “our participation at world political thought and action” would remain without much impact if the scientific and educational levels could not reach a more advanced stage. He asks for a “stronger penetration of the world horizon of the present” into West German education. Again, it is the quest to overcome parochialism in areas of global knowledge and

372 Bergstraesser, 1965b: 154.

373 Bergstraesser, 1965b: 147.

international involvement that leads him to advocate an intensive engagement in the area of International Politics/IR.³⁷⁴

The same issue is mentioned in a talk he gave at the *Amerika-Haus* in Urach in 1957 (so-called America houses were cultural centers aiming to bring American culture to a German audience, and they served as important means for creating a pro-American attitude among the West German population). Common goals and problems of American and West German foreign policy provided his discussion subject. In this earlier presentation, he even went beyond the idea of foreign policy, rejecting it in favor of the concept of world politics. That assertion was a result of his much repeated suggestion that the world and its problems have become global for the first time in the 20th century.³⁷⁵

The American success in the study of world politics and the triggering effects of World War II were similarly mentioned as well as his desire to reach similar levels of knowledge production in West Germany. Universal, world political horizons had to be implemented in his home country, this desire being a consequence of experiences in his country of emigration. This persistent preference for German empowerment in terms of global knowledge can be partially explained by his geo-civilizational preferences that are defended in the face of Cold War challenges. In this regard, Bergstraesser explicitly distinguishes the problem of a divided Germany from the analogous cases of Korea and Indochina. He says that “we [Germans] should not underestimate ourselves. We are citizens not only of an old occidental country of culture [*Kulturland*], but also of a

374 Bergstraesser, 1965b: 154-155.

375 Bergstraesser, 1965g: 167.

country, in which once the idea of a universal order of peace-creating reality was spiritually and institutionally providing the solid foundation of public life.”³⁷⁶ When he keeps defending this line with further historical references back to the Holy Roman Empire, one can ask the question as to why the similarly advanced civilizations of the Far East should be ignored in the context of contemporary world political realities. Therefore, it is more possible to assert that Bergstraesser's is basically a position that derives its major assumptions from his previous nationalist conservative years, now adjusted via the lenses of a supposed cultural-civilizational advancedness.

Simultaneously, his understanding and perception of Germany has to be thought of within the general context of his approach towards Europe, its *culture* and *civilization*. While acknowledging that the continent is itself witnessing cultural differences and even antagonisms,³⁷⁷ he does not shy away from presenting a monolithic description that disregards the use of plurals. Behind this holistic perception of Europe, one can find Bergstraesser's sociological-political approach at the roots of which cultural elements play the foremost role. It is for this reason that he goes on to assert that “European national literatures present in reality a total history of occidental literary thought experience [*Gesamtgeschichte der abendländischen dichterischen Denkerfahrung*].” The legacy of cultural elements points to the single nature of Europe's existence. In this line of reasoning, the idea of Europe is tied to a single cultural circle with its own political and spiritual dimensions, a zone in which the European culture provides its own norms.

376 Bergstraesser, 1965g: 166-167.

377 Bergstraesser, 1965c: 141.

Its organizational-technical management lies at the roots of the global system, and it is in Europe that the scientific form giving birth to these advances has been originally developed. While the roots of the contemporary Cold War rivalry between the US and Soviet Union can be found in Europe, it is also in Europe that the “social question” first emerged in its modern guise. As a result, even the decline of Europe does not necessarily decrease its cultural-scientific influence because the burden that remains from the concomitant problems generated by its social and economic advances continues to change the world and to determine the forms new conflicts take.³⁷⁸

Bergstraesser summarizes all these developments and the level of tacit European influence when he writes that “the spiritual, economic, and social existence of Europe has become the fate of the world” (*Dasein Europas zum Weltschicksal geworden*).³⁷⁹ Thus, his writings reflect a continued belief in the possibility of Europe's distinction. At the end, he again prioritizes Europe as a cultural zone that has “thought in advance and discovered in advance” (*vorausgedacht und vorauserfunden*), that is it accomplished all this before the others. In addition, it has also “suffered in advance/before others” (*vorausgelitten*). It is these legacies that lead Europe to possess the cultural and spiritual means of serving humanity at these times of change.³⁸⁰

Following the focus on the German and European cultural-historical legacies, it is useful to refer back to Bergstraesser's clear preference for the Western bloc of capitalist democracies under the leadership of the US. The American model serves in a useful

378 Bergstraesser, 1965e: 157-160.

379 Bergstraesser, 1965e: 161.

380 Bergstraesser, 1965e: 164.

capacity at another level. When speaking about the American tendency for bipartisanship in foreign policy issues, he adds that West German political parties have started to make similar moves. According to Bergstraesser, the debates within the *Bundestag* (federal parliament) provide less clearly distinguished divisions among the governing and opposition parties. The moment is one at which people need to leave aside old ideological positions and to be conscious about the necessity of “thinking world politically.” Americans were successful in that regard with their new “world political conception.”³⁸¹

A major feature that arises from the analysis of his works, also mentioned by his colleague Fraenkel, is the lack of general theorizing.³⁸² It is more often the case that his texts present carefully written analyses, which aim to provide the reader with a useful understanding of world politics, and not least with relevant issues in contemporary foreign policy. Notwithstanding these aspects that could be met by a more critical stance by today's IR scholars marked by an interminable quest after more (abstract and detached) theorizing, one can actually see in Bergstraesser's idea of culture a circle surrounding his basic approach to the study of international politics. It is in this context that he asserts that knowledge of cultural transformation that takes place in the 20th century needs to be augmented. Even more important is the need to perceive the connection between the plurality of motives that lie at the basis of varying political actions of nations and the actual reasons of these differences, the roots of which he assumes to originate from their “cultural past.”³⁸³

381 Bergstraesser, 1965g: 171.

382 See Fraenkel, 1965.

383 Bergstraesser, 1965b: 155.

As a result, his approach is based on the following triangulation: culture, world politics, and a cultural-sociological study of world politics. Taking note of his earlier work in the 1930s, especially the book on French politics and society, and of the fact that he was a student of Alfred Weber, clarifies his background further. Bergstraesser was not only a political scientist, who became in the eyes of his colleagues perhaps the only scholar (at least) of his generation who had managed to combine all the discipline's main areas, reaching from political philosophy to international politics, domestic politics and political sociology, but also a scholar whose work on this later area made him a sociologist.³⁸⁴ This sociological position presumably provided him with a more culture-sensitive perspective that was to mark his general political scientific and IR works.

In the case of Bergstraesser, the idea of a synoptic political science guided his work in various issue areas. Constellations had to be considered, and culture, sociological dimensions as well as contemporary history were to provide helpful guides for works of IR.³⁸⁵ In a world that was interpreted to be a “unity-in-being/unity-in-progress” (*Einheit im Werden*),³⁸⁶ it was the analysis of contemporary cultural difference and similarity that stood as a focal point in his research. At this juncture, it is helpful to remember his earlier work that had taken similar assumptions. Whereas the implications of his earlier (pre-emigration) ideological views could lead one to interpret Bergstraesser's quest for a holistic-integrative science in more nationalist and even pro-Nazi terms, his post-World War II commitment to the West German democratic system and decisive engagements in

384 Fraenkel, 1965: 254.

385 Bergstraesser, 1965h: 34.

386 Bergstraesser, 1965f: 98.

favor of its strengthening, not only in a US-supported way, but also via the education of its elites in world political horizons, demonstrate that his earlier quest for synopsis had lost the élan of nationalist fervor and anti-systemic elements. Part of this shift was to be found in the general circumstances of a changed international system. But one has also to acknowledge the political transformation that marked Bergstraesser himself. He became a scholar actively involved in the work of UNESCO (and even the president of its West German committee), thus showing the continuation of his interest in education. This time he was more explicit in his calls for the relevance of law and humanity, in his advocacy of international partnership and intercultural dialogue. In UNESCO, he perceived a possible emergence point of world conscience.³⁸⁷

When looking back at Bergstraesser's overall impact in the area of political science, some scholars state that his legacy was weakened once the US-imported features of a modernized discipline started to take the upper hand with the rise of a new West German generation of scholars.³⁸⁸ However, in institutional terms, it is clear that the research and study centers, at the establishment of which he played a major role, continued to provide significant functions. In this regard, it is possible to assert that one cannot necessarily make a final accounting between a scholar's ideational contributions and his/her engagements in the development of a discipline's structures. In many instances, the institutions are known to survive behind the original ideas that were important for, and developed by, the then powerful actors.³⁸⁹ In the case of Bergstraesser, in the broader

387 Bergstraesser, 1959: 7

388 Gantzel-Kress and Gantzel, 1980: 219-220.

389 For an example within the context of IR see Ikenberry, 2001.

scope of this study, it will become visible that his overall weight lost initial power with the generational changes and shifts in scholarly approaches. Nevertheless, his wide-ranging impact lives on: the university and think tank centers he helped to establish are still important players in German research on world politics; his normative interests were continued by other scholars (not least like Krippendorff) focusing on Goethe's impact; and a more recent general opening to US IR and engagement in global IR scholarship seems to have realized his wish for a German IR community that is at the top of world political studies.

IV.5. Meeting for IR: Thinking about the World and the Discipline in 1963

Foundational meetings in which important decisions for the future course and institutionalization of a discipline are decided, and conferences at which initial frameworks of a discipline's research agenda are aired for the first time deserve special attention in any disciplinary history that aims to provide a comprehensive picture of IR's developmental pathways. It is in this context that this section turns to a detailed discussion of a 1963 meeting in which DVPW members devoted themselves to analyzing the contemporary world political structure of the Cold War period, providing thereby useful theoretical and conceptual frameworks for explaining the relevant phenomena. This showed that West German scholars were by now able to employ IR's toolkits in a mutually understandable manner, pointing to another sign of the discipline's gradual establishment in this specific context.

It was only in 1963 that a full day of DVPW's annual meeting would be dedicated for the first time to the subject of IR. This date itself shows the relatively late development of interest in IR in West Germany. To a certain extent, one could interpret this meeting as a functional analogue to the Rockefeller-organized conference on IR theory that had taken place 9 years earlier in the US.³⁹⁰ However, significant obstacles standing in front of the Germans were more visible as their focus was to a larger extent on the idea of world politics itself. Thus, compared to the US meeting, it was sufficient if the scholars could contribute to a self-understanding of IR as a separate field of research and study instead of spending time developing abstract theories capable of explaining the structure of world politics.

The presiding member of the third day's meetings devoted to IR and held on April 25, 1963 in Heidelberg was Arnold Bergstraesser. After acknowledging the backwardness of IR research and teaching in West Germany, Bergstraesser opened the floor to two presenters, Richard Löwenthal from FU Berlin, the only IR-chaired professor of the time, and Wilhelm Cornides, who also played an important role in the West German community of world politics scholars and pundits in his capacity as the founder of the *Europa-Archiv* journal, later renamed *Internationale Politik*. This journal, which was to become part of DGAP that was founded in 1955, did not differ from its British and American counterparts like *International Affairs* and *Foreign Affairs*; it is hence the oldest postwar journal on world politics in (West) Germany.

390 See Guilhot, 2010.

The presentations and debates that followed were published in the 1964 volume of PVS. They provide an important means to gain insights about the way IR discipline developed in West Germany. This same issue of PVS included on its last pages an obituary written by Kurt Sontheimer – for Arnold Bergstraesser, Sontheimer's mentor who had died on February 24, 1964. Interestingly, this founder-role function was asserted in Löwenthal's speech at the conference, when he said that Bergstraesser did not formally have a chair in foreign policy, but that it was he who “in his chair of political science [was] the re-founder and perhaps even founder of this discipline in postwar Germany.”³⁹¹

A similar tone of praise arises from Cornides' presentation. Like Löwenthal, he saw in Bergstraesser a scholar whose contributions to the development of IR studies (in West Germany) cannot be overemphasized. It is thanks to Bergstraesser that “a methodically secured connection [is made] between the 'horizontal' analysis of the world political total constellation of the present and the 'vertical' analysis of historically developed structures of culture circles.”³⁹² What Cornides had in mind concerns Bergstraesser's ability to provide a historical consciousness to world politics that is supported by a *holistic* approach, or in Bergstraesser's own words, a *synoptic* analysis.

When Bergstraesser presented Löwenthal at the opening of the meeting, he mentioned that it was 30 years ago they had met in Heidelberg the last time. This reference itself (made in 1963 about 1933) is sufficient to remind us about the Nazi rupture that took place in Germany and terminated many scholarly engagements. It is no

391 Löwenthal, 1964: 95.

392 Cornides, 1964: 110.

coincidence that Bergstraesser used the same 30 years frame when pointing to Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartoldy's Hamburg-based Foreign Policy Institute (IAP). In the past three decades, Bergstraesser had witnessed both his and Löwenthal's emigration from Nazi Germany and the end of the Hamburg institute, only to see their return to West Germany in the postwar years and the founding of DGAP, the development of its research institute much shaped by his personal contribution. At such a juncture, it was Bergstraesser who referred to US successes in the field of IR because Americans “have recognized for many decades” the importance of dealing with “the problems of international politics with scientific tools.”³⁹³ At the meeting's end, the presiding Bergstraesser would reach a similar conclusion:

The knowledge level [*Kenntnisstand*] and thus also the decision capacity in world political problems have [in West Germany] a still too narrow breadth. Therefore both of them have to be especially developed, if we do not want to be in danger, in comparison with more developed countries like the US, Great Britain and France, of remaining here at the level of provincial thought that opens inexact and irrelevant [*unzutreffende und irreführende*] perspectives for today's world civilization.³⁹⁴

When analyzing the two presentations and consequent debates, it becomes evident that the main questions remain at the level of world political developments and do not reach the more theoretical stage that was on the rise in these same years on the other side of North Atlantic. Bergstraesser explained at the meeting's start that the two scholars would focus on Eastern and Western parts of “current bipolar world politics.” While Löwenthal focused on the predominant role of the two superpowers as their respective

393 Bergstraesser et al., 1964: 93.

394 Bergstraesser et al., 1964: 149.

blocs' leaders, he asserted that major problems would arise in due time *within* the blocs as national interests would differ at least on some issue areas. In this regard, he referred to three aspects. First, there was the case of colonialism and its ending. Countries like the US with their industrial societies but without colonial possessions had interests that naturally diverged from French or British colonial policies. Second, their defense positions were different. For instance, the US could make use of its geographic isolation, whereas that would not be valid in the case of its West European allies. Lastly, in the specific case of Germany, its division was according to Löwenthal a problem for West Germans, but not for their allies within the Western bloc.³⁹⁵ As a consequence, the emerging picture is one of present and potential divergences that stand side by side with the alliance structures and take their origins from the differing nature of national-interest-related givens.

Whereas Löwenthal's analysis was relevant for its focus on the Eastern bloc and the emerging raft between Moscow and Mao's China, the Western bloc built the topic of Cornides' analysis. According to him, there was an existential difference between the foreign political perceptions of maritime powers, by which one can understand the Anglo-Americans, and those of continental Europeans, i.e. France and West Germany. Following Ranke's ideas, he asserted that it was more the case for continental powers to detach themselves from other states in the sense of having to more prominently demonstrate their power and capacity in facing possible challenges. In this context, an important reference to the preceding speaker shows the potential inherent in the 1963
395 Löwenthal, 1964: 98-100.

meeting, that is the search for new approaches to world politics, both with regard to thinking about and studying it. Löwenthal's ability to go beyond the “German misunderstanding” with regard to the assumption of the primacy of foreign policy was acknowledged by Cornides as an important contribution because the former scholar was able to present a shift towards the concept of “primacy of national interests.” Such a preference was seen as better equipped to deal with a plurality of divergent sources of interests. This observation led consequently to a significant frontal attack on US political science. For Cornides, one should be very careful not to equalize “*the*' national interest with *'the*' foreign political interest” - something he saw as being typical of American approaches. He went even further in assuming a “more diffuse concept of national interests for sea powers.” While sometimes national and foreign policy interests do overlap, it is Mahanian geopolitics that plays an important role for Cornides' detailed explanation, especially with regard to sea powers and their foreign policies.³⁹⁶

Interesting to note is the sudden jump in Cornides' references from the German Ranke to his American counterpart Mahan without any further mentioning of Karl Haushofer or other 20th century German geopoliticians. A possible reason lay in the Nazi-taintedness of German geopolitics, which itself seems not to completely prevent geopolitical analysis but could possibly have led West German scholars to disregard contributions from scholars associated with German expansionism. Behind the partial policy nature of Cornides' analysis, also due to his non-academic position, there arises an interesting assumption about postwar US policies. According to Cornides, it was “not

396 Cornides, 1964: 110ff. Emphasis in original.

'realpolitical' interest, but the idealist interest for a better world order” that shaped US moves after 1945. Thus, American economic interests are interpreted to be irrelevant for the ideological motivation of the US in its search for the “one world ideal.”³⁹⁷

While these assumptions would not be bulletproof – as seen later with many revisionist analyses of US Cold War policies, the very existence of such West German observations points to the situation in the early 1960s and the way US leadership in the Western Bloc was taken as given and subsequently idealized. However, Cornides was also clear about divergences between Americans and their European allies. Similar to Bergstraesser's remarks about the greater significance of German problems compared to Asian circumstances, Cornides saw in West Europe something that was not comparable to Japan as an ally in Asia. At the end, he acknowledged that no “complete harmonisation” of interests among the members of the Western alliance in all domains was possible.³⁹⁸

The two presentations were followed by a discussion in which many scholars took part. Their comments also provide useful insights into the state of West German IR by the early 1960s. For instance, a professor stated that “also with regard to international politics, our discipline is a 'practical science’” emphasizing thus the actual nature of debates taking place on that day.³⁹⁹ The subject was alliances and national interests, and the main points touched on by the two presenters had much policy relevance.

Notwithstanding the intermittent theoretical dimensions mentioned above, the general framework was of a practical-political nature. On one occasion, Bergstraesser praised one

397 Cornides, 1964: 113.

398 Cornides, 1964: 115.

399 Bergstraesser et al., 1964: 124.

of his colleagues for having been part of a process that had been a well-known aspect of the US IR community, to wit, the revolving door connection between universities and the government. This was and is a rare case in (West) Germany. When Bergstraesser introduced Professor Boris Meissner from Kiel University, it is Meissner's CV showing both his foreign ministry involvement and scholarly position that led Bergstraesser to ask for more of this type of experiences so that scholars who have gone through practical political duties do not remain a rarity.⁴⁰⁰

The changing world situation marked the meeting's focus on alliances, with Bergstraesser noting the newly emerging relevance of a North-South confrontation that could go beyond the existing West-East tensions, due to their internal problems “between the haves and have nots.” With regard to the ongoing effects of decolonization, it was again Bergstraesser who asserted that the newly independent nations' contemporary nationalism would decrease in due time, once Arabs and Africans would manage to adapt themselves to their new reality. However, his prediction in this regard would not be realized. Another aspect he emphasized concerns the role of interests. In this regard, Bergstraesser presented an interesting proposition when he asserts that political interests oriented at the nation-state no longer provide a compatible framework for 20th century world politics. It was for this reason that West Germany is defensible “only as part of a bigger complex.”⁴⁰¹ This was in line with his other statements discussed earlier that seem

400 Bergstraesser et al., 1964: 128.

401 Bergstraesser et al., 1964: 133-134.

to foresee a world of declining nation-states notwithstanding their current domination in world politics.

With respect to Bergstraesser's comments in the meeting, there is one final aspect that deserves special attention: the language he uses. When concluding his last longer comment during discussions that followed, he presents a multilayered approach for the analysis of world politics. First it is about the “analysis of the existing.” Then it is followed by a prognosis of “the emerging one.” The third layer pertains to a mental preparation in order “to shape the draft of the coming one” in such a way that the statesman can fulfill his “obligation towards the future” to the extent that this is possible for “the human being who is thrown into the fate of his existential struggle.” It is through these different layers that one can generate thinking-in-advance (*Vorausdenken*) in world politics.⁴⁰² These observations not only remind one of some texts written by Morgenthau, a German-Jewish emigrant scholar in the US who was the principal postwar founder of the discipline's post-World War II (American) form. They also point to the arcane language of world politics, with its processes shaped by individuals who cannot change their destinies. Even state leaders are presumed to have a limited sphere of action available to them. Another aspect concerns the much emphasized dimension of Bergstraesser's thought in the context of policy relevance. By again using the idea of “thinking-in-advance,” he points to the way IR is expected to provide help for the decision-makers, at least within the confines of their possibilities.

⁴⁰² Bergstraesser et al., 1964: 136.

It is Bergstraesser's thinking-in-advance concept that leads Löwenthal at the end of the meeting to point to the still weak state of foreign policy studies, that is IR as a discipline, in West Germany. For Löwenthal, this very fragility presents a threat in the sense that “thinking-in-advance [could turn] to wishful thinking” (*Wunschdenken*). As a consequence, he warns against using utopia as a toolbox of methods. Acknowledging that mere analysis does not mean much without synchronous ideas of and expectations about the future, Löwenthal insists that a repeated error in world politics has been to assume that expectations were easily realizable by setting up necessary institutions. Be it the League of Nations, proposed by Wilson or the contemporary example of the United Nations, supported by Roosevelt, he sees a constant mistake due to utopian thinking which created difficulties that arose as a result of actual trials for its implementation.⁴⁰³ Thus, it becomes clear that some versions of world political analyses can end up being reified in ways that do not reflect the original intentions and fail consequently to reach expected levels of success.

A similar conclusion emerges from Cornides' concluding remarks when he discussed the dividedness of Germany, European problems and issues of alliance politics. He saw in political science a tool that provides time frames about the present and potential decisions, possibilities, and chances. Therefore, political science, according to Cornides, also deals with problems that will arise in the future.⁴⁰⁴ The limits within which political science can fulfill its role is visible; it seems that both Cornides and Löwenthal had

403 Bergstraesser et al., 1964: 144.

404 Bergstraesser et al., 1964: 144.

doubts about the extent to which research on and study of world politics can illuminate our understanding of it. In fact, these assumptions were in line with the more policy-oriented, practical concerns that provided the background to the meeting of 1963.

The last words of the third day came from Dolf Sternberger, the president of DVPW, the association of West German political scientists. It is not surprising, after the previous statements, to note that he advocated a pluralistic political science, while praising successful debates held at the conference (including its non-IR meetings), which were rich in discussions, criticisms, and consisted of “different research directions or thought styles – philosophical, historical, legal.” In these circumstances, he accepted that some collisions took place, whose origins lie in the divergence between legal scholars and their humanities-based colleagues. For the association's president, however, these very differences were an important resource that should not be made obsolete by the prioritization of methodological rigidities or “terminologism.” Therefore, Steinberger proposed to make the discipline accept its openness to collision courses, as it is through exchanges that follow that politics becomes richer as a field of study.⁴⁰⁵

While already in 1963, two young IR scholars (both later becoming prominent members of West German scholarship), Ekkehart Krippendorff and Ernst-Otto Czempiel would publish articles analyzing the supposed primacy of foreign policy and criticizing its weak points, thereby providing an early critique of realist IR and supplying a more socially cognizant alternative,⁴⁰⁶ it is rather the meeting of the same year that provides an

405 Bergstraesser et al., 1964: 149.

406 See their articles in PVS's 1963 volume Krippendorff, 1963 and Czempiel, 1963.

example of IR's institutionalization in West Germany. Whereas a younger generation of scholars would provide a more theoretically conscious approach, it was through the efforts of the older generation that the necessary structures for the study and research in world politics were set up. Most importantly, they managed to set up scholarly forums and analytical categorizations that would become initial building blocks of an emerging discipline of IR.

IV.6. Origins of IR: The West German Contribution to Disciplinary History

Looking at the West German analyses of the origins of IR provides not only a path for broadening the general debates about the discipline's birth and development but also a useful means for understanding how the scholarly community in postwar West Germany saw its actual role within the context of scholars' perceptions about the existence and functions of IR. This analysis also serves to present a picture of how certain approaches became the mainstream of German explanations for IR's general history, one that in many instances failed to consider their own contributions in the early 20th century.

As discussed in the preceding chapter, Bergstraesser's earlier evaluations were important in pointing to the influence of US IR, especially in interwar and post-World War II years. His immigration to the US had provided him, like many of his colleagues, with a direct understanding of the American scholarly community and its practices in the area of political science and IR. A more detailed engagement was to come, however, from Ernst-Otto Czempiel's PVS article in 1965, titled "The Development of The Study of

International Relations.” Czempiel, who evolved into one of the most important and globally engaged figures of (West) German IR scene, was interestingly the first scholar to provide a detailed discussion regarding the discipline's origins. According to Czempiel, “a scientific study of International Relations” has been there only since the years following the First World War. Important names from earlier periods like Machiavelli or Kant are disqualified to be contributors to a scientific study of IR due to their lack of providing a “critical-systematical theory.” Science is based upon three distinct features according to Czempiel: being methodological, presenting testable results and providing validity claims. Consequently, works of earlier periods, notwithstanding their high quality in other aspects, fail to provide theories that include all these necessary criteria in order to be called scientific.⁴⁰⁷

Examples of scientific studies are given starting with the 20th century only. Paul Samuel Reinsch's 1900 book on *World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century* counts in this regard, as well as the World War I-era book project of the British Council for the Study of International Relations, bringing together six scholars. However, Czempiel has in fact a later (and exact) date in mind as the main starting point of the discipline of IR: May 30, 1919, the day British and American delegates participating at the Paris Peace Conference had a meeting at which a special issue was on the table. Taking the world war into account, the delegates decided that an institutionalized setting for the study and research on world politics had become a necessity. While the first project was to write a history of the peace conference itself, their decisions paved the way

⁴⁰⁷ Czempiel, 1965: 270-271.

for establishing scientific institutes of international affairs on both sides of the Anglo-American Atlantic.⁴⁰⁸

Interestingly, Czempiel refers in his analysis to a 1950 article in UNESCO's International Social Sciences Bulletin.⁴⁰⁹ This article itself provides a very short history of the British RIIA. It mentions the May 1919 meeting as the original decision point for the founding of the RIIA (Chatham House) and the American version CFR. In that meeting the British and Americans are said to have decided:

to establish institutions in their respective countries where experts on the different aspects of international affairs could meet for discussion, find essential reference material and, by improving their own knowledge and understanding, be in a better position, through their various professions of teacher, journalist, soldier, business man or civil servant, to contribute to the broadening of public information on the issues of the day.

Following this statement, the article also mentions the founding of the Hamburg's foreign affairs institute and Berlin's DHfP, and asserts that the Germans too developed their plans during the Paris conference, “unaware of the British and American plans” of a similar nature. Indeed, the German side of this development is also confirmed by the reports of contemporaries, people like Mendelssohn-Bartholdy who were among the members of the German delegation. Importantly, the RIIA article goes on to point to later developments of an institutional nature such as the cooperation that emerged between these various IR institutes and schools, including the establishment of League of Nations' IIC (Institute for International Intellectual Cooperation) and the consequent step of the

408 Czempiel, 1965: 275-276.

409 Here I use the English version, while Czempiel refers to the same article in its French version.

founding of the ISC. It is as a result of these that “by 1939 there existed on the unofficial plane a network of collaborating institutions throughout the world concerned with the scientific study of international affairs.”⁴¹⁰

If Czempiel's explanation can be labeled IR's “1919 process,” it becomes important to note that IR as an academic field was the result, in his opinion, of “political necessity.” Hence, 19th century peace movements, the conferences in The Hague, and the Carnegie Endowment are mentioned as important factors in the discipline's formation, even carrying more significance than the influence of neighboring disciplines. Democratization of foreign policy and the concomitant rise of perceptions that recognized war's irrationality provided a much needed impetus for IR's eventual birth.⁴¹¹ However, a major problem arises in this explanation of Czempiel, one that concerns his strict criteria about scientific IR. One has to acknowledge that both the institutes and the interwar additions to scholarly IR community were insufficient with regard to his framework. Methodological soundness, validity or testable results were not present in post-1919 IR, not even within its most important interwar organ, the ISC. When Czempiel himself points to the importance of the ISC's 1938 Prague meeting, where it was decided that IR was not about “formulating a system or providing norms” but actually in “analyzing facts, ordering them and trying to explain them,”⁴¹² it becomes evident that on the eve of World War II, there was still no coherent approach in IR that could pass Czempiel's tripartite scientific evaluation.

410 RIIA, 1950: 372.

411 Czempiel, 1965: 274-275.

412 Czempiel, 1965: 280.

As shown by Czempiel himself, the discipline emerged as a consequence of efforts to “help politics in the realization of peace,” although it later evolved in a bifurcated manner so that on one hand, there was a continuing trial to find means of overcoming war, whereas a different approach arose in the shape of basic research. The latter was predominant in the post-World War II years, a point also made by Czempiel. All these propositions, in turn, lead to one conclusion. If one follows Czempiel's own criteria, it becomes unnecessary to put a special emphasis on the 1919 process. Rather, it would be the post-1945 period that is marked by the actual rise of IR as a scientific study of world politics. In this 1964 article, the (West) German scholar underlines an essential problematique of IR, the difficulty of “clarifying the issue areas of its subject matter [*Gegenstand*].” The not so easily solvable question of identification has triggered, according to Czempiel, interest in more pragmatic research areas instead of theoretical elaborations.⁴¹³

At this juncture of IR's birth and development, it is interesting that Czempiel turns to one of his French colleagues when trying to define IR's subject matter. By referring to Chevallier's concept of “le complexe relationell [sic, relationnel] international,” which explains IR's object of study as “an interwoven reciprocity of relations that emerge – in all areas – between different states within a special 'relation'-milieu, which is generally defined as international society,” Czempiel finds a useful definition.⁴¹⁴ However, it is the UNESCO report prepared by the British scholar C. A. W. Manning in which the

413 Czempiel, 1965: 276-277, 280.

414 Czempiel, 1965: 282.

Chevallier definition was used that serves as the actual source of Czempiel's reference. Thus, one cannot necessarily infer that there is a direct interest of German scholars in their French counterparts. Nonetheless, it is significant here to note that early post-World War II IR was marked by a market structure in which there was not an Anglo-American dominance. Another dimension pointing to a significant difference from US scholars' expectations about a scientific IR was Czempiel's position about science itself. For him, the three criteria that he provided for locating actually scientific works are the means of differentiating science from other forms of consciousness (*Erkenntnis*), but this provides only a difference of “methodological but not of [a] qualifying nature.” Science does not necessarily reach more correct results than other forms of cognition (*Erkennen*), as “a mystic or a poet can have much more correct consciousness and insights than a scientist.”⁴¹⁵

The importance of the disciplinary history provided by Czempiel becomes clear when one notes how often it provides in a reference point subsequent years, especially with regard to his emphasis on the “1919 process.”⁴¹⁶ The focus on the role of the 1919 Paris decisions that led to the creation of international affairs institutes shows that they are given a role that goes beyond their actual scientific contributions. However, Czempiel's explanation is useful to the extent that it actually helps in understanding a significant position that quasi-governmental and non-university structures always had, that is as actors in the development of world political research and hence of IR itself.

415 Czempiel, 1965: 271, also fn. 3 there.

416 For instance, Gantzel-Kress and Gantzel, 1980: 199, with fn. 9 on p. 250; Krippendorff, 1977: 29, less engaged Rittberger and Hummel, 1990: 17.

Differing from Czempiel in its emphasis was the approach of Wolfgang Abendroth. As explained above, he was a leading Marxist-critical scholar in West Germany, the founding figure of the “Marburg School.” According to him, it was the fault of neopositivist biases that the scientific nature of IR was discussed in a non-historical manner. This paved the way for ignoring the pre-World War I development of scientific thinking on world politics. In this regard, a special role is given to international law, as Abendroth underlines the importance of de Vitoria and Suarez as well as Grotius with their 16th and 17th century works. The reason for this broader scope is that their approaches are in line with an understanding of science in which “scientific-empirical ... reflexion about social regularities [*Gesetzlichkeiten*]... that go beyond state borders” are present as main tools.⁴¹⁷ By also referring to the impact of peace movements and groupings like the International Worker[’s] Association and the consequent “International”s, Abendroth aimed to draw a chronologically earlier timeline. It was thanks to their efforts in providing “theoretical debates on [a] high scientific-analytical level” that these Marxist movements are interpreted to be among the earliest contributors to an emerging science of IR.⁴¹⁸ At the basis of Abendroth's Marxist analysis lies the suggestion that IR's scientific origins are located, unlike Czempiel's focus on “the 1919 process” with the Paris Peace Conference and the consequent founding of the RIIA and the CFR, in the left-wing movements of the late 19th century.

417 Abendroth, 1973: 14.

418 Abendroth, 1973: 15.

Abendroth's main assumption was the idea that academic disciplines provided historical reflections of a given period. Deriving from his historicalness-tied Marxism, he concluded that “each subdiscipline is only a moment of a ... [changing] whole.” Foreign policy and IR (used in English, as “International Relations” in this text) are therefore “always moments of a such process in its totality that repeatedly penetrate each other.” For Abendroth, this does not necessarily mean that research in IR should not take certain phenomena and processes as reifiable givens, thus leaving aside their historicity. However, he advocates that one has to understand that it is these historical processes that keep changing the world as we know it. Interestingly, there follows a short debate between Abendroth and his IR specialist colleague Czempiel on these aspects of the discipline. While accepting many points put forward by the former, like the role of historical processes and connections between the social and political aspects, Czempiel asks to go beyond “social-economic structure of conditions” by pointing to the influence of other factors like technology, decision-making processes or the role of individuals. Furthermore, he prioritizes the impact of systemic conditions whose roots he locates in international interactions.⁴¹⁹

Criticizing some of Abendroth's assumptions, Czempiel sees a pro-Soviet position when the former interprets Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe as a natural consequence of the world war, talking in a justifying manner of “area of domination [*Herrschaftbereich*],” and interpreting the Soviet support for the Cuban revolution as an “act of solidarity.” The problem for Czempiel is that Abendroth's approach is marked by

419 Abendroth, 1973: 25, 27.

contradictions, which are caused by his decision to make a choice between the two superpowers. With regard to the scientificity of Abendroth's approach, Czempiel criticizes the Marxist method he employs, and asserts that it needs to adjust to analytical levels reached by the “bourgeois” sciences. Abendroth's explanation with its focus on historical totality is seen as lacking in sufficiently dealing with the heterogeneous structure of world politics and its complexities. In Abendroth's concluding comments, one notes the attack on Czempiel's critique, as the latter is accused of ignoring the nature of ideology inherent in his approach. Therefore, while Abendroth accepts the role of ideology as a thought system affecting scholars, he sees in Czempiel's quest for objectivity and his eclectic models an actual example of ideology.⁴²⁰

What emerges from this debate concerns both the theoretical and practical dimensions of IR. With regard to theory, we have to note the diversification that has taken place within West German political science/IR community. On the one hand, there is an approach which sees the need for recognizing the historically situated nature of the international system, with its post-1648 and capitalist roots. The other side presents models that aim at going beyond this focus on economic-historical factors. Czempiel, whose contributions to (West) German IR would be of much significance in his later career, represents a model similar to US IR. It is not unlike the recommendation, in a different context, of Robert Keohane when he proposed to his fellow IR scholars that they should remain within the limits of a certain path when doing IR.⁴²¹ Czempiel's assertion

420 Abendroth, 1973: 32-37.

421 Keohane, 1988.

that Marxist-influenced approaches can only provide an alternative to “empirical-analytical” models to the extent they shift their positions and open themselves to the mainstream with its more complex problematics illustrates the claim to exclusiveness. Czempiel's assumption that only such an adjustment of Abendroth's and others' positions would perhaps no longer present an alternative to empirical-analytical models is itself an acknowledgement that there is a deep gap between the two approaches. In this context, any approximation includes the danger of damaging the model's internal coherence. However, it is at this juncture that the concluding remarks of Abendroth gain a new significance. His reference to the important role controversy plays for science clarifies the advantages of debates within the scientific community, reminding us once more of the functions of dissent and difference for scholarship. With regard to the practical dimensions of IR, Abendroth's acceptance that Marxist approaches have to make use of the factual analysis of the “contemporary 'bourgeois' science,” while adding that the reverse path is in fact more necessary, demonstrates that a pluralistic science of IR can enable its scholars a peaceful coexistence. However, as explained above, these kinds of differences among West German scholars did not always generate positive consequences. The lack of a real dialogue would even lead, in the early 1980s, to a new political science association that requested a more exclusive political science engagement by accepting only scholars (and not students) actively involved in the discipline.⁴²² At that point, it had become clear that scholarly as well as ideological differences were causing a mutually benevolent ignorance.

⁴²² Bleek, 2001: 363.

When looking at the discipline's history, an important explanation of IR's origins came from Ekkehart Krippendorff, one of the most important names in German IR's critical wing. His 1972 PVS article, "International Relations – Experiment of a political-economical frame analysis," provided a radical critique of IR's past and present.⁴²³ Krippendorff started by criticizing the discipline of IR for having failed – as seen with the World War II – in its original goal of finding an effective means to prevent wars. According to him, the study of IR "was given the dignity of an academic discipline only as [a] reaction to the First World War," but this interpretation had to be challenged. What Krippendorff wanted to focus on were the imperialism theories that had preceded IR theories. For him, works of Hobson, Hilferding and Luxemburg present instances of "scientifically high-quality analyses of the international system." Their opposition to bourgeois society is interpreted as having led to the emergence of the discipline of IR. In this regard, not the focused nature of world political changes that brought an end to the European order provided the main factor in explaining the scientification of world political studies. Rather, Krippendorff asserts that IR is "the answer of bourgeois science to the Marxist-revolutionary challenge."⁴²⁴

In this critical scholar's class-related analysis, the acceptance of Marxist explanations of the origins of wars would have generated an implosion for bourgeois society and its science. Therefore, it had to come up with alternative explanations and research agendas. All the consequent debates on war responsibility issues and the concomitant solutions put

423 Krippendorff, 1973a: 9.

424 Krippendorff, 1972: 350.

forward in the form of international law, the focus on the League of Nations as well as the rejection of capitalism's, and especially imperialism's, role in the outbreak of the world war had the purpose, for Krippendorff, of denying further influence of explanations provided by imperialism theories which were offering a Marxist analysis. It was as a result of practices of ignoring that these approaches, in his words “the historically first genuine theory of international politics,” were excluded from the university structure. Theories critical of capitalism were accused for lacking “true scientificity” and being part of a political agenda.⁴²⁵

The way IR's academic birth is interpreted by Krippendorff is of much relevance, as it presents a very different explanation for its disciplinary history. By shifting the timeline of first scientific theorizations to the late 19th century before the “1919 process,” to important books like Hobson's *Imperialism* published in 1900, he is able to offer an alternative narrative.

Another point emphasized by Krippendorff, concerning IR's historical development, deserves special attention: the leading role of the US in post-World War II IR. He asserts that the discipline “exactly reflects the foreign policy needs – and contrasts – of the US after the completed dissolution of England as the economic and political center of the imploded [*zusammengebrochen*] first imperialist system.” Already in 1972, five years before the famous Hoffmann article analyzing IR as “an American social science,” this West German scholar focused on big investments made in university and non-university research in IR as well as US's new global position that paved the way for such a dense

⁴²⁵ Krippendorff, 1972: 350-351.

engagement with the discipline as a consequence of world political connections. For him, noting the lack of non-American works in IR studies, with bibliographies consisting up to 90 % of works with American descent, makes the American dominance in the discipline obvious.⁴²⁶

One final insight from Krippendorff's analysis pertains to IR's role that differs from its interwar function. No longer is it focused on providing analysis about the past war, which was the task that provided the major trigger for the discipline's birth in the "1919 process." While that goal did not succeed and IR was, in Krippendorff's words, surprised and helpless about the coming war in the late 1930s (with the Marxian realist E. H. Carr exempted by Krippendorff from this generally ignorant interwar IR scholarship), he assumes that no such demand existed in the post-1945 period. He sees in this new IR just a tool for "crisis management." The post-World War II order with its "breakability" posits a challenge that is met in the Cold War era by the discipline serving as "a science of bourgeoisie" that helps "the bourgeois-capitalist society of states" to realize its "strategy for self-maintenance."⁴²⁷

It is based on these premises that Krippendorff asserts a continuing need for the discipline, but in a version that needs to undergo certain changes. In one of his rare praises for American IR, he approvingly refers to Hayward Alker due to the latter's understanding that only a self-critical revision of the discipline's methodologies and conceptual tools can open the way for an IR that goes beyond its self-imposed limits.⁴²⁸

⁴²⁶ Krippendorff, 1972: 352-353.

⁴²⁷ Krippendorff, 1972: 353-356 and on Carr see p. 351.

⁴²⁸ Krippendorff refers here to Hayward Alker's chapter in a 1970 volume edited by Norman Palmer.

According to Krippendorff, IR is doomed to remain a discipline that provides empirical descriptions but lacks analytical explanations if such a crisis-management style remains as the predominant approach in its scholarship.⁴²⁹

IV.7. A Different IR: The Tutzing Theses and a West German IR Community in Disarray

In this section, I turn to some West German scholars' interest in giving the IR discipline an alternative and more critical role with regard to its public functions. Such a development and the fact that it was broadly discussed in the main political science journal PVS testify to the lively debates taking place in the West German IR community of the 1970s. In this context, the evolution of the International Politics Section within the German political science association plays an important role and is analyzed in order to clarify the context in which critical scholars could emerge. That many of these scholars had American educational backgrounds testifies to the impact of transnational dynamics that were also at the roots of these critical voices, triggered by a combination of their US studies and their opposition to America's Vietnam War.

The International Politics Section within DVPW was founded in 1965, bringing a new dynamism to IR research. Its various research groups provided a major impetus for the engagement of scholars belonging to the younger generation. This third generation of West German political scientists had sympathies for the then ongoing social movements, aiming for wide-spread reforms. However, this section would become obsolete, and

⁴²⁹ Krippendorff, 1972: 357.

finally closed down in 1977.⁴³⁰ It would only reemerge in the mid-1980s as a separate grouping within the association.

Among the section's most active figures was Ernst-Otto Czempel who later co-edited a volume with his US colleague James Rosenau, becoming one of the first German IR scholars to have an international engagement. While he presided over the section, some younger scholars were active in a way that opposed the perceived US dominance in the field. Thus, one such scholar, Klaus Gantzel would write that West German IR was “making use of the knowledge and experiences as developed by American Behavioral Science, but also consciously moving away from its models and overcoming its inadequacies, and at the same time going back to the social-critical and structural-historical approaches in the European sociological tradition of thought.”⁴³¹ This shows a clearly perceived positioning of some Marxist-inclined critical voices in the discipline who aimed for a separate path in West German IR. This idea would lead, coupled with the opposition of more conservative political scientists, to a big rift within the general association. Some more critical scholars became increasingly disinterested in the work undertaken there, as they saw a rather disconnected political science that did not reflect the needs of a changing German society (at a time of post-1968 restructuring). On the other hand were, the more right-wing scholars, including an association president, resigned and formed the alternative *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Politikwissenschaft* (German Politics Association, DGPW).

430 Gantzel-Kress and Gantzel, 1980: 224, 231.

431 Quoted in Schweigler, 1976: 97.

One possible reason for the increasing irrelevance of the DVPW for many left-wing critical scholars was possibly the fact that they had sufficient power and were thus in no need of such an institutional instrument to develop and promote their ideas.⁴³² According to a less favorable assessment of left-wing political scientists in the context of the student movements, it was only later that orthodox Marxist scholars like Abendroth as well as third generation's critical scholars made gains from students' social activism. This could be also interpreted, to a certain extent, as an inter-generational conflict among scholarly generations.⁴³³

In the process leading to these later differences, the International Politics Section within DVPW made itself an active unit for the promotion of critical voices. A group of critical IR scholars, including Krippendorff, came forward with a proposal about the study of IR. Their separate discussion papers were debated to provide the basis of a joint statement. What was called *Tutzing Thesen* (the Tutzing Theses) became a major factor in developing a self-consciously critical approach within the discipline in that period.

The statement, with the title of Tutzing Theses on a Curriculum of the Science of International Politics, aimed at providing some positions about how to teach and study world politics. The group of scholars contributing to the report, which resulted from the section's 1972 meeting in Tutzing, consciously dealt with both the methodology dimension and the content of world political study. Based on a critical understanding concerning the role of science, they underlined in their proposal the didactical and

432 Gantzel-Kress and Gantzel, 1980: 233.

433 Faul, 1970: 85.

emancipatory aspects in addition to the scientific one. IR scholars were asked to submit to their students the capacity of understanding “the relevant reality of the present as a system.” This meant a student of IR had to gain the analytical capability of perceiving “the phenomena [in] their conditions of constitution and [in] their functions” by looking at their actual context.⁴³⁴

The second proposal pertained to the importance of understanding the international system as something historical. At one juncture, not that much dissimilar from scientific approaches in IR, history was said to provide the “empirical field in which laws [*Gesetzlichkeiten*] can be recognized and understood.” From this point on, though, the theses took a Marxist-critical direction with the authors asserting that the study of IR was about the international system of a certain historical period, the one that had its origins in the development of capitalism. Henceforth, the “history of class struggles” and relations between newly interconnected peoples were presented as decisive factors of world politics, while it was seen as essential to analyze “the international society as a complex class society” consisting of metropolises as well as the Third World. This era of international relations was marked by the “globality or universality of relations.”⁴³⁵

The third idea was to make students capable of “analyzing system-conditioned conflict potentials and manifest conflicts.” This formula referred to the need for understanding the capitalist system and the internal and international contradictions immanent to it. This group of scholars put forward a fourth suggestion about focusing on

434 Krippendorff, 1973b: 364.

435 Krippendorff, 1973b: 365.

the different natures of state, also on state's newness and historical situatedness. Using *dependencia*-related analyses, the Tutzing Theses conceived varying degrees of dependence for states, differentiating between the three worlds. The last goal for critical scholars was to enable their students to “understand the foreign policy of individual states in the context of the national and international class struggle” that was seen as leading toward the “liberation of the human being.” It is in this framework that we read again the word “crisis management.” According to the Tutzing report, today's foreign policy is “a state-negotiated policy of crisis management.” They also mention the significant role of international economic and financial organizations as part of the “imperialist system.”⁴³⁶

In order to realize the goals recommended in the teaching and study of world politics, they proposed to use a diachronic approach toward center-periphery relations. International structures had to be analyzed not only with regard to their political, but also social, economic-technological, communicative, and military dimensions. A similar richness existed in the list of actors presented as part of IR's focus: “state apparatus with their subsystems, (multi-)national corporations and banks, international organizations” including their “functional connections,” but also national centers and national peripheries with their “marginalized groups.”⁴³⁷ The last section of the curriculum proposal presented a framework for theories with, respectively, a theory of imperialism, of militarism, of ecology, of competing systems, of bureaucratization, of crisis strategies, and of revolution. The final theoretical ingredients were to be “concrete utopia,” with

436 Krippendorff, 1973b: 365-366.

437 Krippendorff, 1973b: 367-368.

their main study issues consisting of ruler-free societies and of relevant problems of transition emerging on the way toward that condition.⁴³⁸

As becomes clear from the major points of the Tutzing Theses, the proposal was a means for a new generation of post-World War II born/raised scholars to present an alternative study and research agenda to the West German IR community. However, despite their initial attempts to use the International Politics Section within DVPW to broaden the impact of this critical approach, the initiative was to face a rejection when the section members convened again. As Krippendorff himself stated, the Theses were not intended to be a binding document.⁴³⁹ However, this did not hinder their colleagues from raising significant criticisms. Such an intra-section debate showed the impossibility of a single approach acquiring the status of disciplinary hegemony. Practically, the result was the section's termination. Aside from providing a forum for IR scholars in West Germany, its most important contributions have been the research projects started by its various groups. Names like Czempiel, Gantzel, and Krippendorff worked on different issue areas, in line with certain research interests prevalent among the members. For instance, the first project was started in 1967 and had the support of the West German Thyssen Foundation (connected to its namesake influential industrial conglomeration). While a later project by Klaus Jürgen Gantzel already had a critical agenda, there were also research ideas developed by other groups of scholars. Projects on West German foreign policy and Transatlantic politics were, however, to meet attacks from leftist scholars

438 Krippendorff, 1973b: 368.

439 Krippendorff, 1973a: 9.

within the section.⁴⁴⁰ As a consequence, the combined effect of all these tensions brought about the end of the section.

The polarization that arose within the scholarly community can be seen as a result of critical scholars' growing unease with American political science and IR, both of which were familiar to them from their US studies. Scholars like Krippendorff had undertaken significant study and research projects on the other side of the Atlantic, but were now leading an alternative understanding of science that could have been a result of the decline of American legitimacy among many students of the 1960s, not least due to the war in Vietnam.⁴⁴¹ What emerged was a divided scientific community, at least between traditional and critical approaches, or even in a four-partite division that also included formalistic and reformist understandings. The political connotations of these were more or less visible in their conservative, social democratic or Marxist-socialist orientations, while the behavioral-formalist studies were of a negligible dimension, showing the limits of American influence on scholarly practices and preferences in West Germany.⁴⁴²

In a PVS article that reflected, in its authors' words, thoughts that were developed “in connection with the 'Tutzing Theses' of the International Politics Section” of the DVPW, one sees a position not dissimilar from Krippendorff's. Read together, these texts provide clear elaborations of the Tutzing Theses. In their article, titled “Theoretical and Methodical Problems of a Critical Theory of International Politics,” Wolfgang Hein and Georg Simonis asserted that “the bourgeois science of [IR] produces knowledge [*Wissen*]

440 Schweigler, 1976: 97 and Gantzel-Kress and Gantzel: 1980: 230-231.

441 Schweigler, 1976: 76.

442 For the former see Schweigler, 1976: 76 and for the latter Gantzel-Kress and Gantzel, 1980: 233.

for the rulers and ideologies in order to secure their rule.” The reasoning behind their assumption was that “relations of rule/domination” [*Herrschaftsverhältnisse*] and “socio-economic conditions of society” as well as “class relations” and “state-transmitted [*staatlich vermittelt*] power constellations of the world society” emerge as main factors in the way IR and its research agendas and practices are developed. As a consequence, one notes the same concept employed by Krippendorff in his critique of mainstream IR: crisis management. Thus, Hein and Simonis see the main role of IR (in its “bourgeois” version) as one of control, stabilization and crisis management.⁴⁴³

They propose to attack and criticize this bourgeois IR by developing an alternative reference system, to wit, a metatheory of reality that would include anthropological, normative, science theoretical and real-analytical dimensions. This rather complicated framework is better understood if one notes their main aim of going beyond “the positivistic-empiricist dogmatism.” The critical science of IR has to help the ruled ones by becoming a practical science. This can only be undertaken by openness to using multiple theories for explaining the reality.⁴⁴⁴ As a consequence, the authors conclude by asking for an IR that would not only be “value-oriented, critical and holistic, but also practical,” which means dealing with “concrete problems.” In this context, they wanted science itself to be seen “as part of the political practice and reality.” According to Hein and Simonis, critical IR has three areas of influence reaching from the people to the decision-makers as well as to multinational organizations. While acknowledging the

443 Hein and Simonis, 1973: 92.

444 Hein and Simonis, 1973: 93.

position of critical approaches with regard to ruling authorities, in the sense of having only limited impact through their theoretical contributions, the authors also recognize the inherent danger of being perceived as providing prescriptions from a higher position to the ruled people for the latter's emancipation. Therefore, critical IR can point to alternatives without necessarily asking for their direct implementation. For the authors, it is the ruled classes that should take the steps for emancipation and not the scientists who would act as their vanguard.⁴⁴⁵

A very relevant aspect of IR in that period was that a separate field made significant gains, some of them in spite of IR. This was the area of peace research. The social-liberal coalition government of Willy Brandt decisively contributed to the establishment of the German Peace Research Foundation that would be later closed down by the Christian democrat-led government in the early 1980s. Although critical peace researchers contributed significantly to the area, their initial ties to political science and specifically to IR were significantly cut as they undertook a separate engagement. Nevertheless, names like Czempiel who approaches both areas from a more liberal stand were to make a name both in IR and in peace research.

All these projects demonstrate that Gebhard Schweigler, a member of the important German think-tank DGAP and the author of Ford Foundation's 1976 report on IR studies in West Germany, was correct when he observed that “[w]ithin the confines of the discipline most of West Germany's international relations scholars are currently seeking to overcome the dominance of the United States in IR research and to develop a

⁴⁴⁵ Hein and Simonis, 1973: 101-102.

theoretical contribution of their own.”⁴⁴⁶ However, these trials were not going to end with a success story. Rather, West German IR would enter a long period of internal turmoil, at the end of which, in the post-unification period of the 1990s, a more American-style German scholarship would have the upper hand.

IV.8. Changes in the Discipline: Numbers, Reports, Positions

In this section, I will turn to the specific details of West German political science and IR, highlighting the ways in which the later periods of disciplinary establishment took on distinct features. First, I focus on an issue that can be interpreted as an area of divergence between German scholarship and its Anglo-Saxon counterparts, that of language. After relativizing its supposed significance, I underline the state of West German IR's divisions marking the community in the 1970s. Also, this section aims to provide a broader understanding of IR's developmental trajectory in the post-World War II period. I look at certain statistics that provide useful details on the settled-down nature of West German political science, but also which demonstrate the scholarly positions of IR specialists and their self-understandings in the context of their academic and public functions.

Does reading German texts on political science and IR provide a different experience from reading their American (or English) counterparts? One answer could be to assert the existence of certain linguistic variations. This seems to be assumed by some German scholars. For instance, it is such a reason that leads Schweigler to explicitly apologize at one point in his 1974 report on the state of German IR, which was prepared for the Ford

446 Schweigler, 1976: 100.

Foundation. When he writes in a footnote that “[d]ue apologies must be made for this (and other) translations, which reflect the German authors' difficult, if not at times unintelligible use of language,” then it points to some differences in the linguistic domain.⁴⁴⁷ The actual text that led to such reaction from Schweigler came from the FU Berlin-based professor Ziebura and his team's research project proposal in 1974. While Ziebura's team aimed at a theoretical contribution to IR that could go beyond the US approaches, it is their language, which gets criticized by their colleague. The project statement aimed to (in Schweigler's translation): “attempt to analyze, as the decisive determinant of foreign policy behavior, the power relationships within world societal processes, for example in the framework of uneven international division of labor and the resulting structures of interdependence and dependence, and the transnational and societal interactions within these structures.”⁴⁴⁸ However, reading the text does not necessarily point to a German divergence in linguistic usage. Rather, it shows the way the discipline of IR got accustomed (also in West Germany) to using a more “scientific” language that at times turns into a jargon which can also be influenced by some contemporary ideological tendencies.

Compared to the analyses from the 1950s and 1960s, it becomes possible to recognize actual changes that have taken place within West German IR, when one turns his/her gaze to language-provided insights. As a member of the second generation of post-1945 scholars, Ziebura had taken over the IR chair at FU Berlin, and with members

447 Schweigler, 1976: 144 fn. 82.

448 Schweigler, 1976: 100.

of his team (part of the third generation) he was able to turn West German IR toward a more scientific footing, while also presenting analyses that were closer to Marxist positions. It is noticeable how a more realist-philosophical language was now being challenged by Marxist-inspired approaches with their emphases upon structures and interactions. In fact, these two diverging tendencies, which one could label, following Bleek, as normative-ontological (its major figures were Bergstraesser and his students from the “Freiburger School”) and dialectical-critical, had a third counterpart in the form of empirical-analytical approaches. While one could interpret the first one as ideologically conservative and the second as progressive, even revolutionary, the last theoretical approach was seen by many as a bourgeois social science, the role of which was to support the status quo (hence comments on its “system-affirmative” nature).⁴⁴⁹ On the other hand, others assert that with the development of German political science in general, the various “schools” lost much of their presumed influence, and there arose “a pragmatic diversification” in the professionalization phase of the 1970s and 1980s.⁴⁵⁰ This later development does not weaken the impact of the much heated atmosphere of late 1960s and early 1970s, which was marked by debates across the three major approaches that were further complicated by concomitant problems arising from generational and ideological differences.

It is interesting to note such a tripartite structure used in the categorization of West German political science, as one is reminded of the American version that included

449 Bleek, 2001: 360-361.

450 Lietzmann, 1996: 45.

categorizations first in the form of realists-idealist-Marxist approaches and later as neorealist-liberal-constructivist divisions, presenting a similar differentiation.

The actual development of political science and IR in West Germany is also visible through looking at certain numbers. With the increase in the overall numbers of university students in the 1960s, the Otto Suhr Institut at FU Berlin alone witnessed a rise from around 300 to 900 students within a few years. In the area of IR there was a clear transformation with the number of courses offered by political scientists increasing dramatically, from 30s in early 1960s to 114 by 1968, whereas law scholars, economists and historians did not show an increase in absolute numbers. For this reason, Schweigler points to 1965 as a turning point for IR in West Germany, the first time that political scientists were offering more courses in IR than their historian colleagues and scholars from other disciplines.⁴⁵¹

A report for the German Research Foundation (DFG) by Mario Lepsius had recommended the establishment of one IR chair for each political science department. This was not the case in early 1960s, when there existed only around a dozen IR chairs. The Lepsius report of 1961 was influenced by the post-World War II UNESCO decision, made at its 1948 Utrecht conference to have at each university at least one chair devoted to IR studies.⁴⁵² Titled “Memorandum on the Condition of Sociology and Political Science,” Lepsius' report was not just the product of the author himself, as he was guided by senior scholars including Arnold Bergstraesser. One important aspect of the report was

451 Schweigler, 1976: 72-73.

452 Rittberger and Hummel, 1990: 30-32.

to emphasize the need for more analyses in the fields of foreign policy and international organizations, thus pointing to the weak state of West German IR within a political science discipline that was itself not much advanced.

In the mid-1960s, the West German IR scene would not provide a very rich picture. In 1964-1965 academic year, out of 665 courses on IR, close to a half were offered by political scientists, whereas economists provided some one fourth and international law scholars shared the rest with historians and geographers. With regard to lecture numbers, West Berlin alone provided some one third of all offerings.⁴⁵³ The special position of this enclave in Berlin should not come as a surprise, due to the high impact of the Freie Universität Berlin with its Otto Suhr Institute. In the university's political science department, there were already two IR chairs (out of 11 in political science in total) by the early 1960s, a point in time that witnessed the lack of other IR specialized chairs in West Germany.⁴⁵⁴ In Otto Kiminich's mid-1960s analysis, it became evident that only 5 percent of all IR courses taught by political scientists pertained to IR theory. The greater focus was on issues of world politics in general and foreign policy. An important result emerging from his data presents a picture which it is possible to call the political scientification of IR. This is visible when one notes the three-fold increase of political science-connected IR courses.⁴⁵⁵ Such a change demonstrates that already by 1965 there was a close connection between political science and IR, thus making the situation similar to its American counterpart, where political science had largely incorporated the

453 Kiminich, 1965: 707-708.

454 Gantzel-Kress and Gantzel, 1980: 204.

455 Kiminich, 1965: 709-710.

study of world politics. Compared to 1960s, the changes in the 1970s were significant. From 24 political science chairs in 1960 at 18 West German universities, with 10 of them at FU Berlin, the figures increased to 133 professors of political science by 1975.⁴⁵⁶

This dimension of numbers was important because individual scholars mattered a lot in the early years of West German IR. In a 1976 report prepared for the Ford Foundation (the existence of which shows the continuing interest of American philanthropies in the discipline's development), Gebhard Schweigler from the DGAP would write for instance that Gilbert Zieburg's leaving the FU Berlin had created a major lack there and that frequent academic moving away is a challenge for university research.⁴⁵⁷ The actual problem was not a professor's move to another location but the difficulty in replacing him/her, an aspect of no relevance for the US IR community with its bigger size that made replacements a rather easy thing to accomplish.

An important task of post-1945 West German political science was to function as a tool for creating democratic Germans. Thus, many political science majors were to become teachers of civic classes in schools, increasing both the number of courses and students in political science. It is in this context that one notes once again the role of Bergstraesser, as he was among the most insistent on advocating a separate school course of civic education (*Sozialkunde*). The correct assumption was that having such an established class in schools would guarantee more influence and increase in numbers for the discipline of political science. One of his relatives, also a former DHfP scholar and

456 Bleek, 2001: 310-313.
457 Schweigler, 1976: 101.

member the of federal parliament, Ludwig Bergstraesser used his position within the parliamentary committee for the protection of constitutional order to similarly recommend political education as a school course with its own teachers. While it was only in the 1960s, following certain anti-Semitic attacks by young people that general measures were taken to introduce these courses in all states of West Germany, the process itself was marked by debates between, on one side, the political scientists and their sociologist colleagues, and on the other, the traditionally influential historians. The relative success of the “newer” disciplines was significant for political science, as it was now able to have the necessary resources for its further development.⁴⁵⁸

How did IR as a discipline position itself by the late 1970s, a period in which one could assert both its institutional establishment and scholarly intensification, due to the increase of faculty size, departments with IR chairs, and closely following (carrying over and for some, trying to go beyond) US IR? An answer can be found by looking to results of a survey by Werner Link (with Werner Dörr). In the mid-1970s, Link surveyed IR specialists in West Germany asking questions about their ongoing/recently completed research projects. Based on 71 projects, it became clear that the majority of projects consisted of an analytical-descriptive approach, whereas mainly theoretical ones remained at a low 10 %. In between were the projects that had followed a historical-comparative perspective with 30 %, with another 15 % consisting of both historical-comparative and analytical-descriptive approaches.

458 Bleek, 2001: 316-324.

Again, allowing for multiple answers, the issue areas mainly focused on included security (30), foreign trade and world economy (27), development policy (15), détente (14), “Eastern policy” (*Ostpolitik*) (11), with arms control being the subject of 5 and “*Westpolitik*” of only four. When asked whether their issue choice was influenced by the goal of having practical relevance, some 60 % responded positively, and only one researcher said that such a quest for relevance had played no role at all in the selection of the research issue. However, when answering the question of “whether the study should provide options or directions for practical politics,” for 25 % a clear “no” was the reply. While 31 % thought that their studies should serve such a role, another 27 % said “yes with limitations.” This shows that a majority was also in favor of providing “useful” knowledge for politics.

Of course, these answers themselves do not give us further information as to whether the scholars had in mind a more pro-status quo adviser role or a position as critical scholars aiming to change the given policies by opening up new perspectives. However, answers to this issue are provided by other sections of the survey. For instance, 39 % of scholars said that the addressee of their research was mainly the scientific community. This group, though, is countered by 36 % of their colleagues, whose research was mainly aimed for social and political groups. A third group (some one fifth) saw both their fellow scholars *and* social and political groups as their audience.

Another question provides further clarification about scholars prioritizing presentations to social and political groups over a role of advisor, with more than 57 %

opting for the former in case they are asked to turn their research results into practice. Only 34 % of scholars choose advising as the primary means of making practical use of their research. In order to better understand the position of the West German IR community, a final question deserves our attention. It is about how they perceive a scientific adviser position (if they have it or would have it). One quarter sees it as a positive-instrumental function, whereas 37 % of scholars interpret it as carrying a critical function. These two functions follow a model based on Hans Albert's distinguishing between guiding (*Steuerung*) and enlightening (*Aufklärung*), with the former pointing to positive-instrumental functions of science in its ties to policy and practice. The enlightening role is the instrument of the critical function.⁴⁵⁹

As a result, it becomes possible to conclude from this survey that the West German IR community of the 1970s had a certain preference for a critical role as a scientific community. However, the fact that one third of scholars did not answer the last question demonstrates that the influence of critical scholars was of a limited nature, the actual size of their non-critical colleagues depriving them of a dominant status. In this context, it is possible to see a divided community, with many scholars finding policy-relevance relevant, but also insisting on having the scientific community as the main receptor of their research. Although a plurality exists for critical approaches, they remain in the minority. This reflects, in a significant fashion, the general conditions prevalent in West

459 Link, 1978: 485.

German IR by the 1970s, with more Marxist groups set against more liberal and conservative scholars who developed different research priorities and methods.⁴⁶⁰

IV.9. (West) German IR: Analyzing the Past, Looking to the Future

In this last section, I will first discuss a proposition by Johan Galtung on the supposed existence of certain thought styles that influence (national) academic communities. I will do this by elaborating on the conflicts that affected the German community of political science and IR scholars. Then the focus shifts to important positions developed by Ekkehart Krippendorff which I compare to influential suggestions put forward by Stanley Hoffmann whose 1977 article on IR's American character has shaped the discipline's self-understanding for its American and wider communities. As sovereignty plays a significant role for explaining the existence (or the lack) of interest shown in world political studies in many analyses, there follows a comparison of German and Scandinavian participation in IR. The emerging picture is important, as it rejects the much emphasized role of sovereignty. In this framework, I also point to the role of hybridity in having generated the discipline of International Relations in West Germany in a way that rejects path-dependency claims.

When looking at the issue of the general characteristics of a national academic community, it is important to question whether there exists a certain style of thought. Johan Galtung's interesting approach to this issue has provided some helpful ways to deal with this. According to Galtung, scholars' texts and thoughts can be understood with

⁴⁶⁰ See Link, 1978: passim and for results especially, p. 495ff.

reference to their national culture, at least to a certain extent. Styles of thought and presentation of thinking together build a comprehensive intellectual style and for our purposes, one of the main styles he provides an explanation for pertains to the German academic culture, which can be called, following Galtung, a Teutonic intellectual style. This Teutonic style is “a matrix in which extremist political ideologies can easily be embedded.”⁴⁶¹ Extremist views contain here both Nazi and extreme-left positions.

Among the features that Galtung associates with the Teutonic intellectual style, are a large focus on deduction, a lack of humor, the rather unimportant position given to empirical reality which is replaced by the all-importance of system, a single truth that is incontestable, and an inner circle of people who have knowledge of the core insight. Separate academic groups follow their own terminology, which is completely distinct from the language of competing groups. This brings about the impossibility of dialogue within the academic community. For Galtung, the Teutonic intellectual style could be a result of the family structure with its authoritarian upbringing and the social structure with its feudalism and consequent developments.⁴⁶² Later, he would further develop this analysis by including other intellectual styles like the Gallic, Saxonian and Nipponic. However, the main points of relevance, in this context, are his distinction between the academic and the social contexts. For Galtung, it is not among ordinary people that a Teutonic style prevails but among the scholarly community.⁴⁶³

461 Galtung, 1979: 2.

462 See Galtung, 1979: *passim*.

463 Galtung, 1979: 2.

This commentary provides a useful means for looking at the general picture of German political science/IR community. While Galtung himself as well as many scholars who refer to his comments accept the rather general and topical analysis provided by his assumptions and thus its inherent limitations, significant divisions that played an overwhelming role among the West German political scientists illustrate that at least some aspects of Galtung's portrait reflect certain problematic aspects of the German scientific mentality. The fact that DVPW witnessed a division with many of its members leaving (including one of its presidents) to form an alternative association demonstrates the overall perception among West German colleagues about the impossibility of a joint institutional engagement. However, this situation of a general division among West German IR (and political science) scholars, which one does not see to the same extent in the case of French scholarship (as will become visible in the next chapter), points to the relevance of international and national political pressures which resulted from the Cold War's direct influence on West German state and society. This further points to the general impact of transnational dynamics that shaped the trajectory of IR's development in this country marked by the larger geopolitical divisions of the Cold War.

The general tripartite differences among German scholars with hermetic boundaries between varying approaches discussed earlier can be seen as indicators of a Teutonic style, although the decreased relevance of these ideologically motivated intra-academic debates has to be noted, especially in the context of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Bleek also refers, in his history of German political science, to Galtung's assertions in an

approving manner. When the Norwegian scholar tries to summarize the Teutonic style with reference to its supposed question of “how can you deduce this stringently,” Bleek recognizes in Galtung's approach a much better analysis of German scholars than in certain studies that deal only with parts of German scholarship.⁴⁶⁴

However, when taking into consideration Galtung's ideas about distinct intellectual thought styles that prevail in certain cultural-regional entities, an important dimension is ignored. This is the role played by factors the roots of which are found in transnational interactions. As seen in Lebow's explanation of German-Jewish scholars' contributions to American political science, and specifically in the case of realist IR, social sciences provide an area open to hybridities. In this regard, questions about “actual” origins lose their significance. Their obsolescence is due to the heterogeneity that results from multi-sided influences they have upon each other. To what extent is US realist IR indeed American, or (West) German post-1945 IR in fact (West) German if the very scholars who contributed to these “national” communities carry in their ideational bag experiences both from American and German history including their own life experiences? The answer becomes visible as the interaction-based background testifies to the need for overcoming national characterizations. At least, it becomes obligatory to acknowledge various levels of scholarly and ideational communication that lie in the origins of nationally categorized thought patterns and research agendas. In this context, a German-Jewish scholar who is influenced by his German education can witness a different approach in the US, while him-/herself making an impact on US scholarship.

⁴⁶⁴ Bleek, 2001: 411.

The earlier influence of Prussian university reforms of the Humboldtian spirit on the US and the consequent role of earlier German emigrants who established US political science must be noted also. Furthermore, following the end of the Second World War, the same scholar returns to his/her country in order to contribute to founding a science of politics that could provide one of the basic educational tools in combating a return of totalitarian tendencies in the (West) German state and society, that is, through a *Demokratiewissenschaft*. Noting significant degrees of opposition from other disciplines, but also the heterogeneous nature of political science that is constructed in West Germany as a result of interaction between US authorities and foundations, and taking into account German politicians, returning emigrants as well as re-engaging scholars, the emerging picture is one of contingencies.

None of the actors can be said to have reached an incontestable success in their quest for pushing forward their preferred version of political science. For many actors, there is in fact no settled idea about political science, as their previous and current experiences get intermingled and their engagements are not necessarily means of dictating a certain version but for trying to find a workable structure for the discipline. The implicit aim is to establish a disciplinary structure that would be acceptable for all pro-political science groups, while managing to deal with significant opposition consisting of circles that rejected a bigger influence for the discipline.

According to Krippendorff, there is a basic difference between American and European understandings of social sciences and their functions. Whereas the latter sees in

them means of critically engaging with existing society, the US case is about promotion of the existing civic values, not aiming for social change. Political science was developed in the US for educating a democratic public.⁴⁶⁵ However, such an approach overlooks the rather similar nature of European and American developments, ranging from the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* in late 19th century Germany to the British Social Science Association and to US associations all of whom had similar policy goals in mind. Furthermore, the post-1945 development of West German political science has been marked by similar concerns for civic education of the population so that civic values can be established among a de-Nazified West German society. In this regard, Krippendorff's assumptions present too strict a distinction between the two sides of North Atlantic which did not exist to such a great extent. However, when he approvingly refers to Fred Halliday's point about "the Kissinger syndrome" he is following a path that carries much more weight in the context of US-European differences. This syndrome pertains to the rather covert desire of IR scholars to have some impact on real politics at some point.⁴⁶⁶ In fact, this has been a much emphasized part of the US IR community, unlike the situation in Europe, where such revolving door practices between the scholarly and political/governmental world have been rare.

While Krippendorff mentions the "1919 process" as the birth of IR, his bigger focus is on the post-World War II era when IR was born a second time in a more serious way.

The actual cause for IR's post-1945 empowerment was, according to him, the new

⁴⁶⁵ Krippendorff, 1987: 209-210.

⁴⁶⁶ Krippendorff, 1987: 209.

superpower status of the US so that it was in need of people with relevant world political knowledge, thus making IR more connected to the foreign policy processes of the US. Similar to Hoffmann, Krippendorff sees in the flexibility of the US university structure an opening that paved the way for an easier establishment of separate IR studies, a condition not present in Europe. As seen in the West German case, strong opposition even to political science as a discipline showed the inherent difficulties of creating new programs that would provide “new ways” of dealing with (world) politics. However, while a major part of Hoffmann's general framework pertains to the openness of foreign policy making and the impact of a democratic society thereon,⁴⁶⁷ Krippendorff takes a skeptical position and interprets the actual development of American postwar IR using the idea of *arcanum imperii*. This concept deals with the secretive nature of state affairs, as a realm “that should and must be protected from 'democracy'.”⁴⁶⁸

The exact opposition of the two explanations is interesting. The reason for this is not to be found only in the more critical stance of the West German scholar but in the very ambiguity of IR as a discipline. While both authors underline the impact of the US in the development of a science of world politics, it is the way they prioritize different actors that their frameworks tend to vary so greatly. For Krippendorff, the policy-oriented character of IR's general features leads in turn to its functioning as a tool for foreign policy decision-makers. In Hoffmann's analysis, on the other hand, emerges a more pluralistic picture in which governments are only one of the players, making use of

467 See Hoffmann, 1977.

468 Krippendorff, 1987: 211.

scholars' own predispositions and existing institutional opportunities. It is not the case in his explanation that scholars are disconnected from the policy world; Hoffmann's general focus is about IR scholars being intellectually dependent on the status of their country.⁴⁶⁹ However, the difference of perception is tied to the functions of a democratic country with its scholars providing ways of dealing with new challenges of the post-1945 world, whereas for Krippendorff, these functions are part of a lack of democratic foreign policy, where IR specialists merely become tools of an imperial American superpower.

The problem arises, from an academic perspective, due to what he calls “the Great Lie” of US IR, with its “seductive search for a theory that can qualify as 'scientific' by positivistic standards.” Its constant quest for a theory that should be valid for all times and places is, for Krippendorff, merely a means of “mak[ing] the United States as *the* world power disappear behind the smokescreen of a seemingly scholarly and objective academic language.”⁴⁷⁰ This statement is a very serious critique of US IR, but is it possible to take Krippendorff's assertion as valid for all times? The answer is negative because later developments in US IR have shown that there has not been a single path on which all scholars were to coalesce. To the contrary, it was the US realists who were to lead a critical campaign at the time of the George W. Bush presidency, opposing the Iraq War. Among the names signing the relevant petition was also Kenneth Waltz, usually the favorite target of anti-realist scholars in the US and abroad. He is easily associated in their eyes with a neorealism tied to the Second Cold War of the Reagan years,

469 Hoffmann, 1977: 224-225.

470 Krippendorff, 1987: 213.

notwithstanding his *Theory of International Politics*' publication date which had in fact preceded those developments, a fact later emphasized by critics of the critics.

One dimension that should not be disregarded in this context is the actual influence of a country's conditions, including its power and possibilities, on the scholarly agenda and IR research. Both scholars share the view that US post-World War II superpower status was the leading element in triggering an unquestionable American supremacy also in the *study* of world politics. As Hoffmann asserted, countries that lacked power or were not much engaged in world politics, in turn, were the ones that failed to engender significant IR communities. Scholars in such states would then deal more with domestic politics or other political science fields, but not focus on foreign policy or international affairs. Germany is mentioned as a pertinent example in this regard with its limited possibility for power application, so that its scholars would not “have the motivation or receive the impulse necessary to turn individual efforts into a genuine scientific enterprise.”⁴⁷¹

The context at this junction is clear, as postwar West Germany was associated with a status of limited sovereignty under the control of the Allies. In this regard, it is natural to understand West Germany as a state that lacked uninterrupted access to the international arena due to its position and its responsibilities within the Western bloc. However, there arises a major question from this assumption about the connection between a state's power and IR's disciplinary development when one turns to the influence of the Scandinavian IR community, especially in the last three decades. Following the

⁴⁷¹ Hoffmann, 1977: 224.

significant contributions made in the area of peace research and conflict resolution (thinking just about the impact of their peace research institutes such as Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI] or Peace Research Institute Oslo [PRIO] presents a strong institutional picture in addition to their level of representation in American publications), it is not easy to overlook the fact that there has been a significant over-proportional participation from Scandinavian IR specialists in the discipline leaving other continental European communities on the sidelines.⁴⁷²

Of course, the British role is another European example of active engagement, but this is a different case for at least three reasons. First, the UK was one of the first countries in which IR as an academic discipline took shape. Depending on one's approach, it can be interpreted as either the first or the second place where the academic study of IR emerged. A second feature reflects its great power status that continued into the post-World War II years. Another point would be its sharing of the English language with the current leader of the disciplinary (re-)production, that is the US. Therefore, the British prominence is a natural consequence of these various factors as well as their combined impact, whereas none of the three elements provides a direct explanation for the Scandinavian exception. As an important explanation of the Scandinavian closeness to the US, it is useful to turn to Jörg Friedrichs' approach that sees the Nordic openness for “multi-level research collaboration” as the decisive tool in having reached a “uniquely successful integrated periphery” position.⁴⁷³

472 See Breitenbauch's comparison of French and Scandinavian IR in Breitenbauch, 2008 and explained below in the French section.

473 Friedrichs, 2004: 27.

Adapting US social scientific practices to a certain extent without following a very distinctive model, while also providing some alternative insights seems to serve as a helpful means for becoming a regional IR community the influence of which reaches a global level. Based on this idea, the way for a critique of Hoffmann's suggestions is opened. If the Scandinavian case helps to refute the argument about state power-disciplinary influence connection, then it is also possible to question his suggestion about the German situation. The reasons for the relative weakness of (West) German IR therefore lie not necessarily in the limited power projection of (West) Germany. One could not, obviously, assert that the Danish or Norwegian states, even in their status as NATO members and fully sovereign Nordic countries, had and have more impact than a sovereignty-wise limited West Germany.

An alternative explanation can be derived from the cultural limits of an IR community's readiness for integration into scientific expectations of a leading US IR community. While post-Cold War reunified Germany is seen as being better adapted to the US model than in its pre-unification period, and even criticized for its exclusive focus on the US (and generally Anglophone IR),⁴⁷⁴ a major goal in the West German period had been to try to develop alternative approaches. As West German IR's development, which was discussed in the preceding sections, has shown, the tendency was to go beyond the US models. It was not only critical IR scholars who perceived such a necessity, but also normativists like Bergstraesser were aiming for new insights which would be useful for postwar West Germany. The fact that no simultaneous following and imitation of US IR

⁴⁷⁴ Holden, 2004: 458.

theories took place in the period of 1950s to 1980s, notwithstanding the impact of the US via its local officials in Germany and the emigrant scholars, as well American foundations demonstrates that there was still no insistence on seeing US IR's actual research as the ideal to be approached. Although the way the American discipline had developed was interpreted positively in the sense of its success, there was no obligation to use the same methodological and epistemological approaches in studying world politics. Not much of behavioralism or neorealism was evident. Even Morgenthau's work was closely followed by only a few West German scholars like Karl Kindermann.

In this context, the emerging difference can be explained by the role of hybridity, which decreases the significance of any elaborations focusing on path-dependency alone. There is no direct line that connects West German political science and IR to its prewar conditions, not even the symbolic role provided by the institutional rebirth of DHfP. Certain tendencies shifted to new paths when the impact of the Nazi period brought about radical changes. At the same time, the relative untaintedness of political scientists contributed to start a new period, which did not resemble American IR in the sense of an exact copy. The reason for West German IR's relative weakness was not the lack of power alone, as this factor has been shown not to have played such a role in the case of Nordic IR. More important was the existence of a divided scholarly community whose members lacked means of dialogue due to their separate approaches that prioritized either normative, empirical or critical models. Unlike the case of the US or Scandinavian IR communities, there was a quantitative uneasiness that arose from the inability of any one

group of these competing approaches in reaching the majority of scholars, creating as a result a constant tension that was to prevent the development of a coherent mainstream which could, in turn, have the representative capacity for cooperation with its US IR counterparts. Therefore, I find the reasons for West German IR's relative weakness much more in its divisions than in the country's foreign policy or relative powerlessness, a condition that would not differentiate it from the Northern neighbors.

One suggestion provided by German commentators on the development of world political study and research in postwar West Germany goes beyond presenting a basic prioritization of domestic politics above international affairs as the explanatory variable. In this regard, Schweigler extends such assumptions by emphasizing the reconstruction efforts in the country, the effect of which was to push interest in world politics to the backstage.⁴⁷⁵ In his proposition, there appears at least a factor that would explain the lack of interest in IR proper. However, in my interpretation, even such an extended form of clarification fails to inform about the reasons of IR's relatively lower degree of influence.

If one has to consider the impact of political forces at play, then, notwithstanding the lack of sovereignty, West Germans' interests necessitated remaining attuned to world political developments. As was seen in 1953 on East Berlin streets, it was not workers opposing the Communist authorities who were to determine the short term future of East Germany, but Soviet tanks present on the streets of East Berlin. On a functional level, similar conditions prevailed in West German society. Their very future and its form depended on decisions made by the Allied powers, including France, the neighbor to the

⁴⁷⁵ Schweigler, 1976: 71.

West, and the US with its newly found superpower position. Under such circumstances, the argument that international affairs were less relevant to West Germans provides a rather weak explanation. As shown in the discussion of Bergstraesser's propositions, according to many scholars the significance of world political knowledge and hence of a well-developed IR discipline was indeed a clear necessity for sovereignty-less West Germans.

While it is true that Fraenkel's theory on pluralism or the contemporary fashion of totalitarianism theories took the upper hand in West German political science, they cannot be explained just by the supposedly higher concerns of domestic issues. This means that even these theoretical approaches (of a domestic political or comparative political nature) had direct ties to the external environment or resulted from a tightly interwoven connection between the domestic and the international. At a time of non-sovereignty, with no Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1951, it was certainly difficult to look for a broader focus on world politics. However, the domestic context and contemporary theories providing explanations about it were themselves repercussions of the general international scene. The totalitarian Soviet Union replaced the totalitarian Nazi era, and challenges of Weimar Germany's social and political divisions were now to be overcome in a pluralistic and democratic West Germany that took the Western democracies as its model.

This happened not least due to emigrant scholars' return from the US where they had become familiar with different mentalities, which provided alternatives to their previous

ideas on the German socio-political context. Therefore, it is possible to assert that the deeper reason for a lack of IR was not in fact a lesser involvement in world affairs, but the narrower confines into which this possibility was pushed. Lacking a coherent institutional setting, which would develop into a broader structure only in the 1960s, presented another major setback. An additional negative impact derived from the focus on geopolitics that had prevailed from 1920s to 1940s, now tainted by its Nazi connections. The fact that there was even an exaggerated reference to Karl Haushofer's role with his geopolitical studies on the Nazi imperialism, with imagined great research centers in Munich, further delegitimized this type of research in postwar Germany.

The lack of a great power status that was at the origins of Anglo-American prominence in the discipline provides an additional element for explaining IR's weakness in postwar (West) Germany. Here, I need to underline that this status dimension is not a sufficient explanation by itself. As shown in the above juxtaposition of Scandinavia to Germany, the post-World War II successes of Scandinavian IR demonstrated that great power status itself was not necessary to produce IR scholarship with a global impact. Rather, in the Nordic case, it was their scientific and methodological following of the Anglo-American approaches that paved the way for an advanced community of IR scholars in the region. In the West German situation, however, the impact of returning scholars did not suffice by itself to readjust the political science/IR community toward an American way of doing social science.

One of the reasons for this was to be found in the still continuing weight of German scholarly traditions, both with their varying methodological choices and the more powerful opposition from historical and legal scholarship that was not eager to welcome disciplinary competition in the form of political science or IR. As a result, German IR's temporal backwardness could only be overcome after initial steps taken in the institutional-structural realm showed their impact. The consequent increase in West German sovereignty, in parallel to its economic growth in the postwar years, was to provide the political-contextual pavement for this new route of the West German IR community, but was not by itself sufficient to explain the advances in its scholarship. In the conclusion, I will return to this aspect in a broader analysis.

This chapter has provided the developmental trajectory of (West) German IR in terms of its institutional and scholarly-agential dimensions. I analyzed the role of DHfP and Arnold Bergstraesser in advancing IR studies, and pointed to the important role of US foundations as well as American military and government officials in institutionalizing political science and IR in the post-1945 period. By explaining the structural deficits of West German IR studies, especially its late academic establishment and the opposition it faced from more traditional academic disciplines, I emphasized that it could only emerge as a hybrid IR community in which the transnational dynamics created a discipline that did not become an exact replica of the dominant American model. Important to note is that even German scholars familiar with US IR scholarship took steps that led the discipline to more critical and alternative directions, as seen in the example of Marxist-

influenced approaches and a critical peace research agenda, and the lack of quantitative studies and behaviorist tendencies.

By historicizing the pathways of IR's (West) German journey, this chapter the transnational dynamics that lay at its origins and establishment. Even more than the case of France that I will analyze in the next chapter, Germany presents an example of hybridity. The Nazi years, and earlier Prussian experience, forced many scholars to leave their home country, interacting as a result with the American ways of doing social sciences. At both instances, the impact was visible in the US and German contexts, when the mutual influence generated contingent outcomes. Jewish-German refugee-scholars helped American IR to take a fresh wave of continental European infusion, while the returning and visiting refugees would shape German political science and IR to a great extent. The detailed analysis of Bergstraesser's engagement showed how such individual roles could determine the prospective pathways of the new discipline. Unlike the usual focus of IR disciplinary histories on the American center, I turn the focus to the two continental European cases so that the discipline can be approached in a broader understanding that would also bring new insights about its function(s) and its future role. It is in this sense that the next French chapter looks to another major scene in which transnational dynamics gave birth to a different IR scholarly community.

CHAPTER V: THE DISCIPLINE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN FRANCE

The developmental trajectory of IR's pathways in France show the extent to which transnational dynamics engendered a hybrid social science whose direction was not one determined by the impact of national legacies or international structures alone. Like in the German case, American and international actors played an important role in determining the future shape of the new discipline in France.

Before emphasizing the main points of French IR's disciplinary history (which I explain in detail in the subsequent sections) that demonstrate its distinct trajectory, it is useful to present a brief framework of the politico-historical context under which this new discipline came into being. In the late 19th century, the Third Republic provided another turning point in the long revolutionary-reactionary struggles that had marked the country since 1789.⁴⁷⁶ Its relatively long existence would come to an end in 1940 when the Nazi troops occupied half of the country and left the other half to a collaborationist regime under Marshall Pétain, a national hero of the First World War. In a more teleological fashion, it could be asserted that France has succeeded only in the aftermath of the Second World War in overcoming the great political conflicts that distinguished its 19th and 20th century developments. According to Pierre Birnbaum, the French “Republic

⁴⁷⁶ For a generations-based account of the continuing confrontations that marked 19th and early 20th century French society and of the conflictual legacy of the French Revolution see Gildea, 2008.

has renounced utopian dreams,” while its long-time opponents (e.g. the Catholic Church) have also “forsaken its ancient intransigence.”⁴⁷⁷

Compared to the German case, French developments present a different frame in terms of their “Western” nature. Whereas it is possible to interpret German history as marked by moves that opposed values associated with the West, France sided in both world wars with its British and American allies. The divided nature of its society and politics made it different, but its general choice was to remain a partner of the Western powers, without significant tendencies of expansion and irredentism in Europe. This aspect puts it into a different category from Germany in the context of the pre-1945 period. At the same time, the legacy of the Second World War paved the way for France to feel itself more secure (especially once the decolonization process and its wars were over), while the West German state had to consider the prospects of its survival. It is important to understand this difference when analyzing the developments that led to the establishment of political science/IR in France. In a country marked by a traditional university structure and a relatively less problematic foreign political agenda, the focus on studying the international had a decreased importance.

Due to the close connections of the IR discipline to political science, it is important to start the analysis of IR's developmental trajectory in 20th century France by first turning to the emergence of the influential Parisian institute of higher education, that is *Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques* (ELSP, Free School of Political Sciences). In analyzing the developmental trajectory of this important school, I explain how American

⁴⁷⁷ Birnbaum, 2008: 281.

foundations, French scholars and politicians, and their interactions led to transnational dynamics that shaped the pathways of political science and IR in France. French interest in American ways of “doing” political science and IR, combined with the influence of a more pluralistic and interdisciplinary French approach paved the way for French scholarship that did not resemble its American counterpart.

A detailed analysis of French IR's “founding fathers,” with a special focus on Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, and a critical engagement with Raymond Aron's role, serves to explain how some scholars succeeded in establishing a new discipline. Looking at its associations, publications, meetings, and debates, it becomes possible to understand how all these scholarly and institutional actors shaped political science and IR. I also analyze French perceptions of US scholarship. Such an approach provides helpful insights for gaining a better understanding of French IR's transnational development. The concluding section underlines the French lack of prioritizing theory in IR, a feature so important to American IR. These explanations help understand how IR can take different forms in different countries.

The main points that distinguish French IR can be summarized in four points. First, American foundations' initiatives in supporting the development of social sciences, and French scholars' visits to the US played a major role in determining the shape of IR. However, this American influence did not mean that a complete imitation would be the result. The outcome was a hybrid discipline that continued to preserve many aspects of its interdisciplinary character that was the case of European IR studies. Unlike the US,

disciplines such as law, geography, and sociology had a great impact on IR's French trajectory.

Second, the founders (both in scholarly and institutional terms) of the discipline had roots in other disciplines, i.e. history, sociology, law. This was a natural consequence that derived from its newly established academic status – no previous experience was required. Like the British historian Herbert Butterfield in the UK, French historians Renouvin and Duroselle contributed to the development of the discipline in France. Ties to American foundations provided a useful means that helped them to advance French IR.

Third, the weak status of political science, which was a consequence of its late establishment as a distinct field of study (in the singular version of *science politique*) influenced IR's French pathways in a negative way. While IR became (most prominently in the US) a subdiscipline of political science, its French trajectory could not be built upon a well-established political scientific basis because no such structure existed. It was only in the 1980s that IR could emerge with a powerful research agenda, mostly thanks to a new generation of French IR specialists with sociological approaches.

Fourth, IR is not the only way of dealing with the international. Geopolitical analyses are a major specificity of French scholarship and publications that look at international phenomena and global processes. At the same time, French IR does not resemble its American counterpart that is marked by a continuing search for grand theories. All these features demonstrate that the discipline's French trajectory differs from American scholarship. This difference is at the same time a promise for an alternative that could

bring new insights to the study of the international by a more sociologically informed and interdisciplinary approach. The hybridity of French IR, a result of transnational dynamics that shaped its development, serves to highlight the plurality that is inherent to the discipline's global and divergent trajectories.

V.1. From the 19th to the 20th Century: The Origins of French Political Sciences and the ELSP Years

In this section, I analyze how institutional developments paved the way for enabling the gradual establishment of, first political *sciences* and only later the singular political *science*. The period until 1945 is marked by the prominence of the former, plural understanding of political *sciences*. An analysis about the development of political science prepares the ground for the following sections that turn more directly to International Relations studies. Their often interwoven nature and the lack of IR's independence explain the frequent overlaps between their topics of study. Such conditions explain why a disciplinary history of IR also necessitates a detailed analysis of general political scientific developments in order to create a proper context for focusing on IR.

V.1.a. Before Boutmy: Earlier developments in 19th century French political science

Whereas Emile Durkheim saw in 1890 in political science only “bastard speculations, half-way theoretical and half-way practical, half-way science and half-way

arts,” the weakness of this new social science against its competing disciplines of economics and sociology would be overcome to a large extent in the second half of the 20th century.⁴⁷⁸ However, the general conditions prevailing in the 19th century did not provide the most suitable environment for the emergence of political science(s).

The most important body for the early development of French social sciences in the institutional area was the *Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques* (ASMP, Academy of Moral and Political Sciences) founded in 1832. In fact, it represented the re-opening of the *Institut de France's* (the main French academic mechanism) second class, the branch focusing on moral and political sciences, which had not survived the Napoleonic pressures of its time. Given the liberal atmosphere of 1830s, its founding members like Guizot and Cousin were able to play a role in an academic body that would precede the establishment of university disciplines in the late 19th century. ASMP symbolized the state liberalism influential at the time of its creation. The academy members originated from urban and liberal elites, with their dual opposition both to workers' movements and to reactionary conservatives, which put them into a distinct space marked by a secular, centrist position within the French society. The close connection to the regime becomes directly visible by considering the percentage of its members who had a political position: 75 %, the highest number among all the academies, branches of *Institut de France*.⁴⁷⁹

478 Wagner, 2001: 25.

479 Heilbron, 2004b: 145-148.

It is important to understand the distance the academicians had from the natural sciences. They were not looking for ways to follow models provided by these sciences. Furthermore, academicians at ASMP rejected the concept of “social science,” as its origins were connected to the time of the French Revolution and the concomitant values of materialism and scientism. However, in the mid-19th century, these academic stances were already under heavy attack from scholars and philosophers like Ernest Renan and Hippolyte Taine. For them, a more scientific approach to sciences was necessary. Taine's opinion was that one should follow the model set by natural sciences so that the two scientific enterprises could be brought closer. This meant that political sciences would be modeled on natural sciences.⁴⁸⁰

An important aspect of all these debates was that Taine was later to become the person whose ideas and influence determined to a great extent the way Emile Boutmy would develop his conceptions about the goals and structure of ELSP, the Parisian school for political sciences he would found. Therefore, at the roots of Boutmy's later desire to create a place for the education of the Republican elites, there was the plan to use the scientific expertise for increasing the current elite's power under changing conditions. Interestingly, the anti-ASMP attitude of Taine would continue to exert its influence at the time of ELSP when Boutmy, Taine and their friends were eager to create an institute which would be devoid of dogmatic approaches. This was to be expected, as it was thinkers like Taine who asserted that the academy's position and the way it dealt with moral sciences was not scientific; to the contrary, the influence of ASMP was merely a

480 Heilbron, 2004b: 148-153.

consequence of its connection to the doctrines officially propagated.⁴⁸¹ Ironically, ELSP would find itself under a similar critique in the 20th century, as its *doctrinaire* liberalism generated heavy criticism.

The early years of the Third Republic, which arose out of the 1870-1871 catastrophes of war, defeat and the Paris Commune, were marked by similar projects aimed at bringing about a modern institutional structure for the study of society. In 1872, the *Association française pour l'avancement des sciences* (French association for the advancement of sciences) was founded, followed a few years later by the *Société de l'enseignement supérieure* (Society for higher education). This showed that improving the scientific conditions had become a shared interest. The academy lost its ground in the later 19th century when Boutmy's ELSP took political sciences under its realm, whereas humanities were covered by faculties of Letters, and economics became a subject to be studied at faculties of Law.⁴⁸²

According to Pierre Favre, the development of political science in the last third of the 19th century was triggered by the autonomization of politics, the growth of modern state apparatus, and the secularized and democratized nature of politics. Under these conditions, the need for people educated in aspects of political relevance increased, as they were the ones to fill the new positions from which they could engage with a changing society and state.⁴⁸³ The founding of ELSP was a French response to deal with

481 On this aspect see Heilbron, 2004b: 153.

482 Heilbron, 2004b: 153-157.

483 Favre, 1989: 10ff.

new conditions and to give political studies a much needed impetus that was not provided by the academy or university structures.

In the early 20th century, it was also the work of Emile Durkheim, one of the most significant French sociologists, that provided early signs of interest in the international dimension. His analyses preceded the French sociological approaches that successfully contributed to the advancement of French IR scholarship in the last decades of the 20th century. As part of his interest in world politics, he wrote at the time of the First World War on Germans and their mental approach to international affairs. A limitless German will for power was responsible for their war-proneness in world politics. It was due to the general international reality that Germans would later realize “the impossibility of hegemonic empire,” Durkheim suggested, without foreseeing the continuation of a similar project in two decades' time.⁴⁸⁴

In the case of the idea of international society, Durkheim thought that such a society had not yet come into existence, while he saw in the international milieu “a collection of laws” that were of both a legal and moral content.⁴⁸⁵ Most importantly, for him, no single state can “maintain itself when it has all the humanity against itself.” Moderation and moral law are important aspects of international relations, with “the will to power” being an unacceptable way of acting in that realm. However, it is important not to understand Durkheim as an idealist *avant-le-mot* because he rejects the idea that humanity as such exists. There would most probably never arise a single state in the world; thus his

484 Ramel, 2004: 498, 503.

485 Ramel, 2004: 498, 506.

attention is on the relevance of states, while accepting the limiting influence of the international environment. The primary means for people's identification lies in their *patrie*, in their state.⁴⁸⁶

When dealing with international issues in the pre-First World War period, Durkheim tended to approach this rather skeptically. “No defined law” was visible, and even if such laws existed in the study of world politics, “they [would be] difficult to discover.” Before these comments in 1903, he had asserted in 1887, when talking about the range of subjects sociology should deal with, that he has not focused either on the military or the diplomatic dimension, although these were “social phenomena” which should be scientifically researched. However, “this science does not exist yet, not even in the embryonic state.” According to Frédéric Ramel, these positions that changed during Durkheim's lifetime do not provide substantial bases for seeing him as the first IR scholar. However, Durkheim's analyses sufficiently demonstrate his later interest in the area of world politics that was triggered by the First World War and the characteristics of German understanding of war and international affairs.⁴⁸⁷ This shows, in turn, that world political constellations had an important impact on shaping Durkheim's approach toward the study of the international dimension. Notwithstanding his questioning of the possibility of a science that would deal with international affairs, Durkheim was interested enough in creating a work that aimed to explain the reasons for German aggressive behavior that was seen as the reason of the ongoing war, as his book was

486 Ramel, 2004: 507-511.

487 Ramel, 2004: 512, 514.

published in 1915. However, an effective means for developing study and research in the area of (world) political studies was an institutionalized setting, one that was provided by Emile Boutmy in the early years of the Third Republic.

V.1.b. A Boutmy project: ELSP from 1872 until 1945

The most important French institution for the teaching of (social and) political sciences, *Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques* (ELSP) opened in early 1872 following the initiative taken by Emile Boutmy. The founder, Boutmy, was an intellectual working at that time as an instructor at the Parisian architectural school, with a family background that had led him to accept a liberal worldview. His broad scholarly interests and simultaneous connections to French liberal elites would pave the way for engaging in the difficult task of opening a private institution of learning that dealt with a sensitive area, the teaching of politics and related areas.

The French state's disinterest in the subject made it easier to undertake such a project. In fact, there had been earlier attempts to establish a school of administration, but the revolutionary and reactionary waves that shook the French political order of the late 18th and 19th centuries had presented obstacles that could not be overcome. At the same time, faculties of Law were even in those earlier periods opposing such separate institutes where administrative or political sciences would be taught, fearing a decrease in their significance.⁴⁸⁸

488 Damamme, 1987: 35-36.

The initial courses offered at ELSP were geography and ethnography, diplomatic history, history of economic doctrines, history of finance, and history of social reform theories. The demand being for more practical courses, Boutmy could not implement his original idea about a school of general advanced studies. “Scientific curiosity” by itself would not suffice for attracting the ideal number of students. Later in the same year, the decision was taken to create diplomatic and administrative sections so that students interested in related careers could focus on specific study areas. The socio-political conditions of the period were shaped by the French defeat of 1871 by Bismarck's Prussia and the subsequent Commune experience in Paris. Under these circumstances, Boutmy had to change his initial idea, turning away from plans for an institution that would be like an “encyclopedia of 'sciences d'Etat” (sciences of state), and accepting the realization of a school focusing more on shaping administrative cadres for the future.⁴⁸⁹

The founder of ELSP was motivated by the goal of creating a ruling class that would be competent and thus able to perpetuate its dominant position in the French society and state. While France was undergoing a difficult process filled with conflicts between reactionary and revolutionary forces, Boutmy aimed to present his new institution as a liberal means of keeping the power in the hands of elites who could succeed in presenting their position as a *via media* between two extremes. In his opinion, a few dozen men educated at the school would be able to influence society and thus keep the power position of the liberal bourgeoisie intact. The major figure of influence on Boutmy was Hippolyte Taine. The thought of this important intellectual played a big role in triggering

489 Damamme, 1987: 31-32.

Boutmy's plans for ELSP. Interestingly, Taine suggested that science led to prudence. In line with this, studying was supposed to diminish the role of theoreticians – and thus of revolutionaries. In this quite *sui generis* conceptualization of the impact of studying and science, Taine saw a means for a more moderate public.⁴⁹⁰

As a consequence, ELSP would be shaped by the influence of Taine who was the main personality behind the Boutmian visions for the school's future role. Taine saw there a means of opening another anti-Jacobin front in French society. His follower Boutmy would emphasize the importance of method for science and recognize in the issues that were to be studied phenomena that have their difficult and complex aspects. Therefore, separate analytical categories had to be created when dealing with them in a scholarly manner. According to Dominique Damamme, the whole project was one that aimed to give power to experts. In this construction of ELSP and the concomitant prominence of political *sciences*, it is important to recognize the presence of political “sciences at the service of the political for a politics at the service of the science.” The various groups associated with the school, through their teaching or studying experiences, would in due time shape the general scene of “political producers,” be it the politicians who were educated there, the high bureaucracy whose overwhelming majority were ELSP alumni or the new political scientific intellectuals.⁴⁹¹ It was the last group that would evolve in the course of the mid-20th century into actual political scientists, a time when the French

490 Damamme, 1987: 33.

491 Damamme, 1988: 9, 12.

would finally start to use the label of “*politiste*” instead of the English word “political scientist.”

As stated in the case of DHfP in Germany, the university reforms in early 19th century Berlin provided a significant point of reference because for Boutmy it was these educational initiatives that had enabled the German victory in the 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian war. He thought that the new focus on education in France, in the advancement of which his school was to have a major role, presented the means for giving those classes, which had up to that point political dominance, a different way of keeping their (now challenged) power. In this regard, he spoke of “the empire of the spirit” and “the government by the best.” A democratizing society was challenging the bourgeoisie, so the latter had to keep its power base by using the educational system, instead of legal or political settings, to continue its privileged position. Competence was becoming the new tool for social hegemony, a capacity that could be furthered by education alone. After the days of the Commune, Boutmy saw the necessity of educating the future cadres who, in turn, would be capable of shaping the public opinion. His views did not take shape in an ideational vacuum. One of the most important politicians-statesmen of the time, Jules Ferry suggested that it was “science alone that could teach to democracies like us that the real queen of the world was not reason alone, but reason regulated by knowledge/science [*le savoir*].”⁴⁹²

Whereas the role of ELSP would be greatly emphasized on the other side of the Rhine in the later years, Charles Dupuis, the secretary general of the school since 1895, ⁴⁹² Damamme, 1987: 33-35.

would inform in a text for the German public that ELSP had in fact failed to realize Boutmy's original ideas about creating an enlightened leadership in France, one that would have undergone the broad teaching at the school. As a result, the school had been more successful in the training of administrative and diplomatic elites.⁴⁹³

The school's founding took the shape of a share-holders' association, with members of the *Société d'économie politique* providing the framework of ELSP supporters. Important liberals of the period such as the politician-thinker Guizot and Taine contributed to the process by activating their networks in order to promote Boutmy's initiative. The business world with many industrialists and bankers as well as Protestant and Jewish minority groups played a significant part in the creation of Sciences Po. According to Dominique Damamme, the presence of all these groups points to the significant social capital held by Boutmy who was able to make use of it at such an important turning point in French history. These groups stood at an intersection where economic, intellectual and political fields mingled together. Such diversity also enabled Boutmy to assert the non-partisan nature of his school, trying to feed the image of the school as a national project standing above political questions.⁴⁹⁴ However, this should not lead one to overlook the immanently political nature of this whole scholarly-institutional enterprise. It was not surprising that similar conditions prevailed at the time of the German DHfP's creation, with liberal businessmen like Robert Bosch financing the

493 Bock, 1996: 195-196.

494 Damamme, 1987: 39-43.

founding of the new institution, whose initiators were also intellectuals-scholars close to the most important name of German liberalism of the period, Friedrich Naumann.

According to Damamme, ELSP succeeded in using its instructors' influence for subsequently creating its own influence in France. For instance, in the 1899-1900 academic year, one could look back and see 76 people who were (or had been) active at Sciences Po. 35 of them were higher state officials, 18 were university professors. Eleven of its instructors served as members of various French academies.⁴⁹⁵ There were some 100 students in its initial years, reaching more than 800 in the 1910s. In the aftermath of the First World War, the number was stagnating around the same figure, including close to 150 foreign students, and six female students.⁴⁹⁶

Within ELSP, there emerged four different sections, one of them being the diplomatic section. This department not only offered high-quality courses, but also taught many of them “in the spirit of 'International Relations.’” However, the courses offered in the late 19th century could not be put under IR as the very label did not exist at that time.⁴⁹⁷ The number of students receiving diplomas at ELSP's diplomatic section ranged from 17 (out of 76) in 1900 to 65 (out of 274) in the last pre-World War II academic year. Compared to these numbers, the economic and financial studies triggered the interest of more students, while the administrative section had a similar number of students as to the diplomatic section.⁴⁹⁸ The rise in the number of diplomas, concomitant with a higher standard of

495 Damamme, 1987: 45.

496 Bock, 1996: 200.

497 Chapsal, 1951: 90.

498 Rain, 1963: 102.

admission (as after 1931 the entering students were required to be already in possession of a university degree) demonstrate the school's success in establishing itself as a major educational actor in France.⁴⁹⁹

Boutmy kept underlining the independent character of his school, asserting that they were “of no party” but only “the party of science.” According to Damamme, however, this supposed impartiality did not reflect the true state of affairs, as a pro-science position was deeply connected to the liberal worldview of the era. Progressive conservatives also joined this position, materializing in the form of ELSP an ideational coalition that pursued its own interests by using the educational system as a means of keeping its advantages. In this general framework, political sciences were very important, as also acknowledged by Boutmy, for purposes of providing the bourgeois elites with a *culture générale* (similar to the Anglo-Saxon idea of liberal arts).⁵⁰⁰ When it came to world politics, this was not a dimension foreign to Boutmy. For him, studying non-French issues had been a part of his intellectual interests, also shown in his work on the political psychology of the English people. In that study, he based his approach on the idea of the collective spirit (*l'âme collective*) of nations.⁵⁰¹

In the interwar years, the liberal orientation of ELSP had already started to pose a problem. During the Popular Front coalition government of 1936, the new minister of national education proposed plans to nationalize the school in order to get rid of what was perceived as its privileged position within the French higher education system. This was

499 Rain, 1963: 80.

500 Damamme, 1987: 46.

501 Damamme, 1987: 38-39.

due to ELSP's perceived influence in the higher public offices and the state's main bureaucracy. The numbers themselves suffice to point to the incredible influence of the school. In 1935, the school brochures were filled with self appraisal, indicating that out of 117 *Conseil d'Etat* staff admitted 113 came from Sciences Po. The figure was 246 among the 280 officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁵⁰² The school's success at educating future state cadres showed that its power was only furthered by its production of higher bureaucrats.⁵⁰³ At the same time, the orthodox-liberal concepts that dominated the school's economics teaching and thus the students' education were disliked by left-wing politicians, as they wanted to go beyond ideas generated by such a influential institution.⁵⁰⁴ The fact that many bureaucrats prepared ELSP students for their respective ministry's/organization's entrance exams in informal study groups only furthered protests against a Parisian elite that had managed to find ways of perpetuating itself in state organs. In the eyes of left-wing parliamentarians, ELSP was not only “anti-democratic” but also “a tool of powerful interests.”⁵⁰⁵

The maneuvers of the ELSP administration against the minister's nationalization plans read like an adventure novel, proudly shared in the narrative of Pierre Rain, the establishment's long-serving librarian. Using their parliamentary and bureaucratic contacts, the school succeeded in cutting the more challenging aspects of the plan. However, the outbreak of the Second World War pushed this latter deal into irrelevance.

502 Rain, 1963: 90.

503 Damamme, 1987: 46.

504 Bock, 1996: 200-201.

505 Nord, 2003: 125.

In the meantime, the hero of the previous world war, Marshall Pétain was invited to teach at ELSP on issues of national defense. In the post-Munich context, when the European political order was shaken, he would be the ideal means for the school to symbolize its attachment to the national cause. In early 1939, Pétain was already delivering his inaugural lecture.⁵⁰⁶

The World War II years play an important role in explaining the evolution of ELSP and the reasons for its quasi-nationalization in the war's aftermath. Interestingly, the years marked by the war and occupation seem to be sealed off from the larger history of the school. In an important book, written by Rain, there is a short section provided by Jacques Chapsal (at the time of the book's writing the IEP director) who provided a very short narrative about the war years. A more detailed story comes from a non-French scholar, Philip Nord. This dimension of scholarly research is not irrelevant, as it is another example of French unwillingness to deal with the World War II period in a more (self-)critical fashion. Unlike the German scholars who provided important studies on the wartime developments at DHfP or in the broader area of social sciences, for French scholars, especially in the context of ELSP, this period presents a much neglected aspect for research.

When the Nazis occupied half the country and enabled the creation of a puppet regime in the form of Pétain's Vichy state, the school entered into turmoil. First, the Germans closed it down, as many of its courses were disliked due to their supposedly anti-German character. It should not be forgotten, either, that ELSP was in the eyes of

⁵⁰⁶ Nord, 2003: 126.

many Germans the epitomized version of French intellectual capacities with regard to scholarly capacities that involved the learning and deciphering of the other. Therefore, the school was a center that enabled the French to gain better knowledge about their neighbors, including the Germans, as well as the broader world, including specific emphasis on colonial matters. The remarks from DHfP's founding period, which pointed to the French victory in the First World War being a consequence of Sciences Po's successes, build the background of the German perception that prevailed in the summer of 1940.

In the war years, it is possible to see at least two strategies followed by the ELSP leadership. They developed a certain closeness with Vichy circles, which would shift in the later war years toward Gaullist positions. According to Nord, when the country was finally liberated, “the Ecole found itself in alignment with the [Gaullist] technocratic current.”⁵⁰⁷ In Chapsal's account, on the other hand, no significant changes had taken place in occupied Paris. The school opened a branch in Lyon, that is, in the area under the official control of Vichy France. The balance was definitely in favor of the Resistance, with the school's willingness to withstand the wishes of the Vichy regime and collaborators, according to Chapsal. Its suffering, with regard to the ELSP scholars and students killed in the war, is elaborated at most in a short footnote. No explicit reference is made to people killed because of their Jewish background.⁵⁰⁸ Neither does the text by Chapsal (who in 1939 became the secretary general of the ELSP and was the director of

507 Nord, 2003: 117.

508 Chapsal, 1963: 105-110, see also the footnote on p. 110.

Sciences Po from 1947 to 1979 and the administrator of FNSP) include much about the difficulties of ELSP's Jewish members, such as Jacques Rueff, who not only lost his position as deputy president of the Banque de France but also could no longer teach at ELSP and had to leave Paris.⁵⁰⁹

When the school was finally allowed to reopen in the fall of 1940, Pétain was still on its administrative council. Simultaneously, pro-Vichy figures became affiliated with Sciences Po. After the Nazi occupation of southern France, there was a visible turn, demonstrated most effectively by leaving the Marechal outside the council, as well as a refusal to reemploy the former justice minister of the Vichy government as an instructor.⁵¹⁰ The last period of the war witnessed a cleaning of ranks, as pro-Vichy people went and a world-famous scholar, André Siegfried was made the president. The ELSP leaders, Siegfried and Roger Seydoux would even participate in the San Francisco Conference, while communists had already started to attack the school as early as February 1945, seeing in it a tool of “the global trusts.”⁵¹¹ Such attacks were rejected by the school administrators for whom the end-of-war cleansings of Vichy-affiliated scholars was a useful means of demonstrating their rightness.⁵¹²

509 Nord, 2003: 129.

510 Nord, 2003: 132.

511 Nord, 2003: 137-138.

512 For such a rejection see Chapsal, 1963: 121.

V.1.c. Self-Perceptions – I: The 1937 Report on Social Sciences in France

What was the state of French social sciences in the interwar period? In the earlier years of the post-First World War period, the answer lay in a perception that was dominant among French scholars. They attributed the origins of German power, which they witnessed in the war years, partially to the Wilhelmine Empire's positive emphasis on the teaching of social sciences.⁵¹³ This seems to be an overstatement, especially when taking into account the concomitant arguments used by German scholars for the establishment of the DHfP, which pointed to the French Sciences Po as their model. As a result, the general picture was one of reverse attributions on both sides of the Franco-German (scholarly) divide, with the two parties seeing the other as more successful in the area of social sciences. These images mattered for the two countries because social sciences were seen as being of great relevance for the two nations' future. However, the divided nature of French social sciences was already a problem, furthered by a lack of resources.

In 1937, an important report on the state of French social sciences was published. The study group responsible for this work was located at *Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère* (CEPE) in Paris. In the volume that brought together experts from a great number of disciplines, ranging from history to linguistics, from art history to economic sciences, sociology and ethnology, there were two separate chapters of political *sciences* (still in plural) and International Relations. The distinction is important as it shows the way political science and IR were handled by independent accounts, in the form of two

513 Mazon, 1985: 311.

areas with distinct structures and interests. The justification for the report was provided by an important name in the French university system, the director of ENS, Célestin Bouglé. He referred to the 1900 World Exposition and the concomitantly organized international congress on the teaching of social sciences. Now it was time for Bouglé to present a similar undertaking with regard to French social sciences at the time of the 1937 Parisian World Exposition, as another international conference on social sciences would follow the exposition.⁵¹⁴ In his preface, Bouglé mentioned the helpful role played by two American foundations: Rockefeller and Carnegie. Like their US and British counterparts, French scholars had found in the American foundations one of their main supporters. In his opinion, the project of these philanthropies aimed “to prepare in all countries a kind of coalition of scientific spirit with international spirit.”⁵¹⁵ In that context, one should remember the name of the journal published by the European Center of the CEIP in Paris: *L'esprit international*, “international spirit.” Pierre Renouvin, a name whose importance will be explained below, also participated in the work of the journal. In 1925, he published a book that dealt with the way democratic governments behaved in times of war. One of the supporters of the volume was none other than CEIP's Parisian branch.⁵¹⁶

It becomes clear that Bouglé himself was sharing the internationalist position of CEIP, as he added that the 1937 report had the goal of determining whether French social sciences had contributed to “the formation of an international spirit.” Still seeing IR as an amalgamated version of various social sciences and humanities, Bouglé briefly mentions

514 Bouglé, 1937: 4-6, 11.

515 Bouglé, 1937: 7.

516 De Lannon, 1977: 10.

the Lyon chair in peace, occupied by Jacques Lambert and then goes on to state that there are other ways of doing IR studies beyond the existence of designated chairs. Thus, history, law, economics, etc. could jointly provide ideas on “nations' interdependence today.”⁵¹⁷ The suggestion about interdependence, written in the late 1930s, is significant, as it points to the fact that such statements using the same concepts were not a late 20th century practice.

Augustin Jordan, in his contribution to the same 1937 report's section on political sciences, began by emphasizing an earlier definition of the study of political sciences. In Henri Hauser's 1903 book *L'enseignement des sciences sociales* (The Teaching of Social Sciences), such a study intended “to consider under a certain angle and with a special goal sciences (history, geography, law, political economy), conserving on the other hand their proper individuality and their absolute independence.” For Jordan, such broad definitions of political sciences were no longer ideal, as such an approach would signify making all the subjects discussed in this 1937 report a part of political sciences.⁵¹⁸ Demonstrating a perceptual shift with regard to the way political science(s) is (are) conceived, he proposed a different definition, while still retaining the plural in the name of political *sciences*. In Jordan's list, studying political sciences included such topics as the constitutional and administrative organization of a state, its social, economic, ideological foundations, political movements, the psychology of peoples as well as international relations and international political organization.⁵¹⁹ While such an agenda

517 Bouglé, 1937: 8.

518 Jordan, 1937: 276.

519 Jordan, 1937: 277.

continued to include a large number of items, its focus on the state provides a visible narrowing-down of political sciences compared to their early 20th century definitions. Therefore, while the name in plural stayed the same, it is perceivable that the actual contents were on a path toward singularization, with the state becoming a starting point of studying politics.

In Jordan's account, the study of International Relations was not ignored, as it was shown to be part of the topics to be studied, according to his list of topics for political sciences. He further asserts that this study area's importance “has given birth to an individualized science under the name of international relations.” This new science was about “the study of immediate international events by scientific methods,” events that until then had been left to journalists or higher government officials.⁵²⁰ These explanations are of much significance, underlining the way a newly emerging discipline was being understood in the French academic universe of the late 1930s. That Jordan spent a considerable part of his text also discussing the role of IR, notwithstanding a separate report on IR in the same volume, demonstrates the increased relevance of world political studies by that time. This can also be interpreted as a sign that the new International Relations discipline was already clearly interacting with political science. The only question remaining was whether it would be a relation of equals, or whether political science(s) would be the larger circle that included the study of the international.

When Jordan elaborated issues relevant to the study of International Relations, in addition to discussing works on the League of Nations or non-state actors like the

⁵²⁰ Jordan, 1937: 287.

Catholic Church, he also turned his attention to studies dealing with the future of Europe and the white race as well as the continent's competition with the US.⁵²¹ This way of choosing the kind of studies to discuss when it comes to IR showed that IR had a visibly Eurocentric origin and that looking at the state of the world (affairs) was highly motivated (also in the French context) by concerns of the Western/European nations. Their future depended on a world that had already started to witness challenges posed by actors from the non-Western world. It was only natural under these circumstances that Jordan pointed to the significance of studying colonial issues at ELSP. Not only were colonial matters covered across all sections (not just in the diplomacy section) of the school, but also by the late 1930s there was a special certificate for colonial studies, which students could get after passing an exam set just for this subject.⁵²²

The 1937 French report on social sciences had a separate section on IR authored by Jacques Lambert, the holder of the peace chair at Lyon University's Faculty of Law. Interestingly, he started his observations by underlining the fact that the majority of people involved in International Relations did not tend to use the term (International Relations) itself. More importantly, Lambert added that they also refused to see it as a science. In his view, IR was more of a space of coordination, which involved multiple social sciences instead of a distinct science. Its agenda covered the problem of intergroup relations, the structure of international society as well as its institutions.⁵²³

521 Jordan, 1937: 288-291.

522 Jordan, 1937: 293.

523 Lambert, 1937: 302, 317.

The general idea of IR was to be found more in its function, namely the goal of finding ways for organizing peace. Nonetheless, an important step for this early period of IR was that Lambert was also cautious about the way the results of IR research were to be applied. For him, it was necessary to separate the application phase from scientific research. This is a noteworthy dimension, as it demonstrates that notwithstanding his status as the holder of a university chair on peace, Lambert put emphasis on separating the scientific study from its practical or normative consequences. Obviously, his position did not emerge out of nowhere. It was a time when peace groups were also the ones undertaking research on the phenomenon they were trying to understand in order to secure its establishment. The study groups of pacifist circles were in many instances doing work that could be retrospectively interpreted to have been of a rather scientific nature.⁵²⁴ In this context, one is reminded of the framework provided by Krippendorff in his analysis of the development of IR as a discipline. In that approach discussed in the German section, he referred to the important contribution of pacifist groups to scientific IR.

What distinguished the situation of French IR from its American or British counterparts was, in Lambert's opinion, the non-existence of IR departments in France. However, he was quick to suggest that the subject was not neglected, but studied at different places under various labels. It did not help either that no associations existed, which could match on the scholarly and practical levels the impact of the British Royal

⁵²⁴ Lambert, 1937: 306-308.

Institute of International Affairs/Chatham House.⁵²⁵ However, certain establishments created in the interwar period were of considerable relevance. The *Nouvelle Ecole de la Paix*, a center founded in 1930, was active in the area of peace studies. Louis Joxe, the secretary general of *Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère* (CEPE, on which more below), was also the center's secretary and oversaw the publication of its journal *Europe Nouvelle*.

V.2. Americans in Paris – I: Interwar US Influence on French Political Science and IR

In the development of the social sciences, and in this case more specifically, of political science and IR, French-American cooperation has been an important factor. In order to present a detailed account of American influences on the emergence in France of distinct disciplinary areas like political science and IR, it is useful to deal with this separately. I deal first with the interwar period. In this context, starting with the earlier 20th century is a helpful means of seeing the general context out of which American-French dynamics would create a new hybridity. It was at that point that important steps were made in creating links to the US scholarly world, when the German university system was being perceived as exerting a great deal of influence on other countries. A separate section follows later in this chapter, focusing on American influence in the aftermath of the Second World War.

⁵²⁵ Lambert, 1937: 305, 307.

University exchanges between Berlin and its American counterparts like Harvard and Columbia triggered the French to institutionalize a similar scheme. The University of Paris got involved in this program, cooperating with the same two US universities, thanks to the support of Albert Kahn too, who was a French-Jewish businessman personally involved in philanthropic work, providing grants for young university graduates to spend time in different parts of the world under his *Autour du monde* fellowship. The exchanges showed the ongoing cultural rivalry between France and Germany, as both countries aimed to increase their influence. The Sorbonne also broadened its activities, following a policy set by the French Foreign Ministry, inviting scholars from small and neutral countries to France as visiting scholars at the time of the First World War.⁵²⁶

In 1929, the president of University of Chicago's political science department, Charles Merriam visited Europe on behalf of the Rockefeller Foundation. The tour included a stop in Paris, but in his later report he recommended to the foundation that it focus more on the UK and Germany for the further development of social sciences.⁵²⁷ This observation provides an important means of understanding the weak position of France compared to its two neighbors. The rather complaining tone of Merriam's report is clear: "I planned a chart of the situation, but left the task to my successor, as the complexity of the case seemed to increase the more I looked at it." In these words he undertook to describe the conditions prevailing in late 1920s French scholarship, with the diverse institutional nature of its academic world, ranging from the University of Paris to

⁵²⁶ Charle, 1994: 43-46.

⁵²⁷ Mazon, 1985: 320, also Saunier, 2004.

Collège de France, from ELSP to *Ecole Normale Supérieure* (ENS). According to Merriam, the French were difficult for Americans to understand. He preferred to write more about the brighter prospects of another scholarly institute focusing also on world politics, IHEI Geneva that was co-founded in the interwar period with the help of another American foundation, the Carnegie Endowment. However, the idea of establishing a similar institute in France was also present. The possibility of an Institute of Social Research was mentioned in his report. When it came to the IR dimension, Merriam rightly reported the prominence of historians, diplomats, and legal scholars studying these issues. He suggested that modern approaches should be developed. Economics, psychology, and biology were mentioned as possible extensions of research in the area of international relations, while political science was not directly referred to as another important field to extend into IR.⁵²⁸

Notwithstanding the difficulties explained by Merriam's report, the Rockefeller Foundation decided to go ahead with its project of developing social sciences in the French case also. An intense interaction took place between the foundation and one of the French social scientists of the era, Marcel Mauss, who would gain fame as a sociologist only in later years. However, his bigger institutional projects were rejected by the Americans. There existed a certain distance towards him, as, in the eyes of the Rockefeller officials, he was too close to the left. Therefore, American attitudes one would associate with the Cold War period were in fact already present and showing their impact; being close to leftists or one of them made it difficult to receive American

⁵²⁸ Saunier, 2004: 151-155.

support. The foundation shifted in turn towards cooperation with the Rector of the University of Paris, Sébastien Charléty, a historian. While supporting the founding of a separate Faculty of Social Sciences, Charléty knew that opposition from the faculties of Law or Letters would hinder such a move.⁵²⁹

The intermediate solution between no change and radical moves was found in the creation of *Conseil universitaire de la recherche sociale* (CURS). This council brought together various university institutes in order to be able to present the RF with a clearly defined structure for research in the area of social sciences. The new organism paved the way for the arrival of RF funds, and it was responsible for decisions regarding how to distribute the money among various research bodies.⁵³⁰

The 1930s had been times of demise for German cooperation with the US foundations, as Americans tended not to cooperate with German scholars after the Nazi takeover. On the French side, however, the same period witnessed a significant amount of American aid to their social scientists through the continuing presence of the trans-Atlantic partners. It was in that context that RF developed a more distinct interest in IR, and Bouglé (who became the ENS director in 1935) and Charléty played an active part in talks about the establishment of an institute for the study of international relations. The result was the founding in 1935 of the *Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère* (CEPE, Center for Foreign Policy Studies). In this new French institute focusing on world politics, Charléty became the first president, while his secretary was Pierre Renouvin.

⁵²⁹ Mazon, 1985: 321-329.

⁵³⁰ Mazon, 1985: 330ff.

The funding by RF would not stop with the start of the Second World War, as the foundation wanted its French contacts to study a specific phenomenon: war. Research was conducted in the context of social sciences to witness war's effects on French society.⁵³¹

While scholars like Renouvin would look for a coordination body of social and political sciences in the post-World War II period in newly emerging bodies like EPHE's (*Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes*) 6th section (later transformed into EHESS, *Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales*), this question of a mechanism that could serve as a platform for interaction was already present in the late interwar period. Some saw in CEPE a possible means of filling the gap of a coordinating body. As this institute was both providing regular public lectures and bringing together experts who worked in various study groups, CEPE became a place for scholarly networking, while simultaneously acculturating the French into a certain kind of engagement with political sciences and world affairs.⁵³²

In the general framework of the interwar years, the Rockefeller Foundation was an important US actor in France that wanted to contribute to the development of French social sciences, continuing in Europe with the investments it has made for the advancement of these sciences in the US, symbolized most visibly in financing University of Chicago's Social Science Building. In the specific case of France, the foundation's total aid for social sciences was bigger in the 1934-1940 period than the help

531 Mazon, 1985: 335, 338.

532 Jordan, 1937: 300.

provided by the scientific organs of the French state. The fact that Rockefeller support was meant more for research purposes increased the significance of its contributions, for it was thanks to this inflow of money that the research dimension of the social sciences could be furthered. Moreover, French scholarly publications were also supported by the foundation, which contributed to the creation of three journals in the areas of economics, sociology, and international affairs. In this last area, *Politique Etrangère* was a product of CEPE that had been established by Rockefeller contributions.⁵³³

According to Ludovic Tournès, CEPE was expected to serve as a center that would pave the way for using methods that were scientific in nature and not to approach its study material from abstract expectations but by connecting to real world experience. Taking into account the state of IR as a newly emerging study, the center served primarily by connecting people from various scholarly and public dimensions and by focusing on work through which initial insights could be gathered for studying world affairs. Its other regular publication, *Chronologie politique internationale* provided circles interested in international politics with primary data. As the Rockefeller Foundation was also interested in works that dealt with real world problems, the position of CEPE with its journal and other publications was in line with the expectation of their American supporters. In this regard, articles in the journal often analyzed Nazi Germany, while colonial issues were also on the agenda.⁵³⁴

533 Tournès, 2011: 214, 224.

534 Tournès, 2011: 231-241.

When one turns to the role of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, after the end of the First World War it was to reactivate its European Center located in Paris. In the pre-war period, this American foundation was already engaged in international affairs through cooperating with pacifist circles in Europe. In 1920, University of Paris created an *Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales* which focused mainly on issues of international law. Later, CEIP contributed to the university for advancing the work undertaken there. It was in this institute that Renouvin would start teaching his courses on the history of international relations, thus also “label-wise” ending the diplomatic history approaches of the period.⁵³⁵

What was the scope of activities undertaken by the European Center of the Carnegie Endowment? Its aim was to reach the (educated) public through lectures. In 1930-1931, for example, it included various series of lectures on the role of the Catholic Church in the international pacifist movements, the significance of the Mediterranean region for the European continent, the philosophy of international law, and Europe's position in world politics.⁵³⁶ It was there that from 1925 until 1939 lectures were given by André Tibal, the holder of the Carnegie Chair for the study of international relations.⁵³⁷ Interestingly, the center decided to cancel its practice of enabling the audience to ask questions and provide an atmosphere for discussion. According to Tibal, such a method was “little known in

535 Tournès, 2011: 210, Tournès, 2010b: 19.

536 See CEIP European Center's book *Cours 1930-1931, passim*.

537 Renouvin, 1950: 563.

France.”⁵³⁸ This demonstrates the various stylistic-scholarly attributes that generated differences between the US and French cases.

V.3. Creating the New out of the Old: The Founding of Institut d'Etudes Politiques (IEP) Paris and Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (FNSP)

In the last phase of the Second World War, the two leaders of Sciences Po, Siegfried and Seyroux were able to meet de Gaulle in order to emphasize the significance of their private establishment to the new authorities. By then, they had already undertaken an internal process of de-Vichyfication through a commission chaired by Siegfried. Finally, there emerged an agreement through which both the new (Fourth) French Republic and the school administration could partially realize their aims. On the one hand, ELSP was turned into an *Institut d'Etudes Politiques* (IEP, Institute of Political Studies) Paris as a school and into a *Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques* as a research mechanism (FNSP, National Foundation of Political Sciences). On the other hand, the foundation was not put completely under direct state control, with both new entities witnessing the creation of directorial councils that carried over many members from the previous ELSP establishment. The consequence was the end of the private ELSP and its simultaneous survival in the form of a foundation. However, the Sciences Po people were still not disadvantaged since they managed to get the most important positions, with Siegfried taking over the FNSP presidency, and Seydoux becoming IEP Paris' first director.⁵³⁹

⁵³⁸ Zimmern, 1939: 158.

⁵³⁹ Nord, 2003: 140ff.

At the same time, the new Republic's willingness to invest in social and political sciences was shown by the creation of some half a dozen IEPs outside of Paris, including one in Algiers, still part of France. An old idea was also revived and realized: the establishment of a national school for training future state officials: *Ecole Nationale d'Administration* (ENA). This was to be a center for educating university graduates in order to prepare them for future jobs in higher state apparatus. Simultaneously, this reflected the fulfillment of a long project for having a high-quality state school to generate its future cadres.

The positive contributions of ELSP and its legacy even found their place in the legal document that brought the school's formal existence to an end. The arrangement, which was published in the *Journal Officiel de la République*, emphasized the major role the school had played, throughout its history, in the development of political studies in France, while also mentioning the active participation of ELSP students and scholars in the Resistance, and the war-time suffering this had generated.⁵⁴⁰

The role of FNSP was supposed to be one of directing general research in the area of political *sciences* in the plural. In this regard, the foundation's constitutive text referred in its first article to the task of “enabling the progress and diffusion in France, in the Empire, and abroad, of political, economic, and social sciences.”⁵⁴¹ The instructors were still a mixed body in the 1950s. At the Parisian IEP, out of 85 people, 39 were university professors, while 24 were functionaries, in addition to 16 business people. This situation

540 Chapsal, 1963: 152.

541 Chapsal, 1963: 131.

demonstrated that the old ELSP features continued to shape the post-1945 Sciences Po for a long time, as there existed a great number of non-academic instructors transferring their specific expertise to IEP Paris students.⁵⁴²

Looking at anniversary celebrations serves as a useful way of understanding actors' self-evaluations and ideas about their respective institutes. When it comes to ELSP, or its legacy in the form of IEP Paris, the 100th anniversary was an important occasion. Two presidents of significant organs were present: Georges Pompidou, the French president, and the IPSA president, Stein Rokkan. The former remarked in his speech not only his *Ecole Normale Supérieure* (ENS) background that had led him during his student years to perceive ELSP counterparts as bourgeois and superficial. Although this harsh wording could be interpreted as problematic, the French president continued by stating that his own later study at ELSP as well as his teaching experience there, had led him to change his view. He mentioned this experience as a most useful preparation for his future entry into politics.⁵⁴³

The president of IPSA, Rokkan mentioned in his short speech that “France has always played a prominent role in the development of our discipline,” adding that France has been active in processes leading to political science's international establishment. Not only was the role of ELSP, with its 19th century origins, emphasized, but also the spatial connections due to IPSA's founding at a meeting held at Sciences Po in 1949. According to Rokkan, a later organization for continental political scientific cooperation, the

542 See in RFSP, 1952: 200.

543 Allocutions, 1972, Pompidou's speech.

European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) had its roots in meetings held at this school, demonstrating its influence in the European context.⁵⁴⁴

The ideological position of ELSP, which has been too close to liberalism from its start, was acknowledged by one of the most important names at Sciences Po, François Goguel (the IEP Paris' president of council of direction and president of FNSP) in his anniversary speech. According to Goguel, the school had been too close in the interwar period to principles of economic liberalism, an approach that failed to consider the role that the state could have in the economic affairs. However, this was now overcome. He was also proud to announce that a much criticized dimension of Sciences Po, namely its image as an exclusive private institution for Parisian bourgeoisie, was now changing, with one third of its students coming from French provinces.⁵⁴⁵

In the post-World War II period, the restructuration of ELSP into IEP Paris and FNSP resulted in a four-part division of its study program. There was one public service section for future public functionaries, while those students interested in private sector careers could choose the section on economic and financial affairs. The section on international relations was also a continuation of ELSP's long tradition that had started with the establishment of the diplomatic division in the 19th century. For research purposes, there existed now the political, economic, and social section that focused on political scientific studies. Important to note is the fact that the international section at Sciences Po has not necessarily been the most popular one, with only 14 % of students choosing it in the early

544 Allocutions, 1972, Rokkan's speech.

545 Allocutions, 1972, Goguel's speech.

1990s.⁵⁴⁶ Of the school's three obligatory courses, one was on economic geography, while the other courses on international law and international relations in the modern (post-1871) era emphasized the international dimension. Unlike the Parisian IEP, the provincial IEPs still lacked IR departments in 1950, where they were founded only in the later decades.⁵⁴⁷ This further underlines the distinct position of Sciences Po in France.

The most important place for the development of French research capacities in the context of IR was *Centre d'étude des relations internationales* (CERI, Center for the study of international relations) under FNSP, established in 1952. Duroselle, who had taken part in its initial foundation, was to play an important role following his return to Paris in the second half of the 1950s. It was then that he became the CERI director.

The important contributions of American philanthropies to French establishments of social science and more specifically political science are visible in this specific context when looking at the Ford Foundation. Its contributions to CERI reached 25 million Francs, compared to the French Foreign Ministry's two million Franc support in the 1958-1963 period.⁵⁴⁸ This was at a time when Duroselle had become the CERI director and was in close contact with his US counterparts, a task that was made easier thanks to earlier experiences with both the RF and CEIP, which enabled him to understand how to deal with the Ford Foundation that was gradually filling in the void left by the departure of other American foundations from the European social sciences scene. When Duroselle asked US foundations for money, he was careful not to use it in a way that could be

546 Bock, 1996: 213.

547 Chapsal, 1951: 90ff.

548 Scot, 2001: 52.

interpreted as pro-American from a political point of view. He did not want to expose himself to accusations of following American goals. For this reason, he did not propose projects that dealt with subject matters such as Latin America or Middle East.⁵⁴⁹

Interesting to note, within the Sciences Po-FNSP structure, the label used for regional studies was not the French *aires culturelles* but the American concept of Area Studies.⁵⁵⁰ This shows the extent to which American approaches had a certain influence there.

In its 20th year report, CERI was described as a place where “contemporary international politics” could be studied. The text also underlined the nature of the research undertaken there as being of a political science character. Furthermore, it emphasized the main motivations shaping its approach, one that consisted of going beyond the “*hexagone*,” i.e. France.⁵⁵¹ The fact that Duroselle would preside over the Center in this new period of Ford support should also be interpreted in the context of his long-term cooperation with the Americans, which had started at the time of his study visits to the US.

However, one should be careful not to overstate the IR-relevance of the center, as it was also an institute at which area studies were a major part of the research agenda. It was perhaps for that reason that the 1973 anniversary report included the curious statement that the center could be called “more explicitly: centre d'étude des pays étrangers et des relations internationales” (Center for the study of foreign countries and

⁵⁴⁹ Scot, 2001: 53.

⁵⁵⁰ Scot, 2001: 113. Even nowadays, the Sciences Po library has on its wall information table that shows the location of books on various subjects in French, while the exception of Area Studies usage (in its original English wording) continues.

⁵⁵¹ CERI, 1973: 5ff.

international relations).⁵⁵² Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the name was changed in the second half of the 1970s to *Centre d'études et de recherches internationales* (Center of international studies and researches). The name change illustrated on a symbolic level the fact that IR was not the sole area of research at the center. According to some, it would be even more appropriate to add “and comparative (*et comparatives*)” to its title in order to make it clear that the Center was also doing research of a comparative nature.⁵⁵³

The impact of CERI would be much bigger in the 1980s and after, when it came to the narrow disciplinary area of IR. Scholars like Marie-Claude Smouts and Bertrand Badie as well as Didier Bigo and Zaki Laïdi, all associated with the Center, would provide important theoretical contributions to the discipline, their influence still continuing in the early 21st century. According to John Groom, their approach can be labeled as political sociology of global society.⁵⁵⁴ The fact that the majority of scholars advancing French IR at home and abroad were working at Sciences Po/FNSP's CERI demonstrates that the Center has managed to cover not only comparative and area studies but also the domain of International Relations.

Some perceive IEP Paris as still the place where the “production of the dominant ideology” is pursued. In Pierre Bourdieu's analysis, for instance, it becomes an institution that asserts the independence of scientifically guided experts from class interests.⁵⁵⁵ With

552 CERI, 1973: 7.

553 Constantin, 2002/2003: 66, fn. 11.

554 Groom, 2002/2003: 113.

555 Leca, 1982: 676.

regard to the specific condition of Sciences Po cadres, Luc Boltanski and Bourdieu focus on its instructors who (tended to) hold multiple positions as they also (used to) work at other Parisian institutions, like the Sorbonne history professorships of Renouvin and Duroselle. The fact that Sciences Po continued to have instructors from the non-academic world also in the post-1945 period (in its IEP Paris era) has made it possible for the school to provide “a sample more or less representative of different fractions of the dominant class,” as it includes professors and intellectuals, business people and high officials among its body of instructors. For Boltanski and Bourdieu, the conditions prevalent at Sciences Po meant that reasonable pragmatists joined more liberal sections of conservatism in reaching a compromise that furthered both sides' interests in the academic-political world.⁵⁵⁶

According to Boltanski's and Bourdieu's focus on the “dominant ideology,” the role of Sciences Po is very important in strengthening the pragmatic conservatism that is also recreated at establishments like the LSE and the Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. These are “veritable neutral places bringing together enlightened leaders and realistic intellectuals, [which] legitimate the thought categories and ways of acting developed by advanced sections of the dominant class.”⁵⁵⁷ As recognized by an analysis of Jean Leca, however, Boutmy, the founder of ELSP did not hide his idea of using the new school as a means of keeping the elites' power, keeping them in power by giving them tools of survival in a modern democratizing society, one in which educational

⁵⁵⁶ Boltanski and Bourdieu, 1976: 66-67.

⁵⁵⁷ See Boltanski and Bourdieu, 1976, the English summary and in the French article itself, 62.

privileges had become the new feature of distinction. While for scholars like Bourdieu it was important to question the role of ELSP/IEP-like institutes, by pointing to the interconnectedness of their scholars to the larger political-social world in France, according to Leca, this aspect was not at all problematic in the eyes of Boutmy, who had this exact power position in mind when setting the founding stone of his institute in 1872. Thus was born what Bourdieu would perceive as the place in which prevalent ideological attitudes were engendered.⁵⁵⁸

The school also helped to develop the publication of journals dealing with social and political sciences. Thus, *Annales de l'Ecole Libre de Sciences Politiques*, established by the alumni and scholars associated with ELSP would form the seeds of the later French political science journal after 1951. In its lifespan, this publication was also called *Revue des Sciences Politiques* and after 1937, just *Sciences Politiques*.⁵⁵⁹ This journal set up the basis upon which to found *Revue Française de Science Politique* (RFSP).

According to some scholars, IEP Paris was not created to advance political science “in terms of academic knowledge production.” More like ENA, which was founded in 1945 as *the* administrative school for training higher bureaucratic leadership of the post-World War II France, the position of Sciences Po presented another place where the French “generalist civil servant” would be educated.⁵⁶⁰ However, as will be elaborated below, the school leadership and its most important scholars have been looking for ways to improve their academic standing from early on, be it by taking US experiences into

558 Leca, 1991: 331-332.

559 See Rain, 1963: 50 and Jordan, 1937: 296.

560 Breitenbauch, 2008: 67.

account or by receiving support from American foundations. Perceiving Sciences Po as a mere state administrative institution, as an ante-chamber of ENA would be to overlook this dimension of its scholarly progress that started as early as the mid-1940s.

In an analysis of courses offered at Sciences Po in the 1947-1962 period, Henrik Breitenbauch assesses that some 40 percent of more than 1500 courses were at different levels connected to issues dealing with the international dimension.⁵⁶¹ While these numbers provide a quite significant share of Sciences Po courses on the international, it is important to note that Breitenbauch also counted courses dealing with international geography and international economics, as well as international law and colonial relations, in addition to more typical IR study areas such as foreign policy or area studies.

In 1956, the establishment of the forthcoming doctoral program by FNSP was announced in the pages of RFSP. A structured research dimension was the most important aspect of this third cycle program, that is the postgraduate research level. No uniform program would be implemented, but students would have one general seminar. The program was to include many non-French students, and the entering students were to come from various institutions, not just from Sciences Po or the Faculty of Law. They had to write a *mémoire* on a political science subject before finishing this research study. Scholars such as Maurice Duverger, Alfred Grosser as well as Duroselle were among the directors of study associated with the program. Research conferences in line with the respective director's research work would be organized, with Duroselle leading work on post-World War II Franco-American relations. The functioning of the program was under

561 Breitenbauch, 2008: 69-70.

the guidance of a committee in which representatives from main university institutes were present, including the Faculty of Law and the Faculty of Letters. The significance of the new stage reached by French political science was already known by the initiators, as the article pointed to these initiatives as difficult but important steps that were being taken.⁵⁶²

This program of the “third cycle of studies” was an important milestone for French political science/IR. Its importance was also due to the fact that it presented the first social science area in which a doctoral program was implemented. In its first year the program already had 30 students, with ten of them coming from abroad.⁵⁶³ A significant aspect of this new scholarly opportunity related to the use of American teaching methods that included offering seminars on issues of methodology and research, something not previously featured in the French social sciences.⁵⁶⁴

The significance of the 1956 founding of the advanced studies program under FNSP (*cycle supérieur d'études politiques*) is also underlined by Ludovic Tournés who sees the new program as marking “the official birth of international relations in France.” Intensive support from both Rockefeller and Ford foundations to CERI would contribute to this research center's role in the advancement of IR and related areas like comparative and area studies.

In the process leading to the founding and funding of the new CERI program, Duroselle (then the CERI director) would write to Shepard Stone, the Ford Foundation

562 RFSP: 1956.

563 See the report in RFSP, 1957: 149ff.

564 Scot, 2001: 106.

official, pointing out to him that given the lack of a separate faculty of social sciences, the FNSP system could provide the most suitable means for developing social and political sciences in France. The non-university position of FNSP was presented as an advantage to be made use of. A meeting was held on November 10, 1956 in Paris under the guidance of Jacques Chapsal, the Sciences Po director and FNSP president. The list of participants included very significant names like Aron, Renouvin, Duroselle, Grosser, Duverger from the French community of scholars, the director of the French body on higher education, as well as Kenneth Thompson representing Rockefeller Foundation's Division of Social Sciences, and Shepard Stone. In Tournès' account, the meeting brought these people together because the institutionalization of International Relations was to be formalized. The two foundations, in their turn, agreed to come forward with significant sums of money, which made up some 70 percent of CERI's resources in that period. Starting from such a position, FNSP was able to increase the size of the Center, from 18 members in 1958 to more than double in 1962 including its associate researchers. The significance of the establishment of this “third cycle of study” originated from its paving the way for subsequent doctoral studies in the area by first teaching advanced students certain ways of doing (social and) political scientific research.⁵⁶⁵ Once again, it was the transnational dynamics that were influencing the future path of IR (and political science), securing to a certain extent its academic future in the French educational system.

In the meantime, the French Foreign Ministry would understand the importance of Sciences Po and ask it to establish a program on African issues. This was also a means of

565 Tournès, 2011: 337-339.

having American students who would be introduced to French ways of perceiving Africa, thus presenting a counter-position to US scholarly criticism directed at French colonialism. The Ministry also wanted to increase the overall number of foreign students at the school thereby gaining possibilities to raise future foreign leaders of other countries in France.⁵⁶⁶

V.4. Americans in Paris – II: Post-1945 US Influence on French Political Science and IR

The involvement of American philanthropies in the development of the French social sciences, and specifically in the case of political science and IR, continued not only in the post-World War II era, but also during the war itself. In this section, I will focus on these developments that shaped the emergence of political science and IR studies in France as well as the effects the US foundations had on the institutional aspects of these processes, looking in detail to certain “Americanization” discussions at the post-1945 Sciences Po, that is in IEP Paris and FNSP. This section makes clear how the American involvement in the 1956 founding of the advanced postgraduate program at FNSP, discussed above, could take place, showing the extent of transnational dynamics' role in the development of French IR.

At the time of the Second World War, it was the Rockefeller Foundation that prepared a list of scholars who should be evacuated from Europe should their country fall under Nazi occupation. There was already some discontent with what the foundation

⁵⁶⁶ Scot, 2001: 138-140.

officials perceived as the scientifically insufficient level of some (emigrating) scholars who had come to the US in the late 1930s with Rockefeller support. For this reason, they would prioritize scholars who could significantly contribute to US intellectual life, leaving aside humanitarian concerns. The list included the famous author Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, philosopher Henri Bergson, Henri Bonnet (the director of the IIC), Sébastien Charléty (rector of the University of Paris), Etienne Denney and André Siegfried (both professors at Sciences Po, Siegfried also at *Collège de France*), and sociologist Marcel Mauss. After subsequent changes made in the list, there were 34 French scholars who benefitted from RF's support, including three political scientists. In exile, these scholars worked at the establishment, in New York, of *L'Ecole Libre des Hautes Etudes* that functioned as a University of Free France. Unlike their German colleagues, only three of these emigrant-scholars would remain abroad.⁵⁶⁷ This showed that the postwar conditions affecting German-Jewish scholars were not valid in the case of France, notwithstanding the collaborationist regime in place during the war. Germany had become a place of unreturnability, whereas French society and its university scene were open for the emigrated scholars to return.

The Second World War and its aftermath brought about significant revisions to the position of both the Rockefeller Foundation and many of its French counterparts. A view represented by John Dulles won over the debates that took place within the foundation's board of trustees about the direction RF would follow in the context of the new Cold War era. His less internationalist and more anti-Soviet approach that prevailed in the board

⁵⁶⁷ Dosso, 2010: 112-123.

created a great deal of backlash in France. Frédéric Joliot-Curie, the scientist son of Madame Curie, was among scholars accusing the foundation of making its grant decisions based on applicants' political views. While the earlier support coming from RF was praised, its newly intensified ties to US foreign policy interests had become a problem for many of the French scholars who cooperated with it.⁵⁶⁸

In 1945, Roger Seydoux, the ELSP director, met Joseph Willis who was directing the Division of Social Sciences at the Rockefeller Foundation. Informing his American counterpart about the effects of the war on French society, Seydoux emphasized the need to create a new generation of students marked by closer ties to democratic ideals. After years of war, the French were in need of a reeducation in democracy. With regard to IR, Seydoux asked the foundation to support its development as an area of study, which could provide benefits by giving future decision-makers in France a much needed education in the modern world.⁵⁶⁹ This is an interesting approach, as unlike the German case, one sees a French willingness for self-imposing American approaches to political science as well as IR. Whereas in West Germany, it was mainly remigrating (returning) scholars and American officials participating in the administration of occupied (West) Germany who came forward with such ideas, Seydoux paved the way for close cooperation with Americans by coming from a different position, one that was shaped by the Vichy legacy and by a need for siding more tightly with Western democracies in the war's aftermath.

⁵⁶⁸ Tournès, 2011: 264-268.

⁵⁶⁹ Tournès, 2011: 335ff.

The turn to the US in order to advance the new Sciences Po's scholarly position was also visible in René Henry-Gréard's visit to American universities in 1950-1951. Not only did he manage to see how university libraries were organized, but he also focused on the way IR was organized at US universities. In 1955, Duroselle would present a proposal to the Rockefeller Foundation that related to his research project on French-American relations. Studying these should serve “to the elaboration of a theory of international relations.” In the following year, he was given 8400 dollars.⁵⁷⁰

The way American support was used testifies to an increase of US influence in France. While the money coming from RF helped to purchase English-language sources, which meant mainly gaining access to the relevant American literature, the move of CEIP's European center to Geneva resulted in the enlargement of FNSP resources thanks to the donation of Carnegie's Parisian library.⁵⁷¹

On a more general level, what has to be taken into account is the way in which the Carnegie, Rockefeller, and Ford foundations carried over their tasks from one to the other. The post-Second World War period can also be interpreted as a continuation of their functions in an updated version. Such a framework points to the gradual de-emphasis of one foundation followed by the engagement of another one in that same area. Therefore, it becomes possible to see the support for the development of political science and IR that started with the efforts of the Carnegie Endowment, followed by the aid from

570 Tournes, 2011: 336ff.

571 Scot, 2001: 69.

Rockefeller and consequently from Ford foundations. This chronological line can also be seen on a personal level, the example of Raymond Aron presenting a relevant case.

In 1930, Aron met Shepard Stone who would play a major role at the intersection of American philanthropies and government in the Cold War years, also as the future director of Ford Foundation's International Affairs division. In the mid-1930s, Aron's assistantship at ENS was being paid by the Rockefeller grants that aimed to develop the social sciences in France. In the 1950s, Aron would come to prominence as one of the main organizers of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, to which the Ford Foundation made important contributions. In 1960, Ford support also enabled Aron to establish his *Centre de sociologie européenne*. It was Aron's personal skills that made him a significant figure in the opinion of the American foundations. When the Ford Foundation planned to support the development of International Relations at Sciences Po in 1956, Aron was the “scientific advisor” who could play an important role in the whole process, making use of his trans-Atlantic position.⁵⁷²

The American foundations also interacted with Fernand Braudel, leading not to the realization of his project for a big social sciences institute that would be shaped by his discipline (history) but to the creation in 1957 of the *Maison des Sciences de l'Homme* (MSH, House of the Sciences of Man, which is translatable as Humanities). The two traditional faculties, and now additionally, FNSP intervened, preventing this important scholar of the *Annales* School from convincing the Rockefeller Foundation. This period also witnessed a change in the French university structure, the faculties of Law becoming

⁵⁷² Tournès, 2010b: 22.

faculties of Law and Economic Sciences, and the faculties of Letters now being called faculties of Letters and Human Sciences.⁵⁷³ As a result of these developments, it would be the universities who lost the most, as they turned, with the rise of mass education, into places of indistinct study, whereas the newly established structures such as FNSP or the specific Parisian IEP (that is Sciences Po) and the 6th section of EPHE (the future EHESS) or MSH made use of their non-university positions in order to advance social science research and gradually teaching (except at Sciences Po where teaching was already advancing).⁵⁷⁴

The development of Sciences Po can also be interpreted in terms of its relationship with the American partners that included major US foundations. According to Marie Scot, the post-1945 IEP Paris also became the space within which American social sciences competed with French social sciences.⁵⁷⁵ This meant that the school provided both a testing ground and a field of struggle that brought different ideas of doing social science together, forcing the French to choose some and ignore other aspects of American approaches and structures. In Scot's analysis, the most important French-American interaction at IEP Paris took place in the 1945-1960 period, as later American social sciences would become more heterogeneous, thus no longer having a unique (behavioralist) impact, while French scholarly institutions would have reached by then a more settled state, decreasing the influence of Americans.⁵⁷⁶

573 Tournès, 2011: 343-347.

574 Tournès, 2011: 364-365.

575 Scot, 2001: 5.

576 Scot, 2001: 11.

One of the most important factors that triggered the interest of Sciences Po administrators and scholars in their American colleagues' way of studying and teaching political science/IR had its roots in their ideological-cultural affinity. The value that tied the French scholars to their American colleagues could be summarized in one word: liberalism. This was a worldview that still continued to exert its influence in the post-1945 period, especially as more left-wing tendencies were dominant elsewhere in French social sciences. Whereas the ELSP founders were mostly pro-British liberals, the influential names of this new period would be mostly liberal scholars close to the US.⁵⁷⁷

This tendency resulted in a critical posture taken towards the Soviet Union, as scholars at IEP Paris perceived the Soviets as the responsible party in the outbreak of the Cold War, seeing it also as the major cause of many contemporary conflicts in world politics. This was an approach shared by Duroselle and Renouvin, two scholars whose courses on the historical aspects of International Relations had a significant impact on the education of Sciences Po students. According to Marie Scot, their anti-communist positions had made them blind when faced with more cautious Soviet moves, leading them to ignore aspects that diverged from their opinions.⁵⁷⁸ While this dimension of ideological positioning is an issue that has deeper roots, the relevant aspect one needs to underline in this context is that its scholars' political views had an impact that put the school into a different position from the more left-wing influence found in the contemporary French intellectual scene.

⁵⁷⁷ Scot, 2001: 7-8, 29. Here, it is important to understand this liberalism as part of classical liberalism.

⁵⁷⁸ Scot, 2001: 95-97.

According to Scot, some scholars affiliated with IEP Paris, like Duroselle and Aron, were active in promoting US methods at the institute, while others took a more critical position towards “Americanization” of French political science. However, the previously shaped liberal ideology of the school as well as its historically rooted anti-communism preceded the pro-US position.⁵⁷⁹ In line with this historical legacy, the closing of the distance between the French and American ways of doing social and political sciences, as well as more specifically of IR, could be seen as a not unexpected development, whose origins lay in values characteristic of Sciences Po and its position within the French social sciences and higher education system.

The position of IEP Paris in the 1950s was a distinct one as it was the only institute where social sciences could be taught in an interdisciplinary fashion. As seen in the general context of French social (and political) sciences, the influence of the faculties of Law or Letters deterred efforts to establish a separate structure like a faculty of Social Sciences, thus limiting these disciplines mostly to IEPs.⁵⁸⁰ This special condition would change with the later creation of the 6th section at the EPHE, which became, in 1975, the famous French social sciences establishment EHESS – another structure that was developed thanks to American foundations' financial support.⁵⁸¹

The slow shift towards more American-style (or towards an internationally emerging consensus) studies was seen in 1948 when Sciences Po created a new categorization in terms of courses offered, distinguishing between international relations, administrative

579 Scot, 2001: 147.

580 Scot, 2001: 23.

581 On that separate case see Mazon, 1988.

and political sciences, and economic sciences. Decreased or gone were the courses that had in their titles words like history or law.⁵⁸² While the existence of a diplomatic section at the old ELSP and the post-1945 founding of International Relations department have been already underlined, the post-1945 introduction to IEP Paris of a special area of International Relations demonstrates the desire to follow the latest fashion in the area of social sciences, introducing a popular new discipline with visible Anglo-American origins in terms of its institutionalization in the UK and the US.

Among the most active proponents of close cooperation with the US were Siegfried, the FNSP president, Duroselle and Aron. Siegfried's position was quite important, as already seen in his wartime presidency of ELSP. His name served as a symbol of successful scholarship and political moderation that provided a message for the American counterparts and partners of Sciences Po. In the aftermath of the Second World War, IEP's director, Roger Seydoux would write to the American ambassador that Siegfried was teaching a course on the US in 1942 (during the war and occupation) at the school, thus referring to his (for Americans) trustworthy character. The situation becomes more visible when taking into account his membership of the Interallied Union Circle that brought scholars from allied countries together, as well as his participation, as early as 1910s, in the work of the French-American commission for scholarly exchanges (*Commission Franco-Américaine*).⁵⁸³

582 Scot, 2001: 25, 112.

583 Scot, 2001: 32.

An interesting debate that concerned the degree to which the American style of teaching should be implemented at Sciences Po related to the issue of writing French-style *dissertations* vs. American-style *papers*. As explained by Breitenbauch, dissertations had a completely different approach with respect to student's explanations of the research issue. The way a dissertation's structure shaped the student's handling of the subject was tied to the French stylistic concerns in which essayistic analyses prevailed.⁵⁸⁴ Stanley Hoffmann, who in those years prepared a report about the organization of political science courses at Harvard following his visit to the US, informed his colleagues, including its director Chapsal, at IEP Paris, about the way (writing of) papers were used as a significant part of courses and evaluations in American universities. In the end, no decision was made in favor of introducing American-style papers at Sciences Po; probably such a change would signify too drastic a break in the French academic tradition.⁵⁸⁵ It is interesting that Breitenbauch did not deal in his study (on the difference of French IR when he focused so much on the aspect of *dissertations*) with this possible shift to writing American-style *papers* that would have meant a visible weakening of the French *dissertation* tradition.

584 For further details see Breitenbauch: 2008.

585 Scot, 2001: 106-108.

V.5. The Founding Fathers: Conceptual and institutional developers for a new discipline

In the specific case of IR, Pierre Favre, the major historian of French political science, distinguishes between two approaches, one shaped by the historical tradition, advanced by Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, and a more theoretical one, represented by Raymond Aron.⁵⁸⁶ In another analysis regarding the development of French IR, Marie-Claude Smouts, an important member of the generation that came forward in the 1980s, provided a similar dual categorization, with Renouvin and Duroselle on the one side, and Aron on the other. Of considerable importance is the fact that all of them came from non-political science, non-IR backgrounds: history in the former, sociology in the latter. Aron was among the few scholars engaged in IR who came from Faculty of Letters.⁵⁸⁷

Smouts asserted that the origins of French disciplinary advances could be found in Aron's work, as it that was in line with the meaning of IR.⁵⁸⁸ At this juncture, it is important to underline the conceptualization and perception of IR and its disciplinary meaning. If a scholar (such as Smouts), belonging to what one could call in this context the third generation of political science/IR scholars, was prioritizing Aron, this was to a certain extent realizing a retroactive validation. This was the case, because as discussed earlier, French scholars of the earlier periods have tended to point to Renouvin as the real founder of IR, at least in the sense of having enabled it to prosper, in cooperation with his

586 Favre, 1981: 103.

587 See also Leca, 1991: 327.

588 Smouts, 2002/2003: 83.

student and successor, Duroselle. However, once a temporal distance took place, the way was paved to evaluate the earlier conditions from today's viewpoint and thus to refer to Aron, who was the scholar closest to theorization, as *the* IR scholar of earlier periods. As mentioned earlier, theory-building itself should not be the only criterion to determine a discipline's founding fathers/mothers. At the same time, such preferences generate problematic conclusions because it was Aron who always tried in his work to distance himself from abstract theorizing.

V.5.a. Pierre Renouvin

Pierre Renouvin started his academic career in law, only to receive his *agrégation* in the discipline of history in 1912. Unlike many of his “newly initiated” political scientist colleagues, he continued to perceive himself as an historian throughout his academic life. That he would become a figure of influence in the post-World War II establishment of political science and IR, however, should come as no surprise. As his student and colleague Jean-Baptiste Duroselle recognized, it was not until the 1960s that students could have a separate degree in political science. Like the initial period of post-1945 West German political science and IR, scholars engaged in the newly emerging discipline were researchers who came from various branches of social sciences and humanities like geography, history, sociology, or from a law background.⁵⁸⁹

Renouvin had participated in the First World War losing his left arm in the war. For him, the impact of this first great global catastrophe of the 20th century was not only

⁵⁸⁹ Duroselle, 1975: 561.

psychological but also physical, and can be said to have influenced his future life. Subsequently, he worked with Camille Bloch to establish a library and museum on the war. Although his earlier research had dealt with pre-1789 France, on which he had finished a thesis in 1921, Renouvin would turn studying various dimensions of the 1914-1918 war by looking at its origins and the way the war developed. The museum project was also a way of presenting a demonstrative means for looking at the history of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The war library project turned into an important *Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine* (BDIC), a center of documentation that Renouvin would always take care to praise, as his section in the 1950 UNESCO report on political science refers to the useful contributions of this center for researchers.⁵⁹⁰

After Renouvin became the BDIC director, the minister of national education appointed him to Sorbonne as a professor of history focusing on the First World War. From these new positions, Renouvin would publish his important book *Les origines immédiates de la guerre* in 1925. It is important to remember in this context similar research undertaken by the Germans, a process at which, as shown earlier, Eugen Fischer-Bailing, one of the first IR chair holders in post-1945 West Germany, had taken an active role. Thus, two countries that had just fought each other would give their scholars the duty of researching the causes of the war; both of these scholars would in the aftermath of the Second World War have important functions in the eventual development of IR discipline, with their books providing the first sources for a discipline-in-progress.

⁵⁹⁰ Renouvin, 1950: 575.

Renouvin's work can be seen as a French answer to German research, and of a similar nature would be his decades-long work on French diplomatic documents covering the 1871-1914 period. From 1927 until 1959, it was he who worked for the relevant French commission.⁵⁹¹

In this juncture, it is important to note that the role of the First World War in generating future IR scholars is not only visible in the case of Fischer in Germany or Renouvin in France. While their pathways were tied more to the postwar inquiries into the causes of war, British scholars like E. H. Carr, Alfred Zimmern, and Philip Noel-Baker had also participated in the processes that would create the interwar world political order. This they did as members of the British delegation at the 1919 Paris peace conference. All of them became important IR specialists at universities in the UK, holding the first chairs in the new discipline of International Relations.⁵⁹² These examples point to the significance of the 1914-1918 war in generating new scholarly interest in the broader subject of world politics.

Renouvin joined the interwar ELSP in 1938, the last peaceful year of Europe's interwar period, at a time when he was already a professor at Sorbonne. His arrival there can be seen as part of the broader mid-1930s efforts by the school administration to get an academic *aggiornamento*, modernizing its educational offer.⁵⁹³ Renouvin would continue to teach courses on diplomatic history during the Second World War. In the academic year 1943-1944, Renouvin's course was titled General Political History. In its

591 Frank, 2012b: 7-8.

592 Williams, 2008: 57.

593 Nord, 2003: 121.

24th lecture he dealt with the First World War and the decline of Europe, emphasizing how the world's center of gravity was shifting to non-European regions. Not to be forgotten is the fact that his lecture was given a time when the Nazi Germany was aiming to establish its so-called “New Order” in Europe, at war with both the Soviet Union and the United States. While the lectures stopped (chronologically and with regard to its subject) in the late 1930s , Renouvin still had sufficient place to discuss, what has now become, the interwar years. The focus in the 25th lecture was on the dictatorial regimes in Europe: the Soviet Union, Germany, and Italy. Renouvin provided an early comparative analysis of these regimes, using the word “totalitarian” and juxtaposing them to democratic parliamentary regimes. The three common features of totalitarian regimes were, according to him, the primacy of the state, one man's overwhelming power, and the end of political liberties.⁵⁹⁴ It is important to refer to these, as they show his analytical capacities in providing features that became common knowledge only after the end of the war, forming the basis of totalitarianism studies.

Whereas the *Annales* School, a contemporary group of French historians centered around the namesake journal, ignored diplomatic history, Renouvin managed to find a useful connection that resulted in going in his historical studies beyond political history and including social and economic factors. According to Robert Frank, Albert Sorel, who was also one of the first members of the newly founded ELSP's teaching staff in 1871, can be seen as the initiator of a French school of diplomatic history.⁵⁹⁵ The way Sorel

⁵⁹⁴ Renouvin, 1944: 134, 139-145.

⁵⁹⁵ Frank, 2012b: 6.

succeeded in developing a successful approach to diplomatic history with its focus on national interest had to change in the 20th century, once the alternatives (such as a big interest in social and economic processes and phenomena) put on the table by the members of the Annales School became influential. The consequent epistemological turn which one sees in the work of Renouvin led also to the re-labeling of “diplomatic history” as “history of international relations.” In Frank's opinion, this had an impact that went beyond a mere name change. It was in fact a paradigm change.

The ideas of Renouvin in the context of doing historical work can be summed up in his concept of *forces profondes*, an idea that has to be understood, as carefully noted by Duroselle, in a way detached from the Marxist duality of base and suprastructure.⁵⁹⁶ While Renouvin first used this concept as early as 1934, its trademark status would develop in 1950s, after he led the efforts to publish a series of volumes titled *L'Histoire des relations internationales*. Complaining about the prioritization of governmental action in traditional forms of diplomatic history, he called for expanding scholarly horizons by going beyond a research agenda predominantly dealing with issues of security, power and prestige.⁵⁹⁷ Renouvin's volumes on the history of international relations, according to his student-colleague Duroselle, present the best analysis of the *forces profondes* concept. Referring to his teacher's critical distance towards establishing laws in the study of IR, Duroselle cites Renouvin's closing sentences in the first volume of *L'Histoire des relations internationales* that focused on the 1815-1871 period.

⁵⁹⁶ Duroselle, 1975: 566.

⁵⁹⁷ Frank, 2012b: 9-10.

According to Renouvin, IR is there just “to try to understand the complex game of causes which have created the big transformations in the world.” Basically agreeing with him, Duroselle asks whether at least one could not try to find certain *données fondamentales*, that is basic givens around which the framework for further studies can be structured.⁵⁹⁸ The picture that emerges from these earlier suggestions from the mid-1950s show that the general tendency was rather one of “understanding” instead of providing law-like “explanations” which should be valid for all times.

The scholarly position of Renouvin in the specific domain of IR is open to differing interpretations. For Jacques Vernant, Renouvin was “a sociological teacher” in the sense of studying a certain period “not as a historian strictly speaking” but “as a sociologist.” What Renouvin did was to accomplish a *synthesis* which brought together economics, history and politics. According to Vernant, merely “juxtaposing” an economist or political scientist would not generate the same rich perspective.⁵⁹⁹ This *synthesizing* position is important, as it is not dissimilar from the position of Bergstraesser in the West German context, who managed to combine his sociological and cultural interests into a political scientific direction, also building the first frameworks for West German IR in the post-World War II years. In this regard, Bergstraesser's interest in *symbiosis* is similar to Renouvin's success in creating *syntheses*.

For his contemporaries, Renouvin's contributions were important even if his self-declared unwillingness to present a theory of international relations was clear. According

⁵⁹⁸ Duroselle, 1956: 400, 405.

⁵⁹⁹ Goodwin, 1951: 44.

to Pierre Gerbet, Renouvin provided not a theory, but “a real philosophy of historical causality” that took both the *forces profondes* and the decision margins of the statesman into account.⁶⁰⁰ According to Duroselle, who was first his assistant at Sorbonne's history department, and later his colleague and co-author, the basic difference between political science and history continued to have an impact on the thought of Renouvin, and it was the latter to which he remained tied. Although his shift to the history of international relations was also a turn toward a more conceptual approach, demonstrated most clearly in his idea of *forces profondes*, he never aimed to be a political scientist who would look for general explanations. A political scientific hierarchization of various factors with regard to their impact and relevance was impossible for Renouvin, for none of the various dimensions could be given a (pre-determined) more significant explanatory role at the start of an analysis.⁶⁰¹

Renouvin was also an important personality in the context of institutional developments, especially in the early years of the establishment of post-World War II French social science, and political science. His long presidency of FNSP, from 1959 until 1971, which enabled him to embrace a more open approach to disciplines other than history, as well as his role in the 1935 founding of *Institut d'histoire des relations internationales contemporaines*, now the Institut Pierre Renouvin at Paris-I University, reflect his engagements with academic institutionalization.⁶⁰² Setting up a continual basis for studies on the history of international relations, the cooperation with IHEI Geneva

600 Gerbet, 1968: 149-150.

601 Duroselle, 1975: 562, 567.

602 Duroselle, 1975: 561, 569.

paved the way for the influential review *Relations Internationales* that was subsequently established through the cooperation of Duroselle with his counterpart at the Geneva institute.

Of relevance in understanding the exact position of Renouvin within the French academic universe and its scholarly and institutional dynamics is his election as the dean of University of Paris' Faculty of Letters in 1955 as well as to the membership at *Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques* (this branch of *Institut de France*, the general name given to the French Academy, in which *Académie Française* is a separate unit, dates from the 19th century, as elaborated above) in 1946. Before his retirement in 1965, he would use not only his position at FNSP and the academy but also in the history department and its selection committee to set the future of French social sciences and historical studies, while his presidency of the foundation continued for seven more years after his university retirement. At the same time, he was a member of the Sciences Po directorial council.⁶⁰³ Accordingly, it becomes evident why Renouvin has to be considered as one of the foundational and nodal points of French political science and IR. However, none of his articles would be published in the most prestigious post-World War II French political science journal, *Revue Française de Science Politique*, demonstrating his continuing distance from the effective center of an emerging discipline.

As stated earlier, Renouvin was not himself a political scientist, but a historian of international relations. When it comes to his status as a scholar of IR (here, as throughout this study, IR denotes a special disciplinary undertaking that is more than an amalgam of

603 De Lannon, 1977: 14-15.

various disciplines' work with an international dimension), one faces a similar dilemma. What if Renouvin is just a historian of International Relations, but not a specialist in IR? The answer lies in the context, one that is shaped by the early years not only of IR's or even political science's establishment as a separate subject of study, but also by the general weakness and work-in-progress status of social sciences in general. While one has to admit that sociology and economics had a much stronger position at that time, from which they could go on to dominate the university system, all of them faced a number of difficulties occasioned by the lack of a relevant faculty structure. The later renaming of Faculties of Law that would include also the economic sciences was a step in that direction, but except the 1975 foundation of the *Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales* (EHESS), social sciences as such lacked an institutional structure beyond the impact of IEPs. It was understandable that Renouvin saw, in the form of the newly founded 6th section (with its focus on social sciences) within the *Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes* (EPHE), a much needed body that could bring more organization into IR-related studies if a special IR branch would be established therein.⁶⁰⁴ At this point, it is useful to note that this 6th section would become the famous EHESS, but with some limited scope given to IR.

Under these conditions, Renouvin has to be seen from a perspective that is based on less strict criteria for IR. While the *forces profondes* concept points to his scholarly dimensions that connect to IR in their scientificity and their overcoming of traditional diplomatic history, his institutional positions pushed him towards a more active

⁶⁰⁴ Renouvin, 1950: 574.

acceptance of wider social scientific approaches. Hence, Renouvin's role in post-World War II French IR is one that derives both from his scholarly tendency for innovations and from his institutional visibility that combined positions of power in history as well as in the emerging political science and IR disciplines. In this framework, his earlier cooperation with the CEIP, which had enabled him to publish a book and be involved in its journal, is another example of how US foundations were present at the time when preliminary steps were taken in the formation and academic and societal advancement of future French scholars. At this juncture, one should also take into account a similar role played by Herbert Butterfield, as this British historian would become the founder of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics. Similar to Renouvin, Butterfield would advance IR (and also its theories), while his background was detached from the newly emerging discipline. Therefore, a scholar's non-IR past should not be interpreted as a sign of lesser relevance when analyzing a scholar's contributions to the discipline.⁶⁰⁵

For Renouvin, IR's subject matter could be more or less found in “determin[ing] what influences affect the foreign policies of the Great Powers.” Before post-war projects like the UN were realized, it was still the Great Powers that dominated scholars' research interests. According to Renouvin, IR is “the meeting place” where demographics joins economics, sociologists work with legal scholars and psychologists, with diplomats not left out of the picture. In the French context, he notes two ways of studying IR. Whereas one pertains to the study of “historical evolution” of international relations in the modern

⁶⁰⁵ See Dunne, 1998.

era, and aims at “establishing *facts* and giving *explanations*” without thereby reaching “conclusions applicable to the present situation,” the other type deals with finding the relevant influences that shape interstate relations.⁶⁰⁶

It is essential to understand that Renouvin, a member of the first generation French scholars dealing with IR, who was in fact a professor of modern history, an earlier diplomatic historian, still privileged the historical level of IR. Once this important characteristic of the early post-1945 French IR becomes clear, and one understands the different starting point of its leading names, it becomes easier to understand this statement. According to Renouvin, “[t]he study of international relations is based upon history. In all countries, young men who intend to follow a diplomatic career are required to have a sound historical education.” While recognizing the dominance of historical approaches in French IR, Renouvin takes a significant step and calls historians active in this field to consider explanatory factors by going beyond a narrow focus on diplomatic documents alone. This suggestion is even more important if one takes into account that it was Renouvin himself who played an important role in gathering this kind of diplomatic material, especially in his position as a major name who collected and studied foreign ministry archives with regard to the outbreak of First World War. Thus, Renouvin's call is one for going “beyond what might properly be called 'diplomatic' history, a true history of international relations.” The reference in that context to the *Annales* School is only natural, as Renouvin perceives this new approach of studying history, one based on the

606 Renouvin, 1950: 561-562, emphasis in original.

study of social and economic phenomena as a useful addition to the traditional methods of history.⁶⁰⁷

V.5.b. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle

Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, who was an assistant of Renouvin, would later follow in his teacher's foot steps, and became a professor at the Sorbonne history department. Similarly, he took up the commission work on French diplomatic archives. Previously, he had been a student of Marc Bloch in the 1938-1939 period. In his own words, he was greatly influenced by the *Annales* School. However, Duroselle also criticized this school whose scholars affiliated with the journal *Annales*. Their approach to history had a strong negative reaction towards politics, and especially diplomatic history.⁶⁰⁸ The work of Duroselle, in collaboration with his senior colleague Renouvin, succeeded in going beyond these dichotomies and helped to further develop a new synthesis that was called “the history of international relations.” Duroselle himself recognized the fact that this was a French peculiarity, with the usual diplomatic history being the dominant field in other countries.⁶⁰⁹

Duroselle received his *agrégation* in history during the Second World War and wrote his thesis on the subject of French Catholicism in the early 19th century. In 1946, he became Renouvin's assistant at Sorbonne. After a few years at the University of Sarre (now Saarland in Germany), Duroselle would return to Paris and get an important

607 Renouvin, 1950: 568.

608 Duroselle, 1995: 296.

609 Duroselle, 1995: 295.

position at FNSP. From there, his major involvement was at its center focusing on world issues, namely CERI. In the 1958 to 1964 period, he directed this important research center at the crossroads of FNSP and IEP Paris. In 1964, he succeeded his teacher in the Sorbonne professorship and ten years later at the commission working on French diplomatic documents, taking up its direction. This long list shows Duroselle's ability to cross the boundaries of history and political science.⁶¹⁰ Duroselle's engagement was not only institutional, in the sense of working at Sorbonne's history department and teaching at Sciences Po. He also contributed to political science and specifically to IR beyond his functions at FNSP and CERI, as seen through scholarly contributions that derive from his research on international conflicts. He contributed to the development of conflict studies by providing some limited theorizing on them. His historical approach enabled typologies that would be richly illustrated with relevant cases.⁶¹¹ It was in this context of conflict studies that Duroselle used his position at FNSP and thus at the RFSP board to establish a section focusing on conflict issues in this French political science journal, giving thereby a solid place in this publication to the IR dimension.

With regard to Duroselle's role in the advancement of IR, and more generally political science, it is useful to consider the comments by Robert Frank, who speaks from the position of a significant French historian of international relations. According to him, Duroselle was the person who introduced American-style political science to France as part of IR studies. His multiple visits to the US, including his meetings with Morgenthau

⁶¹⁰ Frank, 2012b: 13-14.

⁶¹¹ For a short introduction see Duroselle, 1964.

and Wolfers in the early 1950s, were the reasons for his interest in the then much emphasized research issues of American IR, that is decision-making processes. His 1981 book *Tout empire périra: vision théorique des relations internationales* (All empires will perish) can be seen as an attempt to push his political scientific interests forward while still basing them on a historical study. Duroselle's work is more about certain temporary regularities instead of a general theory, as he was conscious as a historian about the singularity of events.⁶¹² However, even the theoretical aspects of this later book were not very well received, as his historian status seems to have led observers not to expect from him such theory-laden work. It is interesting to note that in the same decade, an American historian would receive much acclaim for a work of a similar nature: Paul Kennedy with his *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*.

In 1963, Duroselle became the director of the French-American Commission in Paris, where Siegfried had also been a member. This important organization was also responsible for the implementation of the Fulbright program in France. Already by the early 1950s, Duroselle had taken part in the founding of Johns Hopkins University's Bologna Center.⁶¹³ In 1967, as the then dean of the Faculty of Letters at Sorbonne, he paved the way for the establishment of the first chair in North American history, contributing further in generating close scholarly ties with the US.⁶¹⁴ These posts illustrate Duroselle's nodal position at the junction of US-French cooperation. First, he

612 Frank, 2012b: 14-15.

613 This Center also functioned as a training ground for French scholars like him and Aron as well as Grosser where they could stay in touch with their American colleagues and the US way of doing social science. See on this aspect Scot, 2001: 47.

614 Scot, 2001: 33, 36.

was at the receiving end of this structure, only to become one of its shapers in his later academic career. One should not overlook the similarity of his scholarly-academic position to Bergstraesser, who was playing an equal role at the intersection of scholarly-institutional levels of cooperating with American foundations, while also serving on committees that brought Europeans to the same table with their US counterparts.

Duroselle was also to make use of early post-World War II opportunities for scholarly visits to the US, becoming affiliated throughout the 1950s with American universities such as Indiana, Chicago, and Harvard. These visits not only gave him new material to expand his IR (theoretical) knowledge, but also contributed significantly to his status in France as an expert on the US. Based on these advances, he became a specialist in American foreign policy and Franco-American relations. He even changed his course on diplomatic history into a course on International Relations. Duroselle's research interests in area studies led him to establish at CERI, where he presided, a section for the study of the US, thus providing an example of how his American experiences had not only shaped his research interest but also the way he was to study his subject matter, that is in a manner that he had learned from his American colleagues.⁶¹⁵

Duroselle's position within French IR scholarship and his role in the advancement of this new discipline are exemplified in a 1952 article published in RFSP. There, he presented to his audience a broad picture of IR that dealt with its three important dimensions: object, method, and perspectives. Duroselle first referred to views of American specialists who wanted to turn IR into a separate academic discipline, with its
615 Scot, 2001: 33-35.

own department, as well as to focus it more toward studying really existing phenomena instead of the (utopian) ideas proposed by the interwar idealist precursors of IR studies. It was important for Duroselle to point to newly founded IR institutes at American universities, while at Sciences Po he noticed certain advances, like the section of International Relations that was founded in the post-1945 period.⁶¹⁶

According to Duroselle, the study of IR is different from older disciplines like international law, diplomatic history, and political economy. The reasons for IR's distinction derive from the way its focus is different from these other areas of study with which it used to be intermingled. For Duroselle, IR studies what *is*, in the *present*, in a *broader* perspective, thus differing, respectively, from law's normativity, history's focus on the past, and political economy's narrower dimensions. With regard to the question of IR's ties to political science, he asserts that this is only an academic question, the answer to which “depends on the definition one gives political science.”⁶¹⁷ Duroselle’s acknowledged agnosticism about the place of IR within political science shows that in the early 1950s the (more interdisciplinary) past of IR as a broader social scientific and also humanities-tied enterprise was still making it difficult to perceive it as merely a branch of political science.

In Duroselle's opinion, IR as a “pure science” would mean that it is tasked with creating laws, being able, in turn, to predict; and, for him, it is this degree of scientificity that is impossible when dealing with the domain of the international. Scholars who

616 Duroselle, 1952b: 676-677.

617 Duroselle, 1952b: 678.

devote themselves to such big expectations are doomed to undertake “immense efforts” that bring about “deceiving results.” However, he is quick to add that IR should be more than a descriptive science. Distinguishing accidental data from more fundamental ones is important, as it is the demonstration of the latter that should be IR's focus. In the larger context, the study of IR deals with contemporary phenomena. Nevertheless, Duroselle emphasized that these dimensions of the actual/present “cannot be artificially separated from [their] situation of evolution.”⁶¹⁸ This point testifies to Duroselle's background as a history scholar for whom the context of historical framework is an important part of analyzing world politics. Such a point of departure directly implies taking the impact of changing dynamics into consideration. Under these conditions, it is easier to understand how his later book on empires, written in more theoretical-conceptual terms, still provided in its essence a study that did not detach itself from the general world historical process. In Duroselle's approach, it becomes impossible to reach an abstract theoretical level, one with which American IR scholarship would be associated in the second half of the 20th century.

For Duroselle, the idea of IR is understandable by defining what its study means: “the scientific study of international phenomena to succeed in discovering the fundamental data and the accidental data that govern them.” The often mentioned international phenomena that constitute the objects of IR's study refer to issues that cross national borders.⁶¹⁹ A concept of relevance and dominance in IR, that of national interest

⁶¹⁸ Duroselle, 1952b: 679-680, 682.

⁶¹⁹ Duroselle, 1952b: 683.

is also analyzed by Duroselle. It is assumed to be a combination of the general interest of all citizens and the interests of the governing strata. In the case of democratic regimes, he underlines the rather interwoven nature of these two spheres of interest, thus bringing about a more consensus-based national interest to prevail in democracies.⁶²⁰ The area covered by the study of IR extends in his analysis beyond a mere study of foreign policy issues. What he calls international life (*la vie internationale*) presents another dimension, and IR needs also to deal with this larger area, which is close to the late 20th century French interest in studies that deal with the sociological dimensions of the international.⁶²¹

Duroselle proposes to approach the development of IR as an area of study that can be advanced in three stages. First, monographs should provide much needed basic knowledge with all its differing aspects and issues. Then these studies are to be used by area studies specialists to generate broader insights. The last stage pertains to the general theory of International Relations. Following the syntheses produced by area studies, the last stage concerns “an assembly of even more general syntheses.” It would be out of these that “one or more” theories would emerge.⁶²² This position of Duroselle was to be repeated with some minor changes throughout his scholarship, as will be shown again in terms of his views on theory and its role in IR studies.

620 Duroselle, 1952b: 690.

621 Duroselle, 1952b: 691.

622 Duroselle, 1952b: 692-696.

For Duroselle, Machiavelli's *The Prince* presented the first scientific theory of IR.⁶²³ This was a rather surprising choice, because it was Duroselle himself who emphasized the importance for theory of not being value-laden. Whereas in his approach to IR, the normative dimensions of theories were rejected, in Machiavelli it was the case that the supposedly value-free proposals regarding the role of statesmen emerged as the result of a certain normative approach to politics. Therefore, according to Duroselle's own criteria, *The Prince* is a rather inappropriate reference to be provided as a scientific book. His opposition to normative issues playing a role in framing theories demonstrates the connections of Duroselle's scholarship to the broader realist IR community. As the supposedly value-free approach of Machiavelli was already a major feature of realist IR of the period, Duroselle's positive evaluation of the Italian thinker is a sign that the French scholar shared the views of his American colleagues who were defending more scientific approaches in which normative issues had to be left out of the analysis.

Important for purposes of questioning the position of IR and history of international relations, it is useful to note his remarks in a 1989 colloquium: "Our 'Europeocentrism' has led us to call 'period of peace' that one in which our continent is in peace."⁶²⁴ This statement is relevant, as it shows that IR scholarship's current preoccupation with these issues had precedents in the pre-1990 era. While Duroselle was a scholar positioned close to the pro-US trans-Atlanticist standpoints in French scholarly community, this geo-ontological complaint provides a clear demonstration of his scholarly quality and

623 Duroselle, 1952b: 697.

624 Duroselle, 1995: 303.

openness, one that recognized the ongoing proxy wars and other conflicts throughout the world as phenomena in need of consideration and study. However, in order to better understand Duroselle's worldview, one needs also to consider his unquestionably positive evaluation of French experiences in general. For him, "Napoleon is not Hitler for sure." Furthermore, he sees colonization a consequence of disequilibrium, thus not a bad thing in itself. According to Duroselle, the French "went beyond the seas, also now, with MSF [Médecins Sans Frontières]." A general French distinction, a certain *la différence française* emerges even more when he asserts that France is Third Worldist. Careful not to refer to a communism-tainted version, he underlines the French features of solidarity in its ties to the emerging world. The standpoint of Duroselle becomes clear when he explains French foreign policy as one that had "a durable vocation to protect the weak ones." This presents in his opinion an unchanged characteristic of France's international position.⁶²⁵

Duroselle's analysis of IR studies concluded with remarks about the high quality of French culture with regard to its capacity for synthesis. This, coupled with the French scholarly interest in general (for greater, and broader) ideas could pave the way for a new approach to IR that was lacking in Anglo-Saxon scholarship. In line with this, French IR had the potential for bringing new insights into the study of world politics. While acknowledging the already predominant weight of American and British contributions to IR, Duroselle advocated more French participation in this emerging discipline. Even the lack of "original contribution" should not be a problem. What counted was that France

⁶²⁵ Duroselle, 1986: 22.

did not ignore this scholarly area and did its best to be a part of this enterprise so far overpopulated by their Anglo-American colleagues. This was also necessary as the cultural and political interests of France meant that its scholars had to deal with aspects of trans-border phenomena and processes.⁶²⁶ As a result, it becomes evident that Duroselle saw in the advancement of IR a priority for the French academic community. However, this task also carried certain political connotations because a country such as France could not just remain in the back seat of this new discipline.

The role of US foundations becomes visible on a personal scholarly level when Duroselle used the preface of his book (*Tout empire périra*) to thank the Carnegie Endowment whose works had helped him, as well as the Rockefeller Foundation that enabled him (through Kenneth Thompson) to receive a fellowship.⁶²⁷ Such a feeling was not expressed for the first time, as an earlier work on US foreign policy also had also used its preface to acknowledge the support from the Rockefeller Foundation (Wolfers and Thompson) and the Carnegie Endowment as well as the Ford Foundation.⁶²⁸

In his book on empires, Duroselle underlines the prestige of the very concept “theory of international relations,” because it includes a certain reference to secrets only known/discovered by some scholars. However, he rejects such expectations and suggests that, as with all social sciences, IR (theory) cannot and will not go beyond the empirical. His position is further clarified when he opposes following “the model of natural

626 Duroselle, 1952b: 701.

627 Duroselle, 1992: 15.

628 See also Scot, 2001: 35, 55.

sciences.”⁶²⁹ In Duroselle's eyes, Waltz's neorealism is about ignoring history, with no or few historical references. He also attacks Morton Kaplan whose behaviorist approach was part of a well-known controversy with his traditionalist colleagues such as Martin Wight. Sharing a symbolic anecdote, Duroselle writes about having asked Kaplan who he thought were the most important US scholars. Kaplan responded that he was not reading them. The reason provided by Kaplan was that he wanted to have more space for free thought and time.⁶³⁰

In the early years of French IR, Duroselle was informing his audience about the place of area studies within IR: “An area study is essentially a contribution to the study of international relations.” Quickly he added his reservation that “the expression 'international relations' should not... be taken in its narrow sense.” Otherwise it would just focus on inter-state relations, an aspect which Duroselle wanted to expand. However, his position with regard to the idea of IR as a discipline was based on the proposition that IR was a “study” and not a “science.” Perceiving IR as a science presented a quest for or an assumption of “exact laws,” a goal that Duroselle, following his teacher Renouvin, rejected. Presenting “accurate forecasts” or “establish[ing] laws” was not within the confines of IR.⁶³¹ With regard to the prospect of developing “a theory of international relations as a whole,” he accepted the usefulness of an advanced state in area studies research, but that was still a much later possibility, now only possible through hypotheses-building. Pointing to the helpful role of geography has been the usual position

629 Duroselle, 1992: 17-18, 20.

630 Duroselle, 1992: 21-22.

631 Duroselle, 1952b: 637-639, also fn. 2 on p. 639.

taken by French IR scholars, based on the developed state of that discipline in the French scholarly world. Duroselle did the same, and criticized attempts to jump from raw data to a general theory. This could be undertaken differently, namely by “an intermediate stage of geographical studies.”⁶³² Such suggestions are examples of French IR's breadth. It is at such a juncture that he declares that in addition to geography, it is history and sociology that present areas “of paramount importance in the study of international relations.”⁶³³

In a 1952 article, Duroselle defined the scope of Area Studies, that is the limits of an area, more or less in the shape of a number of states, or regional blocs. Tunisia and Morocco are different from metropolitan France, whereas he wrote that “[m]uch the same applies to Algeria, *although* it has become a far more integral part of metropolitan France.” This is a statement whose value has to be recognized. It presents a tacit acceptance of the ambiguity regarding this French territory. In two years' time, the war would start; in 1962, Algeria would no longer be a part of France. In this context, the very way in which Area Studies/International Relations frames its research material is demonstrated in the case of perceptual and geographical boundaries. There is a two-way process, in which studying a place affects its position, and the conditions prevailing in that geographical area are in turn affecting the way it is studied. These aspects can also be found in Duroselle's opposition to the bringing-together of various countries under the heading of Western Europe when doing an Area Studies research. Too many differences mark the countries of that region in order to make them a joint subject of such studies.⁶³⁴

632 Duroselle, 1952b: 640, also fn. 1 there.

633 Duroselle, 1952b: 643.

634 Duroselle, 1952b: 641-642, emphasis is mine.

His approach shows the existence of a certain double standard: when US scholars talk of Western Europe, tending to analyze it as a homogeneous unit, that is an affront; but for French scholars to talk about (a single homogeneous region of) Latin America is a perfectly acceptable way of doing Area Studies. This character of IR/Area Studies underlines the way geo-ontological conditioning shapes the actual processes of study.

For Duroselle, putting the emphasis on concrete events was more useful for IR rather than abstract approaches which he compared to “houses of cards.” Problematic were intra-disciplinary oppositions of an ideological nature. He rejected tendencies that divided science into two camps such as bourgeois science vs. proletarian science. However, he also criticized the “reification of concepts” with the concomitant generalization drives. While this was partially a means of questioning Marxist approaches, his dislike extended also to what he called “mathematicism” as well as scholastic tendencies.⁶³⁵ Even in one of his most American-style formula-filled article, he would finish his analysis of international conflicts by remarking that one should not expect to reach certain “numerical values” by looking at “various parameters” so that future “mathematical formula” could be established. His objection to tendencies which aim to “assimilate IR theory to game theory” is explicit.⁶³⁶

Duroselle's various positions become much clearer as a result of all these rejections: a historically shaped understanding of world politics, a geo-ontology that was still under the impact of French and European assertiveness, and the impact of US academic visits

⁶³⁵ Duroselle, 1992: 22-28.

⁶³⁶ Duroselle, 1960: 305, 288.

and cooperation that influenced his stance on contemporary events of world politics. His methodological choices were determined by his background in history, whereas his later theorization attempts would remain as rather limited experiments of conceptualization. Thus, Duroselle's scholarly approach provides a useful means of interpreting the way in which these external dynamics play an essential role in the formation of social scientists (and of an early IR specialist). While his focus on the study of events is a result of his formative exposure to the historical sciences, in the case of conflict studies, there emerges the influence of Duroselle's American experience that visibly paved the way for a turn toward some level of theorization. Whereas he kept criticizing generalizations, the very book in whose introduction he repeated these views, was to become a sign of his later attempts at proposing more generalizable conceptual mechanisms that he derived from the concrete cases of world history. Duroselle's attempts at theory building were explicit. He wanted to present "his own theory [*ma propre théorie*]," one that is based on an "empirical evaluative" approach.⁶³⁷

This change of attitude that marked his later scholarly phase can be interpreted as the consequence of a shift towards theorization that would start to show its influence in the French IR community more generally especially in the period starting with the 1980s. Thus, it is no coincidence that Duroselle's theoretical work came at a time when other French scholars such as Badie and Smouts would start their journeys to the more sociologically influenced shores of IR theory. Their differences should not lead one to overlook the temporal closeness. Hence, it becomes possible to note the emergence of the

637 Duroselle, 1992: 32-33.

more theoretical stage of French IR in this period. While Duroselle was greatly influenced by American IR's decision-making-related studies, his other colleagues, members of a younger scholarly generation, would shift their focus to sociological dimensions, thus turning French IR into a new direction, but one again marked by higher levels of theorization. Nevertheless, as discussed here, Smouts and others would still reject the idea of the theory of IR, thus distinguishing French approaches to IR from those of their US counterparts.

V.5.c. Renouvin and Duroselle: A joint scholarly enterprise

Both Renouvin and Duroselle taught (in addition to the Sorbonne history department) at IEP Paris (Sciences Po), and the latter would first be the former's assistant and then in many instances his institutional and scholarly follower throughout their academic lives. Their most important contribution in the area of IR can be located in a book they co-authored. This study was an important means of further promoting the *forces profondes concept* of Renouvin, while updating it to the more IR-shaped academic scholarship of the time.

Renouvin's and Duroselle's joint volume, *Introduction à l'Histoire des Relations Internationales*, was published in 1964, and consisted of two parts. The first one, dealing with the “profound forces,” was the work of Renouvin, while Duroselle authored the second part that looked at the statesman, largely in the context of decision-making. The deeper forces of Renouvin's analysis included geographical factors and demographic

conditions, as well as economic forces of both cooperative and competition/conflictful nature, and financial issues. Furthermore, national sentiment and nationalisms, in addition to the pacifist sentiment were analyzed in a framework that underlined these influential elements. What distinguished all these deeper forces from the usual subjects of diplomatic history was their being shaped by bigger groups and collectivities. Otherwise, as Duroselle clarified many years later, there would be no difference between economic profound forces and mere economic causes. The separation can only be formalized by looking to the actual collectivity, which stands behind the creation or shaping of deeper economic forces and the size of that group. Otherwise, in the case of smaller pressure groups, the appropriate concept would only be economic causes, a conceptual tool not suitable within the general idea of *forces profondes*.⁶³⁸

When the Renouvin and Duroselle book was published, their earlier extensions into non-state spheres were to a certain extent de-emphasized. As states were still the ultimate decision-makers, the role of peoples and individuals was only seen as relevant to the extent this was permitted by the state organs. The opening sentence that ties the study of IR generally to interstate relations has to be interpreted in light of this powerful role given to the state.⁶³⁹

For Duroselle, Renouvin stood next to scholars like Raymond Aron, Stanley Hoffmann, and Arnold Wolfers, for all these names understood that “no political science” could exist “outside of history, that is outside the data provided to political scientists by

638 Duroselle, 1995: 305.

639 See Renouvin and Duroselle, 1991 [first published in 1964]: 1 as well as Frank, 2012b: 12.

history.”⁶⁴⁰ While it is possible to see here a rather surprising suggestion, which sees in history just a source for political scientific work – an approach that is nowadays much criticized when analyzing ties between the disciplines of history and political science – one could also interpret it differently, that is by pointing to the relevance of historical work for any political science research. In this second reframing of Duroselle's comments, it should be possible to find the roots of a certain European (at least French) divergence from the more quantitative and abstract approaches favored in the US. It is in that regard that one can understand how the Renouvin and Duroselle volume received a very positive evaluation on the other side of the Atlantic, in a short review by Morgenthau, a scholar whose worldviews were largely shaped by his earlier German and European experiences. After praising the combination of the historical material and theoretical concepts used in the book, he points to the artificial separation of diplomatic history from international relations, which has been successfully overcome by the work of these two French scholars. However, his greatest admiration is for the part written by Duroselle, as Morgenthau sees there a helpful elaboration of the role of statesmen and the processes of decision-making. Much appreciated is Duroselle's rejection of a tendency whose influence in American scholarship is lamented by Morgenthau. It pertains to “reduc[ing] the complexity of the political world to a series of abstract and rigid, preferably mathematical propositions,” an approach not taken by the French scholars.⁶⁴¹

⁶⁴⁰ Duroselle, 1975: 573.

⁶⁴¹ Morgenthau, 1965: 422.

Morgenthau's wish that the volume be translated into English (at least the part written by Duroselle) was realized with its 1967 publication in the US.

Morgenthau's comments have to be placed into the context of a traditionalist vs. behavioralist debate that was shaping the future of political science and IR in those years of the mid-20th century. His approval of the French work is that of a traditionalist who found in the Renouvin and Duroselle volume an ideal amount of history and conceptual elaboration, which to a certain extent was also a mark of his 1947 book *Politics Among Nations*.

While Renouvin and Duroselle did not like the talk of a French school of International Relations in the context of their work, it is important to note the influence they had both in scholarly and institutional aspects on the development of IR as an emerging discipline in the French academic system. Even as late as 1989, Duroselle was careful to warn his audience (mainly historians of international relations) against perceiving themselves as a School. The idea of a School brings to his mind dogmatism, to which he juxtaposes the better option of being members of a free and dynamic movement.⁶⁴²

While it would be possible to find in the early 2000s French scholars who could openly write about the *passé*-ness of earlier works in IR, like those of Duroselle, and Aron,⁶⁴³ one has still to consider the fact that their joint volume continues to be in print and to be used as an important scholarly source. Therefore, by both taking into account

642 Duroselle, 1995: 305-306.

643 Roche, 2002/2003: 103.

their broadening impact for French IR and their book's standards-setting position, as well as their roles as significant administrative-academic figures, Renouvin and Duroselle emerge as important founding fathers of post-1945 French (world) political studies.

The scholars affiliated with the Sciences Po would be simultaneously the bearers of complex identities. While many of them, including Renouvin and Duroselle, or Aron, kept teaching their “original” subjects at faculties of Law or Letters, they would contribute to the newly established disciplines as professors at IEP Paris.⁶⁴⁴ This was an important aspect of their position, pointing to the “intersectionality” of these professors who came to embody the first generation of political scientists or IR specialists if one understands these as modern mid-20th century disciplines with their separate fields of study and research. This is an important aspect to bear in mind with regard to the founding fathers of French post-1945 IR studies. Therefore, it is useful to turn to the distinct position of Aron within French IR.

V.5.d. Inside, but still outside: Raymond Aron and IR

Raymond Aron has a special place in global IR scholarship, not least owing to his much admired status in American IR scholarship. One could assert that he was more or less the only French scholar doing IR-relevant work who has been regularly mentioned in American works. Here, I will shortly refer to this exclusive position and explain how his most important book was perceived in France.

⁶⁴⁴ Scot, 2001: 31.

Aron's *Paix et Guerre entre les Nations* triggered many reviews, including the historical journal *Annales*. For the purposes of this study, the comments there by Renouvin are important as they illustrate his perception of IR in the early 1960s. For him, Aron's approach is more about war than about peace, ignoring in general pacifism. The diplomatic-strategic aspects underlined by Aron pushed economic issues into secondary importance. For Renouvin, it is important to understand the varying impact of different influences, making use in that context of his *forces profondes* concept. One should not attribute to any of them a certain and hierarchically reified importance. In this way, Renouvin approaches Aron's work critically, because he sees in the latter's prioritization of political-diplomatic factors the impact of contemporary politics. Therefore, it is Aron's focus on the present that led him, wrongly in Renouvin's opinion, to see in the 19th century the overwhelming prominence of that same dimension, that is the political-diplomatic forces.⁶⁴⁵

Duroselle is another scholar who has a lot of praise when it comes to the work of his contemporary, Raymond Aron and the latter's work on IR. Of course, Aron's *Paix et guerre entre les nations* can be seen as *the* French work that has had the most influence in the Anglo-American context of IR studies. However, Aron can be approached as a scholar who stood too close to the Americans to be considered as *the* prototype of a French IR scholar. On the one hand, his distinct style of theorizing IR was a result of his French education that shows the overwhelming influence of history and philosophy, which shaped his most influential IR book also. On the other hand, Aron's engagement in the

⁶⁴⁵ Touraine et al., 1963: 476-478.

Congress for Cultural Freedom (a project that brought Western anti-Communist liberal and center-left thinkers together), whose secret funding by the CIA became a major embarrassment, as well as his general stature as a sociologist places him apart from the overwhelmingly historian and legal scholar background of his fellow professorial colleagues doing IR relevant work. Aron's distinct position in French IR and his connectedness to American IR can also be explained with regard to his success in integrating US ideas of containment or balance of power to Clausewitzian thought on war, mixing them within his “vast philosophical culture.”⁶⁴⁶ At the same time, his closeness to American IR becomes visible when noting that 63 percent of his references (in his major book *Paix et guerre entre les nations*) were to American (and British) scholars, with a mere 17 % to his fellow French scholars.⁶⁴⁷

However, Aron's different position did not hinder Duroselle from seeing in his work many original insights that triggered the emergence of a French school of IR. While not forgetting the impact of Renouvin's studies on the history of international relations, and the role of international law scholars, Duroselle commented positively on Aron's approach that prioritized history as a building block of theory (“*la théorie à partir de l'histoire*”). It is interesting to note that Duroselle found Aron's rejection of a general theory of IR to be rather pessimistic, because it was Duroselle himself who was to point multiple times to the impossibility (at least in the short and mid-term) of such a comprehensive theory of IR. The ideal of IR was, according to Duroselle, to be able to

⁶⁴⁶ Constantin, 2002/2003: 95-96.

⁶⁴⁷ Holsti, 1985: 111-112.

“predict better.” Exact predictions are not possible, while intuitive rather than scientific capacities could serve a useful role in “predict[ing] possible evolution” in the domain of world politics.⁶⁴⁸

While Aron's position in French social sciences was quite influential, his status in IR can still be interpreted as one of an outsider, as his more direct connection was always his sociology professorship. But his engagement with IR was genuine, as one sees in his comments on the relatively undeveloped state of IR studies in France. When one turns to Aron's 1967 article in RFSP, the title itself suffices to see his direct intervention: “What is a theory of international relations?” According to Aron, it was in the post-1945 period that scholars from other disciplines turned to IR as their new specialty.⁶⁴⁹ This temporal delimiting demonstrates the historical newness of world political studies in France. However, as the analysis presented in the 1937 report on French social sciences shows, by having dealt with International Relations in a separate chapter, it is not that easy to overlook the pre-1945 existence of such studies in France. Of course, the institutional dimension is lacking, except a few courses at ELSP and some related subjects taught at faculties of Law.

Aron profoundly believed in the existence of political science as such, claiming that history can be successfully integrated in political scientific works. On a more general level, Aron rejected the view that the social sciences needed to generate laws or to point

648 Duroselle, 1962: 967-968, 979.

649 Aron, 1967: 838.

to “a macroscopic determinism,” remaining still at a lower scientificism compared to his US colleagues.⁶⁵⁰

For Aron, there are two kinds of theory in IR: one more philosophical, the other more scientific (especially in its methodological dimensions). Under these conditions, Aron perceived it as problematic that IR was becoming an area in which too broad concepts were applied. Morgenthau's *power*, for instance, was losing its capacity as a concept. The extreme emphasis on power and all the supposed functions it had to carry made it in fact “a philosophy or an ideology” but not a scientific theory.⁶⁵¹ A similar difficulty arose, for Aron, in the case of the concept *national interest*. The necessary approach in IR should be one that aims “to determine the historical perception which directs the moves of collective actors, the decisions of the leaders of these actors.”⁶⁵² Interestingly, Aron does not just reject the possibility of a “pure theory” in the domain of IR, but his opposition to such a theorization extends also to the area of domestic politics, for which an all-covering theoretical framework could not be valid either. The general reason for this perceived impossibility derives, in his analysis, from the suggestion that actors cannot be given an omnipresent and omnivalid objective which would be expected to permanently guide their behavior. Similarly, the “pure” theory of IR is impossible due to the lack of potential equalizations. Investments could equal savings in microeconomics, but the same could not be said even in an analogical fashion for the factors of relevance on the world political stage, and it is based on this that he questions the possibility of a “distinction

650 Touraine et al., 1963: 491.

651 Aron, 1967: 838, 842-843.

652 Aron, 1967: 847.

between independent and dependent variables” in IR. As a consequence, the scientificity of economic theory cannot be found in a discipline dealing with world politics because the latter excludes the important possibility of separating endogenous from exogenous variables. From these observations, both a sociological sensibility to dynamics and a historical knowledge with its focus on change and contingency emerge. Such a position paves the way for rejecting “pure” theories. According to Aron, IR can be reduced to “a sociological and historical study,” as it is “the theoretical analysis itself” that points to “the limits of pure theory.”⁶⁵³

Political science and IR were not, in Aron's analysis, among those disciplines like economics that would enable predictions or manipulation capacities. He also recognized that for certain scholars the lack of these features decreased the value of the discipline, making IR into an inoperationalizable science, hence not a science at all in their eyes. However, it was these very rejections that Aron wanted to counter by criticizing the 1960s behavioralism and a concomitant focus on operational studies. Explicitly, he attacked non-proliferation theory. It could not be a scientific theory, but only “a doctrine of action” that coincided with (certain) states' interests. In Aron's opinion, the doctrine of non-proliferation, with its assumptions of actors' unique or supreme goals, could not present itself as a privileged theory of truth or scientificity.⁶⁵⁴ The Arondtian counter-proposal was to start with practice, and thereby generate what he called “praxeology.” Taking into consideration the multiple objects held by the actors-participants of the

653 Aron, 1967: 848-851.

654 Aron, 1967: 855-858.

international system was the only means to overcome incorrect representations delivered by the simplifications of diplomats. “By understanding the diversity of perceptions of the historical world which determine the conduct of actors,” one could make useful advances in IR, not by abstract theorizations or policy-connected modelings.⁶⁵⁵ These statements by Aron testify to his specific position in IR that still remained tied to the broader French understanding regarding the scientificity of the newly emerging discipline.

Notwithstanding his closeness to American scholarship, even Aron was not that far away from his two contemporaries, Renouvin and Duroselle.

V.6. Political Science and IR in post-1945 France

In the aftermath of the Second World War, one can recognize a gradual institutionalization of political science and IR in France's academic world. However, at this juncture, the influence of law and legal scholars continued to be an obstacle in the eyes of many IR scholars who felt closer to political science or sociological approaches. Professors at faculties of Law directing IR theses which lacked any political scientific content were criticized by these IR scholars for their ongoing impact on IR.⁶⁵⁶

In this context, opposition to the weight of law in the area of political science and IR derived from IR specialists who also perceived themselves as political scientists. For Marie-Claude Smouts, “[i]n so far as International Relations has existed at all in France as a specific field of study, it has effectively been closely bound up with Political

⁶⁵⁵ Aron, 1967: 859.

⁶⁵⁶ Smouts, 2002/2003: 86.

Science.”⁶⁵⁷ As Henrik Breitenbauch also points out, an important reason for approaching the developmental trajectory of IR by taking into account the broader discipline of political science (with its synchronous advancement in French higher education) stems from “the low degree of... differentiation of IR as a specific field from political science.”⁶⁵⁸

Based on this promise, IR is more easily perceivable as an area of study that did (only slowly) develop in tandem with French political science, although in its interwar period the former was also more of an interdisciplinary field where the social sciences and humanities met. This reality, coupled with the relative weakness of both research areas, necessitates in the present study a frequent interwovenness (with political science) in analyzing the development of French IR proper. The subsections here should be approached with that understanding in mind.

V.6.a. Post-1945: Early developments in French political science and IR

According to Pierre Favre, one of the leading scholars of the disciplinary history of political science in France, the birth of political science as an autonomous and scientific discipline can be located in the early post-World War II period. While his account, interestingly, overlooks the role of non-French influences like American aid for the advancement of social sciences, Favre is nonetheless careful to underline the difference between mere labels and realities. It is important for him to go beyond referring to a

657 Smouts, 1987: 282.

658 Breitenbauch, 2008: 64.

handful of *Instituts d'Etudes Politiques* (IEPs) of the post-1945 period which carried in their very names the word political sciences. Such an extension is necessary because it was also in faculties of law that courses on politics were offered as part of their educational structure.⁶⁵⁹ The political science courses in these faculties were started by 1955.⁶⁶⁰ In Favre's analysis, five major tendencies prevail in French political science: juristic-constitutionalist, empiricist, Marxist, interactionist, and sociologist (in the sense of political sociology).⁶⁶¹

There is one geographical factor that should be kept in mind: the Parisian dominance in the area of political science and IR. This disproportionate intellectual power is also valid in other scientific areas, and explains why French political science is largely shaped by Parisian scholars who are cut off from the provinces and their colleagues. In this process, IEP Paris and the political science department at the Paris-I University (established in 1969) play an important role. Whereas the non-Parisian IEPs are tied to their local university, Sciences Po Paris is not institutionally subordinated to the Parisian university system, connected instead to FNSP. This is another source of difference and influence that is built on the school's long history.⁶⁶²

Jean Luca underlined the weak state of French political science even in the 1980s. For instance, while main French national research organization, CNRS employed some two hundred sociologists, there were only some 40 political scientists engaged in its

659 Favre, 1981: 99.

660 Leca, 1982: 665.

661 Favre, 1981: 112ff.

662 See Roux: 2004, *passim*.

various research projects. The numerical weakness of political science emerges more visibly when comparing the number of its professors to those of public law: 70 vs. 300. Not to be overlooked was the fact that many political scientists originated from law. The negative perception or even the very lack of political science's recognition is summarized when Leca adds that nobody shows interest in the conditions prevailing in French political science, not even American scholars, whereas studies dealing with French sociology and social sciences more generally as well as with important institutions like ENS or ENA are more commonplace.⁶⁶³

In the French academic world, which is rich in scholars who provide self-evaluations and observations of their scholarly environment, it should come as no surprise that Leca was quick to add that there was a certain negative perception about political science in France. The discipline was accused of serving the “mystification” of politics.⁶⁶⁴ One of the most prominent examples of this is the critical scholarship of Pierre Bourdieu. According to Bourdieu (and Boltanski, in their joint article), the dominant ideology is mixed with political science. The former is political science in action, while the discipline of political science is politics (set) in discourse. The combined and interrelated forces of scholarship and politics keep recreating their power by means of using their personal and institutional capacities for the instrumentalization of political science in order to empower the existing political system, of which this “practical science” is an essential element. Political science is interpreted hence as a tool for keeping an open door for the

⁶⁶³ Leca, 1982: 654.

⁶⁶⁴ Leca, 1982: 656.

dominant class so that they can have an uninterrupted access to, and remaining in, power.⁶⁶⁵

According to Renouvin, French IR's weakness was mainly a result of the failure to create proper mechanisms of coordination. While *Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales* at the University of Paris (now at Paris-II) Law Faculty, founded in early 1920s, as an important place for studying international law, and the post-1945 IEP Paris (as a continuation of the pre-1945 ELSP) with its interests also in the area of world politics were recognized as relevant places for educational and research purposes, CEPE, an institute focusing on foreign policy, is provided as one of the influential sources of associational work connected to the domain of IR.⁶⁶⁶

Based on this, and following a chronological approach with regard to the post-1945 era, it is useful to start with the last months of the war, as it was before the end of the Second World War that important names in American scholarship participated at CEPE's activities in Paris. In April 1945, Quincy Wright would come from University of Chicago to give a talk on US foreign policy, while another American scholar followed in the summer of 1945.⁶⁶⁷ These engagements show not merely the capacity of CEPE to survive the war years, but even more importantly, the extent to which cooperation with their US counterparts was important for members of the French academic community. After the first meeting in which René Cassin discussed French foreign policy in the 1940-1944 period, held in October 1944, followed a quick re-connection to international partners

665 Boltanski and Bourdieu, 1976: 58.

666 Renouvin, 1950: 574.

667 *Politique Etrangère*, 1945: 114.

such as RIIA, CFR, and the Carnegie Endowment.⁶⁶⁸ During the war, when it had stopped its activities, its cadres also took steps into different directions. While one of the pre-War CEPE scholars was discredited due to his high position in the Vichy government, two important figures, Louis Joxe and Henri Bonnet joined the governmental service (of de Gaulle), with the latter appointed as French ambassador to Washington. Bouglé and Charléty, other influential figures of interwar French academic world who had played important roles for CEPE had by then passed away. The emerging void was filled with new members, including Jacques Vernant who became its secretary. The continuing prestige of the center is visible in the fact that Léon Blum (the prewar socialist French prime minister of the Popular Front) became the president of its administrative council. In this context, RF was also quick to renew its prewar support. In 1945, CEPE was attached to the newly founded FNSP. Afterwards, with the position of EPHE's 6th section, the center became less visible on the social scientific scene, as other academic establishments were being formed.⁶⁶⁹ This center would be turned into IFRI (*Institute Français de Relations Internationales*) in 1978, becoming an influential think-tank-like structure, the activities of which were also of international significance.⁶⁷⁰

This new dynamism of institutional innovations triggered a widening of the French social scientific structure. While new establishments were coming into being, older ones were undergoing transformation. EPHE's 6th section with its focus on social sciences, becoming the separate EHESS in 1975 was an example of the former, while IEP Paris

668 *Politique Etrangère*, 1945: 114-115.

669 Tournès, 2011: 297-300.

670 Chillaud, 2009: 246.

serves as a case for the latter. Compared to 1940, there existed now a greater number of institutional actors. In addition to the Rockefeller and Ford foundations, FNSP was a *sui generis* structure that somehow managed to tie the state and older ELSP cadres into a joint organ, putting IEP Paris under its foundational guidance. Faculties of Law and Letters continued to exert pressure against a possible hostile takeover of their subject and research matters, leaving the area of political sciences only (except themselves) accessible to Sciences Po. The problem with Faculties of Law's influence was that while many offered introductory level courses, they did not provide advanced political science courses. This prevented students from going beyond a basic knowledge in the discipline. However, at least in the institutional-structural sense, the discipline had witnessed major advances, like its autonomization in 1969 in the form of new separate sections established at universities as well as the possibility for direct *agrégation* exams in political science after 1973.⁶⁷¹

When it comes to the conditions affecting the teaching of IR, a major problem was still the relatively late access of students to courses dealing with international issues. Coupled with linguistic weaknesses that cut them off from accessing non-French literature, students were only able to gain much needed knowledge in later stages of their studies. An additional difficulty arises from the fact that there was a continuing ambiguity with regard to the way these studies were labeled: international politics, world politics, foreign policy, and international relations.⁶⁷² While such confusions are also valid in the

⁶⁷¹ Legavre, 1998: 40, 42 and also Tournès, 2011: 317.

⁶⁷² Devin, 1998: 231, 233.

context of Anglo-American approaches to the study of international issues, it is important to note the call of Guillaume Devin for a “*pluridisciplinaire*” approach to IR that enables a useful basis for comparative studies, without forgetting the role the international dimension plays “at the construction of the political.” It is for this reason that Devin emphasizes the need to make “the international” a constant part of political science. His demand is for a global regard that gets beyond the distinctions between internalist vs. externalist approaches, making political science thus a more holistic study of politics on all levels.⁶⁷³ This would mean that distinctions between comparative, international, and domestic politics become less relevant, as their constant interaction is acknowledged. It is also important to understand that the French discipline includes area studies, presenting thereby a rather broad research agenda for scholars of IR. The lack of a distinction between IR and area studies continues in France.⁶⁷⁴

V.6.b. From organizations to journals: The establishment of *Association Française de Science Politique* and *Revue Française de Science Politique*

The French association for political scientists, *Association Française de Science Politique* (AFSP) was founded in 1949 and had as its first president Alfred Siegfried. This scholar was one of the earliest names associated with French political science, as his 1913 study, *Tableau politique de la France de l'ouest sous la 3e république*, was seen as the foremost example of political geography. Siegfried would maintain his influence

⁶⁷³ Devin, 1998: 235, 240.

⁶⁷⁴ Smouts, 1987: 283.

through his columns for the center-right *Le Figaro*, a newspaper whose board of directors included Raymond Aron. Given these circumstances, the two scholars' association with Sciences Po would pave for many the way of perceiving the school as the bastion of liberal, Christian-Democratic positions.⁶⁷⁵ Such interpretations were, of course, not devoid of historical precedents, as shown in the case of the interwar years, a period in which ELSP was seen as a big defender of economic liberalism.

The French Political Science Association has now more than 600 members, but it started quite late to organize regular scientific conferences, in a biannual fashion only in the early 1980s, thus going beyond its earlier practice of intermittently held workshops and study meetings. Another organization that brings together teachers and researchers in political science *Association des enseignants et chercheurs en science politique* (AECSP) includes around 150 members. This is a newer addition, founded only in 1995.⁶⁷⁶ A much more recent embodiment is the *Association des Internationalistes*, established in 2010. Its aim is to bring together scholars working on the international dimension, IR specialists as well as researchers from related disciplines. This is an important addition to the discipline's institutional structure, as it fills the void that exists due to the rather weak character of AFSP's *Section des Etudes Internationales* (International Studies section). Compared to the work undertaken at the West German political science association's IR section, the French scholarly community has not succeeded in preparing and presenting interesting studies. Therefore, the “Association of Internationalists” can be expected to

⁶⁷⁵ Nord, 2003:145.

⁶⁷⁶ Blondiaux and Déloye, 2007: 153-154.

play such a role for more scholarly cooperation and interdisciplinary exploration in the area of world politics.

The AFSP organized an important round table in 1953 on foreign policy, enabling many scholars to present papers on specific aspects of this important field of IR, ranging from public opinion to diplomatic traditions, from international law to economic or religious factors, with all these being discussed as shapers of foreign policy. This meeting was significant as it showed the rise of interest within the political science community for world politics. While Stanley Hoffmann wrote a short summary of the foreign policy fundamentals that were discussed, the participant-presenters included an interesting mix of people: a member of the mission for the study of German Foreign Ministry archives, a French Foreign Ministry official, Stanley Hoffmann and Alfred Grosser as well as two other participants from Oxford and Harvard whom one should place among the junior scholars, but also an Oxford professor, and William T. R. Fox, the IR professor from Columbia University.⁶⁷⁷ The latter's presentation dealt with the moral and juridical basis of US foreign policy, which he used to inform his audience about realist theory of IR, talking about Morgenthau and “pragmatic Realists” such as Walter Lippmann and Carl Becker.⁶⁷⁸

Duroselle, at that time still outside Paris, and the dean of Sarre University's Faculty of Letters, analyzed the evolving diplomacy and its impact on states' foreign policy. Most importantly, he focused on the dual structure foreign policy has taken in the aftermath of

⁶⁷⁷ See AFSP, 1953.

⁶⁷⁸ Fox, 1953: 12.

the Second World War. There was on one hand the diplomacy that took place between allies, inside their respective blocs. On the other hand, there existed a second type of diplomatic process between the two blocs.⁶⁷⁹ This categorization of diplomacy into two distinct sections is similar to the discussions held in West Germany in the same period. As analyzed in the case of (West) German IR, early specialists of world politics suggested similar proposals with regard to the existence of two separate diplomacies.

The AFSP meeting is significant as one the first foreign policy debates that brought not only French but also other Western IR scholars and experts together. The initial framing that resulted from the papers' differing emphases meant that the basics of foreign policy were to be found in many different factors. Through this wide variety of subjects, the papers tried to frame a preliminary inquiry into foreign policy processes, and to provide a scientific analysis of states' moves in the domain of international politics. That the French had managed to bring many fellow IR scholars from the UK and the US, demonstrated that the supposed French ignorance of non-French IR was not a reality in the 1950s. The presence of scholars from Oxford, New York, and Chicago pointed to their French hosts' interest in broadening their knowledge, both in theoretical and practical terms. This can be the reason that invited scholars presented papers that looked into factors which shaped *their* country's (American or British) foreign policy.

In the area of scholarly publications, the most important player was the French political science journal, *Revue Française de Science Politique* (RFSP) that was established in 1951 by AFSP, in cooperation with FNSP. For some scholars, the founding

679 Duroselle, 1953: 20.

of RFSP meant that French political science was reborn.⁶⁸⁰ For a long time, this journal provided the only academic publication in the area of political science and IR.

When the first issue of the RFSP was published in 1951, the introductory text underlined the continuing indeterminacy with regard to the political *science/political sciences* difference. The official RFSP position was to not specifically prefer one of these labels. Noteworthy was the fact that the two co-publishers of the journal, FNSP and AFSP reflected this ambiguity in their very names, with the former talking of political *sciences* in plural and the latter in the singular – political *science*. The journal's name was also in the singular, just like its American counterpart. For lack of an agreed upon French label, the editorial introduction also used the original English words of “political scientists” when referring to scholars of political science. On the other hand, a not successfully accomplished goal of the journal concerned its initial wish to become “an international journal.”⁶⁸¹ This target of internationalization did not become a major part of the new journal, notwithstanding intermittent contributions from non-French and non-Francophone scholars.

In French political science journals, the space devoted specifically to IR is of a rather limited nature. *Politix*, an important disciplinary journal established in 1987, has virtually no articles on IR. In the case of RFSP, in the 1970-2004 period, 14 percent of articles dealt with issues that fell under the IR domain, and 15 percent under comparative politics.⁶⁸² For a long time, no specific IR journal with a scholarly stature existed,

680 Breitenbauch, 2008: 74.

681 RFSP, 1951: 6-8.

682 Billordo, 2005.

although *Etudes Internationales* and *Relations Internationales* demonstrated the possibility of such Francophone publications, respectively in Canada and Switzerland (the latter, as stated earlier, was initiated by the support of Renouvin and Duroselle circle).⁶⁸³ Smouts and Badie played an important role in the advancement of French IR when they published their 1992 book *Retournement du monde*. Badie had a background in political sociology, working mostly on the state. Thus, their arrival in IR gave it a visible sociological basis from which to approach the international dimension.⁶⁸⁴ It was only in the period following the increase of interest in IR shown by scholars with sociological background that advances in the area of academic journalistic publications were made. Journals such as *Cultures et Conflits*, published by CERI in addition to other important regular publications it developed, brought a significant growth in IR-related articles.

V.6.c. Self-Perceptions – II: Reports on French political science and IR in the early post-Second World War era

In 1951, the ISC report on the university teaching of IR, whose records of the 1950 Windsor conference I discussed in chapter III, included one chapter by Jacques Chapsal on French IR. As stated earlier, he was by that time both the IEP Paris director and the administrator of the FNSP, providing thus a text that was submitted by a very high-ranking name in the postwar institutional structure of French political science. The first

⁶⁸³ On this lack see Chillaud, 2009: 248.

⁶⁸⁴ Smouts 2002/2003: 84-85.

aspect recognized by Chapsal concerned the undeveloped nature of French IR. For him, the idea of International Relations had not yet “achieved in France the same notoriety as it enjoys with Anglo-Saxon countries.” Its place in French universities was rather marginal, while both the US and the UK were seeing a rise of interest in courses offered on that subject. As asserted by many other French scholars, in his opinion, the major difficulty arose from the structure of the university system that had a duality based on the faculties of Law and faculties of Letters which shared among themselves the subject matter(s) of social sciences and thus of IR. The lonely exception of Sciences Po in Paris was not always sufficient to overcome such immanent difficulties. Some seven decades after Boutmy founded ELSP, it was still important to refer to Boutmy's words who wanted to emphasize “the mutual interdependence of every main element that goes to the making of a society” in his newly founded institute.⁶⁸⁵ However, as late as the mid-20th century, the faculties of Law were still an obstacle in reaching this goal.

When dealing with the institutional precedents of IR in France, it is important to note that Chapsal underlines the role of these faculties of Law. In the interwar years, the chair in Lyon, held by Jacques Lambert, was officially called “study of institutions for preserving peace,” or for short, the chair of peace. In Chapsal's opinion, this chair placed IR quite close to being autonomous. As seen in the context of CEIP's Parisian activities, the position of University of Paris Law Faculty's *Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales* was also relevant, at least in the area of International Law.⁶⁸⁶

685 Chapsal, 1951: 84-86.

686 Chapsal, 1951: 89.

Unlike many of the French scholars proposing the establishment of separate Faculties of Social Sciences, where their newly emerging disciplines could be independently developed and taught, Chapsal was rather skeptical about this possibility of radical reform. No “great upheavals (such as the creation 'ex nihilo' of Faculties of Social Sciences)” were desired, as the chances of “passing from conception to realization” were very slow. In his opinion, therefore, IEPs should be sufficient for studying IR.⁶⁸⁷

Chapsal rejected claims about a general French disinterest in things international: “It is sometimes said that the Frenchman lacks the international approach; that he does not consider problems on the world scale... But I regard it as wholly untrue of the élite being trained in our Universities – an élite which gives proof of a very real interest in international relations.” According to him, while people on the street could (in any country) be less knowledgeable about world affairs, the ones who really needed to know, i.e. the elites, were quite knowledgeable in France.⁶⁸⁸

What was the position of scientific independence? Chapsal was quick to dismiss any possibility of state propaganda by means of IR. The case of German geopolitics was used as a good counter-example. While geopolitics would become popular in France in the second half of the 20th century, Chapsal's text (written at the start of the 1950s) suggested that geopolitics was not important in France due to “some German professors ha[ving] systematically put it to tendentious uses.” This distancing was not just a post-World War II attitude. Already in 1937, another French scholar commented that geopolitical

687 Chapsal, 1951: 92.

688 Chapsal, 1951: 93.

approaches had not attracted his colleagues, as certain publications had turned it into a means of propaganda instead of a scientific tool.⁶⁸⁹

While criticizing German scholars' manipulation of geopolitics, Chapsal was also quick to broaden his attacks to include his American and British colleagues. French scholars had witnessed (in the interwar years) the problems of the League of Nations system and international organizations in general. For this reason, Chapsal asserted that French IR specialists were not under the impact “of that slightly Utopian confidence which has sometimes been shown by certain Anglo-Saxon elements.”⁶⁹⁰ What emerges out of these descriptions of non-French IR is a French self-assuredness that perceived itself as a kind of *via media*. Even if unintentional, the suggestions of Chapsal refer at least tacitly to the possibility of a French approach to IR that could go beyond the naivety of Americans or the British as well as beyond the Nazi-time geopolitical propaganda that influenced their approach to world politics and the study thereof. It is for this reason that Chapsal's conclusion is a very positive one, seeing French IR's prospects as promising: “how fruitful the part played by France in the study and teaching of international relations is capable of being.” A retrospective analysis enables one to note the rather unfulfilled nature of the hopes of the early 1950s. French scholars would put a big emphasis on geopolitics and develop it in the shape of both more critical and Marxist approaches, and create concepts such as *droit d'ingérence* (right of intervention) in order to challenge sovereignty claims of states committing human rights abuses against their own

689 Chapsal, 1951: 93 and Jordan, 1937: 287.

690 Chapsal, 1951: 94.

populations. But in general, no French approach or theory of IR has emerged that has established an influence of international dimensions.

In 1950, it was Raymond Aron who wrote a text on the general state of political science in his country for the UNESCO report. Highlighting a problematic aspect of French political science that haunted many generations of scholars, he started by pointing to the close ties of political science and political sociology. For him, political science was only able to detach itself from sociology when it succeeded in underlining the relevance of “a specifically political angle.” However, when it comes to France, Aron is careful to distinguish the still plural nature of political *sciences*, as “there is no 'political science' in the singular.” He continues to state that “political science is not recognized either as a scientific discipline or as a university school.” In Aron's opinion, this newly emerging discipline for the study of the political is threatened by its usage of “implicit postulates, of the values which justify the existing political order.” It is in this context that political science is seen as being a reflection of “a country's own idea of itself.” Certain priorities emerge therefore as a consequence of nationally determined research interests.⁶⁹¹

When it comes to the existing university structure in France, the major institutional difficulty for political science derives, in Aron's, but also many other contemporaries', opinion, from the nature of faculties. While Science or Medicine faculties are not relevant in this regard, it is the difficulty arising from the influence of Faculty of Law and Faculty of Letters that determined the divided shape of political science, and more generally of social sciences. While sociology was taught at the Faculty of Letters (Philosophy),

691 Aron, 1950: 49-50.

political economy was a subject within the Faculty of Law. History and geography, on the other hand, also made a part of Faculty of Letters. For Aron, it was even more surprising that until 1945, the state had largely left the domain of political sciences to ELSP, which itself had not existed as a part of the official state university system.⁶⁹² However, Aron saw a bigger problem in the lack of prestige for the social sciences. Political science was bereft not only of the significance given to hard sciences on the one hand, due to their transformative capacities, but also to literature, “which fills the columns of the newspapers and the hearts of women.” The language used by Aron is a good marker of the mid-20th century. But, with regard to the role of political science, it is also a visible sign of the wish to promote it so that a new niche could be opened for an emerging disciplinary candidate. Two reasons are provided for the relative weakness of political science under these circumstances prevalent in the post-World War II period. First, there is a remarkable skepticism towards the scientific approach to politics. Second, the public mood is one of political apathy, not a surprise when considering the era as one marked by the aftermath of the catastrophe of 1940, the subsequent Vichy years, and the Resistance activities. Therefore, the French are content with a “non-specialized culture” in order to face political problems.⁶⁹³ When it comes to French research done on other countries, Aron laments the lack of political scientific work in that area, seeing the dominance of country experts instead, while historians and their historical method have

disproportionate weight in IR.⁶⁹⁴

692 Aron, 1950: 50-51.

693 Aron, 1950: 55.

694 Aron, 1950: 57, 61-62.

In another French contribution to the 1950 UNESCO report, by Lazara Kopelmanas, the singular political science understanding prevalent in the US and the UK must be underlined. For Kopelmanas, “[t]he term 'political science', familiar to scientists of Anglo-Saxon countries, in France does not refer to a clearly defined scientific discipline. In France, one speaks more easily of 'the political sciences', in the plural, and not of 'political science' in the singular.” In his opinion, political science in the singular is in the French case only the common method of dealing with results derived from various researches of political sciences.⁶⁹⁵ Like Aron, Kopelmanas pointed to the division of social and political sciences between the faculties of Law and Letters. It is especially under the area of public law that the plural form of political sciences was to be found, a condition that would be valid until the late 20th century. According to Kopelmanas, this nature of different study subjects' academic placement presents certain problems, as the more legalistic focus at Faculty of Law prevented deeper engagement with real political issues. His proposal, one brought forward at different points by other French social and political scientists, was to establish independent Faculties of Social (or Political) Sciences. These would be places “where common problems would be taught by representatives of the different disciplines.” However, he acknowledged the difficulty of overcoming structural constraints that such an academic innovation would face.⁶⁹⁶

The postwar reforms whose results were the dissolution of ELSP and the birth of IEP Paris, FNSP, ENA and a few other provincial IEPs throughout France, are commented by

⁶⁹⁵ Kopelmanas, 1950: 647.

⁶⁹⁶ Kopelmanas, 1950: 648, 650.

Kopelmanas to be signs of the French government's interest in advancing the study of political science. Simultaneously, in his opinion, the new situation of the post-World War II period was suitable to try to generate a more united political science, instead of keeping the way various subjects were taught separate from each other. EPHE's 6th section and IEPs could be additional spaces for actual research. It is with this line of argumentation that he finished his analysis by stating that “[t]he unifying of methods of research will eventually be translated into teaching, which will essentially be based on the methodological results and the materials of research.” The role of FNSP would also be of relevance in this process, the ultimate consequence of which would be the joining of political *sciences* within a methodologically united political *science*.⁶⁹⁷

Another important source on French political scientific works is the 1960 bibliographical volume with comments on French scholarship of the period, largely covering the post-World War II period until the late 1950s. In this book, the suggestion is that IR studies were still not fully considered as a branch of political science. At the same time, however, it was noted that there had emerged a progressive detachment from diplomatic history and international law, which had put IR under their “tutelage.”⁶⁹⁸ Although the volume lists some 75 works in the domain of IR for the given time period, the editors did not note the presence of theoretical studies. An exception was provided by some work of Aron – and at that point, Aron's most important IR book was not yet published.

697 Kopelmanas, 1950: 651-653.

698 Meyriat, 1960: 99ff.

A significant explanation of the way French political science was structured came from the volume's general editor, Jean Meyriat. He stated that the divisions in the discipline with regard to its areas of study were generated in line with the plans suggested by the International Political Science Association (IPSA). The French had generated a nine-part division that included study areas ranging from political science, its objects and methods to political theory, from parties and pressure groups to history of political ideas, and included International Relations as well as Area Studies as additional separate sections.⁶⁹⁹ At this juncture, international guidance coming from UNESCO played a visible role. This demonstrates that such post-Second World War international institutions provided important levels of support to the development of political science – a type of support that in general signified the implementation of American scholarship norms on a global dimension.

As late as 1960, Jacques Chapsal, the IEP Paris director and FNSP president, was speaking about the existence of French political *sciences* in plural. This was reflected in the way Sciences Po courses were organized. According to Chapsal, out of some 120 courses, 30 could be put into the category of political and administrative science, whereas another 30 courses were offered in the area of economics. In the case of International Relations and Area Studies, each one was represented by some 20 courses, thus bringing them in total to one third of all IEP Paris courses. The lateness of French political science is again visible if one considers that doctorates in political studies began only in 1959.

While this was undertaken at Sorbonne, under the auspices of the Faculty of Letters, the

⁶⁹⁹ Meyriat, 1960: 102ff.

jury included scholars from both the faculties of Law and Letters, as well as FNSP members. From an institutional perspective, Chapsal lamented the lack of foundational support.⁷⁰⁰ For the French academic community, their experiences of cooperation with the US philanthropies had showed them the possibility of using such non-university sources in order to advance both their research and to extend their networks.

V.6.d. Examining French interests: The *agrégation* exam as an indicator of the scholarly agenda

French scholars take the *agrégation* exam in order to be allowed to work as instructors. To some extent, this is similar to the German practice of *Habilitation* that follows the doctoral degree. The fact that the political science discipline became available as a subject for *agrégation* in 1973 meant that henceforth scholars would be able to call themselves political scientists in the academic world. The process consisted of both written and oral exams, and the exam-taker had to prepare certain presentations by making use of a literature that was provided to him/her by the committee – whose members changed each year.

By looking at the literature lists provided by the committees, one can gain a fairly broad perspective about the access of French scholars (at least of their influential and more senior figures who made up the examining committee) to classical and contemporary studies and the fashion in which these were perceived. For instance, this constantly updated bibliography included in its 1996-1997 edition no members of the

700 Chapsal, 1960: 7-13.

English School of IR (with a single exception of a Barry Buzan-edited volume), while Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* made the list (in its 1973 edition). Similarly, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye with their work on transnational relations, Robert Jervis with his study of (mis)perceptions, Robert Gilpin with his late 1980s book on the political economy of IR, Graham Allison with his famous book *The Essence of Decisionmaking*, James Rosenau with his book *Turbulence in World Politics*, Immanuel Wallerstein with his world system books, and Susan Strange with her study *States and Markets* joined the bibliographical world of possibilities for the examinee.

Turning to the French scholars listed in the bibliography, one finds a great number of books by Raymond Aron and Pierre Bourdieu on a wide spectrum of issues. In the more specific area of IR, Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle's works take a prominent place, as their joint volume in addition to their individual studies on the history of international relations are both present in the list. Duroselle enters it also by his more conceptual-theoretical work *Tout empire périra*. Interestingly, Stanley Hoffmann, a scholar who started his IR studies in France and continued as a scholar in the US was not in the 1996 list of bibliographical sources. Instead one notes the presence of another French IR scholar who is also a prominent public intellectual: Pierre Hassner with his 1995 book on peace and violence, joining the list with a very recent work. From the newer generation of scholars who came to prominence after the 1980s, both Bertrand Badie and Marie Claude Smouts were there, as well as Marcel Merle whose work in IR focused on the sociology of IR.⁷⁰¹

⁷⁰¹ See the attachment on the bibliography used for political science agrégation in Favre and Legavre,

Tendencies prevailing in the French political science/IR scene can be understood if one looks at the scientific journals, and at the year of their inclusion, in the list.⁷⁰² A clear turning point is noticeable in 1984, as the *American Political Science Review*, *British Journal of Political Science*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, *International Organization*, and *World Politics* were among the many non-French journals that were added to the exam preparation list only in that late period. This change, which could be seen as an opening toward non-French publications, can be contrasted with the presence of the British journal *Political Studies* since 1953 and *Political Theory* since the 1970s. What emerges from this comparison is to a certain extent explainable in the turn towards more American-style “scientific” political science. More importantly, it shows that interest in IR increased only at that time, enabling the inclusion of so many journals focusing on the political scientific study of world politics. This shift becomes visible when one notes that the Duroselle-initiated journal *Relations Internationales* also joined the list in the same year. On the other hand, the French journal *Politique Internationale* had made the list in 1978, and two main scientific journals, *RFSP* and *Revue Française de Sociologie* were present from the start.

The first scholar who passed through the agrégation process under the heading of IR was nominated in 1987, while in subsequent decades the way was opened for scholars who would come with a doctoral degree in the area of IR. However, the difficulties for academic placement would continue to be a challenge for junior scholars who had to go

1998: 373-419.
702 For a complete list see Favre and Legavre, 1998: 419-421.

through a conflict-ridden terrain that separated political science proper as well as IR from the domain of law studies. For instance, if scholars interested in political science are associated with faculties of Law and want to pursue a career by entering the academic structure via political science sections, they face challenges from both domains with regard to their employment.⁷⁰³ Whereas the political science discipline had its agrégation since the 1970s, it was the case for IR only in the late 1990s, under the former's exam structure.⁷⁰⁴ On the other hand, the faculties of Law also enable diplomas in higher studies (DES) for political science as part of a student's law studies. Such a degree was necessary in order to advance in doctoral studies before the thesis process.⁷⁰⁵

V.6.e. The French exception: Geopolitics instead of IR?

In France, IR as a discipline has found itself in a different position compared to both its Anglo-American and German counterparts. The distinction stems from the importance given to geopolitics. French *géopolitique* has an influence that must be noted when analyzing the way French scholars engage in the study and research of world political issues. It is not a coincidence that even the coding system at FNSP library uses 327 (Dewey system's 32.7) to refer to works in the area of both International Relations and Geopolitics, merging the two.⁷⁰⁶

703 Roche, 2002/2003: 104-106.

704 Smouts, 2002/2003: 86.

705 Zettelmeier, 1996: 175-176.

706 Breitenbauch, 2008: 75.

Renouvin also referred to the significance of geography for French IR studies. He noted that there was a French attempt “to counteract the tendencies of German 'Geopolitik’”.⁷⁰⁷ However, as geopolitics was (during the interwar and early post-World War II periods) associated with German expansionist propaganda, it would be only in the 1970s that France witnessed a major boom in this area. The work of Yves Lacoste's Marxist-influenced geopolitical studies paved the way for interest in this subject, with a distinct way of approaching and analyzing world politics. Today, geopolitics is not only a serious subject of study at French universities, but it also stands as an area in which every year dozens of books and atlases provide the French audience with constantly updated publications.⁷⁰⁸ The journal established by Lacoste, *Hérodote* was followed by other similar publications, leading to a huge increase in studies devoted to this subject, or stated differently, to this way of engaging with international phenomena.

What can explain this feature of French difference in the context of studying the international? How is it that geopolitics has managed to become a self-sufficient academic as well as an intellectual enterprise that also commands a large audience among the ordinary public? The answer lies in pointing to the non-unique nature of this phenomenon. Interest in geopolitical matters can also be seen in various other nations such as Russia and Turkey. The fact that this emphasis does not exist in Germany, a country whose scholarship it also troubled by its own *Geopolitik*-tainted past, is understandable. The rather weak position of geopolitics in the American and British

707 Renouvin, 1950: 563.

708 For a useful introduction to recent French geopolitical scholarship in English see Lévy, 2001.

cases, on the other hand, can be clarified by pointing to the influence of realism in the formative years of IR, which led to the inclusion, to a remarkable extent, of many points one could associate with geopolitical ideas. It is no coincidence that some of the earlier (during the World War II and its aftermath) IR scholars in the US and the UK started their analyses from geopolitical perspectives, which would be carried over into IR in due time so that a more scholarly, and in the context of German *Geopolitik's* negative connotations, a less burdened way of dealing with international politics could be offered.

Another factor helping to the rise of *géopolitique* was the already significant historical legacy of geography as an academic discipline. It was not coincidence that Siegfried's early 20th century study of French society and its regionally varying political choices was a work of political geography that also paved the way for the future development of political science. Based on such precedents, one could argue that the French turn to world politics through the lenses of geopolitics showed the re-empowerment of French interests in the subject, as the country had by the last third of the 20th century managed to overcome its postwar and post-decolonization crises, but faced domestic quests for new perspectives, not the least illustrated by the events of May 1968.

On the other hand, in the specific area of peace studies French scholarship has not been prominent, unlike its German neighbor. The 1976 Ford Foundation report on IR studies in Europe provided a relevant explanation. The two authors of the French chapter suggested that “[t]he origins of peace research in the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic countries have been coloured by a strongly marked Protestant attitude to the problems of

war and peace.” On the other hand, the distinct French enterprise of *poléomologie*, led by Gaston Bouthoul and his institute was a sociological study of issues of collective violence, with the very concept derived from its Greek meaning “conflict.” However, this version of conflict studies did not have much impact, and its significance would diminish after the 1970s.⁷⁰⁹ The existence of this report, like its West German version, testified to the continuing interest of American foundations in the development of IR studies in Europe. Such analyses would provide US supporters with more knowledge about the actual state of this discipline's trajectory outside the US.

V.7. American IR in the Eyes of French Scholars: Analyses, Explanations, Speculations

In the mid-1950s, in a review article discussing recent works of American IR scholarship, Alfred Grosser would ask whether “the study of international relations” was an “American specialty.” Referring to Duroselle's 1952 RFSP article on the study of IR, he started by assuming the origins of IR teaching in the US of the 1930s. Thus, a certain way of perceiving the disciplinary advances was being developed, one that focused on the role of American scholarship in the emergence of IR as a discipline. In this approach, “the 1919 process” that was discussed in the case of German narratives about IR's scientific history was not present; consequently, no mention was made by Grosser of the Versailles meeting, Chatham House or the Council on Foreign Relations. For him, the period to be underlined lay in the post-World War II years. At the same time, the French distinction

⁷⁰⁹ Deriennic and Moisi, 1976: 42-43.

was symbolized by pointing to the ideas of Renouvin (which were in turn taken over from an article by Duroselle) who rejected a search for historical laws in IR.⁷¹⁰

From Grosser's French viewpoint, Americans' ignorance of historical dimensions was an important point of complaint about US scholarship in IR; their ignorance of history as a discipline had negative consequences for IR. It was also problematic that scholars like Quincy Wright did not take European literature sufficiently into consideration, with only a few references to French and German sources. Even more deserving of criticism was a statement by Wright about the necessity of the scholar to “be precautionary in his research, to protect as a citizen his institutions.” Such declarations were anathema in the eyes of Wright's French colleague who criticized him for having forgotten the significance of research freedom. The questioning of Wright's approach was also extended to other American scholars. Grosser asserted that many other US IR specialists were following Wright in not dealing in a critical manner with certain aspects of American behavior. In this context, such scholars also tended to ignore the impact of moral and psychological forces in their analyses.⁷¹¹ When discussing individual works, Grosser disliked the tendency of what he perceived as “excessive Americanism.” In the case of *International Relation[s] in the Age of Conflict between Democracy and Dictatorship*, a book co-authored by Robert Strausz-Hupé and Stefan Possony, what disturbed the French reviewer concerned the way these two American scholars had provided a list of 19 differences between the US and the old, “decaying,” and

710 Grosser, 1956: 634.

711 Grosser, 1956: 635, 637, 643ff.

“crumbling” Europe. Grosser was not sure whether “to laugh” at or to “be annoyed” by such juxtapositions.⁷¹²

Interestingly, Grosser was also to find a lack of democratic engagement in Morgenthau's work. Commenting on the second edition of *Politics among Nations*, the French scholar remarked that his American colleague had a cynical conception of politics which could be a factor decreasing Morgenthau's willingness to defend democracy against the communist challenge. Such an accusation is clearly an early critique of American realism's detachment from democratic values, a point raised in the post-Cold War period. Not overlooked was the too Nietzschean dimension of Morgenthau's characterization of all humanity in terms of power aspirations.⁷¹³

For Grosser, the Americans were excessively occupied with creating great syntheses. IR scholarship in the US was too broad in its scope and goals. The French scholar, on the other hand, defended the suitability of case studies, after which one should turn to generalizations.⁷¹⁴ However, he also emphasized the difficulties that faced French IR. While historians were skeptical about this new area of study, seeing its focus on current events as rather unserious, in the case of legal scholars, the prominent position of international law was thought as sufficient “to explain the essential of international phenomena.” What was even more interesting concerned the position of political scientists who, in Grosser's opinion, did not differentiate between the comparative and the international, thus mixing comparative politics with IR. As a result, there existed a visible

712 Grosser, 1956: 646-647.

713 Grosser, 1956: 639-641. On later similar critiques see for instance Ish-Shalom, 2006.

714 Grosser, 1956: 649-650.

weakness when it came to the actual development of IR in French scholarship. Looking to prospective paths of IR in his country, Grosser suggested that one should not expect a quick disciplinary development of IR proper, while recognizing the advances being made in the early 1950s. These extended from ASFP workshops to the coming (1956) establishment of the third cycle doctoral studies at the Parisian Sciences Po. On the other hand, Grosser observed that the French had a major advantage vis-à-vis their American colleagues. This derived from a certain distance the French had from the new conditions prevailing in global politics. As the US had become a superpower, American specialists of IR could no longer position themselves easily as scholars detached from the daily impact of international affairs. In this regard, Grosser found a laudable benefit that could be derived for French IR scholars as they were not citizens of a country “that played such a decisive role in world politics.”⁷¹⁵ Therefore, this new-found position of detachment and distance could serve usefully for furthering French IR by providing its scholars with a point of view that did not remain closely tied to a great power's global interests.

When all these statements by Grosser are taken into consideration, it becomes possible to understand why his article mainly reviewing American scholarship asked even in its title whether the discipline was something made in the US, an “American specialty.” The trends that mattered originated from works by US scholars; there existed an already influential literature that covered a wide area of topics. This aspect was demonstrated by Grosser's individual analysis of seven recently published textbooks, which were all American works, with the single exception of George Schwarzenberger's
715 Grosser, 1956: 650-651.

London-published book *Power Politics*. From this early statement in the 1950s, two decades would pass until Stanley Hoffmann's observations about IR being an American social science.⁷¹⁶ The connection here was that this latter scholar had started his career in France, and made use of opportunities available in the context of the early Cold War period to visit the US. There, Hoffmann would prepare reports on the way IR was taught at the most influential American universities. His suggestions, presented to Sciences Po, had played an important role in guiding the school's directors and professorship in choosing the future path of their institute.

Stanley Hoffmann's position at the intersection of French and American political science/IR attracted the attention of Boltanski and Bourdieu who in turn underlined his Sciences Po and (subsequent) Harvard paths. In their account, Hoffmann played an influential role in generating representations of American and French differences for both scholarly audiences. Furthermore, his approach is interpreted as one of using the newer Harvard professorship as a means for recreating the Sciences Po ideology from the supposedly neutral and detached point of a foreign observer.⁷¹⁷ On the other hand, looking at Hoffmann's post-1955 writings, that is after he gained a permanent position in the US as a Harvard professor, one cannot but note his rather critical views of the state of American political science. In a 1957 RFSP article, he summarized the ongoing debates in the US among behavioralist and classical scholars, which he interpreted as a battle fought between scientists and philosophers. Hoffmann was careful to add that scientism

716 See Hoffmann, 1977.

717 Boltanski and Bourdieu, 1976: 20.

was also Americanism in the eyes of the US scholars. Importantly, it should be noted that he made this suggestion twenty years before his famous article analyzing IR as an American social science.

Making use of Louis Hartz' emphasis on the influence of the liberal tradition in America, Hoffmann saw in its impact the origins of conformism's negative consequences. According to him, scholars in the US could assume that they would not engage with values, while in truth their position was one based on dominant values.⁷¹⁸ It is important to juxtapose Hoffmann's critical attitude with the critique raised against him by Boltanski and Bourdieu. While their motivation derives from a report on French social sciences policy for OECD, which Hoffmann had edited, the two thinkers are rather incorrect in accusing him of reproducing the dominant ideology. Even if one acknowledges Hoffmann's position as a scholarly and politically liberal internationalist,⁷¹⁹ his scholarly approach has been one that kept a visible distance from the dominant positions of the day, as shown in his criticism of George W. Bush's foreign policy or in his 1977 article, in which he provided an essential account of the (American-led) dynamics shaping IR without defending but just analyzing the reasons for that process.

If all these dimensions of Hoffmann's position are taken into consideration, then it becomes possible to understand his suggestions in the mid-1950s for French scholars to go beyond mere empiricism, which he saw as being especially the case in the domain of IR. The unseparated nature of French social sciences could be used in a positive fashion,

718 See Hoffmann, 1957, 921.

719 On his liberal internationalism see Hoffmann, 1995.

as the academic disciplines, only weakly distinguished from each other at that point, were open to significant interdisciplinary work.⁷²⁰

In the late 1950s, Duroselle would sum up the situation of IR research in the US when informing the readers of the RFSP about the state of American foreign policy studies. Not only did he underline the quantitative advantage of the American university system, with its 4000 universities, but he also referred to the fact that rich sources and support from non-university establishments like the philanthropic foundations (he mentions all the three foundations that were also of relevance for their work in Europe, that is Rockefeller and Ford Foundations as well as the Carnegie Endowment) provided further means of advancing the study of International Relations. As a result, hundreds of US scholars participated in foreign policy studies, whereas Duroselle complained about the academic weakness of France, as only a few dozen French scholars were doing research in this field. However, in his opinion, the problem did not just derive from a lack of material means, but was one of vocation. This meant that French scholars had not managed to find a settled way of engaging with world political studies, reflecting the conditions that were prevailing in the 1950s. Overcoming this difficulty would pave the way for reaching “a role proportional to our possibilities.”⁷²¹ For Duroselle, the French position could be turned, with some effort, into a more advanced one so that a complete backwardness in the face of American dominance would no longer be the case. After all, the number of books published in a much smaller France was 9908 against the US' 10892

720 Hoffmann, 1957: 931.

721 Duroselle, 1959: 737-738.

in 1949.⁷²² These data were used to implicitly refer to the cultural potential one assumed to exist in France, notwithstanding the difficulties of war years and crises that followed the country in the post-1945 period.

The IR community in France aimed to advance its knowledge about the state of non-French IR, and reports were presented for this purpose at various AFSP meetings. For instance, in 1973, at another round of study meetings, Pierre Hassner, informed about US scholarship, presented an 8-page text dealing with the latest theoretical trends in (American) IR. He discussed the decline of debates that had set classical against scientific scholars, the emergence of James Rosenau's ideas based on linkage, as well as IR's broader horizons extending beyond the usual state-centric approaches. Furthermore, Hassner explained the newly prominent structuralist and neo-Marxist explanations that were also having an impact on IR scholarship abroad. Of note was the absence of peace research in the French IR community.⁷²³ The very presence of this report shows that the US focus on theory was acknowledged and followed by the French community of IR scholars. Such developments should be taken more directly into account, especially because many observers of IR disciplinary history have tended to approach the French IR scene as a completely detached space of scholarship. In regard to this and to similar French reports, it would be more suitable to interpret the supposed French disconnection in more conditional terms.

⁷²² Duroselle, 1952a: 152.

⁷²³ See Hassner, 1973.

According to Andrew Williams, the backwardness of French IR, at least in the eyes of its Anglo-American colleagues, is not disconnected from the distinct position France has on the world political stage. Going back to 1919, he points to the debates between French and their American and British wartime allies that aimed to determine the subsequent structure of a new international settlement. The French insistence on their war-related security and financial concerns led, in his opinion, to a detachment from the then emerging Anglo-American cooperation that would be demonstrated also through the establishment of think tanks. In this context, the Chatham House/RIIA and Council on Foreign Relations lacked a French counterpart. For Williams, the reasons for French IR's state of slow development are thus interpreted to lie in the fact that "the discipline has tended to freeze out French scholarship," with Aron's exceptional position.⁷²⁴ While, in the later interwar years there was the Carnegie-supported CEPE, it did not fill in the gap left by the early disconnection of the French from the American-British cooperation. However, it is difficult to accept that the distinct position of France at the end of the First World War and its subsequent conflicts with its American and British allies could emerge as the reason for France's absence from the world political stage as a major partner in this Anglo-American coalition. Neither could one interpret these factors as the sole causes of IR's weakness as a discipline in the French academic world. Nonetheless, the lack of a French institute resembling British or American foreign affairs institutes has to be noted as a major gap that hindered a speedier advance of world political studies and debates in

⁷²⁴ Williams, 2008: 66-68.

France. The American-supported founding of CEPE would come too late, only in the mid-1930s.

According to Smouts, a problem faced by the French IR community pertained to its being disconnected from contemporary Anglo-Saxon debates. While these debates are seen as having dominated the field in intermittent waves, it is also possible to question the historicity of these – a position emphasized by recent works in IR historiography.⁷²⁵ When Smouts says that the newer generations are knowledgeable about the works which are influential in the (present) American scholarship, her comments demonstrate an implicit acceptance of the US as the center of the discipline, seeing in the latest French observance of it a useful means for academic success.⁷²⁶ What are the reasons for the American influence? For Smouts, it is found in the quantitative gap in favor of US scholarship, in their resource richness, and in the impact of the US journals, as well as in another underemphasized feature: that American scholars are successful in referring to/citing each other. In this regard, Smouts sees the existence of a critical mass that is still lacking in the French community. Nonetheless, a new generation of scholars, whom she praises, has taken a turn towards adapting itself to these prevailing conditions by aiming to publish in Anglo-Saxon journals and attending (their) international conferences, which carry weight in terms of disciplinary power.⁷²⁷

With regard to the differences of French IR from the mainstream American or British scholarship, it is often the case that for some scholars, the pluridisciplinary character of

⁷²⁵ See works mentioned in the general disciplinary history chapter.

⁷²⁶ Smouts, 2002/2003: 84.

⁷²⁷ Smouts, 2002/2003: 85.

French IR is a welcome aspect. The lack of an autonomous foundation is interpreted as the main cause for the visibly heterogeneous nature of IR studies in France.⁷²⁸ On the other hand, for some scholars, a reason of the perceived French disconnection from a more influential American political science lies in the perceptions of Anglo-Saxon scholars who recognize only the mysterious nature of French approaches. An epistemological rupture is seen to exist, one that results from differing methodological choices and varying approaches to issue areas and with regard to data interpretation. On a more general level, the main factors behind these variations can be located in the impact of historical paths taken and the role of traditions. The qualitative domination in political scientific studies (only some one quarter of works are of a quantitative nature) could be explained by reference to the influence of sociology, history and law. In the area of IR, the hegemony of qualitative methods is even higher than the political science average, their figure being some 85 %.⁷²⁹ Such figures show the existence of a position that stands as counterpoint to Americans' interest in quantitative methods, providing another area of divergence from US practices and expectations.

V.8. Theorizing *à la* French: French IR and the Inexistence of *The* Theory of IR

The general position of French IR scholars is marked by a non-theoretical stand as they tend to “do IR” in the form of more empirical studies. However, one has also to note the increased interest in the sociology of the international that is being developed mainly

⁷²⁸ Groom, 2002/2003: 110.

⁷²⁹ See for an elaboration of the relevant views Billordo, 2005: 179-180.

among CERI scholars. This section analyzes French IR in terms of its relation to theory and theorization in order to stress the different understanding of the discipline and its functions among members of the French IR community.

French IR, nowadays more appreciated due to its focus on sociological studies, had in fact always had a certain approach that came from that direction. After the initial Durkheimian analysis that also illustrated the rather weak position given to a separate realm of world political analysis, in the early 1950s, Jacques Vernant would talk of international society (*la société internationale*). He aimed to bring IR to a level that would go beyond the usual emphasis on inter-state relations found in the discipline. In his analysis, IR was located close to sociology and could be made a part of this discipline. One had to have comprehensive knowledge “of all forms of the social life,” as only in that way a broad comprehension of the new complexity one witnessed in the international society could be reached. The study of IR was not merely a means for educating “technicians capable of securing the functioning of the international mechanism.” One had also to become familiar with a “sociological culture” in order to more easily “understand the contemporary universe.” For Vernant, this sociological IR was the means of educating the “cultivated man” (*homme cultivé*) of the 20th century. The increasingly social nature of the world necessitated the advancement of this social dimension of IR so that future enlightened elites could understand more clearly the world in which they lived.⁷³⁰

730 See Vernant, 1952: *passim*.

Many decades after Durkheim, another French IR scholar using sociological frameworks, Marcel Merle would refer to repeated claims that this area of study lacked theories and explicative models. Empirical-descriptive models had the upper hand.⁷³¹ A general skepticism regarding the weight of theory in IR is a French academic feature of continuing influence. In the words of Marie-Claude Smouts, “if there had been [such a theory], one would have known it.” Even the scholar most closely associated with a more theoretical IR becomes a reference point in the rejection of theory in IR, as Smouts qualifies her stance as being at the same time an Aronian one: “I do not believe in *the* theory of international relations.”⁷³²

Even in the early 2000s, French scholars would perceive IR studies as theoretically weak and too descriptive, asserting that it is a “poor relative of political science,” all this despite the more intensive turn toward IR taking place in France from the 1980s on. Following the British observer of French IR, John Groom, Nadège Ragaru also refers to a “historical bifurcation” that resulted from the successes of British and American scholars, unlike their colleagues in France, in reaching early on an institutionalized level for the discipline. This was realized by the establishment of departments, research centers, even think tanks, whereas France would follow with a temporal delay, partially overcome only in the second half of the 20th century. According to Ragaru, this institutional late-comer status was visible even as late as 1987 because it was only then that the first political science agrégation with the specific label International Relations was obtained.⁷³³

731 Merle, 1983: 403-406.

732 Smouts, 2002/2003: 85, emphasis in original.

733 Ragaru, 2002/2003: 77-79.

According to Breitenbauch, French IR is not very “integrated into the transnational-American knowledge production community.” His statement derives from having juxtaposed Scandinavian articles published in 13 internationally significant IR journals to the number of French articles, in a period that ranges from the 1960s to 2000s. The number of articles written by scholars from Sweden, Denmark, and Norway was three times *bigger* than the number of works published by French scholars in the same time frame. One would have expected, relative to their population, that the number of Scandinavian articles would be nine times *smaller*. In the specific area of IR theory, Breitenbauch found only one French article in the 1995-2004 period, whereas the number of Scandinavian theoretical studies published in leading journals in those years amounted to 25.⁷³⁴

While these numbers point to a notable French backwardness, it is important to locate the actual position in which this weakness is placed. As seen in the developmental pathways explored while presenting a history of French IR's disciplinary journey, there has not been a lack of interest in regard to taking the US and its version of doing IR into consideration. To the contrary, even before the end of the Second World War, the French were hosting their American scholarly counterparts in Paris, and in turn visiting American campuses in the early postwar years to learn about their ways. Under these circumstances, it becomes important to challenge Breitenbauch's claim. What distinguished the French community of IR scholars was not their non-integration, but

⁷³⁴ Breitenbauch, 2008: 76-81.

rather the prior problem of having been engaged in the creation of a discipline that would meet the definition accepted by its Anglo-American promoters of the time.

In this context, the problem arose from the structural deficits French scholars and promoters of IR had to face: traditional faculties opposing a separate discipline, the general fragile state of social sciences left between faculties of Law and Letters, that is legal and humanities-related studies, as well as a France whose world political significance was in decline, thus not generating much interest in world politics at the intersection of academic and political worlds.

In the case of the supposed lack of theoretical work, *pace* Breitenbauch, it is possible to talk of significant work done by French scholars, especially in the area of sociological approaches to world politics. One could explain the above mentioned difference (between 25 theory articles and only one, written respectively by the Scandinavians and the French) not only by asserting that the theoretical openings of the last three decades needed some time to reach mainstream IR publications.⁷³⁵ As one of the latest introductions, the journal *International Political Sociology* shows that it was also necessary for French scholars (such as Didier Bigo) to co-initiate a new ISA-tied journal so that their perspectives and insights, which have in the meantime managed to generate new theoretical frameworks, could reach a wider audience. Taking these aspects into

⁷³⁵ One should take into account also the fact that Scandinavian scholars use English in a very effective way and that their successes in peace research provides further advantages when they publishing articles in top IR journals.

account, one could reject the idea presented by Breitenbauch⁷³⁶ that there exists a clear preference for policy-oriented studies among French scholars.

On the other hand, even if such a tendency exists, it is questionable whether IR only becomes, as stated earlier, more of a discipline when it generates its own abstract theories. In that regard, from the meetings of ISC in the interwar and early post-World War II era to Duroselle's and Aron's objections, there arises a clear picture which demonstrates the possibility of doing IR without generating abstract theoretical frameworks. It is in this context that one could talk of a French distinction. One should not merely consider the level of French (theoretical) contributions to American-produced journals, but look at the domestic production that is not so weak in its own versions of theoretical studies.

The problem with Breitenbauch's proposal arises when he refers, in the case of French scholarly community, to a possible conceptual difference from “the modern social science paradigm shared to a wide extent by the transnational-American discipline.”⁷³⁷ By tying the journals to the modern paradigm, he makes these mostly American-led publications into the markers of the latest scientific standards. Such an approach engenders a closed circle, because more American scholars follow these standards generated at home. It is not even necessarily only scholars from France who end up being perceived as unscientific, or at least as less scientific, for not following the latest fashion prevalent on one side of the Atlantic. At the same time, however, there emerge many non-

736 Breitenbauch, 2008: 82.

737 Breitenbauch, 2008: 83.

US scholars who position themselves strategically by fully implementing the American model, turning it into their standard points of reference and citation, connecting themselves to the US center. In the case of France, scholars' attempt to implement certain American-initiated IR models were not sufficient in paving the way for a local IR discipline densely connected to the American IR community, as first their non-theoretical approaches and later on their differing (sociologically infused) theoretical approaches made French scholars foreigners in the US-centered world of IR studies.

With regard to the supposed French tendencies for less theorization, Duroselle's analysis of IR and its early scholarship suggests that American scholars tended to leave the task of producing synthetic studies to their European or European-educated colleagues, notwithstanding their success in generating monographs and contributing significantly to advance Area Studies. Duroselle also referred to Klaus Knorr who had suggested that “Anglo-American Social Scientists” have a “traditional reluctance” when it comes “to generalize about the causation of historical events,” whereas it is the European scholars who “construct their sweeping theories.”⁷³⁸ These observations by Duroselle (and Knorr) are relevant since they point to an aspect of IR scholarship that seems to have gained retrospective implausibility: that Europeans were the ones doing the theorizing. However, it is this neglected aspect that becomes visible through an intensive engagement with the disciplinary history of IR, showing contemporary scholars the neglected dimensions of an area of study. While the dominance of American scholars in IR theoretical works is nowadays a more or less accepted reality, it is the non-American

738 Duroselle, 1952b IR: 698.

origins of the discipline's mid-20th century specialists that one should also consider. It is in this context that Hans Morgenthau, John Herz, Arnold Wolfers, Karl Deutsch and others emerged, before names like Kenneth Waltz or Robert Keohane came to replace this older generation. It also becomes understandable why a broader European tradition in social theory and consequently French sociology of IR has not generated the same degree of interest in the US.

During the last three decades a theoretical approach that was more sociologically influenced came to the forefront of French IR. At this juncture, it was the functions of theory itself which were still open to question. Thus, Jean-Louis Martres would assert in 2003 that “the West, the essential place of theoretical debate, finds always good reasons to elaborate interventionist doctrines based on great principles or good sentiments. First the Church and just war, then the defense of democracy and human rights.” According to Martres, all these are just means that make the West look like the defender of such positive values. Based on these premises, Martres puts the question in the context of IR, asking whether it is “a modelization of a political practice” or indeed “the embryo of a science” that could find “repetitive regularities.”⁷³⁹

Martres is critical about the theoretical possibilities of IR, because the influence of political ideas give it the shape of a “pseudoscience.” This becomes clear also when he asserts that realism in IR is neither a theory nor a paradigm. Realism is more “an art of politics transposed into international relations.” Similar to recent critical approaches that study IR's disciplinary history, Martres underlines the role of ideological factors in the

739 Martres, 2003: 19-20.

formation of IR theoretical frameworks, also pointing to the actual foreign policy orientations that have an influence on these processes. In his opinion, many debates shaping the discipline, such as those related to epistemology, become possible at times such as the end of the Cold War when more scholars could engage with these issues.⁷⁴⁰

Bringing his analysis of the role of paradigms/theories in IR to the level of their meta-theoretical roles, he suggests that they are religion-like structures that emerge as a consequence of scholars' great expectations for "discovering the final explication." These concerns, coupled with the binary approaches prevailing in the Western philosophy, constrain IR from reaching broader levels of analyses. Martres concludes by calling for overcoming paradigms, so that it becomes possible to do IR by approaching individual events and dealing with "concrete issues." His call for eclecticism originates from the assumption that paradigms/theories converge with and complement each other.⁷⁴¹ The picture emerging from his proposition shows that even early 21st century French IR scholarship continues to keep a certain distance from too structured approaches in the study of world politics, being skeptical about making use of tightly separated paradigmatic/theoretic tools. I emphasized the impact of sociologically infused IR theories in the last period of French scholarship because the existence of such eclectic positions is important. It is this flexibility that paves the way for going beyond a single theory, and offers a significant feature of French IR that makes it different from American scholarship that is more hermetic in terms of theory.

740 Martres, 2003: 20-34, 37.

741 Martres, 2003: 36-37, 39-40.

In this chapter, I analyzed French IR's main features. I pointed to the role of American foundations and French founding fathers as well as the distinct nature of the French academic world. Their interactions triggered transnational dynamics that gave the discipline a distinct trajectory in France. By explaining the interwoven nature of French political science and IR, and demonstrating their gradual development as social scientific disciplines that faced important opponents (e.g. law, history, sociology) during their academic journey, I was able to clarify the reasons for French IR's relative weakness. That geopolitics and other disciplines have their own share in studying the international means that IR cannot claim to be the only scholarly undertaking to analyze international processes and phenomena. I turn in the conclusion to a broader overview of transnational dynamics and the future of IR. This French case, together with the German one, showed how IR's disciplinary history can provide useful insights in thinking about the discipline's present and future. This is possible because analyzing IR's multiple developmental trajectories testified to its inherent plurality. This is not only the starting point of the discipline, but also its present path that goes beyond American IR.

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

In this concluding chapter, I first provide an overview of German and French IR's developmental trajectory in the last two decades, underlining the degree to which the two scholarly communities managed to gradually advance in providing for IR a more developed academic standing. As will become visible from the two sections on post-1990 German and French IR, it is more the former that has succeeded in establishing a relatively developed IR scholarship, whereas the greater structural obstacles in the French case have prevented French scholars from making advances similar to their colleagues on the other side of the Rhine.

After analyzing the two IR communities separately during the last 20 years, there follows a third section in which I offer a comparative framework that emphasizes the commonalities and divergences of German and French IR as well as their position vis-à-vis the American IR community. Finally, I conclude by emphasizing the dissertation's main contributions in advancing the scope of knowledge in the area of IR's disciplinary history.

Before the detailed sections, it is useful to take a general look at this study. I provided an analysis of transnational dynamics affecting both the shape of interwar debates on the nature of IR, and more importantly the emergence and development of IR in 20th century Germany and France. By taking into account not only national academic contexts but also actors such as American foundations, scholar-refugees, visiting scholars

to the US and Europe, national government decisions and international scholarly associations, I offered both a disciplinary history of German and French IR and an analysis of how these transnational dynamics paved the way for hybrid IR communities in these two continental European cases. Path-dependency arguments were rejected as it was shown that even American foundations did not succeed in establishing the IR discipline in its American model. While French scholars focused on more empirical studies and neglected theoretical works, Germans turned their attention to alternative areas such as peace research and did not participate in the American “great debates.” Therefore, both disciplines had developmental trajectories marked by hybridities. While I finish the last section by discussing the future possibilities for a broader disciplinary history of IR that can reflect the discipline's own internationality, it is useful to summarize at this juncture the present study's major findings by also considering the broader literature and scholarship in this subject.

First, this disciplinary history goes beyond studies that look at IR's present conditions. In this regard, I engaged with Ole Wæver's and Arlene Tickner's geocultural epistemological studies (and the former's sociology of IR studies), Steve Smith's critical studies of IR's political functions, and John Hobson's critical approach to the discipline's Western-centric nature in order to demonstrate that a detailed analysis of IR's disciplinary history could provide a broader framework for clarifying the current challenges our scholarship faces. German and French cases demonstrated that there exists an impressive past of our discipline, one that has been mostly neglected when thinking of IR's present

conditions. Expanding the literature on American and British IR studies, successfully developed by scholars such as Brian Schmidt, Tim Dunne, and Nicolas Guilhot, I aimed to point to the internal dynamics of “Western” IR that carried the immanent seeds of its own plurality.

Second, this study of IR's continental European pathways offers the important lesson that IR cannot be properly understood as an area of study without considering its wider aspects including the role of the transnational dynamics. US foundations and their interactions with German and French scholars provide very important instances of processes that produced the discipline in Europe. Whereas the mainstream scholarship tends to ignore non-American trajectories of IR, the two cases showed that no single narrative of the discipline's development can be taken for granted. The fact that Sciences Po and DhFP/Otto Suhr Institut played a prominent role in the institutionalization of the discipline and its gradual establishment as a separate academic area explains why highlighting schools and their functions for IR's development is essential. Similarly, the focus on the axis of “founding fathers” offers another means for demonstrating the way in which transnational dynamics determined the shape of IR. These two aspects, institutes and scholars, provide a new tool for offering broader explanations of our discipline. Whereas many scholars whose works greatly contributed to the advancement of IR's disciplinary history study the ideational and theoretical developments, I offered an alternative frame that emphasizes the interactions between a great number of actors in the form of transnational dynamics and showed the consequences in the institutional and

individual scholarly dimensions. Therefore, unlike Schmidt's intensive textual analyses, I pay attention to the interactions of political, academic and societal processes, bringing into my study the academicians as well as foundation officials. In this regard, the framework I present is similar to the cultural-institutional one suggested by Jørgensen. However, by paying special attention to the transnational dynamics (and especially American foundations) I offer a different general picture, one marked by factors that are not limited to national, or even European, developments.

Third, it becomes visible with the German and French cases, and the analysis of ISC's role, that IR cannot be taken as a single discipline that can be explained by considering only its American trajectory. Due to its original interdisciplinarity and the different extent to which it interacted with political science, IR's development in various national and regional contexts emerges as a process that is too heterogeneous, preventing one from seeing it as a single narrative with teleological tendencies. In this context, the detailed trajectories of the discipline's European journey showed that the degree of its academic setting differs and that the American focus on theory, with its concomitant emphasis on positivism should not provide the only way to understand IR's present form. Such a conclusion enables the future opening of the discipline to a post-Western future without neglecting the historical legacy of its Western (and European) roots. IR's origins had multiple roots, and its continental European trajectories have shown that its disciplinary structure was marked by the impact of transnational dynamics, bringing about as hybrid discipline. Understanding this past paves the way for preparing ourselves

for IR's current challenges, the ones it faces through the growing influence of non-Western IR communities. Whatever the future paths, the disciplinary history presented here shows that it would not be the first time that contingent outcomes determine IR's new hybridities.

VI.1. Closing a Century – I: Post-1990 German IR

In this section, I provide an analysis of IR in a reunified Germany, following the end of the East German regime in 1989/1990. By highlighting the main developments in the 1990s and early 2000s through reference to German scholars' self-evaluations, my aim is to underline the closer ties of German IR to its American counterpart. The specific case of a new IR-dedicated academic journal can be seen as the major mark of this attitudinal change. At the same time, certain critical traditions continue to have an impact as questioning the direct imitation of American approaches has generated heavy criticism within the German scholarly community.

With regard to the number of professors involved in political science, it is remarkable that there has been a significant rise over three decades in the percentage of IR specialists. According to various categorizations, their share rose from 11% in late 1960s to more than 18% at the beginning of the 21st century. If one adds a similar increase in the area of comparative politics, it is possible to note the steady rise in interest in research issues that go beyond the domestic scope of Germany.⁷⁴²

742 Arendes, 2005:133-134.

In the 1990s, following German reunification and a concomitant rise of German influence on the global level, its IR community witnessed some major changes that brought new energy into German scholarship on world politics. The most important factor was the 1994 founding of the *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* (shortly *ZIB*, Journal of International Relations), providing the first specifically IR journal four decades later than in the US, with *International Organization* and *World Politics*, founded in 1947 and 1949 respectively. The same period marked a visible trend towards internationalization in the sense of reaching American scholarly audiences.

Whereas as late as 1986 Czempiel, one of the leading scholars of (West) German IR, lamented the lack of any central issue area prevailing in the German IR community, complained about the non-existence of a separate working group within the political science association, criticized the overlooking of IR issues in the major political science journal PVS (as a separate IR journal did not exist anyway),⁷⁴³ all these aspects would change by the early 1990s. The International Politics Section (SEI) within the association (DVPW) was reactivated in 1986, and the new journal *ZIB* was born a few years later. This broader engagement with global debates was a major change of direction. No longer could Czempiel write that the shadows of the discipline's famous three debates had failed to reach German IR. Complaints about the relative weakness of theory-oriented approaches would end. In 1990, Rittberger and Hummel summarized the prevailing conditions by pointing to the lack of sufficient institutional structures for cooperation, including the need for an IR journal. Furthermore, the importance of broader engagement

⁷⁴³ Czempiel, 1986: 251.

in the area of policy advice was emphasized, by proposing to go beyond guidance for the national government, to turn to transnational and non-governmental organizations. A third point was to communicate with the public in sharing the results of IR research.⁷⁴⁴ While the two authors saw major weaknesses in all these areas in 1990, the situation would quickly improve by the next decade.

In 2003, Michael Zürn provided a direct answer to the claims of Rittberger and Hummel by underlining the changes in German IR. More theorization, greater ties to international scholarship and broader cooperation in research projects provide a different picture of a reunified Germany's IR community.⁷⁴⁵ The existence of the *ZIB* with its double blind peer review system was a most welcome novelty for IR scholarship, as it was the first political science journal to introduce this system in Germany. Due to mainstream authors' focus on building bridges between constructivist and rationalist approaches and similar *via media* trials, Zürn referred ironically to an ongoing Venetianization of German IR.⁷⁴⁶ He was emphasizing an aspect that became important for German scholars who aimed to reach a synthesis between US rationalist IR and continental approaches with their more constructivist features. From a political context, one could assert that this bridge-building was to a certain extent influenced by post-1989 Germany's new European and global position. In line with Hanns Maull's concept of civilian power, the 1990s were paving the way for the prioritized values of human rights

744 Rittberger and Hummel, 1990: 38-39.

745 See Zürn, 2003: *passim*.

746 Zürn, 2003: 28.

and related issues, thus enabling Germans to make use of their continental weight in order to promote such issues.⁷⁴⁷

Under these circumstances, a political orientation towards normative concerns was in line with the scientific turn and a close following of US models. Therefore, the actual Venetianization can be seen as a consequence of both academic and political developments. In more general terms, Zürn provided a different picture of German IR that was shown to have greatly improved its position among German social scientific fields. Internationally, quantitative increases in authorship and editorial positions in major journals like *International Organization* (IO) and *International Studies Quarterly* (ISQ) as well as the *European Journal of International Relations* (EJIR) demonstrated, according to Zürn, the growing impact of German IR.⁷⁴⁸

In 2009, further analysis of German IR was offered by Nicole Deitelhoff and Klaus Dieter Wolf who claimed that the common disciplinary thread was a focus on global governance. This was in line with previous reviews that referred to the significance of transnational actors in German IR research. The authors rejected Bleek's suggestion that had put German IR (in his history of German political science) into a separate realm within the general political science discipline, pointing to its rather weak position. Rather, they asserted that IR is now at the very center of German political science. This new situation provided a notable contrast to earlier decades in which IR was a backwater field within (West) German political science not only in the eye of its critics but also its

⁷⁴⁷ See Maull, 1990 for an early example of his framework.

⁷⁴⁸ Zürn, 2003: 32.

promoters. Advances at home were in line with the concomitant progress on the international dimension. In this context, the 1990-1991 ISA presidency of Helga Haftendorn, a leading IR scholar at Freie Universität Berlin, and the first foreign scholar to lead this important North American (dominated) IR association was a significant landmark. The concomitant rise of Thomas Risse to IO's co-editorial position signaled a much more “integrated” German IR community.⁷⁴⁹ The state of German IR in the early 21st century is marked by pluralism, while its new mainstream consists of an institutionalist paradigm that combines rationalist and constructivist approaches in a form of soft positivism. What continues to differentiate German IR scholarship from its US counterpart is the taking into account of political and social theories, reaching from the philosophical texts of Habermas to Luhmann's systems theories.⁷⁵⁰

Christoph Humrich's analysis points to a potential threat facing more dynamic IR research in a unified Germany. He sees a new normality that is turning German IR into a post-critical discipline. According to Humrich, the new mainstream, also established in the shape of the influential *ZfA* journal, has left behind the impact of critical theory-based approaches by emphasizing empirical or logical critiques but not normative ones.⁷⁵¹ Important to note is that this changing landscape is tied in Humrich's explanation to new conditions prevailing in a re-unified Germany that has started to have more impact on world politics. Humrich explicitly refers to the regaining of full sovereignty, although he concludes that a detailed discussion of this connection is not part of his broader

749 Deitelhoff and Wolf, 2009: 456 and also fn. 7 there.

750 Deitelhoff and Wolf, 2009: 461-462.

751 Humrich, 2006: 73ff.

framework.⁷⁵² At this juncture, it is exactly these aspects which deserve more analysis. However, the role of sovereignty should not be overemphasized. As discussed earlier, sovereignty by itself cannot explain the general impact of IR's disciplinary influence. Southern European countries such as Italy, Spain and France have not been active internationally in contributing to IR, whereas the Scandinavian IR community has provided examples of global engagement with their prominent role in research on world politics. On the other hand, when Humrich ties the consequences of social and political changes to a certain kind of renewed self-confidence, which in turn decreases the role of self-reflection among Germans, and also in IR itself, he provides a useful tool for looking at the state of German IR in the post-1989 period. Whereas the critical scholars of the 1960s and 1970s were motivated in their questions not only by their desire to overcome American IR but also by the legacy of the Nazi years that had to be faced and challenged, the general fashion for normality seems to have weakened these claims in the post-unification years. However, the consequent failure of Germany to deal with neo-Nazi movements and racist attacks shows that this shadow is not easily left behind. In this regard, a point made by Deitelhoff and Wolf provides another aspect about the context-related dimensions of German IR scholarship. Whereas Habermas and Kant were the important figures for many scholars, world political developments seem now to have pushed aside the literature on peace. Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben emerge as the ideas-providers in this transformed era of international affairs, as one turns his/her gaze toward issues of war and emergency. Deitelhoff and Wolf are critical of this, claiming

⁷⁵² Humrich, 2006: 75-76.

that short-time attention spans are the reasons for this focus on the “latest fashion.”⁷⁵³ At a first look, it can be problematic that changing times bring about drastic agenda shifts in the discipline. The obvious alternative expectation is that new theories have to replace old ones, as new times necessitate new insights. Between the two extreme options of complete changes in direction and a stubborn insistence on (old and established) theories and research areas, there lies a middle position. It consists of a gradual adaptation of research issues and generated theories to actual world political developments. It is this middle approach that dominates the German IR community in the early 21st century.

While new fashions emerge intermittently, the research exhibits certain continuities. Institutionalism and global governance as well as transnationalist approaches still exert considerable influence on German IR scholars. This dominance generates a disadvantage for certain theoretical approaches. Peace research has lost its previous impact, as its separation from IR proper has triggered the latter to ignore the work of peace researchers. Normative theory is seen as another victim of positivism's rise in German IR. According to Christopher Daase, the focus on global governance-related approaches can be problematic due to their overlooking of normative and power political conditions that should also be taken into account in analyzing the issues of governance. Otherwise, these studies are prone to become means of optimization for policy processes, serving to reach certain targets like “security, democracy or good governance.”⁷⁵⁴

753 Deitelhoff and Wolf, 2009: 467-468.

754 Daase, 2010: 322-325.

The new trend is one of getting closer to US IR, while not necessarily imitating it in its totality. Some earlier differences that had created variations between continental and American approaches in the scientific study of world politics continue to have influence. In this regard, the remarks by Gantzel-Kress and Gantzel in the late 1970s have not lost their relevance. According to them, the divergence between the US quest for strict methods and the concomitant desire for natural-science-like scientificity could not emerge to the same degree in Germany as the influence of “theories of the European traditions of thought do not allow themselves to be forced into the procrustean bed of the scientific approaches.” Historical-sociological and radical theories are an important part of European understandings of science, leading scholars to reject an abstracted version of science.⁷⁵⁵ Notwithstanding the ability of German scholars to engage internationally, a visible distance between American and German approaches to IR continues to exist.

An aspect that needs to be mentioned again in this context concerns the role of language. In this instance, it was seen as a problem for many German scholars that their studies, which were seen by the German IR community as providing many original insights, were ignored by their American colleagues. One obvious reason for this is the fact that German scholars usually write (or rather tended to write) in German. While Deitelhoff and Wolf noted the positive contributions arising from the increasing tendency of German scholars to publish directly in English language journals, they also emphasized the necessity of remaining connected to the German context. Otherwise, the “sterile, solid but also more or less pointless” features of US IR would be repeated in

⁷⁵⁵ Gantzel-Kress and Gantzel, 1980: 235.

German scholarship, making it lose its distinction and originality. These preferences also hinder national journals like *ZIB* and *PVS* from receiving high quality articles as many German IR scholars prefer to send their articles directly to more influential English-language publications. Interestingly, Deitelhoff and Wolf acknowledge the role of *IO* and *ISQ*, while individually declaring their liking for the *European Journal of International Relations* or *Review of International Studies*, both with lower rankings in the academic publications field, but closer to German ideas of IR.⁷⁵⁶

When the American IR scholar David Lake gave his presidential address at the 2010 ISA annual meeting, he triggered a great deal of criticism because of his alleged failure to take German and European IR research into account. The direct cause was his proposal to deal with global governance as a new focal point of the disciplinary agenda. According to Daase, by that time global governance had already become an established research field in European and German IR. He continued by asserting that it was now even possible to assume that it was the Americans' turn to follow European- (and German-) initiated theoretical advances.⁷⁵⁷ However, the language issue seems to provide a barrier in that regard too. One famous example was the so-called “*ZIB* debate” in the 1990s, which witnessed the use of Habermasian Critical Theory for IR purposes. While articles followed one another in the pages of *ZIB*, creating a new mainstream within the German IR community, it was only with the much later article of Thomas Risse that this whole debate was finally taken to the international IR agenda. His contribution, published in

⁷⁵⁶ See Deitelhoff and Wolf, 2009: 469 and also fn. 21 there.

⁷⁵⁷ Daase, 2010: 317-318.

2000 in *IO* paved the way for an English-language, and thus global, opening for ideas emerging from the *ZIB* debate to a non-German audience. Before that, there had been no American (or British) scholar undertaking such a transmissive function, leaving it to the Berlin-based German professor Risse, who was simultaneously very successfully connected to his US colleagues. Certain ramifications of the tensions in the national community were visible when an article by Risse was published in *ZIB* in 2004, with the title “We did much better! Why it had to be in American [English]” (the first sentence was actually in English in the original). This was a later reply to Zürn's 1994 *ZIB* article titled “We can do much better! But does it have to be in American [English]?” (Again the first sentence was in English in the original). The general debate concerned various ideas about the extent to which one should direct his/her research toward the international IR community. Not only the language aspect, but also the limits of following an American-influenced research agenda provided important points of debate.

Notwithstanding the changing structure of the German IR community, explainable by the mainstream scholarship's perceived need of a disciplinary *aggiornamento*, the idea that theoretical pluralism should remain as a major feature in German IR continues to shape the way scholars approach the discipline. It was in such circumstances that Rittberger and Hummel were approvingly quoting Daniel Frei's assertion that an “[a]ctive, critical theoretical engagement with international politics has to be based always on a plurality of theories.” According to these two authors, the choice would be between issue-related and competing thought schools in the discipline on the one hand,

and an alternative development with the dominance of a big theory that would challenge the pluralist structure.⁷⁵⁸ When looking at the German IR community through these two conflicting categories, the second condition more aptly describes its present state. While issues like global governance, and in a broader light, the constructivist-rationalist synthesis carry weight, they are still not the only game in town. Critical theoretical approaches continue to exert influence, although the bridge-building synthesis of constructivist-rationalist approaches has the upper hand in the mainstream.

The epistemological choices of constructivist-rationalist positions present a challenge to critical theoretical scholarship, which nonetheless has a rich basis of political theoretical sources applicable to the study of world politics. The analysis conducted by Deitelhoff and Wolf in 2009 also pointed to this aspect of German IR by emphasizing its pluralist nature as a feature that has provided from early on an essential characteristic of its IR community and that still yields the same impact.⁷⁵⁹ Proposals for a turn to a more holistic IR can be given as relevant examples of this openness. For instance, Mathias Albert has put forward the idea of making IR a “science of the global” (*Wissenschaft vom Globalen*). For the German IR community this would mean making use of its distinct position that enables it to turn to its long-established ties with other social sciences and humanities, using insights from the social historical tradition of the Bielefeld school or applying the approaches taken from Niklas Luhmann's sociological insights. Such a preference would make it possible, in turn, to “de-border” the discipline.⁷⁶⁰ This proposal

758 Rittberger and Hummel, 1990: 25.

759 Deitelhoff and Wolf, 2009: 461.

760 Zürn, 2003: 40-41.

can be seen as similar to earlier calls emanating from the German scholarly community that aimed to bring IR closer to general social theory. While such a broadening beyond IR's strict borders was defended in the 1960s and 1970s in order to undertake Marxist-inspired analysis, in the 1990s and 2000s, the tendency was to bring Habermasian or Luhmannian approaches into IR as new tools for research and theory.

However, not all scholars agree that the current state of German IR is sustainable in its present structure. Daase claims that advances made in areas like global governance should not lead to a theoretical narrowness in German scholarship. According to him, theory is the only means for a lively scientific debate to determine the overall quality of the discipline. Although such a preference derives from a boundary-setting practice, which is itself based on a certain understanding of scientific practices and its internal hierarchies that prioritize theory-building, Daase's reference to the functions of theoretical discussions as tools for an efficient communication among IR scholars provides a useful insight. He acknowledges that “theory is no goal by itself [*Selbstzweck*],” rather, it should serve as an enriching means for renewing research in the discipline, bringing in new dimensions that need to be taken into account. In all these processes, the empirical part needs to be considered as well so that no self-centered theoretical debates take place.⁷⁶¹ When seen from this perspective, *pace* Daase, it becomes possible to underline the double success of German IR. First, there is a closer engagement with American IR scholarship and a concomitant rise in German scholars' international engagement. Second, a continuing influence of insightful critical theoretical

761 Daase, 2010: 319, 336-337.

contributions managed to overcome the actual and potential challenges posed by a more US-like German IR. The reason for this lies in postwar West Germany's and reunified Germany's contingencies in the field of IR scholarship. As stated earlier, no single factor has played a role that would pave the way for a decisive form of path-dependent development in German IR. The roles of US officials, foundations and scholars as well as returning emigrants interacted with earlier German political science, generating a very heterogeneous community, the original members of which even lacked a formal education in political science or IR proper. As further domestic and world political developments and social trends gave birth to important upheavals in (West) Germany, the consequence was a discipline that did not show any direct reflection of US imitation or “older traditions” of German political science, but presented a mixture of the two, while also continuing to change in line with all these shifts. Such was the general developmental trajectory of German IR, one marked by the contingent dynamics influencing scholarly, institutional and ideational pathways in a not pre-determined fashion.

VI.2. Closing a Century – II: Post-1990 French IR

In this section, I discuss the developments that have marked French IR in the last two decades. After the impact of the transnational dynamics that had shaped the developmental trajectory of the emerging discipline in the mid-20th century, this last period was marked more by domestic developments. As pointed out earlier, this is an era

marked by the rise of more sociologically influenced scholars with scholars like Bertrand Badie, Marie-Clause Smouts and Didier Bigo developing a distinct approach to IR that includes a certain level of theorization. An increase in turning toward the international scholarly scene was also visible in this period.

What were the relevant circumstances that enabled such a process of change in French IR? A reliable answer comes from one of the actors of this new French IR. According to Badie, three big ruptures have paved the way for new disciplinary positions. The end of a bipolar world order, coupled with “the crisis of the state” in the sense of the turmoil witnessed by states in their domestic and international dimensions, notwithstanding their First or Third World status, as well as new forces of globalization have, in his opinion, also shifted the nature of the discipline. In such a context, new frameworks of analysis have become a necessity, making earlier analysis, for instance that of Aron, less relevant in this period of change. Badie's references to James Rosenau's book *Turbulence in World Politics* that deals with these transformations in the international dimension testify to French scholars' interest in following American IR.⁷⁶²

The specific DEA titles that provide distinct doctoral degrees in International Relations are still very few, showing the relative backwardness of French IR at least in institutional terms.⁷⁶³ According to François Constantin, the difficulties of IR in French higher education are increased by failing to distinguish between studies of the foreign and the international and the concomitant concept of *aire culturelle*, or Area Studies. In this

762 Badie, 1993: 66-69.

763 Constantin, 1999: 59.

context, the specific area of IR is rather weak, also due to the “marginalisation of internationalists [that is IR scholars]” within political science. Constantin focuses on the need to update the scholarly field by suggesting that Renouvin or Aron can no longer be taken as examples of scientific research, as new generations of IR specialists have developed new ways of dealing with the international. Of course, the lack of translated works (from English into French) demonstrates some obstacles for students of IR in France – as works of scholars such as Robert Keohane, Robert Cox and James Rosenau remain untranslated. According to Constantin, a better position for IR scholars requires that the discipline attract more interest from the French academic community. Problems tied to hiring processes make it difficult for IR specialists to advance, while their international engagements can present much easier platforms than the ones they face at home. A solution would be to try to establish separate IR positions, against the continuing opposition of the older academic disciplines.⁷⁶⁴

If one takes statistics from the early 21st century into account, more than 100 out of some 300 professors and associate professors teaching political science and its subfields are in the Parisian center of the discipline. Similarly, in the area of thesis production, one sees the reproduction of institutional power in terms of intellectual reproduction, as, for instance, in the 1990-2001 period close to 60 % of theses were submitted in Parisian institutes. The continuing weakness of political science compared to disciplines like public law can also be seen with some 7000 scholars active in the latter, while political scientists number around 500 in all the subfields. With regard to international

⁷⁶⁴ Constantin, 1999: 64-66.

cooperation, French political science finds itself disadvantaged, as in the mid-2000s there were only twelve institutional members of ECPR in France, whereas the figure was 54 for the UK and 18 for Italy, not to mention more than 20 American universities who take part in this pan-European political science research association.⁷⁶⁵ These numbers show that the mid-20th century transnational dynamics shaping the emerging IR discipline in France have not succeeded in generating an independently viable area of study when compared to its traditional competitors like history, law or sociology. At the same time, the long tradition of mainly Paris-based teaching and research (and more generally, political science) has continued to shape the French scholarly community. Even ENA's move to Strasbourg has not changed this in any visible way.

In the late 1990s, French political science had still not reached the advanced institutional position of its Anglo-Saxon counterparts. However, it already had its own sections within the relevant organs of the French university system, with its own section at CNRS, within the national scientific research organization, added in 1993.⁷⁶⁶ In a state-of-the-art publication of this later period, edited by the president and vice-president of the French political science teachers and researchers association AECSP, Pierre Favre (as its president) mentioned the public perception of their discipline which had created a division between doing politics and undertaking political scientific research. Even as late as the 1990s, he would call for “*pluriproblématisme*” which meant that students should be taught multiple aspects of political science issues as part of their studies.⁷⁶⁷ Such an

⁷⁶⁵ Blondiaux and Déloye, 2007: 140-142, 157.

⁷⁶⁶ Bock, 1996: 216.

⁷⁶⁷ Favre, 1998: 17, fn. 2.

approach reminds one of the earlier origins of French political science, which derives from its pluralistic nature under the broader concept of political *sciences*. It could be said that many decades have passed, but not much of an ideational change has taken place.

In the case of French IR studies, Daniel Battistella asserts, in his major French textbook on IR theories, that its weakness can also be interpreted as a result of its subdisciplinary position within political science. He points to “the historical evolution of political scientific study of international relations” in the French academic structure. For Battistella, the disciplinary pathway had been a rather strange one in the sense of becoming a crossroads discipline (*discipline-carrefour*) “without having been ever a discipline of/by itself.”⁷⁶⁸ However, such reasoning does not withstand a comparison with the US case, in which a similar subdisciplinary position of IR does not diminish its impact as an important scholarly undertaking.

In Marie-Claude Smouts' opinion, the option available for French IR in the early 21st century was to establish a visible presence in IR at the international level. This would include books published in English, the *lingua franca* of social sciences, as well as more active participation in international conferences.⁷⁶⁹ In addition to having only a small community, the fact that no political science departments existed except the programs within the IEPs and the University Paris-I's separate institutional arrangement in late 1960s demonstrate the quantitative and qualitative challenges faced by IR and political science. An undergraduate degree in political science began in France only in the 1990s,

768 Battistella, 2010: 691-692.

769 Smouts, 2002/2003: 88.

again mainly in faculties of Law.⁷⁷⁰ Under these circumstances, IR did not evolve into more prominence independent of its political science ties. Such a structure did not trigger a specific research interest in the discipline itself.⁷⁷¹ It is important to again underline the nature of this study that ties together various aspects of French IR in order to present an understandable but still detailed trajectory of its disciplinary and developmental pathways.

An important point made by Constantin concerns his suggestion that there exists a certain dialectic between a “state's features and its international status” and “the status attributed to the study of international relations in that state.” French scholarship with its more legal and historical studies of world politics in the interwar period was a concomitant feature of a France which still asserted its status as a great power. However, Constantin is careful to add that the privileged position of such studies of the international declined with the post-World War II period, once France had lost much of its earlier global significance. It is in this context that he asserts the weakness of French goals in the study of world politics, thus paving the way for US scholars who would fill in the void with their theories that were developed in a country (the US) enjoying the benefits of its newly taken superpower status.⁷⁷²

Such a framework signifies that one could indeed talk of two separate periods of IR. The first was the pre-1945 era, which one should mainly think of as the interwar years heavily marked by the work of ISC and the emergence of a new discipline, with

⁷⁷⁰ Zettelmeier, 1996: 183.

⁷⁷¹ See also Smouts 2002/2003: 89.

⁷⁷² Constantin, 2002/2003: 94.

continental European scholars playing an important role. The second began in the early years of the post-World War II period. In the first era, multiple voices could be heard, whereas the second one was marked by the intellectual and scholarly hegemony of the US, extending to the domain of IR.

Constantin asserts that in states with middle power status such as Scandinavia and West Germany the discipline of IR “became an important issue.” It was similar in developing regions of the world. According to him, such tendencies suggest that the advancement of IR in these various parts of the world points to a connection between academic status and political goals.⁷⁷³ However, it is rather exaggerated to see in this newly emerging discipline a means of realization of a new state's quest for a better status. More importantly, notwithstanding Constantin's assertion that peace research undertaken by France's European neighbors witnessed significant advances, it would be difficult to state that West German IR of the period was marked by a developed scholarship. What Constantin perceives as a French backwardness was in fact also valid in the case of its West German neighbor.

For Constantin, the essential aspect that needs improvement in IR is to go beyond the focus on inter-state issues, taking in the dimensions of solidarity and cooperation.

According to him, scholars of IR ignored the relevance of everyday phenomena, while they were busy looking to the US-Soviet rivalry, “reading the American theoreticians of the Cold War.” For the present conditions affecting French IR, Constantin presents a more promising horizon as when he suggests that the rather small IR community in

⁷⁷³ Constantin, 2002/2003: 96.

France could in fact secure the further existence of “the virtues of an handicraft [*artisanat*]”, which would thus serve for “innovation and quality.” The lack of a major market place with its effects of setting certain structures could contribute positively to French IR's gradual but scholarly advancement.⁷⁷⁴

In a 1998 letter French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin asked François Heisbourg to prepare a report on the state of research and study in the areas of International Relations as well as Strategic and Defense Affairs. In 2000, the Heisbourg Report was made public, offering ideas on the future of these areas. Not only did it complain about a continuing lack in the education of (future) researchers, but it also pointed to an insufficiently interdisciplinary approach. Most importantly, Heisbourg stated the obvious by underlining the failure to make IR a subject of study and research with a significant position within the university system.⁷⁷⁵

With regard to possible measures that could advance the standing of IR (and strategic studies) in France, Heisbourg suggested several options. One was the founding of a separate school for IR. At the same time, he proposed to recognize IR's crossroads-like disciplinary structure (a point made by other scholars, as shown above) and to focus on doctoral studies more directly, extending the doctoral studies mostly done at IEP Paris to a broader frame. Another point was to change some fiscal rules so that foundations could also become more active in this domain, becoming able to carry costs of research institutes instead of the currently overburdened state.⁷⁷⁶

774 Constantin, 2002/2003: 98-99, emphasis on *artisanat* is mine.

775 See Heisbourg, 2000: [2ff.] No page numbers provided, I did the page numbering.

776 Heisbourg, 2000: [6].

The report shows some interesting data about the state of IR-related scholars in France. Out of some 336 candidates who applied to become researchers in the political science unit of the French national scientific research organization CNRS, only 33 were IR specialists (including 11 scholars with a focus on the European Union), and 111 doing “*aires culturelles*” (Area Studies). The low percentage of IR background is remarkable, illustrating that even in the post-1990s the numerical weakness of this area of study (even as a political science subdiscipline) is not yet overcome.⁷⁷⁷

An *Ecole Française des Relations Internationales* (French School of International Relations) has not come into being as yet, and the proposals by Heisbourg were left as another unrealized project for the advancement of French IR. However, a similar process was launched in 2004 when the French foreign and defense ministers asked two IR-involved pundits Gilles Andréani and Frédéric Bozo to prepare a report on how to establish “a national institute for study and research in the area of international relations.”⁷⁷⁸

Their 2008 report recommended founding a *Maison des Relations Internationales* (House of International Relations) where graduate programs including doctoral research would be created. The continuing lack of a separate unit for the discipline of IR in the national body for universities, *Conseil National des Universités* (CNU), was also underlined. In the words of a French scholar discussing this report, it is history that “teaches ... what happens to countries whose elites are not interested in international and

⁷⁷⁷ Heisbourg, 2000: [23].

⁷⁷⁸ Buffotot, 2008: 12.

strategic questions.” Such a statement demonstrates the cognitive significance given to IR, at least by some of its own scholars in France. However, this perception is not shared by the political decision-makers who tend to contact non-university pundits rather than IR professors when preparing such reports.⁷⁷⁹ While both these reports can be perceived as a means for advancing the position of a unified IR,⁷⁸⁰ there has been no follow up on implementing these projects.

As this report also failed to see the realization of its proposals, French scholars from within different disciplines came together to establish a new organization, *Association des Internationalistes* in 2009. The initial project was to institute an *Ecole de Relations Internationales de Paris*, but when government officials did not give the green light to such a project, the association was formed to generate “a structural rapprochement between historians, political scientists, legal scholars, geographers, economists, strategists.”⁷⁸¹ This move points to the willingness of pursuing a self-acknowledged goal of providing an interdisciplinary approach to the study of IR. The concomitant comments in the first editorial of association's bulletin explaining the new connections between IR specialists and Area Studies (*aires culturelles*) scholars testify to the rather distinct positions of intra-scholarship niche areas that also prevented the French from reaching the more influential status of their American colleagues with a broader IR community.

In the post-Cold War period, French scholars would still complain about an effective disciplinary status for political science. It was “a *profession* but not yet a socially

779 Buffotot, 2008: 10-15.

780 See also Frank, 2012c: 41.

781 Soutou, 2010: 1.

legitimate discipline.” The concept of a crossroad science (*science carrefour*) was put forward to underline French political science's difficult position vis-à-vis other social sciences and humanities. According to Jean Leca, the subfields that remained under this discipline were actually ones that were left to its guidance, subjects like international politics and French politics, while other issue areas were at best shared with other competing disciplines.⁷⁸² Interesting to note in this context is that both IR and the more inclusive political science were seen as crossroad sciences by scholars with specific IR and broader political science backgrounds. In this regard, it also becomes possible to understand that such a feature was not always contributing positively to the advancement of IR (or political science in general) as the discipline (or subdiscipline) lacked a definable core structure. The simultaneous connectedness of IR to political science brought about a less cohesive nature to the former, as the weaknesses of French political science were also showing their impact on IR.

VI.3. Comparisons: Germans, French, Americans – The Internationality of International Relations

In this penultimate section I will present a comparison of German, French, and US International Relations. By using the case studies as a source of analysis, it becomes possible to see the discipline in a more holistic manner. The broader perspective that emerges from this general framework is one that demonstrates the ways in which varying disciplinary models came into existence in different countries.

⁷⁸² Leca, 1991: 323, emphasis in original.

A major point shared by both Germany and France is the involvement of US philanthropies in both countries. The Carnegie Endowment, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Ford Foundation came to play an important role in the development of the IR discipline as part of their overall support for the promotion of the social sciences, and for political science itself. As seen in chapter III, their goal was to create viable networks that could strengthen a global base of scholars in favor of internationalist positions. At the same time, these foundations supported international scholarly organizations like the ISC and IPSA, and expected them to develop policy-relevant studies. In the national contexts of Germany and France, these foundations developed their efforts in cooperation with democratic forces, thus terminating their overall engagement during times of dictatorial regimes. In the World War II years the Rockefeller Foundation would aim to help scholars escaping Nazis and their French collaborators. These circumstances explain why I dealt mostly with the democratic periods, as the Nazi and Vichy periods stood as major obstacles in the way of a viable internationalist scholarly enterprise that was characterized by transnational dynamics.

The American foundations, the main forces generating these transnational dynamics, triggered the opening of unforeseen pathways for the IR discipline in Germany and France. While the guidance of political science was – more or less – a reality affecting the development of IR, the three US philanthropies played a role both in the interwar and post-Second World War years, creating conditions necessary for an intensive interaction between the two continental European countries and their American partners. While in

the more exceptional case of West Germany, the US civilian and military officials had an active engagement, the foundations kept supporting West German IR as seen in their material support acknowledged by German scholars (like the case of Fischer-Bailing's preface to his 1960 book on foreign policy).

An aspect that concerns two “founding fathers” of IR in the two countries, namely Bergstraesser and Duroselle was their joint interest in the US. Whereas the former had spent close to two decades of his life in the US, starting with his emigration in the later interwar years, Duroselle had undertaken many research visits to American universities. That the scholars played active roles in promoting American studies in their respective countries can be understood as a rather natural part of their academic-institutional involvement. Bergstraesser participated in the founding meeting of West Germany's *Amerikastudien* (American studies) experts, while Duroselle founded at CERI a research unit focusing on the US. These examples show that there existed a US-connected institutional-scholarly nexus that was developed thanks to the efforts of these two important scholars. As discussed earlier, this pro-American attitude in the early Cold War period presents another indicator of their contributions for setting up a more coherent academic structure that was simultaneously effective in advancing a positive image of the US. Thus, it is possible to see their role in the development of IR studies as part of their overall interest in promoting US political values as well as scholarly approaches associated with American styles of scholarship.

Another point of commonality in the two country cases concerns the main institutions that have set the course for the future development of political science in general, and IR specifically. Both schools were marked by founding circles with a liberal worldview. From ELSP's Boutmy to DHfP's Jäckh, as well as from their ideational supporters like Guizot and Naumann to financial supporters like Bosch, this frame is one that provides an important aspect of the background of the groups who stood behind the two initiatives. Such a shared starting point was not a mere coincidence. To the contrary, it points to the general setting in which social sciences in general took shape. As I showed in this dissertation, political science(s) as well as IR, as parts of a wider engagement with social sciences, would develop in order to provide an answer to knowledge claims of influential groups. At the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth century, it became clear that state intervention in this field was necessary. Such positions took a more decisive direction after the First World War. It was in this context that calls for ELSP's nationalization would begin, while the Berlin-based DHfP was from its founding co-shaped by the interests of the Prussian state, as was shown in the discussion of the future education minister Becker's involvement in its creation.

Under the Nazi and Vichy regimes, both institutions lost some of their basic characteristics. The German school witnessed a complete disconnection from its original position, and was first taken over (another victim of Nazis' *Gleichschaltung*) and then merged into another body leading to its termination. Parisian ELSP survived the war, but not intact. First, it undertook a pro-Vichy shift, only to change its stand in the later years

of the Second World War. Its Jewish scholars were oppressed and could not keep their positions. Under such conditions, it was natural that the post-war German and French states were in favor of a restart that would be marked by the state's direct engagement. In the case of Berlin, the pro-Western political parties under the Social-Democratic leadership in the city laid the basis for the 1949 re-founding of DHfP, while in France, the state reached a feasible agreement with the ELSP leadership in order to turn a new page in its institutional history, this time under the name of IEP Paris and FNSP. Sciences Po as the general label survived both periods.

A fourth condition that was present both in the German and French cases pertains to the gradual merger of IR into the domain of political science. This meant that following the US model, IR was turned into a subdiscipline of political science, with its scholars turning more and more toward studies marked by the features of this discipline. However, it is important to note that in France this is still an unfinished process. The above discussed recent institutionalization in the form of *Association des Internationalistes* points to the fact that interdisciplinarity is still a preferred tendency among French IR specialists. As seen in the analysis of post-1990 developments in German IR, a more decisive shift into political science becomes visible in Germany.

At this juncture, it is useful to compare German and French IR to their American counterpart. From the time of the ISC conferences, the continental European “backwardness” in IR has been a major point of emphasis for scholars on both sides. As demonstrated in chapter III, debates in 1938 and 1950 underlined the rather

uncomfortable feelings of continental European scholars when facing a discipline advanced by their Anglo-American colleagues. The differing perceptions which had become visible even during detailed discussions on the discipline's name "International Relations" illustrate that a common understanding was never reached when talking about such basic starting points. The institutional advantages of the British and US IR communities have presented a continual gap that has never been completely overcome.

In the mid-1980s, Kalevi Holsti talked about the existence of an Anglo-American condominium in IR, with the American part carrying a heavier weight. A type of oligopoly was asserted to exist with regard to IR's theoretical dimensions, in which American and British scholars play an over-proportional role. "The degree of asymmetry" was interpreted to be very high, which in turn generated "a virtual national academic hegemony." There existed an "asymmetry of consumption" in favor of these two communities. According to Holsti, this more advanced state of Anglo-American scholarship in the IR discipline is explainable with regard to its "half-century head start over the others," by which he refers to British and American scholarship's earlier making IR "an organized discipline."⁷⁸³ The historical explorations I presented in chapter III as well as the German and French case studies, however, point out that interest in IR was also present in the interwar years in continental Europe. On the other hand, Holsti is correct in pointing to an Anglo-Saxon precedence in establishing IR as an academic study area, with its own courses and departments.

⁷⁸³ Holsti, 1985: 13, 102-103.

VI.4. Beyond the National, Above the International: A Transnational Perspective for IR's Disciplinary History

What emerges most clearly from this study is that no single and shared understanding of IR has existed in the 20th (or 21st) century. The focus on the historical origins of IR as a scholarly undertaking, the analysis of its interwar organizations as well as the detailed study of its developmental trajectories in Germany and France have demonstrated that IR in its disciplinary, or subdisciplinary, or even interdisciplinary versions has emerged in different guises in various country/regional contexts. By shifting the focal point of disciplinary history to the spatial frame of continental Europe, I intended to not only broaden the discipline's self-understanding but also to question the much repeated claims about the dominant position of American (or earlier British) scholarship in IR. At this juncture, it is useful to discuss the results reached in this dissertation in general and to set the context for future studies of IR's disciplinary history.

First, the detailed analysis with its historical dimensions enables us to reject the existence of a single narrative of IR's history. The extent of the discipline's development in Germany and France is relatively weak when compared to the Anglo-American cases. However, one has to acknowledge that as a result of transnational dynamics shaping its emergence and further development in continental Europe, IR cannot be interpreted as a non-existent phenomenon in Germany and France. On the contrary, the aspects I underlined with regard to two higher educational institutions, Paris' Sciences Po (from ELSP to IEP years) and Berlin's DHfP, testify to the historical roots of these respective

nations' interest in world political studies. While the analysis, due to the complexly interwoven nature of political science and IR, has at certain points also provided analyses of political science's broader pathways, the schools with their teaching and research policies, as well as their scholars, stand as major examples of interest in IR and its advancement. In all these processes, the impact of American foundations cannot be overlooked, and in the case of the West Germany, the US government's role has also to be taken into consideration.

Based on these premises, the second main feature concerns the contingent nature of IR's emergence and development in the continental European cases. Unlike the interest in IR in the British and American contexts that was mostly triggered by world politics and the impact of international developments, the gradual institutionalization of this area of study has taken place in (West) German and French cases at times of relative disinterest in world politics. Two processes should be distinguished. First, as stated above, a late 19th and early 20th century interest in IR was shared by the German and French elites, not unlike their American and British counterparts. Indeed, the historical pathway of IR shows that interwar efforts within the ISC framework were shared by continental Europeans, as witnessed by the numerical strength of non-Anglo-American scholars at ISC conferences. The second aspect pertains to the post-1945 interest in IR as a powerfully institutionalized academic (sub)discipline. In this regard, the Anglo-Saxon scholarship had a major advantage in the form of an earlier tendency for making IR an academic subject, thus providing it with viable means for survival and further

development within the university system. As demonstrated by reference to explanations by French scholars, this flexibility of the American and British IR communities had significantly paved the way for the future trajectory of a more advanced IR discipline in these countries.

The third point concerns the influence political factors have on the development of the discipline. As I explained in chapters I and II, the distinctions between science-internal and science-external divisions are not always effective tools of analysis, as they do not necessarily provide a coherent conceptual structure, with their definitions being open to modifications and shifts. For this reason, I preferred to implement a broader analytical concept in the form of transnational dynamics which goes beyond national or international explanations. Furthermore, this enables one to simultaneously point to political and scholarly interactions without choosing one of them as the more relevant dimension. The picture that emerges from these assumptions opens the way to establish a framework, also proposed by Duncan Bell, that overcomes external and internal categorizations. However, I stress in the same context that politics and science cannot be presented as easily distinguishable elements. Therefore, it becomes possible to explain the relative weakness of IR to the extent of its institutionalization and academic development as a consequence of the post-1945 differences in the possibilities for world political significance for the West German and French states. As suggested above with reference to Constantin's suggestions, it is useful to separate IR's pre-1945 and post-1945 developmental trajectory in the case of these two European countries.

The fourth dimension I wish to highlight is the disciplinary status of IR in these two countries. It is important to remember that taking IR theory for the whole of the discipline and commenting on IR's existence by a mere analysis of the local production of theories are by themselves not sufficient to determine the position of IR. Such approaches are open to false impressions because they ignore the broader features of IR in different national contexts. Thus, the greater status given to theoretical work in the discipline's American community should not lead one to directly assume this aspect as the all-decisive factor with regard to IR's disciplinary standing. As discussed in chapter I, a discipline's existence is determinable with regard to the presence of certain criteria. Its academic establishment can be confirmed by looking at whether it offers PhDs, and has its own scholarly publications or chairs. When IR fulfills these criteria, the degree of its theoretical advancement need not present an additional layer for analysis. In both the German and French cases, I focused more on the institutions and scholars in order to show that such critical features of a disciplinary status were in fact reached. The details of these characteristics can be open to different interpretations, but even if small, less independent and less influential than their American colleagues, there are German and French scholars who perceive themselves as IR specialists. The fact that IR can carry differing meanings is a legacy that reaches back to the days of the ISC conferences.

As I began this study by prioritizing the necessity of rejecting a single narrative that provides the IR community with its time-worn explanations about its mainstream disciplinary history, the dissertation provided an extended focus on the discipline's non-

American trajectory in order to overcome such accounts. By focusing on the agential capacities of its German and French scholars and on the role of institutions, it became possible to demonstrate the existence of IR in continental Europe. My analysis of the national IR community's focus on the theoretical and conceptual tools of the discipline has been limited in order to put the two main axes of institutions and scholars on the forefront. The concomitant actors such as US foundations, emigrant and/or returning scholars, American officials in postwar West Germany, and French and German political authorities have provided the forces whose combined efforts brought about transnational dynamics that played a decisive role in shaping the newly emerging IR discipline. The structure that is generated by these processes is one of hybridity.

This hybridity whose institutional and scholarly dimensions have been discussed is also to be found in the ideational sphere that can in turn emerge on the basis of these two axes. As the structure of this study necessitated focusing on these axes, a separate aspect dealing with theoretical and conceptual issues was used only as a means of demonstrating the developments that were co-constituted by the transnational dynamics. It was in this context that I analyzed the intra-German debates on the political functions of IR (and political science). These discussions also show the influence of such hybridities because many of the critical scholars were in fact recent visitors to the US. As a result, their scholarly knowledge and skills were shaped both by their American experience and the concomitant effects of the Vietnam War. Similarly, the post-1945 interest by the Parisian Sciences Po in American ways of doing social science (and hence political science, and

specifically IR), and the debates within the confines of the French political science association AFSP on foreign policy issues demonstrate the way agential and institutional developments were impacting the generation of ideas, without forgetting the parallel influence of world political developments.

Thus, it becomes clear that IR's disciplinary history cannot be confined to a single dimension or a certain category of factors. In this dissertation, I used disciplinary history as a means of rejecting interpretations which see IR as only an American undertaking. As an alternative approach, I used institutions and scholars as the main axes, empowered by the analysis of IR's earlier origins in interwar Europe. A broader research agenda that should, at this juncture, emerge as a focus for works about IR's disciplinary history concerns the contextualization of this study area's ideational patterns in terms of transnational dynamics. Only such research can help the IR community reach strategic perspectivism. This concept, developed by H  l  ne Pellerin, refers to the idea of becoming familiar with different ways of seeing the world. Such an effort can pave the way for understanding what other options exist.⁷⁸⁴

Based on German and French institutional and scholarly (agential) dimensions, this dissertation provides an initial framework, which can be advanced in the future by considering the ideational axis in a more separate and detailed fashion. The knowledge of IR's continental European developmental trajectory (which testifies to the influence of dynamics that went beyond the national and extended above the usual international dimensions) that emerges from this study contributes to a broader understanding of the

⁷⁸⁴ Pellerin, 2010: 23.

discipline's non-American past and present. It is only upon such an understanding that one gains a clearer perspective, which also secures the future of IR's plurality.

Recognizing the plurality of IR in its European past can pave the way for more a informed discussion about the prospects of the discipline in its globalized future that I discussed in chapter II. Europeanizing IR's disciplinary history can help to prepare us for IR's post-Western developmental trajectory, one that will be co-shaped by world political developments that influenced the rise and strength of American IR and the relative weaknesses of its continental European counterparts. In a more globalized world, it is clear that transnational dynamics would create even more hybrid forms of IR. Looking at our discipline's past would pave the way to understand how these new hybridities would be shaped.

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